ML15118A136
| ML15118A136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A134 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-96-10, 50-270-96-10, 50-287-96-10, NUDOCS 9608230086 | |
| Download: ML15118A136 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1996010
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04
License Nos:
DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503
Report No:
50-269/96-10, 50-270/96-10, 50-287/96-10
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
Facility:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3
Location:
7812B Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672
Dates:
June 2 - July 13, 1996
Inspectors:
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Humphrey, Resident Inspector
N. Salgado, Resident Inspector
N. Economos, Reactor Inspector
L. King, Reactor Inspector
L. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector
Approved by:
R. V. Crlenjak, Chief, Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
ENCLOSURE 2
9608230086 960812
PDR ADOCK 05000269
G
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3
NRC Inspection Report 50-269/96-10,
50-270/96-10, 50-287/96-10
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6 week
period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of
announced inspections by two regional inspectors. A Safeguards inspector
provided closure for an open item and the Project Manager provided information
for an engineering issue.
Operations
Unit 2 experienced a dropped rod which required a power reduction
to 55%, and the resetting of the High Flux Trip setpoints and the
Flux/Flow/Imbalance trip setpoints. Maintenance technicians did
not reset the Flux/Flow/Imbalance trip setpoints within the 4
hours required by Technical Specifications. This was identified
as Violation 50-269,270,287/96-10-01.
(Section 01.2)
Maintenance
Technicians performing surveillance activities on the
nonsafety-related Component Cooling Water system did not follow
the step sign-off process required by the procedure. This was
identified as a weakness in the use of and adherence to
procedures. (Section M1.2)
-
The present Inservice Testing program and procedures at Keowee are
adequate to perform the required testing. The implementation of
the modification for the turbine guide bearing oil system will
allow increased testing for that system. (Section M1.3)
-
The inspector concluded that failure to perform inspection of
activities affecting quality by individuals other than those who
performed the activity was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion X requirements. Violation 50-269,270,287/96-10-03:
Weld Procedure Qualifications Welded, Tested, Certified and
Approved By Same Individual, was identified. (Section M1.5.3)
Engineering
The licensee's evaluation of the hydrogen ignition during the
welding of a dry cask storage canister at Point Beach as it
related to ONS was considered a strength.
(Section E1.1)
A minor violation concerning the licensee's failure to request
relief for Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Reactor Vessel Weld WR35 was
identified as Non-Cited Violation 50-269,270,287/96-10-02: Failure
To Request Relief. (Section E3.1)
ENCLOSURE 2
Plant Support
-
The inspector concluded that the licensee conducted emergency
response drill 96-02 professionally and thoroughly.
(Section Pl)
At the licensee's corporate office, the inspector reviewed
corrective actions relative to the finding that the licensee
allowed a vendor to continue to implement their access
authorization program after determining the vendor failed to
provide assurance that the individuals granted unescorted access
were trustworthy and reliable. Corrective actions were timely and
included a.complete audit of the vendor's records and program.
Arrangements have been made to audit the licensee's Access
Authorization Program by the Regulatory Audits group beginning
October 28, 1996.
(Section Si)
0
ENCLOSURE 2
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full power throughout the reporting period.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power until July 6, 1996, when the unit
reduced power to 55% in response to a dropped control rod (paragraph 01.2).
The unit was returned to full power at 5:30 a.m. on July 7, 1996.
Unit 3 operated at or near full power throughout the reporting period.
Review of UFSAR Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary
to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted
the need for a special focus review that compares plant practices, procedures,
and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing inspections
discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of
the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that
the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices,
procedures, and/or parameters. As addressed in Section M2.1, Reactor
Protection System testing frequency differences were identified between the
Technical Specifications and the UFSAR.
I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general the conduct of
operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and
noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
01.2 Dropped Control Rod On Unit 2
a. Inspection Scope (93702)
On July 6, 1996, at 2:10 a.m., Unit 2 control rod 3 in Group 7 dropped
approximately 18% into the core as displayed on the position indication.
The inspector interviewed operators and technicians, reviewed control
room logs, procedures, and associated Technical Specifications (TS).
SII
b. Observations and Findings
At 3:20 a.m. the control rod dropped into the core while the licensee
was attempting to manually realign the rod with its group. The licensee
entered abnormal procedure AP/2/A/1700/15, Dropped Control Rods.
