IR 05000269/1982012

IE Insp Repts 50-269/82-12,50-270/82-11 & 50-287/82-11 on 820310-0410.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Have Two Trains of Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Operable During Fuel Movement & Failure to Submit Summary of Safety Evaluations in Rept

ML20054K340
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/30/1982
From:	Bryant J, Falconer D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054K325	List: IR 05000269/1982012 ML20054K324 ML20054K331 ML20054K333 ML20054K337
References
50-269-82-12, 50-270-82-11, 50-287-82-11, NUDOCS 8207010442
Download: ML20054K340 (11)

Text

.

.

.

'/

UNITED STATES E

4, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

E REGION 11 k

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 g

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

.....

Report No. 50-269/82-12, 50-270/82-11 and 50-287/82-11 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License No. OPR-38 DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:

$2 h. -[Ma*[W

,b' n 3t/J3

%

W. Orders {

g

/

Date Signed 0 0 2clar$w. l, 4 /3e/8.a 0. Falcong,

} g

,/ "

Lat'e S1'gned L/ A d /

uf8f L

Approved by:

/

J.

ry* ant;'$ecprfn I61'ef, Division of

. Dat'e Signed

.

Pr ect and ReW' dent Programs SUMMARY Inspection on March 10 - April 10,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 340 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety, mechanical maintenance, surveillance testing, design change / modification program, and licensee event analysis.

Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; two items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Violation - Failure to have two trains of spent fuel pool ventilation operable '

during fuel movement-paragraph 9; Violation - Failure to submit a summary of the safety evaluations of facility changes in annual report paragraph 10).

o$$o0$l9 PDR

.

.

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. Ed Smith, Station Manager

• G. Vaughn, Assistant Plant Manager

• T. Cribbe, Licensing & Project Engineer

• N. Pope, Supervisor Operations

• T. Owen, Supervisor Technical Services Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic, and office personnel.

" Attended exit interview

.2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 8,1982 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The licensee acknowledged understanding of the enclosed violations, with no other significant comment.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (50-269/81-04-03):

Failure to label radioactive waste.

A reply to this item was not requested.

(Closed) Violation (50-269/81-18-01):

Failure to follow couadure for equipment removal and restoration. Operations and mainter.ance personnel.

have been instructed on the methods of isolating equipment and the con-sequences of isolating equipment not required to be isolated. A procedure has been issued to cover the proper removal from and return to service of the 6900/4160/600 volt breakers. The procedure includes verification of the position of the spring charging motor switch. The corrective actions appear adequate.

(Closed)

Violation (50-269/81-30-01):

Failure to follow radwaste procedures. Shift personnel have been instructed and appropriate procedures have been revised to notify chemistry of any changes needed in LHST valve line-ups. The corrective actions appear adequate.

(Closed) Violation (50-269/81-32-01): Failure to perform radiation survey.

The cited areas were surveyed, roped-off and properly posted. The correc-tive actions appear adequate.

.

.

%

(Closed) Violation (50-270/81-30-01): Failure to perform radiation survey.

The cited area was surveyed, roped-off and properly posted. The pH sampling line has been extended and buried to allow water to drain directly into the pond. The corrective actions appear adequate.

(Closed) Violation (50-270/81-32-02):

Failure to follow control of

,

secondary contamination procedure. The licensee has revised the procedure to include sign-off steps for returning the sump pumps to local manual mode.

The incident was also reviewed and discussed by operations shift personnel.

The corrective actions appear adequate.

'

(Closed) Violation (50-287/81-02-02):

Failure To follow removal and

restoration procedure. The licensee counseled those personnel involved and discussed with all shift supervisors the importance of a thorough review of removal and restoration sheets prior to their issue. The corrective actions appear adequate.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operation: throughout the report period, March 10 - April 10,1982 to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative controls.

Control room logs, shift supervisor logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were routinely perused.

Interviews

!

were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel on day and night shifts.

i Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at

!

shift changes.

Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as j

prescribed in Station Directives. The complement of licensed personnel on

!

each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by the technical specifi-cation Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.

Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a continual basis.

The areas toured included, but are not limited to the following:

Turbine Building

'

Auxiliary Building

!

Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical l

Equipment Rooms l

Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms i

l

!

L

.

.

Station Yard Zone within the protected area Units 1 and 3 Reactor Buildings During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equip-ment status and radiation control practices were observed.

Oconee Unit 1 began the report period in a force outage to repair a tube leak in the B steam generator. The leak was identified as tube 78-2 and was subsequently stabilized and plugged.

Following completion of maintenance the unit achieved criticality at 6:45 a.m. or March 24, and was placed on line at 5:05 p.m. that day. The reactor experienced a trip from approximately 35's power at 7:30 p.m. the same day resulting from a feedwater swing ini tiated. by a malfunctioning turbine header pressure instrument.

The unit was placed back on line at 10:37 p.m. following resolution of the instrument malfunction.

The unit attained full power on March 26, 1982. On April 2 the reactor tripped from full power on a variable low pressure signal which resulted from the inadvertent trip of the Group 6 control rods.

It was subsequently determined that the rods tripped due to a control rod drive power supply gate circuit malfunction.

The power supply was repaired.

The reactor attained criticality at 11:45 p.m. April 3, and was placed on line at 3:51 a.m. on April 4.

At the close of the report period, Oconee Unit 1 is at full power with no discernable problems.

Oconee Unit 2 continued an ISI/ refuel outage throughout the report period.

Core reload began on March 15 and was completed on March 19.

HPI nozzle i

repair, which evolved from inspections performed pursuant to problems identified at Crystal River, is ongoing at the conclusion of this report

,

'

period, and will be completed prior to unit restart. More details on this topic is elsewhere in this report.

The unit is expected to be placed on line on April 24, 1982.

,

l Oconee Unit 3 began the report period in a forced outage to repair a steam

'

generator tube leak. The unit was shut down on February 15, 1982 to repair what was identified to be a leak in tube 2-4 which was subsequently l

stabilized and plugged. The HPI makeup and injection nozzles were inspected l

and repaired during the outage as a result of cracking identified at Crystal River; more details concerning nozzle inspection is elswhere in this repr':.

Following completion of the outage, the unit achieved criticality on March 29 and was placed on line at 8:56 a.m. on March 30. Full power was attained on April 2, and at the close of the report period, is being maintained.

__ _

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

.

6.

Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy.

The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical content.

The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed and test results were adequate.

The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications; they appeared to have received the required administrative review and they apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribed.

Procedure Title PT/1/A/600/10 RCS Leakage Evaluation Test PT/0/A/150/09 Personnel Hatch PT/0/A/610/17 4160 Breakers IP/0/B/340/02 CRD DC Hold Power Supply IP/0/A/301/35 SR & IR Channel IP/0/A/0310/12A HPI & RB On-line Test IP/0/A/310/13B LPI Logic On-line IP/0/A/0310/14A ES Channel A On-line PT/0/A/200/44 Fuel Transfer System PT/0/A/255/1 Air Leak Test PT/1/A/600/01 Periodic Instrument Surveillance PT/1/A/610/5A Breaker Trip Test PT/0/A/610/4A Central Tie Logic The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:

10 CFR ANSI N 18.7 Oconee Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directive Duke Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi fied.

a

.

.

.

7.

Maintenance Activities

=

c Maintenance activities were observed an/or reviewed throughout the report period to ascertain that the work was being performed by qualified person-nel, that activities were accomplished employing approved procedures or the

. activity was within the skill of the trade.

Limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that technical specification requirements were satisfied. Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to ensure adequate fire protection, cleanliness control and radiation protec-tion measures were observed and that equipment was properly returned to service.

Acceptance criteria employed for this review included, but were not limited

"

to:

STATION DIRECTIVES ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY MANUAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TITLE 10 CFR.

