IR 05000424/1988002

Insp Rept 50-424/88-02 on 871222-880129.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maint Surveillance,Fire Protection, Security & Quality Programs & Administrative Controls

ML20149H028
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	02/08/1988
From:	Burger C, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149H026	List: IR 05000424/1988002 ML20149H023
References
50-424-88-02, 50-424-88-2, NUDOCS 8802190069
Download: ML20149H028 (11)

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• UNITED sT ATES

[po stop 'e, NUCLEAR R!GULATORY COMMIS$lON

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f / 'e REGION 11

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,e Report No.: 50-424/88-02 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: NPF-68

{ Facility Name: Vogtle 1

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Inspection Conducted: Deceeber 22 - January 29, 1933

i Inspectors: 6r NC, '. /' S

" J. F. Rogge, Senior Resicent Inspector ~ bate Signed f1 <-

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e .. < . . . . - . .l 71 R. J. Schepens, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed i ., t'..

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.. / b t C. W. Burger, Resident Inspector

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i Approved By: _f C[u d u. L 2 6 , /[

j M. V. 51nkule, Section Cnief Dat'e Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY ,

l l Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed resident inspection in l

! the following areas: plant operations, radiological controls , maintenance, 1 l surveillance, fire protection, security, and quality programs and administrative ,

i controls affecting qualit '

! Results: No violations or deviations were identified,

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8802190069 800212 PDR ADOCK 05000424 0 DCD

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J REPORT DETAILS

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) Persons Contacted -

1 i j Licensee Employees  ;

'G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations ,

• R. M. Bellamy, Plant Manager T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager  ;

E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager

"J. E. Swart: welder, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager  ;

4 *W, F. Kitchens, Manager Operations '

j * C. Marsh, Deputy Operations Manager i

! R. E. Lide, Engineering Support Supervisor (

, H. Varnadoe, Plant Engineering Supervisor

! *R. E. Spinnatu, ISEG Supervisor ,

C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager  !

• W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor '

t M. A. Grif fis, Maintenance Superintendent

R. M. Odem, Plant Engineering Supervisor [

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'C. L. Cross, Senior Regulatory Specialist S. F. Goff, Regulatory Specialist i A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager

! H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Plant Support Manager

! F. R. Tim: ons, Nuclear Security Manager  ;

'K. Pointer, Senior Plant Engineer j *P. D. Rushton, Plant Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, j supervision, engineers, operations, maintenance, chemistry, inspectors, ;

j and office personne >

j * Attended Exit Intervies l

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1 Exit Interviews - (30703) [

l The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on January 29, 1938, .

j with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspector I described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection l

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results. No dissenting coments were received from the licensee. The !

licensee did not identify.as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period by a resident j inspector. This inspection closed five Licensee Event Reports (LER), The 1 items identifica during this inspection are l

Unresolved Item SS-02-01 %eview Technical Specification 4. !

Surveillance Require ents for the July 12,19S7 Reactor Startup" - [

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i Unresolved Item 88-02-02 "Determine Licensing Bases Status Regarding i i

Survet11ance Requirement 4.6.1.la" paragraph i

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3. Unresolved Items - (92701)  !

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required I j to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or i i deviations. Two unresolved item identified during this inspection is  ;

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discussed in Paragraph 4 b.(6). >

4 Operational Safety Verification - (71707)(93702) [

The plant began this inspection period in Power Operation (Mode 1) at f

approximately 100*. power until the unit tripped on January 17 ending a 67  :

day continuous power run. The trip resulted from a loss of the #2 Reacter (

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Coolant Pump when the power supply breaker opened on a faulty time  !

j distance relay. The unit planned to remain in Hot Standing (Mode 3) to i

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conduct an outage to repair a Hydrogen seal breakage problem on the main  ;

generator, however, on January 23 was forced to go to cold shutdown (Mode

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i 5) upon discovery of a reacto- coolant pressure boundary leakage. With i repairs complete, the unit entered Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) on January 2 l

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The unit experienced one ESF actuation of the Control Room Emergency f a Ventilation System when the radiation monitor RE-12116 spiked momentaril !

