IR 05000424/1988021
| ML20150B979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1988 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150B962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-88-21, 50-425-88-31, NUDOCS 8807120270 | |
| Download: ML20150B979 (12) | |
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u UNITED STATES s
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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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,j 191 MARlETTA STREET, N.W.
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't AYLANTA, GEORG! A 30323
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JUN 2 81988
. Report Nos.:
50-424/88-21 and 50-425/88-31 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Cox 4 45 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:
HPF-68 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: May 23 24, 1988 Inspector:
4>M kw is 96l88 A. L. Cunningham
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Date Signed-Team Members:
K. M. Clark
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J F. Rogge M.EJSte)n'
Approved by:
M k/ES/8A T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUhMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise, and review of licensee action on previous emergency response findings.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The scope and objectives of the exercise were met. The licensee demonstrated a strcag commitment to training and personnel, and effective interaction with State, county, and Federal participants.
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8807120270 880628 PDR ADOCK 05000424 O
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licen'see-Employees
- G. Bockhold. General Manager
- W. Kitchens, Manager, Operations
- R Bellamy, Plant Manager
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- T. Greene, Plant Support Manager
- A. Desrosiers, Health Physics and Chemistry Superintendent
- I. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent
- J. Badgett, Manager, Nuclear Training and Emergency Preparedness
- P. Rushton, Training and Emergency Preparedness Mar.ager
- J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
.*H. _ Butterworth, Operations Supervisor
- M. Griffit, Maintenance Manager
- G. Fredrir.k, Quality Assurance Site Manager-0perations
- C., Stinespring, Manager, General Support L.- Hill, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness D. Mothena, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor (Plant Hatch)
NRC Resident Inspect: ors
- J. F. Rogge
- Attended exit interview 2.
ExerciseScenario(82301)
The emergency exercise scenario was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a trajor portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date. The l
document was discussed in detail with cognizant luensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies were apparent:
for example, inconsistencies between the scenario event timeline and specific times listed on plant data sheets regarding the reactor vessel level instrument system (RVLIS)
level, plant trip, and fouling of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) #2.
These findings were discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise.
The licensee implemented appropriate revisions to the scenario
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prior to the exercise.
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The scenario developed forLthis exercise was detailed, aM fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the State, counties, local government and Federal agencies-consistent with the scope of their participation.in the exercise.- The licensee demonstrated a significant coninitment to training and personnel through use. of controllers, evaluators,- and specialists participating in the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise. Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment Of Responsibility (82301)-
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance-promulgated in Section II. A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated. licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with, licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and op(eration of the L
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center TSC), and the l
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
The OSC was not evaluated during i
this exercise.
At the cited response facilities, the required staffing
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and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Radiological Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures, and the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergoney organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appandix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific
guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NURRG-0654, namely:
(1)unambig-uous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key fonctional areas at all times; and (3), specification of onsite and offsite support organizations' interaction.
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The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional Augmentation of the initial emergency positions within the organization.
response organization was accomplished through mobilization of on shift The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency personnel.
Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the' simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interaction between the licensee's emergency response organiza-tion and State and local offsite support agencies-was effectively The licensee also demonstrated a significant commitment
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to training-to assure the required interaction with ' State, Federal and assigned offsite agencies was consistent with the Emergency Plan, implementating procedures, and scope of the exercise.
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No violation or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements for_ requesting and-effectively using assistance resources were made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility were made, and that other organizations caoable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR
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50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria t
in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
The States of Georgia and South Carolina involvement in the emergency Burke County preparedness exercise was limited to partial participation.
of Georgia and South Carolina Counties of Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell, however, fully participated in the exercise.
Representatives of the States and above cited counties were accommodated in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Technical Support Center Licensee (TSC), and the licensee's offsite Emergency News Center (ENC).
contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
Assistance resources (e.g., fire, medical, offsite radiation monitoring and related dose assessment) from State and local agencies were available to the licensee The consistent with the senpe of their participation in the exercise.
licensee demonstrated strong and effective interaction with State,
Federal, and local offsite agencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification f
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and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C. of Appendix E to
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10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83.-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate the. plant status to more -
severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed. Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency. classification system was effectively used and was-consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The syste'n was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
All emergency classifications were promptly declared and appropriate protective action recommendations were provided, when required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to. response organizations were established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were. established pursuant to 10 -CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Notification of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and designated local offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification.