Power
was reduced manually to 55 percent by the Operators in a controlled
manner. TS 3.5.2.2.d required in part that the nuclear overpower trip
setpoints based on flux and flux/flow/imbalance be reduced to 65.5
percent within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the power reduction. The licensee reduced the
setpoints associated with the flux. The licensee discovered at 12:15
p.m. that the flux/flow/imbalance setpoints had not been reduced. The
licensee notified the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 50.72 that Unit 2
had entered TS 3.0.3 after failing to reset the flux/flow/imbalance
setpoints within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of dropping the control rod. The licensee's
failure to meet the requirements of TS 3.5.2.2.d is being identified as
Violation 50-270/96-10-01, Failure To Change Flux/Flow Imbalance
Setpoint.
The licensee identified that the rod dropped because of a blown fuse on
one of the six phases of the control rod drive stator. The licensee
replaced the blown fuse and verified that the control rod drive stator
was functional.
Unit 2 was returned to full power at 5:30 a.m., on July
7, 1996.
c. Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the licensee was in violation of TS 3.5.2.2.d, and identified Violation 50-270/96-10-01, Failure To Change
Flux/Flow/Imbalance Setpoint.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1
Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walkdown accessible
portions of the following safety-related systems:
Keowee Hydro Station
Low Pressure Injection System
Spent Fuel Pool
Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were
acceptable in all cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to
the licensee's attention and were corrected. The inspectors identified
no substantive concerns as a result of these walkdowns.
ENCLOSURE 2
3
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
(Closed) VIO 269,270,287/94-38-01: Failure to Follow Keowee Transfer
Procedure
On December 11, 1994, Keowee Hydro Unit 1 was not operated in accordance
with OP/0/A/1106/019, Keowee Hydro at Oconee, Enclosure 3.4, in that
operational control of the hydro unit was transferred from remote to
local (using OP/O/A/2000/041, Keowee Modes of Operation) with the unit
operating at speed-no-load conditions instead of being shutdown. The
transfer of control with the unit operating at speed-no-load conditions
resulted in overheating the generator field breaker closing coil and a
loss of excitation to the operating hydro unit. Keowee procedure
OP/0/A/2000/041 did not contain steps to transfer control using the
remote/local switch. Therefore, the Keowee Hydro Operator had no written
instructions to shutdown the operating hydro unit prior to transferring
control from remote to local.
The inspector verified that Keowee procedure OP/0/A/2000/041 was revised
to give Keowee operators instructions which would prevent control
transfer while the Keowee unit was operating. The inspector also
verified that OP'n/A/1106/019 was revised to provide guidelines for
control transfers. The Keowee operators were trained on the revisions
made to OP/O/A/2000/041, specifically, remote to local transfers. This
item is closed.
II. Maintenance
Al
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a. Inspection Scope (62703)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance
activities:
W096041837
3CCW-11 Perform Mech/Ele PM on Operator
Limitorque-Preventative Maintenance
ON3IPA0305001
RPS Chan B Pump PWR Monitor Calibration
IP/0/A/0310/012B Engineered Safeguards System Logic Subsystem 1
LPI Channel 3 Online Test
IP/O/A/0310/013B Engineered Safeguards System Logic Subsystem 2
LPI Channel 4 Online Test
ENCLOSURE 2
4
RPS Channel D Pump Power Monitor Calibration
-
NSM-32881 Part D, Replace Power Battery Chargers
-
PT/1/A/2200/019
KHU-1 Turbine Sump Pump IST Surveillance
-
U-2, LPSW To RCPM, LPI, RB Component Cooler
Calibration
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors found the work.performed under these activities to be
professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the
work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced
and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently
observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress.
Quality control personnel were present when required by procedure. When
applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.
c. Conclusion
The inspectors concluded that the Mainterance activities listed above
were completed thoroughly and professionally.
M1.2 Unit 2 Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) Pump B Rotameter and Flow
Switch, W096040910
a. Inspection Scope
On June 11, 1996, the inspector observed calibration of the flow switch
on the lube water to the 2B CCW Pump.
b. Observations and Findings
Calibration procedure IP/O/B/0261/004, Enclosure 11.2.2.b, CCW Pump B
Rotameter and Flow Switch, was being utilized to perform the
calibration. However, the inspector observed multiple steps being
signed off when he approached the technicians. In addition, the
inspector noted that the last step which was signed off was in advance
of performing the activity specified in that step (step 10.2.22.c,
Isolation Valve).
The inspector questioned the technicians regarding signing off multiple
steps. The individuals told the inspector that they believed that the
nonsafety-related procedure did not specifically require the steps to be
signed off one at a time as they were completed.