. Control Room Activities

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Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that [

f acility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory j requirement These inspections consisted of one or more of the j following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspectio !

- Proper Control Room staffing

)' - Control Room access and operator behavior

- Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress l r

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- Adherence to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for [

, Operations (LCO)  ;

! - Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related and [

i important to safety systems for abrormalities  ;

i - Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct I

! - Control Board walkco*ns  ;

J - Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system  !

] operability status i - Discussions and interviews with the On Shift Operations Supervisor, l J

Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shift Technical  !

} Advisor to determine the plant status, plans and to assess operator  !

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- Review of the operator legs, unit log and shift turnover sheets I

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l b. Facility Activities t

Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the i effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct '

observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status and LCO's, licensee mectings and facility records. During these !

l inspections the following objectives are achieved: i

(1) Safety System Status - Confirmation of system operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve alignment, control ;

and power supply alignments, component conditions, and support i systems for the accessible portions of the E5F trains were !

proper. The inaccessible portions are confirmed as availability I permit !

(2) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and I components and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-out the facility were observed to determine whether safety l and/or fire hazards existed,  !

i (3) Fire Protection -

Fire protection activities, staffing an l equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing l was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, i actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency !

equip ent, and fire barriers were operabl I (4) Radiation Protection (71709) - Radiation protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify proper program implementatio The inspection included review of the plant program effectiveness. Radiation work permits and personnel ;

compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours. Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to verify proper identifica- i tion and imple entatio l (5) Security (71S51) - Security controls were observed to verify }

that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, l and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in !

accordance with the facility security pla Personnel within i the PA were observed to verify proper display of badges and that i personnel requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel l within vital areas were observed to ensure proper authorization :

for the are Equipment operability of proper corpensatory !

activ! ties were verified on a periodic basi l In addition to the above inspection, the Security Barrier '

Valkdown procedure No 90317-C was reviewed with the license This walkdown was being conducted as part of the corrective action for earlier security violations and should be complete by February 15, 1958. The program has identified 24 deficiencie _ - . . _- _ ~ _-- ___ - _-. -. . _ _ ..

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) (6) Survet11snee (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed i to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified i j personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to i

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verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; j and TS requirements were followed. The inspectors observed j portions of the following surveillances and reviewed completed

, data against acceptance criterts: i l

i $ury. N Dep Title l

I, 14S50 OP Cold Shutdown valve Inservice Test 1 i

) 14980 OP Diesel Generator Operability Test {

14596 OP ECCS Check Valve Cold Shutdow.. Inservice i j Test i

i 14000 OP Operations Shift And Daily Surveillance  !

Logs  ;

i An inspection was conducted relative to the licensee's  !

administrative controls for ensuring that power is removed to l the pilot solenoids (by cpening sliding links) during all modes of operation except during set layup & periodic testing fer the steam generator chemical addition isolation valves (1 HV-5278, 1 HV-5279,1 HV-5250 & 1 HV-5281) in accordance with note 8 on P&l0 1x408159-1 & 1x40B159- Also, FSAR table 6.2.4-1 note h

} stated that for the steam generotor chemical addition isolation 1 valves the air supply valves will be closed and enclosed in f lockable boxes to provide seal-closed barriers, i

J The inspector determined that administrative controls were in l' place for the steam generator chemical addition isolation valves via Clearance No. 1-57-1418 which removed power to the solenoid by pulling fuses to the pilot solenoids for valve Nos. 1 HV-5278, I HV-5279, 1 HV-5230 & 1 HV-5281 as required by operations surveillance procedure N "Contaiorent Integrity verification - Valves Outside Containment," Rela 61ve to the F$AR state ent that the air supply valves be closed ar.d enclosed in lockable boxes it was determined that this was not being i admi ni strat,1v ely controlled and the licensee initiated j deficiency Report No. 1-88-006 In addition the licensee

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initiated Clearance No. 1-85-0015 to remove power from the SG chemical injection isolat, ion valve pilot solenoids by opening