Telephone notification of the States of Georgia and South Caroiina, and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmissions of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such cooies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source term in mci /sec) where applicable, site boundary and offsite integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessary.
Periodic updates were issued to the above organizations throughout the simulated emergency. Consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise, the prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ was actuate _ _
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All notification forms were reviewed to verify documentation of notifica-tion' time, completion of notification checklists, and inclusion of Implementing Procedure 91002-C required information consistent' withAll notification forms (worksheet)
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(Rov.12 (Emergency Notifications).
messages, were consistent with procedural directives including followup (Checklist 4)~ documenting notification of the NRC except the form attending each emergency classification declared.
The latter forms were incomplete in the following areas:
definition of event category, related cause of failure, event description, radiological releases where appli-cable, and special action taken by licensee.
The above item was discussed in detail with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during the NRC/ Licensee critique convened on The inspector informed the subject representatives that May 24, 1988.
this item would be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) and reviewed during future exercises.
The licensee acknowledged the. finding and committed to implement the appropriate corrective action.
IFI 50-424/88-21-01, 50-425/88-31-01:
Inadequate Completion of NRC Event Notification Form No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Comunications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendi.v E to-10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency f acilities, the licensee and offsite agencies, and the radio-logical field monitoring teams and the emergency facilities (TSC, E0F).
Inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within Emergency communications involving the licensee's emergency organization.
notification of the State, local agencies, and the NRC of emergency classifications discussed above, were prompt, effective and consistent Note, with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
however, inadequate documentation of licensee's notification of the NRC discussed in paragraph 7, above.
Comunications' between the E0F and radiological field monitoring teams was evaluated and determined to be adequate.
Communications, once established with each team, was maintained throughout the exercise.
In those instances where teams were unable to communicate directly with the E0F due to building structures or topography, information was transmitted to the E0F via relay to te6ms having radio access to that facility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Facilities And Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room (CR), TSC, and the E0F.
The OSC was not evaluated during this exercise.
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Control Room - Use of the Unit 1 Control Room was supplemented by the near-site reactor simulator throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the initiating accident sequence, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to implement required responses to the simulated emergency.
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gency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and assured maintenance of an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency condi-tions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
State, Federal and local offsite agencies were promptly notified of NOVE, Alert, and Site Area Emergency classifications.
It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the simulated accident sequence were effectively managed by the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate actions in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was also observed that failure or momentary loss of use of the simulator occurred several times during the exercise.
Such failures, however appeared to have no adverse impact on the exercise.
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Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency
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duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the essigned staff.
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TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and/or leaving the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was monitored, and dosimeters were routinely distributed to all personnel and periodically checked during the exercise.
Status boards and related visual aids were strhtegically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Dedicated communicators.were assigned to the facility, and required notifications were promptly implemented.
Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into protlem solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm;' (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the TSC to E0F was declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with changes in plant status and related eniergency conditions; and (5), accountability, including identified missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope and objectives.
During the course M the exercise, an inspector noted that the schematic posted in the TSC which defined the facility layout and designated work stations for staff principals and specialists within the operations area was inconsistent with Revision 2 (March 1, 1986)
of Procedure 91201-C (Activation and Operation of the Technical This item was discussed in detail with cognizant Support Center).
licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique.
The licensee was informed that this item would be tracked as an IFI and reviewed during future inspections. The licensee acknowledged the finding and committd to update the current schematic with the existing facility layout.
IFI 50-424/88-21-02, 50-425/S8-31-02:
Update posted TSC f acility layout with existing operations area configuration and designated work stations.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The E0F is located in the c.
The training center, approximately two miles fro:n the plant site.
facility was adequately staffed and equipped to support the required emergency response consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
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E0F-security was promptly. e:tablished and was' included as a routine Status-requirement'for preparation and activation of the facility.
boards and-other related visual aids were strategically located and readily' accessibla for viewing by the E0F staff.
. Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility, and required notifica-tions were promptly made.
The. State of Georgia Dose Assessment Group and Federal Agencies (DOE-SRP,) were readily accommodated in the E0F and fully the exercise.