Detailed below are 15 of 52 maintenance activities which were observed and/or reviewed during the report period:

Work Request Procedure Component 20333 MP/0/A/3000/22 1MS-4 TM/1/A/4000/115A 20334 MP/0/A/3000/22 1MS-8 TM/I/A/4000/115A 50593B MP/0/A/1150/12 Rx Vessel Studs 13639 MP/0/A/1800/16 3Al RCP 15863 N/A 2-HD-17 21723 MP/0/A/1800/1 2-CF-2 MP/0/A/1200/26 52128B TM/2/A/400/107 HPI Nozzels 13783 MP/0/A/1200/01 2FDW-38 57788B MP/0/A/2001/3C SWGR-270

._.

_

-

_-

_ _.

--

-

- - ' -

'

,.

.

.

.

1 21758 MP/0/A/1800/01 FDW-104 21429 MP/0/A/1200/02 MS-86~

22707 MP/0/A/1200/02A 2-85-25-23345 MP/0/A/1200/01 LT-5 51807 MP/0/A/1200/19 RC-66 23292 IP/0/A/0100/01 LPSW-24 Within the areas inspected no violations were identified.

8.

HPI Nozzle Degradation

.

On February 5,1982, the licensee became aware of a cracking problem in the HPI nozzles at Crystal River.

As a result,,an extensive examination of the suspected areas on Units 1, 2 and 3 was performed.

Two cracked safe-ends, one cracked thermal sleeve and four loose thermal sleeves were identified.

All repairs have been completed.

The following table summarizes the examination results and the necessary repairs.

f

>

.

(

f

!

..-

- -.

.

.

..

.

___ _ _ _ _ -

-_

__

_ _ - - _ _ _

. _ _ _.

}

STATUS Of HPI NO27LES

Thermal Pope PT T he rma l Nozzh Sleeve Crack RT Inside UT Special S leevitepa i red 1A1 Oh Hone Yes No Yes-C lea r NorHY N/A 1A2 OK None Yes Yes Ye s-C l ea r Hone

'Yes 181 OK None Yes No Yes-Clear Hone N/A Ill?

OK None Yes No Yes-Clear None N/A 2A1 UK None Yes No Yes-Clear None Yes 2A2 Loose Yes Yes Yes Yes-Indications Replaced Yes 2tl1 Loose None Yes Yes Yes-Clear Lepanded Yes 2B2 Cracked None Yes Yes Ye s-C l ea r Replaced Yes 3A1 OK None Yes No Yes-Cl ea r fione N/A 3A2 Loose Yes Yes (es Yes-Indications f'ep l a ced Yes 301 Loose None Yes Yes Ye s-C i ca r Expanded Yes 3152 OK None Yes No Yes-Clear None N/A

'A fitup problem on a 1" warming l ine was repa i red.

.

,

I

.

,

'

u

%

'

. 1 I

l

.

9e

,

O

-

- _ _

.-

.

.

-

--

__

...

.

_..

- -

.

.

i 9.

Fuel Handling Operations On March 30, 1982, the licensee discovered the Unit 3 spent fuel pool ventilation system to be inoperable.

Investigation revealed that the control power breaker to the spent fuel pool ventilation fans had been

tagged open on March 23, 1982 for the performance of procedure PT/3/A/

i 0150/27, Local Type B Leak Rate Test for penetration numbers 19 and 20.

Although the procedural step requiring the restoration of system / equipment i

affected by the local leak rate test had been signed off, the tagged open control power breaker to the spent fuel pool ventilation fans was not restored.

Failure to restore control power to the spent fuel pool ventilation fans, step 12.1.11 of the procedure, resulted in the movement of

,

ten fuel assemblies within the Unit 3 spent fuel pool with the spent fuel

pool ventilation system inoperable.

In a similar occurrence on April 2, 1982, the licensee moved one fuel

'

assembly to the sipping can within the Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pool with the spent fuel pool ventilation system inoperable. The system had been removed from service to perform a purge system filter test. The operator failed to follow procedure OP/0/A/1506/01, Fuel and Component Handling Operating Procedure which requires the verification of spent fuel pool ventilation

system operability prior to the movement of fuel within the spent fuel pools.