The equipment being calibrated was not safety-related, but the licensee
confirmed that management's expectations for performing this work were
'the same as for safety-related equipment. That is, the steps are to be
ENCLOSURE 2
signed off as they are performed. The technicians were counseled by
their supervisor on adherence to procedures.
c. Conclusion
The inspector concluded that a failure to maintain current documentation
of the steps performed indicated a weakness in procedure adherence.
M1.3 Conduct of IST Program At Keowee Hydro Station
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee IST program that was applicable to
the Keowee generating station. The licensee's submittal of the IST
program was reviewed to ensure that all of the critical components that
are applicable were included in the program and that where differences
to ASME Section XI existed that justification for the differences was
included in the submittal. The temporary and periodic tests were also
reviewed. PIPs that were written on the system were reviewed to
determine if there were any equipment failures.
b. Observations and Findings
All of the critical equipment for Keowee was listed for testing in the
IST program with the exception of skid mounted equipment. The skid
mounted equipment was tested under the Appendix B program. The licensee
had stated this in their IST program submittal.
A review of the temporary test procedures and the periodic tests
indicated that the applicable testing was being performed. The
licensee's testing to date has been performed using temporary test
procedures.
Periodic test procedures have been developed to replace the
temporary test procedures.
The licensee plans to modify the turbine guide bearing oil system so
that individual components can be tested. The inspector reviewed the
proposed modification drawings and periodic test procedure. The
inspector determined that the modification will allow testing of the
pumps and valves which is not possible under the present installation.
The modification is due to be installed in September 1996.
The inspector reviewed the completed quarterly tests for the fall of
1995 and the first quarter of 1996. No problems were identified. The
inspector reviewed three PIPs associated with the system. Corrective
action had been completed for the PIPs.
c. Conclusions
The present IST program and procedures are adequate to perform the
required testing. The implementation of the modification for the
ENCLOSURE 2
6
turbine guide bearing oil system will allow increased testing for that
system.
M1.4 Surveillance Observation (61726)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector observed all or portions of the work activities required
in the following work orders:
Inspection Procedure
Title
IP/O/A/3000/001
Instrumentation and Control Battery
Daily Surveillance
IP/O/A/300/011
Instrumentation and Control Battery
Quarterly Surveillance
b. Observations and Findings
The inspector reviewed the above procedures to verify that requirements
specified in Technical Specification 4.6.9 and referenced in the subject
procedures were accurately delineated, that appropriate reviews had been
performed, that instruments and/or test equipment were appropriately
identified and calibrated. A pre-job briefing was held to discuss the
objectives of the activity and to review safety precautions while
working around the cells. The surveillance was performed in a careful
and unhurried manner following procedural instructions. Each cell was
checked for evidence of corrosion and degradation around the terminals.
Each cell was tested for voltage, specific gravity, temperature and
electrolyte level.
Data from each cell was documented in the
appropriate enclosure provided in the procedure. Technicians were
qualified to perform their task with training received under the
licensee's training and qualification system. The surveillance was
conducted in a well-planned and orderly manner following procedural
requirements.
M1.5 Maintenance Observation (62703)
M1.5.1
Replacement Mechanical Operator for Valve CCW-267
a. Inspection Scope
This work effort was performed to replace the operator on valve CCW-267
which was discovered broken in the conduct of a system pump test on
June 3, 1996.
b. Observations and Findings
The valve was identified as a QA-1 condition active valve, that ensures
Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) Auxiliary Service Water System (ASW) pump
minimum flow requirements are met. This valve is also used to isolate
ENCLOSURE 2
7
Flow through the SSF, ASW test line at the start of a SSF event to avoid
diverting flow away from the Steam Generators (S/Gs).
The work was performed as minor modification No. OE-9246 under Work
Order No. 96046304-01. The maintenance procedures (MP) used to perform
the task of removal and replacement were MP/O/A/1800/005, Torque
Miscellaneous Fasteners and MP/O/A/1210/007, Operator Limitorque-SMB/SB
Series Removal and Replacement. This valve appears on flow Diagram No.
OFD 133A-2.5 (J-11) Rev. 25. Because an exact replacement of the
original manual actuator (Model B320-40) was not available, the licensee
used a similar actuator (Model B320-50) made by the same manufacturer
(Limitorque).
The inspector reviewed the above mentioned documents including the
replacement evaluation, the unreviewed safety question evaluation
(10 CFR 50.59), and the Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No.