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the sliding links and to close the air supply valves in order t,o ,

l be in strict co pliance with the P&ID and F5AR. Subsequentl l

the licensee determined that per Bechtel letter No. BS 666S I dated September 22, 1956, the method of administrative controls i

to be ut,ilized for providing seal closed barriers for the SG and AF'n' chemical addition rerete - sanval valves was to remove power l

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from their rerpoetive pilot solenoid valves. The licensee has taken corrective action in this matter consisting of initiating licensing doecment change request No FS-63006 to change the FSAR note to ref het that power will be removed from the solenoid During the licensee's reviu of Bechte' letter No. BS 6668 it [

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was determined that the requirement to removt power from the pilot solenoids to t'ne SG chemical addition isolation valves also applied to the AFW chemical injection valves (1 HV-5194, 1 HV-5195, 1 HV-5196, & 1 HV-5197). The licensee dete* mined that acministrative controls had not been er.tabli sb9d for these valves and documented the as found condition on deficiency recort No. 1-88-0080. The licensee also initiated clearance N to remove nower from the pilot solenoids to the AFW i chemical injection isolation valves in accordance with note 7 on C&IO 1X4DB168 Gn:ed on the above information the inspector conducted a review of surveiance procedure 14475-1 and determined that the AFW 4 chenicc.1 injection talves were not included to be verified as l

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being closed with p Wer removed every 31 days in accordance with  :

i technical specification surveillance requirement 4 01.l The !

licensee is takino action to include these valves into the surveillance proedure. Pending further review of the licensing basis toward thW TS surveillance anplicability with NRR this item will be identified as Unresolved 7 tem 50-4P4/88-02-02 4 "Determine ' Wa%ing bases status regt.rdi ng surveillance requirements 4 S.4.la."

A second i w u e, identified c'uring the inspection involved an '

interpretation bv the licensee regarding surveillance TS 4.3. (Table 4.3-1, I ~.em 2.b. ) ' whi ch requires the Analog Channel Operational Test (ACOT) to be prformed "prior to each startup unless performed within the last 31 days." The ACOT was performed on June 5, 1987 and on July 23, 1987. A startup conducted on July 12, 1987 hari been Signed off as having the ,

ACOT complete, however in preparin; fo the startup on July 23, ,

1987, the plant personnel could not identify a surveillance

. performed within the last 31 days. During the review of the  :

draft LER on the event, the corporate office determined that t provisions of TS 4.0.l? could apply allowing a 25% extension on i the surveillance. This would makt the surveillance performed on l

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June 5 adeqaate for 31 days + 25N (7.75) or 38.75 days. The 1 ef f t:tive due date would be thus July 14 and thus the startup '

was performed within the surveillance interval. The inspector notes that a specified time interval does not exist for this TS in that it is due "prior to each reactor i.tartup" and the 25%

extension would have to be applied to th'. s term which is mathematically not possibl The inspector requested copies of the draf t LER and DC card and will furtbor reviuw this item in

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the next inspectio This item pending completion of this review is identified as 50-424/88-02-01 "Review Reactor Startup

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Of July 12, 1988 And Determine If TS Requirements And Report-ability Requirements Were Met".

(7) Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment ,

clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention -

work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection i activities as required; retesting and return of systems to -

service was prompt and correct; TS requirements were being ,

followed. Maintenance backlog was reviewed. Outage activities were closely monitore .

(8) Cold Weather Preparations (71714) -

The inspector reviewed !

implementation of the cold weather preparation progra '

Maintenance and engineering activities were reviewed to ensure that proper equipment and sensitive systems had been identifie Operational activities implemented when cold weather is pending ,

(temperatures less than 40 degrees F) were reviewed. The Safety Evaluation Report, Section 7.5.2.6 and FSAR Question 420.11 were reviewed as they pertain to area of freeze protectio Operations Procedure 11877-1, Cold Weather Checklist, Rev 0 was reviewed.