State and Federal Agency participated in P
representatives attended and participated in all technical briefings, The licensee demolstrated (3nferences and recovery planning.
interaction and cooperation with the cited offsite effective agencies in management,. direction, and successful mitigation of the simulated emergency.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. AccidentAssessment(82201)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite
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personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
During the exercise.
the engineering accident assessment teams functioned effectively in the analysis of varying plant status, and the provision of recommendations to the Emergency Directer concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, minimize releases of radioactive materials, and prompt termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within th(
Offsite plant, based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radio-logical effluent data was received in the E0F.
Dose assessments and projections were coa &uted and compared on a timely basis with results Consistent computed by the State of Georgia offsite monitoring group.
with the scope of the scenario, the State participated in this phase of the exercise.
Offsite radiological field monitoring and surveillance teams were not evaluated by the NRC, t
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11. Protective Measures Response (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions, consistent with Federal guioance, were developed and in-place, and,that protective actions -for emergency workers including evacuation of non-essential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.J
.of NUREG-0654.
The DNtective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the
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Recomendations implemented by the TSC and E0F staffs were inspectors.
Protective timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteria.
measures recomendations were provided by the licensee to the States -
of Georgia and South Carolina, designated counties and local offsite organizations consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radio-logical exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuent to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K. of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing rupplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the various categories of emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protec-tion was available for use as required. The OSC nor radiation controlled plant areas involved in the exercise were not-evaluated.
P No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Recovery Planning (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(13), Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.
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Consistent with the scope of the exercise, the licensee conducted a Licensee recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise.
administrative and planners discussed and established the following: manpower and enginee logistical support, surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization A review consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
of reentry plans and status was conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. Public Education And Information (82301)
This area.was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made availabla for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and'
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
- Information was provided to the public, via the media, in advance of the The information included details on how the public would be exercise.
notified and the initial actions which should be taken during a radio-logical emergency.
A rumor control program was also in place.
The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC).
The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination, and l
dissemination of emergency news and information.
Written press releases were prepared and issued from the ENC.
Releases issued were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions.
A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings.
The briefings were I
l technically accurate-and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen.
Visual aids were provided and effectively used.
Question-and-answer sessions were held after each briefing.
Representatives of State, county and Federal agencies were accommodated at the ENC.
Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with these agencies was effective.
The cited representatives fully participated in the composition and preparation of news releases.
In esscnce, each news release was the product of the integrated activity of the licensee and above cited support groups.
Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the ENC fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise.
Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with the Emergency Plan requirements and approved implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to verify that negative findings and required improvements identified during the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
I A formal critique was held on May 24, 1988, with licensee management, controllers, ovaluators, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified
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l during the exercise and designated for licensee corrective action were l
sumarized and discussed.
The conduct and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory criteria and specific guidance cited above.
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The NRC Evaluation Team also observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique conducted imediately following the_ exercise on April 24, 1988.
Inspection disclosed that _ the subject critique was comprehensive, and
' addressed ' activation, detailed operation and required functions of the emergency-response _ facilities, simulated accident events analysis and mitigation, dose assessment and projection, protective action recomenda-
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tions,. fire and medical emergency drills, field monitoring, security, and The licensee identified all items observed by the public'information.
NRC evaluation team, except IF1(s) disclosed in Paragraphs 7 and 9b,
- All deficiencies and indicated improvements were fully discussed above.
and documented by licensee representatives, and prepared for presentation These findings and respective at the formal critique discussed above.
corrective actions will be routinely reviewed by the NRC during future inspections and radiological emergency preparedness exercises..
No violations or deviations wire identified.
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Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency - Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during this exercira will be forwarded under separate correspondence.
Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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50-424/87-41-01, 50-425/87-29-01:
Declaration of Emergency (Closed) IFI_
Evaluation of the previous annual emergency preparedness Classification.
exercise disclosed a delay of approximately 15 minutes in declaration of Review of plant conditions and corresponding the General Emergency.
emergency action levels (EAL) disclosed that all emergency classifica-tions, including the General Emergency, were promptly identified and declared within the assigned 15 minute constraint.
18. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and results w>re sumarized on May 24, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection results defined above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided No dissenting to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
coments were expressed by the licensee, i