4-096-1101 dated June 3, 1996. The inspector observed disassembly of
the broken actuator, inspected the broken parts and the replacement
component following installation. By review of the work package and
through discussions with cognizant QA personnel, the inspector verified
that QC inspections were performed during the reassembly as required,
and that a post-maintenance functional test showed the valve was
operational.
M1.5.2 Spent Fuel Canister Closure Weldment Welder Performance Qualification
a. Inspection Scope
To observe the conduct of welder performance qualification test to
assure compliance with ASME Code Section IX, Regulatory and Procedure
Requirements.
b. Observation and Findings
At the time of this inspection, the licensee was in the process of
requalifying a welder to weld the closure joint on a spent fuel
canister. The test was being conducted using the machine gas tungsten
arc welding process with remote visual control to the requirements of
Field Weld Data Sheet, No. L-165B Rev. 1. Within these areas, the
inspector checked the power supply unit, and the wire feed equipment and
the remote visual control console for physical condition, operability,
and evidence of calibration as applicable. The test was performed on a
3/8" plate in the flat 1G position. Joint contour involved a typical 37
1/2 degree open groove with backing. During the test, the inspector
observed filler metal deposition over several passes and verified that
the weld was being fabricated within the essential variables of QW-360,
ASME Code,Section IX and the parameters of FWDS L-165B, Rev. 1. Also,
through observation and discussion with the welder being requalified,
the inspector determined that he had adequate knowledge and expertise
with the process and technique to requalify successfully. Following the
close of this inspection, the individual monitoring the test and
responsible for evaluating the test coupons for integrity provided the
ENCLOSURE 2
8
inspector with a copy of the performance qualification record showing
that the welder had passed requalification requirements.
M1.5.3 Review of Weld Procedure Qualification Records
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed weld procedure and associated Field Weld Data
Sheet qualification records to verify compliance with ASME Code Section
IX, Regulatory and Procedural requirements.
b. Observation and Findings
PIP NO. 0-095-1409 was written to document a concern over the apparent
lack of independent inspections in the conduct of welding procedure
qualifications. In this regard, the inspector ascertained that the
problem as described in the subject PIP involved a review of the
licensee's welding procedure qualification record L-137D. The
inspector's review of this qualification record showed that the
individual who qualified the process did the brazing, tested the coupons
for code acceptance, certified the results as meeting code requirements,
and approved the procedure. In addition, the inspector noted that the
above mentioned PIP identified additional examples of weld procedure
qualifications where the same individual had performed a number of the
activities described above during the qualification process. Following
are examples where this same individual performed a number of activities
and functions during the qualification process.
L-129D
L-131D
L-133D
L-134D
L-137D
Weld\\Braze Test
A
A
A
A
A
Test Coupons
A
A
A
A
A
Certify Results
A
B
B
B
A
Approve Procedure
A
B
B
B
A
Qualify Process
A
A
A
A
A
QA Review
B
A
A
A
B
By review of the organizational chart the inspector ascertained that
both individuals (A and B) work in the same organization, the metallurgy
laboratory. Both individuals work for the same supervisor and are
essentially charged with similar tasks which suggests a lack of
independence between two separate functions, welding and inspections.
In discussing this issue with site mechanical maintenance and safety
assurance managers, the inspector expressed concern over the adequacy of
the welding program as implemented by Procedure L-100, Rev. 13, in that
it does not preclude the same individual from performing in the role of
a craft/welder, a QC inspector, a QA reviewer, and a certifier of his
own work. The licensee's cognizant engineer indicated that an
investigation of this practice was being pursued through the PIP process
and that a decision was expected to be reached by July 1, 1996. In
conclusion, the inspector stated that failure to perform inspection of
activities affecting quality by individuals other than those who
ENCLOSURE 2
9
performed the activity was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion X requirements. Violation 50-269,270,287/96-10-03: Weld
Procedure Qualifications Welded, Tested, Certified and Approved by same
Individual, was identified.
M1.5.4 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Maintenance: Eddy Current Examination
Results, Unit 2 (73755)
a. Inspection Scope
Through discussions with cognizant personnel and by review of eddy
current examination records the inspector ascertained inspection results
and corrective actions taken by the licensee before returning both S/Gs
to service. The following table depicts a summary of the number of
tubes examined, the type of examination performed, and corrective
actions taken.