Technical Specification 3.8.12 requires both trains of spent fuel pool ventilation system to be operable during the movement of fuel within the spent fuel pool.

The failure to follow procedures as detailed above resulted in the movement of ten fuel assemblies in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool and one fuel assembly in the Units 1 and 2 spent fuel pool with both

,

trains of spent fuel pool ventilation system being inoperable. This is a l

Violation (50-287/82-12-01).

I 10.

Design Change and Modification Program In an inspection performed by regional inspectors during the period of March

'

23-27, 1981, the results of which were recorded in inspection report a

50-269/81-06, the area of tests and experiments program was scrutinized.

In that inspection, the inspectors verified the following aspect of the program:

A formal method has been established to handle all requests or

-

i proposals for conducting special tests involving safety-related

'

components.

,

e- -

,.-e,

.

.-

---,n

_ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

,

,

'

Special tests will be performed in accordance with approved procedures

-

Responsibilities have been assigned for reviewing and approving special

-

test procedures A system, including assignment of responsibility, has been established

-

to assure that special tests will be reviewed.

Responsibilities have been assigned to assure a written safety

-

evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 will be developed for any special test to assure that it does not involve an unreviewed safety evaluation or change in Technical Specifications.

i Based on their review, one violation was identified (269, 270, 287/81-06-01)

concerning the following:

10 CFR 50.59 (b) requires that licensees submit a brief description of changes made to the facility pursuant to that section and also provide to the NRC a summary of the safety evaluation for each change.

The 1979 list of Oconee f acility changes submitted to the NRC on October 27, 1980 did not contiin a summary of the safety evaluations for the listed modifications.

This failure to provide a summary of safety evaluations to the NRC was a violation of 50.59 requirement.

The licensee responded to that violation, admitting non-compliance stating that all future reports required by 10 CFR 50.59 (b) will contain a safety evaluation of each modification.

In a letter dated November 20, 1981 the licensee transmitted a description of all facility changes station modifications which were completed between January 1, and December 31, 1980; a report required by 10 CFR50.59(b).

Similar to the report tendered for the year of 1979, the 1980 report did not contain a summary safety evaluation of each modification.

10 CFR 50.59 requires that a summary of the safety evaluation of each change to the facility made pursuant to this section be submitted to the NRC at least annually.

Facility change safety evaluation summaries were not submitted to the NRC in that neither 1979 nor the 1980 lists of Oconee facility changes submitted to the NRC on October 27, 1980 and November 20, 1981 contained a summary of the safety evaluations for the listed modifications.

The above detailed occurrence constitutes a repeat violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b). (269/82-12-02)

.

_

_

_

.

..

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

.

,

.

11.

Contaminated Injury I

At 11:20 a.m. on March 24, 1982 a worker in the spent fuel pool area shared by Units 1 and 2 was exchanging cables on a sling used to transport a spent

,

fuel cask basket. The cable skipped, resulting in a portion of two of the worker's fingers being severed. The worker, whose arm was contaminated in the accident, was transported to the Oconee Memorial Hospital after removal of his anti-contamination clothing.

The licensee provided health physics personnel monitoring during transport and at the hospital. The hospital was prepared for a contaminated patient, i

'

rendered medical attention, and successfully decontaminated the patients arm to acceptable levels.

The licensee failed to realize, during the foregoing, that the transport of a contaminated individual from site to offsite constituted an initiating condition of the Unusual Event category of their Emergency Plan.

The licensee later realized the error, notified the parties normally notified during the parties normally notified an unusual event, and closed

'

'

the incident.

Although the licensee did not comply with the requirements delineated in their Emergency Plan nor their Emergency Action Level - Unusual Event implementing procedure, AP/0/A/1000/02, the noncompliance was licensee identified, reported and corrected.

l l

!

!

,