ML15224A707

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-269/90-23,50-270/90-23 & 50-287/90-23 on 900716-19.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss
ML15224A707
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  
Issue date: 08/02/1990
From: Belisle G, Hallstrom G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15224A706 List:
References
50-269-90-23, 50-270-90-23, 50-287-90-23, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 9008210060
Download: ML15224A707 (4)


See also: IR 05000269/1990023

Text

0p

REGU'

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGI

NIl

0

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-269/90-23, 50-270/90-23, and 50-287/90-23

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC

28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

License Nos.:

DPR-38, DPR-47,

and DPR-55

Facility Name:

Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection Condu

d:

July 16 -

19, 1990

Insp~ec tor:_____________________________

G. A. Hallstrom

Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: G. A. Belisle

Approved by:__

G. A. Belisle, Chief

Date Signed

Test Programs Section

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection examined Licensee actions in response to

NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB)

88-04 "Potential Safety-Related

Pump Loss."

The bulletin basically requested the licensees to determine if

any operating safety-related systems would result in dead-heading, to evaluate

safety-related systems for flow division, and to evaluate the minimum flow

bypass lines for safety-related pumps with respect to damage resulting from

operations and testing in the minimum flow mode.

Results:

Completion of all licensee actions in response to the bulletin was scheduled

for September 1990.

However,

actions were mostly completed for all three

units and included both procedural corrections and plant equipment

modifications.

However, "strong" versus "weak" test data

measurements were

2

not taken for the turbine driven and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps

and necessary clarification documents were unobtainable prior to the exit.

Therefore closure of the bulletin was noted as contingent on satisfactory

clarification of the "strong" versus "weak" determination for these pumps.

(This clarification was provided by review of calculation NO.

OSC 2515

and

telephone conversations with site personnel on August 1 and 2, 1990.)

Licensee engineers and operations personnel provided knowledgeable responses

to technical issues raised by the inspector during this inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified.

2

SYSTEM

PUMPS

MANUFACTURER

Low Pressure Injection (LPI)

1 A&B, 2 A&B,

Ingersoll-Rand

3 A&B

High Pressure Injection (HPI)

1 A,B&C; 2 A,B&C;

Ingersoll-Rand

3 A,B&C

Reactor Building Spray (RBS)

1 A&B, 2 A&B, 3 A&B Ingersoll-Rand

Motor Driven Emergency

1 A&B, 2 A&B, 3 A&B Bingham

Feedwater (MDEFDW)

Turbine Driven Emergency

1, 2 & 3A

Bingham

Feedwater (TDEFDW)

Auxiliary Service Water (ASW)

1A

Ingersoll-Rand

Low Pressure Service Water

1 A,B&C 3 A&B

Ingersoll-Rand

(LPSW)

SSF Auxiliary Service Water

P2

Bingham

(SSFASW)

SSF HVAC Cooling Water

1 & 2

Ingersoll-Rand

(SSFHVAC)

SSF Diesel Engine Water

1

Ingersoll-Rand

Jacket (SSFDEWS)

The inspector reviewed the following procedures and calculations to

verify licensee commitments contained in their responses:

PT/3/A/0203/12

"Low

Pressure Injection Pump Low Flow Test" dated

September 1, 1988.

This test established LPI pump long-term low flow

capability for mid-loop operations (400 gpm) without pump damage.

The

test subjected the 3C LPI pump to a 400 gpm (or less ; 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> were at

300 gpm)

minimum flow for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with constant vibration and

temperature monitoring. This test was followed by a normal 3000 gpm IWP

surveillance test.

No damage was identified during or following the

tests.

OP/1,2&3/A/1102/15

"Filling and Draining Fuel Transfer Canal"

dated

April

25,

1990.

This OP was revised to require completion of IWP

testing (PT/1,2&3/A/0203/06) of any LPI pump following its use at flows

below manufacturer's recommendations for 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> operation (500 -

800

gpm); i.e., LPI use at 400 gpm during mid-loop operations.

PT/3/A/0203/06

"Low Pressure Injection System Performance Test" dated

December 10, 1989.

This PT re-established operability of LPI pump 3C

after its use below recommended flow during refuel operations.

(The

test also re-established operability of the 3A and 3B pumps after

repairs.)

OP/3/A/1104/04

"Low Pressure Injection System" dated November 28, 1989.

This OP provides limits on minimum allowable LPI flow (800 gpm per

section 2.4) and run time against shut-off head (30 minutes per section

2.5) assuming new miniflow recirculation of 60 gpm. The OP also includes

a caution (Note 2.8) intended to prevent excess cavitation during RCS

depressurization and draining.

3

EP/3A/18000/01

"Emergency Operating Procedure" dated February 22, 1990.

This EP was revised to alert Operators and Station Response personnel of

the LPI minimum flow concerns for continuous operation during the

HPI/LPI piggyback mode of operation.

Calculation No.

OSC - 3077

"Low Pressure Injection Pump Minimum Flow

Verification ", Revision 1, dated February 5, 1990. This calculation is

conservative in verifying a 7/16

inch flow orifice for the

manufacturer's recommmended 60 gpm start/stop recirculation flow.

Calculation No.

OSC - 2515 " Verification of Emergency Feedwater System

Flow Utilizing MFW System Bypass", Revision 4, dated September 15, 1989.

This calculation provides the verification of "strong"

versus "weak"

emergency feedwater pumps as well as assurance of minimum flow under

worst case deadhead conditions for all pumps.

The inspector examined the following exempt change packages:

OE number

LPI number

3047

iC

3049

3C

3176

3A

3177

3B

3165

lB

3166

1A

The above exempt change (OE) documentation packages for installation of

7/16 inch flow orifices in LPI pump miniflow lines included work

requests, installation procedures,

PMT plans,

flowrate test results,

50.59 evaluations,

QC sign off sheets,

etc.

Verification of

installation of the above flow orifices was completed through field

examinations.

Unit 2 orifices are scheduled for installation by

September 1990.

After examination of the above documentation and field verifications,

the inspector concluded that licensee actions in response to IEB 88-04

had been satisfactory.

The inspector informed cognizant licensee

personnel that IEB 88-04 was closed for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3.

3.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 19,

1990,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection

findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

Proprietary information was reviewed in the course of this inspection,