The numbers in parentheses represent the original work scope quantities
planned or estimated:
Activity
A H/L
A C/L
B H/L
B C/L
1. MRPC 1-690 plugs - 20
54
0 (35)
78
0 (40)
H/L (orig. included
c/1 baseline)
2. MRPC Lane/Wedge
227
N/A
222
N/A
3. Bobbin/Plus Pt. sleeves
278/57(278)
N/A
266/54(266) N/A
(all 1-690) (orig.
included plus Pt. all)
4. Re-expanded rolls
0
2
1
1
5. 0.510 Bobbin (100%)
15,393
15,263
coil probe
6. MRPC special interest
1213 (680)
2124(1094)
tubes
7. Plug removal
none
none
8. Tubes plugged
199 (61)
213(65)
9. Tube Pulls
4 full length from 2A cold leg
A review of Unit 2 steam generator maintenance data on tubes plugged
following this outage (EOC-15) was as follows:
S/G
Tubes Plugged
% Of Tubes Plugged
Plug Limit Tubes Sleeved
2A
337
2.17%
10% max*
277
2B
481
3.10%
10% max*
261
- The licensee is performing analysis to raise the plugging limit to 15%
per S/G.
ENCLOSURE 2
10
M1.5.5 S/G 2A Upper Head-to-Tubesheet Weld With Subsurface Flaw Indication
a. Inspection ObJective:
Provide a summary of the licensee's ISI examination findings in the
upper head-to-tubesheet weld No. 2-SGA-WG58-1, including disposition of
the indication identified and NRR's safety evaluation.
b. Discussion:
As required by the licensee's Third Ten Year interval examination,
inspection of the subject weld was performed during the 1996 EOC-15
refueling outage per ASME Code Section XI, 1989 edition requirements.
Examination of this weld was also performed during the two previous
intervals.
During the first interval, this weld was examined in 1982 during the
fifth refueling outage per ASME Code,Section XI, 1974 edition
requirements. The weld was re-examined during the second interval in
1990 during the eleventh outage per ASME,Section XI, 1980 edition
requirements.
Examination of the weld during the 1996 refueling outage led to the
identification of a subsurface ultrasonic indication that exceeded code
allowable size. The indication was located close to the midplane of the
weldment and measured 56 inches in length, 0.8 inches in depth, and was
located 3.8 inches from the outer and 3.9 inches from the inner weld
surface. Because the indication exceeded code allowable flaw size, the
licensee evaluated the indication under IWB-3600 and Appendix A code
requirements. This evaluation showed the weld was acceptable under IWB
3132.4, Acceptance by Analytical Evaluation. This paragraph references
IWB-2420 which requires re-examination of the flaw during the next three
inspection periods for monitoring for possible growth. On May 2, 1996,
the licensee communicated this finding and analytical results by
telephone to NRR who indicated that as required by IWB-3134, details of
the evaluation and analysis had to be submitted for their review and
approval before the plant could resume operations. On May 3, 1996, the
licensee submitted the requested information to NRR who reviewed and
accepted the evaluation and analysis as the basis for continued
operation with the proviso for re-examination of the weld as required by
the code.
M2
Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
M2.1 Testing of the Unit 2 Reactor Protective Channels
a. Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed Section 7.2, Reactor Protective System (RPS), of
the FSAR which requires that RPS Channel A be electrically trip tested
for every input up to and including the channel trip relay within one
ENCLOSURE 2
11
week of unit-startup. It further required that the B, C, and 0 channels
be tested consecutively within the following 45 day periods.
b. Observations and Findings:
The inspectors questioned the licensee as to how this requirement was
met after the Unit 2 Refueling Outage was completed and returned to
service on May 7, 1996. In response, the licensee informed the
inspectors that the sequence of testing the RPS channels was not
performed as outlined in the FSAR. The A channel was not tested within
the one week requirement as specified in the FSAR. Channel A was tested
on June 13, 1996, under the requirements specified in WO 96043107.
The TS was changed by Amendment No. 199 to Facility Operating License
DRP-38, Amendment No. 199 to Facility Operating License DPR-47, and
Amendment No. 196 to Facility Operating License DRP-55 to require that
the testing for each RPS channel be performed within a time period not
to exceed 45 days but not in a particular sequence. The TS change was
approved and received by the licensee on April 13, 1996.
