ML15224A561
| ML15224A561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1989 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A562 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-269-89-22, 50-270-89-22, 50-287-89-22, NUDOCS 8908010011 | |
| Download: ML15224A561 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1989022
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION
REGION II
'
W101
MARIETTA ST., N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos:
50-269/89-22,
50-270/89-22, 50-287/89-22
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C.
28242
Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos.:
Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted:
June 19 - July 16, 1989
Inspectors:
~
~/~47
P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
tate/Signed
L. D. e
eside '
VInspector
at Si ned
Approved by:
M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief
ate
igned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the
areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, safeguards
and radiation protection, plant startup from refueling, TMI action items, Lee
Steam Station tour, licensed operator requalification program, and inspection
of open items.
Results:
During this period the inspectors noted a continuing strength in the licensees
Integrated Scheduling effort. The outage planned for 43 days was accomplished
in 44.5 days.
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G.ic
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager
C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative
R. Campbell, Lee Steam Station Manager
D. Couch, Keowee Hydro Station Manager
- T. Curtis, Compliance Engineer
J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
D. Detherage, Operations Support Manager
- W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer
D. Havice, Instrument & Electrical Engineer
C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer
E. Legette, Assistant Engineer Compliance
H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group
R
c
Morgan, SeniorQA Manager
- G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors:
- P.H
Skinner
- L.D. Wert
- Attended exit interview
2.
Plant Operations (71707)
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period
to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifica
tions (TS),
and administrative controls.
Control
room logs, shift
turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were
reviewed routinely.
Discussions were conducted with plant operations,
maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument and electrical (I&E),
and performance personnel.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily
basis.
Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during
week days and on weekends.
Some inspections were made during shift
change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions observed
2
were conducted as required by the Licensees Administrative Procedures.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or
exceeded the requirements of TS.
Operators were responsive to plant
annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant conditions.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine
basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building
Auxiliary Building
Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms
Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area
Standby Shutdown Facility
Units 1/2 Spent Fuel Pool Room
Keowee Hydro Station
Lee Steam Station
During the plant tours,
ongoing activities, housekeeping,
security,
equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
Unit 1 -
Oconee Unit 1 began this period at 100 percent full power.
On June 26,
1989,
power was reduced to 72 percent due to
problems with Main Turbine Control Valve Number 3 (CV-3).
On
June 30, the unit underwent a runback from 98 percent power to
63 percent power.
The runback was caused by a failure in the
'lA' Feedwater Pump control circuitry.
Power was further
reduced on June 30 to 30 percent and repairs were made to CV-3.
Power was returned to 100 percent full power on July 4, 1989.
Unit 2 -
Unit 2 began this period in a scheduled refueling outage.
On July 4, 1989 the outage was completed (see paragraph 6).
Unit 2 returned to 100 percent full power operation on
July 10,
after some delays- due to dispatcher requests and
problems with the '2A' Feedwater Pump inboard bearing.
Unit 3 -
Unit 3 operated at 100 percent power for the entire report
period except for a one day power reduction to 81 percent on
June 21 as requested by the dispatcher.
During routine tours of the Keowee Hydro Station, the inspectors noted
that the Keowee control room Alarm Response Procedures require review and
updating. The procedures presently utilized were approved in early 1973
and do not address all the annunciators available.
Some of the actions
listed appear to be out of date due to changes made since the response
procedures were approved. Discussions with the on shift Keowee operators
indicate that these procedures would be relied upon in certain conditions.
3
This was discussed with Keowee and station management who acknowledged
that the procedures required updating and stated that plans had already
been made to complete such revisions after the Keowee procedure upgrade
process (currently in progress) is completed. While 'emergency start' of
the Keowee units from Oconee blocks (or prevents) many features from
affecting Keowee operation, correct alarm response procedures could play
an important role in operation of the hydroelectric units during certain
conditions.
This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 269,
270,
287/89-22-01: Update of Keowee Hydro Station Alarm Response Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural
and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for
necessary test prerequisites,
instructions, acceptance criteria,
technical content,
authorization to begin work,
data collection,
independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted,
and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part,
were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test
equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met,
tests were conducted
according to procedure,
test results were acceptable and systems
restoration was completed.
Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
MP/1/A/2000/17 Keowee Hydro Station (U-1)
Turbine,
Governor and Generator Weekly Preventive
Maintenance
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting
period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that
approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within
the skill of the trade.
Activities, procedures and work requests were
examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for
fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to
service, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.
Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
Repairs to '!A' MDEFWP Test Switch
No violations or deviations were identified.
4
5. Safeguards and Radiological Controls Activities (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included
review of portions of the licensee's physical security activities.
The
performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the
conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas
access controls,
searching of personnel,
packages and vehicles, badge
issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory
posts.
The inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and
vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the
security organization and operations or maintenance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Plant Startup From Refueling (71711) (Unit 2)
Unit 2 commenced zero power physics testing on July 2, 1989, as part of
the final actions required by End of Cycle (EOC)
-
10.