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During the first portion of the inspection (see NRC Rp ,

50-424/87-70) the inspector questioned the lack of a completed lineup procedure. The licensee produced an acceptable lineup performed during the fall of 198 The inspector reverified portions of the lineup with the assistance of the license ,

During the ice and snow storm which occurred or. January 7 and 8, 1988, the inspector conducted various additional inspections to determine if the licensee had a contingency plan for the adverse

' weather conditions. Each department had a list of tne minimum shift crew required to safely run the plant per the Site Emergency Pla Essential plant personnel were held over the evening of January 7 and were provided sleeping facilities and meal On site licensee's four wheel drive vehicles were assembled and used to transport personnel as required. As a result of this exercise the licensee noted that additional

< supplies were needed prior to another occurrence. An order has been placed by the licensee to acquire the additional supplie In addition to the above inspection the inspector also performed an inspection of the freeze protection operability for various outside systems during the stor No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(90713)(92700) In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports This inspection consists of reviewing the below listed reports to l determine whether the information reported by the licensee is l technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of the material contained within the report. Selected material within !

the report is questioned randomly to verify accuracy to provide a !

reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate !

document for their activitie ;

(1) Monthly Operating Report - The report dated January 12, 1988 was reviewed. The inspector had no significant comments regarding this repor (2) (0 pen) Special Report 50-424/87-02 "Containment Tendons Structural Integrity." The licensee submitted tnis report on January 6, 1988 pursuant to TS 3.6.1.6.b and 6.8.2. This report discusses the identification of sheathing filler grease voiding in excess of 5% of the net duct volume in four of the ten sampled hoiizontal tendons. These tendons have been correcte The inspector questioned why the report did not address corrective action or provide engineering evaluation to address the statistical implication that filler grease in the tendon population has voiding greater than allowable by the technical specificatio Licensee Event Reports and Deficiency Cards Licensee Event Reports (LER) and Deficiency Cards (DC) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the technical specifications and other regulatory requirements were satisfied. In-office review of LERs may result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have been completed, or to identify violations in addition to those described in the LER. Each LER is reviewed for enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. Review of DCs were performed to maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory compliance, follow the licensee corrective actions, and assist as a basis for closure of the LER when reviewed. Due to the numerous DCs processed only those DCs which result in enforcement action or further inspector followup with the licensee at the end of the inspection are discussed as listed below. The LERs denoted with an asterisk indicates that reactive inspection occurred at the time of the event prior to receipt of the written repor .. -- .. - _ .

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(1) Deficiency Card reviews:  ;

i (a) DC 1-88-3386 "Radioactivity Releases Potentially Greater ;

j Than Expected During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture .

(SGTR)". As a result of the North Anna SGTR, Westinghouse is reevaluating the Vogtle Analysi Pending the completion of the analysis this DC tracks the issu The inspector reviewed the preliminary information and ,

determined that until Westinghouse can make a more j definitive analysis that this is sufficient licensee !

action. The inspector was informed that Westinghouse l should be able to provide and Southern Company review the '

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issue by March 1, 198 I (b) DC 1-88-0143 "Reactor Trip Due To #2 RCP Trip" On

January 17, 1985, the unit tripped when distance relay 221 I at switchgear 1-1825-53-0AB sensed a fault and opened the ,

1. 2 RCP breaker. The unit tripped on low RCP flo This l trip received follow-up by the residents and a review of ;

the post trip data was conducted. This item will receive further review when submitted as an LER pursuant to 50.73 ,

(a)(2)(iv). .

l (c) DC 1-88-0194 "Failure To Declare The B Diesel Generator Inoperable" On January 21, 1988, the shift supervisor identified that the B diesel had been inoperable for 1 hou Operations procedure 14980 was in progress when the barring device failed preventing the performance of the required moisture check Maintenance personnel were attempting to correct the problem when the decision to backout of the procedure was initiated and the deficiency was identified.

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This item will receive further review when the LER is submitted pursuant to 50.73 (a)(2)(1)(B) is issue (d) DC 1-88-0209 "Steam Leak At Line 1-1201-068 3/4 Inch Attachment To Line 1-1201-036-6" Di. January 23, 1988, the licensee identified that a cracked weh' was emitting stea The weld was located on a Class 2 pipe oi, the pressurizer safety relief loop seal drain line. The licensee declared j a Notice of Unusual Event based on having RCS pressure i boundary leakage. The discovery in Mode 3 required the ;

plant to achieve cold shutdow The shutdown and work i procedures were reviewed by the inspectors. This item will l receive further review when submitted as an LER pursuant to !