Although the FSAR had not been changed, a proposed change that
incorporated the TS amendments had been prepared and was scheduled to be
presented to the NRC on June 30, 1996.
c. Conclusion:
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's effort to review and update
the FSAR was acceptable for the issue identified.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenace Issues (92902, 90712)
M8.1
(Closed) VIO 269/94-28-01: Failure To Follow Procedure (Breaker
Installation)
On September 12, 1994, during the performance of TN/1/A/2881/0/DL1, step
8.8.10, which required that internal wiring of the replacement breaker
assembly be verified by performing a meg ohm (continuity) check between
the conductors, was not performed prior to installing breaker 1XO-F1AT
in motor control center 1XO. The breaker leads had been inadvertently
reversed during the modification process and this resulted in the loss
of MCC 1XO when the breaker compartment stabs contacted the bus bars due
to a phase to phase short. Loss of 1XO resulted in the loss of the
majority of the Unit 1 radiation monitors, as well as pressurizer spray
control.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the
licensee's response letter, dated November 17, 1994, to be reasonable
and complete. This violation is closed.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 269/94-05: Containment Isolation Valve Technically
This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/94-32
and was dispositioned as Non-Cited Violation 50-269/94-32-02, Inoperable
ENCLOSURE 2
12
Containment Isolation Valve Due To Maintenance Error. Accordingly, this
LER is closed.
M8.3
(Closed) LER 287/94-01: Reactor Trip On False High Level Indication Due
To Equipment Failure.
This LER describes the reactor trip that occurred on March 1, 1994, when
a defective heater drain tank level switch caused a false high drain
tank level signal to be generated. The resulting transient and the
licensee's corrective actions were addressed in detail in Inspection
Report 50-269,270,287/94-08. As corrective actions were considered
appropriate, this LER is closed.
III. Engineering
El
Conduct of Engineering (37551, 37550)
E1.1 Hydrogen Accumulation During the Welding of a Spent Fuel Canister
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response tu Information
Notice 96-34, Hydrogen Gas Ignition During Closure Welding Of A VSC-24
Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket.
b. Observations and Findings
The licensee performed an evaluation, Calculation OSC - 6580, to
determine the amount of hydrogen that would be generated when welding
the lid on the canisters that are utilized to store spent fuel in the
This evaluation was in response to the combustible gas burn
at Point Beach Nuclear Plant when a welder began welding the lid to the
canister. The ONS canisters have an aluminum coating inside whereas the
canister at Point Beach was coated with a Carbo Zinc-11 material.
The results of the ONS evaluation revealed that the "worst case"
hydrogen yields at ONS could reach 1.7 volume percent, but nominally
would not exceed 0.26 volume percent for the ONS equipment. A second
calculation utilizing the Carbo Zinc-11 coated spent fuel canisters like
those utilized at Point Beach revealed that a volume of 40.80 percent
could be obtained. Based on this calculation, the licensee determined
that the corrosion of aluminum was not enough to generate sufficient
hydrogen during the time period of concern to reach the lower
flammability limit for hydrogen even for the most conservative case.
Actual measurements were made during welding of canister #37 which
revealed a hydrogen content of 2.05 volume percent. Although this
amount is less than the lower flammability limit, the licensee is
further evaluating the source of the hydrogen.
ENCLOSURE 2
c. Conclusion
13
The licensee's actions in taking a proactive role in evaluating the
Point Beach Incident as it related to ONS was considered a strength.
E3
Engineering Procedures and Documentation
E3.1
Failure to Reauest Relief
The project manager identified that the licensee had not requested
relief related to the Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Head Weld
on Units 1, 2, and 3 since at least the beginning of the Second
Inservice Inspection Interval.
Section XI of the ASME Code Examination
Category B-A, Item B1.21, requires 100% volumetric examination of
accessible length of one circumferential head weld as defined by Figure
IWB 2500-3. The licensee did not meet the requirements of TS 4.2.1
which states that inservice examination of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3
components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10
CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g)(4), to the extent practicable within the
limitations of design, geometry and materials of construction of the
components, except where specific written relief has been granted by the
Commission. The licensee is in the process of requesting relief for
Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Reactor Vessel Weld WR35. This failure
constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a
Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement
Policy.
This issue will be identified as NCV 50-269,270,287/96-10-02,
Failure To Request Relief.
E8
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903, 90712)
E8.1
(Closed) LER 50-269/94-01, Seismic/LOOP Event May Result In The Loss Of
Post Accident Cooling Due To Design Deficiency
The licensee identified on December 30, 1993, during a walkdown of the
CCW System, 4 valves on Units 1, 2, and 3 that did not appear on the CCW
flow diagrams. The valves and some instrument tubing were located near
buoyancy restraints on the system. Due to the potential for interaction
during a seismic event, an operability evaluation was performed. The
results of the evaluation revealed that these valves could be sheared
and result in the system becoming inoperable due to the intake of air at
the interface points. This intake of air could be sufficient to defeat
the siphon mode of operation during a loss of offsite power (LOOP).