The inspector
witnessed, in part, TT 2/A/0711/11, Unit 2 Cycle 11 Zero Power Physics
Test dated June 26,
1989 and TT 2/A/0811/11,
Unit 2 Cycle 11 Power
Escalation Test dated June 28, 1989.
In addition the inspector conducted
a walkdown of the emergency feedwater system and the electrical
distribution system to ascertain they had been returned to service as
required.
This outage was scheduled to be performed in 43 days and was
accomplished in 44.5 days.
Some of the major accomplishments of this
outage were the sand blasting and recoating of condenser circulating
water intake piping, overhaul of A and B low pressure turbines, pipe and
fitting erosion inspections and numerous valve overhaul.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
TMI Action Items (NUREG-0737)
II.F.2.3 (Closed) Inadequate Core Cooling
Instrumentation.
The
Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICC)
at Oconee consist of two
trains, each indicated on a video plasma display. Each train consists of
wide range hot leg level,
reactor vessel
head level,
core exit
thermocouples,
and subcooling monitors.
The TS for this system was
issued on June 6, 1989, as amendment number 174, 174 and 171.
This system
has been installed in each unit and has been in use since 1987.
Normal
operating procedures have been issued for this system and guidance for
use of the system during emergencies are included in the Emergency
Operating Procedure.
The inspectors have reviewed this area in detail
and based on this review this item is complete.
8. Lee Steam Station Tour (71707)
On July 11, 1989, the inspectors visited Duke Power Company's Lee Steam
Station.
The station is located approximately 30 miles from the Oconee
Nuclear Station, and includes three combustion turbine generators which
5
are used as a "backup" emergency power supply in accordance with TS 3.7.
If for some reason,
the Keowee Hydro Station generators (or associated
power paths) become unavailable, continued operation of the Oconee Units
is permitted for a limited time provided that the 4160V standby busses
are energized by one of the Lee turbines via a 100KV transmission line
(isolated from the rest of the grid) and transformer CT-5.
The
inspectors met with the Lee Steam Station manager and several other key
personnel.
A tour of the station was completed with emphasis on the
control room area,
the three combustion turbines and associated
switchvard features.
The inspectors reviewed
and discussed the
procedures to be utilized to supply Oconee via a combustion turbine and
an associated power path isolated from the remainder of the grid.
Detailed discussions were held on how often the turbines were test run,
who operated the turbines and their qualifications and the
methods
available for communicating with
the Oconee Nuclear Station (in regards
to both longterm planning needs and immediate demands of the combustion
turbines). No problems or concerns were noted.
9. Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator requalification program
with respect to actions taken when a licensed operator fails to pass the
administered requalification examination.
The licensees program is
identified in DPC Employee Training and Qualification System Manual,
Standard #2306.0,
Revision 4, Periodic Training Licensed Operator
Requalification.
Section V.B addresses the removal of personnel from
licensed duties
for
individuals
having significant identified
deficiencies during the retraining programs.
The removal from licensed
duties shall commence within one day of identifying the deficiency. The
retraining will be
provided and
remedial
examination conducted.
Discussions with the Operations Superintendent identified that two
persons in a recent requalification training class had not met the
criteria specified in this standard.
One operator had deficiencies in
the written examination and one with the simulator examination.
Both
individuals were removed from licensed duties and placed in a remedial
retraining program.
Re-examinations were subsequently administered and
both individuals passed and were returned to licensed duties.
10.
Inspection of Open Items (92700)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee
reports, inspection,
record review,
and discussions with licensee
personnel, as appropriate:
a.
(Closed) Deviation 269/86-20-02:
Discrepancies Between FSAR and
Installed Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.
This deviation had
been
generated
because five of the six 2G
peak recording
accelerometers were out of service, apparently due to deterioration
over time.
The licensee made plans to resolve this issue by
replacing the Teledyne PRA-103 instruments with Kinematrics Model
III
6
PAR 400 instruments.
Inspection Report 269,270,287/87-11 states
that 2 of these replacements had been completed and the deviation
would be closed when the remaining four instruments were replaced
(these 4 are located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building).
The inspectors
reviewed Exempt Change packages which indicated that four instruments
had been replaced during the most recent Unit 1 outage.
Installation
procedures could not be located for the remaining two instruments
(tendon gallery, Core Flood Tank first floor support) which were
replaced prior to the outage. The inspectors did review completed
work requests which indicated that PAR 400 instruments at these
locations had been calibrated (February 1989).
Based on this review
this deviation is closed.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 269,270,287/89-11-01:
SSF Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
System Issues.
The inspectors verified that procedural changes and
corrections/improvements in valve labeling had been completed to
correct the discrepancies.
The fuel oil strainers and filters are
being maintained in a configuration which places only one in service
at a time. Explanation notes have been added to the fuel oil system
operating procedures.
All of the issues identified by the
inspectors concerns have been addressed. This item is closed.
11.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 18, 1989,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following items
were discussed in detail:
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
269/86-20-02
Closed
Discrepancies Between FSAR and
Installed
Seismic Monitoring
Instrumentation
269,270,287/89-11-01
Closed
SSF Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
System Issues
269,270,287/89-22-01
Open
Update of Keowee Hydro Station
Alarm Response Procedures
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.