50.73 (a)(2)(1)(A). l (2) The following LERs were reviewed and are ready for closure pending verification that the licensee's stated corrective actions have been complete I l

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(a) 50-424/87-52, Rev 0 "Inadvertent Containment Ventilation  ;

During Source Check Of Radiation Monitor" This LER

! documents an unplanned automatic actuation of the

{ Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) on August 9,1987, when the containment vent effluent radiogas monitor setpoint

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was changed to a valve below background. Two of the four corrections were reviewed regarding the issuance of a memo [

on communications and a standing order. Records of training l l and further procedure revisions will be verified at a latter l

inspectio ;

l f (3) The following LERs were reviewed and are considered close :

t (a) 50-424/87-48, Rev 0 "Local Leak Rate Test Not Performed j Within Technical Specifications Time Limit" This item i is discussed in NRC Report 50-424/87-56 and required l verification of corrective actio The inspector reviewed t

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the work control process revisions to ensure early control [

! of maintenance work orders which effect surveillance requirement '

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(b) *50-424/87-49, Rev 0 "Entry Into LCO 3.0.3 Oue To Inoperable ESF Room Cooler Chiller Trains" On July 22, 1987, the unit was forced into LCO 3.0.3 because a ,

temperature switch failed on the train "B" chiller while >

, the "A" train was out of service for preventive maintenanc '

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The plant restored the "A" train to service within 45

, minutes and LCO 3.0.3 was no longer applicable. The event '

was followed by the resident at the time of occurrenc The maintenance order was also reviewe (c) 50-424/87-51, Rev 0 "APd Flow Transmitters Inoperable Oue To Inadequate Instructions And Personnel Errors". This issue was review in NRC reports 50-424/87-49 and 50-424/87-56 and resulted in ideotifying a licensee identified violation This inspection completed the

, review by verifying the licensee corrective action

implementation.

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d (d) *50-424/87-53, Rev 0 "Personnel Error Leads To Exceeding Technical Specification Surveillance Time Limit". During the period from August 18, 1987 until September 2, 1987 surveillance intervals for measuring the stroke times of

, thirteen valves required to be tested by ASME section XI i exceeded the required technical specification time i requirements. Upon performance of the missed surveillances all valves were verified to be operabl Two factors contributed to this event. The first factor involved the increasing of the surveillance from quarterly to monthly and the second factor was the rescheduling of the quarterly-

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due dates to even the workload. For these thirteen valves j the two factors resulted in an error in schedulin .

Corrective actions were to perform the surveillance, counsel the schedules and verify the other 153 potentially affected valves. In addition , the licensee immediately informed the Residents of the findings. The inspector verified completion of the actions. This item represents a j violation of NRC requirements where the licensee has met the criteria for no citatio To track this item the !

following is identifie l 50-424/ LIV 88-02-01 "Failure To Perform ASME Section XI Surveillance Of TS 4.0.5 At The Required Surveillance (

Intervals".

(e) 50-424/87-54, Rev 0 "Containment Hydrogen Level Indication ,

Inoperable Due To Personnel Error" On August 24, 1987, the '

licensee identified that the A channel hydrogen monitor had i the signal wires reversed. Investigation revealed that on *

August 3. 1987, the quarterly channel calibration was j performed which incorrectly reversed the signal wire l Independent verification also failed to identify the erro .

Individuals and the IC department were counseled on :

procedure complianc The licensee determined that the i instrument was inoperable for 21 days which violated TS !

3.3.3.6 action statement 31 by 14 days for the unit to be i in Hot Shutdown. The inspector noted that this is the most j restrictive of two TS. TS 3.6.4.1 would allow inoperability i for 30 days. The test that led to discovery was being i performed to satisfy TS 3.6. Upon discovery the :

licensee recognized the action requirements of the more )

restrictive TS 3.3.3.6 and complied with these. Corrective i action was verified. This item represents a violation of l NRC reouirements where the licensee has met the criteria ,

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for no citatio To track this item the following is identifie / LIV 88-02-02 "Failure To Comply With TS 3.3. i Operability Requirements For The A Train Hydrogen Monitor". l

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