An investigation into the situation revealed that the buoyancy
restraints were installed on July 18, 1991, October 14, 1992, and June
22, 1992, for Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The evaluation
determined that air leakage could be sufficient to cause the loss of
siphon effect and therefore the units would have been inoperable since
the dates that the restraints were installed.
ENCLOSURE 2
14
The licensee implemented a minor modification to increase the clearance
between the buoyancy restraints and the instrument lines to reduce the
potential for failure with respect to a seismic event. In addition, the
valves were added to the flow diagram drawings. The inspector reviewed
the system and determined that the interferences in question had been
corrected. This LER is closed based on the licensee's efforts to
identify, report and correct the deficiency.
E8.2 (Closed) VIO 269,270,287/94-28-03: Corrective Actions Associated With
Turbine Bypass Valves Randomly Repositioning Not Adequate.
On August 10, 1994, the Unit 3 "B" steam generator was blown down to a
dry condition when the turbine bypass valves for that steam header
randomly repositioned following power restoration to the Integrated
Control Circuit module controlling the valves. The licensee had been
aware of the potential for this event for several months. However, the
preventive measures which were implemented were ineffective in
preventing the dryout event.
The licensee replaced the ICS modules with an equivalent module which
does not randomly reposition the bypass valves. The inspectors
confirmed that the new modules Were installed for -ll three Oconee units
on August 13, 1994. This item is closed.
E8.3
(Closed) Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-26:
Pressure Transient Protection
The inspector reviewed the documentation and inspection efforts for USI
A-26, and concluded that the modifications had been completed and
documented in previous inspection reports. The final open item for this
USI was Inspector Followup Item 50-269,270,287-98-36-03, Revised Low
Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) System Operability. This IFI was closed
and documented in Inspection Report 50-269,270,287-91-31. This IFI was
considered closed based on implementation of Technical Specification 3.1.2.9, which specifies requirements for assuring operability of the
LTOP system. USI A-26 is closed.
IV. Plant Support Areas
P1
Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities
On June 26, 1996, the inspector observed portions of activities
associated with the licensee's emergency response drill 96-02. The
initiation of the drill scenario involved a S/G Tube Rupture in the 1A
S/G. An Alert was declared, and the technical support center (TSC) was
activated. The inspector observed activities with manning the TSC. The
inspector concluded that the licensee conducted the drill professionally
and thoroughly.
ENCLOSURE 2
15
Si
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
a. Inspection Scope (TI 2515/127)
On April 25, 1991, the Commission published 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel
Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, which
required licensees to fully implement their Access Authorization Program
(AAP) by April 27, 1992.
By letter dated July 1, 1994, the licensee
submitted Revision 0 to .the Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Physical
Security Plans committing to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and NRC
Regulatory Guide 5.66, Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power
Plants.
The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) has published
NUMARC 89-01, "Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access
Authorization Programs," dated August 1989, which was adopted by NRC's
Regulatory Guide 5.66 as an Appendix. During an inspection of the
licensee's AAP conducted November 13-17, 1995, it was noted that for
approximately 11 months, the licensee allowed a vendor to continue to
implement their AAP after determining the vendor failed to assure that
individuals granted unescorted access were trustworthy and reliable. On
June 17, 1996, at the Duke Power Company Corporate Office, the inspector
reviewed the corrective actions implemented by the licensee in response
to this identified violation (VIO 50-269,270,287/95-24-02).
b. Observations and Findings
The licensee performed a 100 percent audit of the vendor's access
authorization records and program during the period of December 4-8,
1995, to confirm acceptability of the vendor's AAP. Three findings were
noted by the licensee with respect to three individuals granted
unescorted access prior to the completion of background investigations.
These three background investigations were completed during the audit.
No derogatory information was revealed. Additionally, the vendor
responded to these findings and delineated corrective actions in a
letter to the licensee dated December 14, 1995.
The licensee failed to have a procedure in place to audit small vendor
AAPs. The licensee developed "Procedure for Evaluating
Contractor's/Vendor's Access Authorization and Fitness For Duty
Programs," Revision 1, dated January 19, 1996. This procedure outlines
the responsibility of the auditor in relation to conducting audits of
vendors not being reviewed under a joint utility audit. In addition,
the Manager, Workforce Processing's role, in the area of acceptance of a
vendor's AAP, is documented. Previously, these two individuals'
responsibilities were not clearly delineated. The procedure also
outlines necessary steps in cases of nonconformance by a vendor to
assure action is taken to correct the deficiencies, or upon
determination, having the vendor removed from the approved
contractor/vendors list of acceptable AAPs.
ENCLOSURE 2
16
Licensee procedure "Access Authorization Program," Reviqion 8, has been
revised to reflect clear responsibility of the Manager, Workforce
Processing. The licensee has incorporated audit function
responsibilities for vendor programs as well as the Manager, Workforce
Processing's responsibilities to ensure that vendor/contractor employees
meet Duke Power Company and NRC requirements, before being granted
unescorted access. The procedure also provides clarification with
respect to temporary access authorization requirements.
In a letter dated January 22, 1996, the licensee committed to performing
a full audit of their AAP. Upon further discussion with licensee
representatives, the inspector was informed this audit would be
conducted during the period of October 28 - November 8, 1996. The
licensee stated the audit report would be made available for review.
c. Conclusions
Based on document and record review and discussion with licensee
representatives, the inspector found the licensee's corrective actions
to be thorough and timely. The licensee's procedures now more clearly
define responsibility between Workforce Processing and the audit review
group to better prevent recurrence of the violation. This item is
closed.
V. Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 18, 1996. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
Partial List of Persons Contacted
Licensee
B. Peele, Station Manager
M. Bailey, Acting Regulatory Compliance Manager
D. Coyle, Systems Engineering Manager
J. Davis, Engineering Manager
T. Coutu, Operations Support Manager
W. Foster, Safety Assurance Manager
J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site
D. Hubbard, Maintenance Superintendent
C. Little, Electrical Systems/Equipment Manager
.
J.
Smith, Regulatory Compliance
G. Rothenberger, Operations Superintendent
R. Sweigart, Work Control Superintendent
ENCLOSURE 2
17
NRC
D. LaBarge, Project Manager
Inspection Procedures Used
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62703: Maintenance Observation
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 92901:
Followup -
Plant Operations
IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance
IP 92903:
Followup -
Engineering
IP 90712:
LER Followup
IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Event Response
IP 37550:
Engineering
IP 40500:
Problem Identification, Resolution and Prevention
TI 2515/127: Access Authorization
Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed
Opened
50-270/96-10-01
Failure To Change Flux/Flow/Imbalance Setpoint
(Section 01.2)
50-269,270,287/96-10-03 VIO
Weld Procedure Qualifications Welded,
Tested,
Certified
and
Approved
By
Same
Individual
(Section M1.5.3)
50-269,270,287/96-10-02 NCV
Failure To Request Relief (Section E3)
Closed
50-269,270,287/94-38-01 VIO
Failure to Follow Keowee Transfer Procedure
(Section 08.1)
50-269/94-28-01
Failure To
Follow Procedure During Breaker
Installation (Section M8.1)
50-269/94-05
LER
Containment Isolation Valve Technically
Inoperable (Section M8.2)
50-269/94-01
LER
Seismic/LOOP Event May Result In The Loss Of Post
Accident
Cooling
Due
to
Design
Deficiency
(Section E8.1)
50-269,270,287/95-24-02 VIO
Failure To Assure Individuals Granted Unescorted
Access Were Trustworthy And Reliable (Section S1)
USI A-26
Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
Pressure
Protection (Section E8.3)
ENCLOSURE 2
18
50-287/94-01
LER
Reactor Trip On False High Level Indication Due
To Equipment Failure (Section M8.3)
50-269,270,287/94-28-03 VIO
Corrective Actions Associated With Turbine Bypass
Valves
Randomly
Repositioning
Not
Adequate
(Section E8.2)
List of Acronyms
Access Authorization Program
ASW
Auxiliary Service Water
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Condenser Circulating Water
Duke Power Company
End Of Cycle
IR
Inspection Report
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
In Service Test
In Service Inspection
KHU
Keowee Hydro Unit
LER
Licensee Event Report
Loss of Offsite Power
Low Pressure Injection
Low Pressure Service Water
Low Temperature Overpressure
Maintenance Procedure
Non-Cited Violation
NSM
Nuclear Station Modification
NSD
Nuclear System Directive
Nuclear Management and Resources Council
Oconee Nuclear Station
PSID
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge
Preventive Maintenance
Problem Investigation Process
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
S/G
SSF
Safe Shutdown Facility
TS
Technical Specification
Work Control Center
Work Order
ENCLOSURE 2