ML15224A599
| ML15224A599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1989 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A598 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-89-29, 50-270-89-29, 50-287-89-29, NUDOCS 8912070136 | |
| Download: ML15224A599 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1989029
Text
Spa REG(q
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
NOV 221L
Report Nos.:
50-269/89-29, 50-270/89-29, and 50-287/89-29
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC
28242
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270,
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and
and 50-287
Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3
Inspection Conducted:
September 25-28, 1989
Inspector:6
o
/- 3
E. D. Testa
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel: S. Ninh
L. Wiens
F. Victor
Approved bv:q&J.
c
__L__
//-
3
W. H. Rankin, Chief
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the
annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified;
however,
three exercise
weaknesses:
1) inadequate demonstration of command and control of the fire
fighting resources during the fire drill, 2) emergency classification at the
Site Area Emergency Classification was not completed until approximately
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes after the initiating event, and 3) timely notification
of State and local government officials was not made at the Alert in that it
took 36 minutes to complete notification class (Paragraphs 3, 6, and 7).
F1*
t :A
-:'112
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. Austin, Nuclear Production Engineer
- R. Brown, Production Specialist II
- D. Davidson, Production Specialist III
- J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
- J.
Groves, I&E Maintenance Services
- N. Hammett, Contract Services Security Specialist
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner
- C. Jennings, Station Emergency Planner
- P. Kusek, Supervisor, World of Energy
- G. McAninch, Shift Manager
- R. Norris, Nuclear Production Engineer
- P. Stovall, Director, Operator Training
- D. Sweigant, Suptintendent of Operations
- M. Tuckman, Station Manaaer
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen,
engineers,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
P. Skinner
- L. West
- Attended exit interview
2. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
No
previous emergency preparedness enforcement matters remained
outstandina.
3.
Exercise Scedario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and
organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to 10 CFR 50,
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
2
the scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in
advance of the schedule exercise date. As a result of the discussion the
licensee moved the Medical Drill scheduled a day prior to the main
exercise to the day of the exercise.
The licensee also added a small
break LOCA in addition to the seismic event. These additions resulted in
a more challengina exercise and are considered scenario enhancements. The
final data and exercise message packets including the chanaes were
discussed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held September 26, 1989.
The scenario developed for this small scale exercise was detailed, and
exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The exercise was conducted
from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on September 27,
1989.
The
exercise involved limited participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties and
the State of South Carolina.
Their participation involved notification
only.
The.controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise. The
inspector observed no undue interaction between the controllers and the
players.
The exercise used the onsite simulator as the Unit 1 Control Room. Its
use provided a unique opportunity to evaluate player reaction to changing
plant conditions.
Players were able to demonstrate those actions that
they would take to cope with an emergency in the plant.
In addition to the main exercise conducted on September 27, 1989, a fire
drill was conducted on Tuesday, September 26,
1989.
The fire drill was
designed to demonstrate proper response by the onsite fire brigade to a
simulated fire on the 7th floor of the new administration building just
outside the protected area.
The drill was also designated to demonstrate
the ability to obtain fire-fighting support from offsite fire departments.
After some initial confusion by the county fire dispatcher as to whether
the request was real or if the equipment were actually to respond, four
pieces of equipment responded. The onsite fire brigade responded with an
adequate number of personnel in appropriate time; however,
the fire
brigade leader did not demonstrate an aggressive manner in conducting a
search of the affected building and was ineffective in using his manpower
pool.
There was an inadequate demonstration of command and control of the
fire fighting resources.
In addition, the building elevator failed to
switch to a fire response mode when the fire alarm sounded and continued
to operate in the normal mode. The elevators were used in the normal mode
and transported at least two search teams.
The search sweeps of the
building were slow and not conducted in an expeditious manner.
The 7th
floor, where the simulated fire was located, was not searched.
The failure of the elevator to switch to a fire response mode was
identified as an inspector followup item (IFI).
The failure of the fire
brigade leader to aggressively and effectively use responders was
. identified as an exercise weakness.
The licensee committed to provide
repair of the elevator and provide additional trainina to the
3
fire brigade and demonstrate the corrective actions during a February 1990
drill.
IFI 50-269, 270, 287/89-29-01:
Failure of the new administration building
elevator to switch to a fire response mode.
Exercise Weakness 50-269,
270,
287/89-29-02:
Failure to demonstrate
aocressive leadership and use of available manpower resources.
A simulated medical emergency occurred in the vicinity of the boric acid
water storage tank (BWST).
One of the team responding to the simulated
leak fell and suffered a contaminated compound fracture of the leg.
The
medical response team responded and provided first aid and moved the
victim out through security to the offsite ambulance.
The inspector
observed responders leaning over and obtaining supples from outside the
establish contamination zone thus spreading contamination. The victim was
not ready for transport when the ambulance arrived. It took approximately
12 minutes to ready the victim for transport. The victim's wound was not
surveyed for contamination until after he was placed inside the ambulance.
This was identified as an inspector followup item (IFI).
IFI 50-269, 270, 287/89-29-03:
Failure to conduct timely wound surveys
and poor contamination control during a simulated medical emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that
adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for
the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate
staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial
response
organization
was
augmented
by
designated
licensee
representatives.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term
or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that
sufficient technical staff were available to provide for continuous
staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and the
Operations Support Center (OSC).
At each response center, the required
staffing and assionment of responsibility was consistent with the
licensee's approved procedures.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
4
5. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
the
following
requirements
were
implemented
pursuant
to
Paracraph IV.A of Appendix E to
arid
specific guidance
promulgated
in Section II.B of
NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;
(2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite
and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill
key functional
positions within the organization. Argumentation of the initial emergency
response organizations was accomplished through mobilization of additional
day-shift personnel.
The on-duty simulator Shift Supervisor assumed the
duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated
emergency,
and directed the response until formally relieved by the
Station Manacer.
Violations or deviations were not observed.
6. Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paracraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance
recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and
properly classify the simulated seismic event.
A team was dispatched to retrieve the seismic scratch plates from the
tendon gallery. When the site assembly siren sounded this team responded
to the call for accountability.
After the site accountability was
accomplished some 30 minutes later the team assigned to retrieve the
scratch plate was
redeployed to other jobs.
The need for this
information and the retrieval status apparently was lost in information
transfer during turnover from the Simulator Shift Control Room Supervisor
to the TSC Director.
This caused a significant delay in retrieval of
important seismic data which would have upgraded the event to a Site Area
Emergency.
In response
to the Seismic Trigger Statalarm and
procedure AP/1/A/1700/05 (Earthquake) and AP/2/A/1700/05 (Earthquake) the
shift supervisor tasked I&E to obtain and analyze the tendon gallery peak
acceleration recorder and strong motion accelerometer (SMN-3),
I&E was
given the assignment seven minutes after the Earthquake occurred.
The
scratch plate analysis was not completed until approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and
15minuiftter the seismic event.
5
This delay in classification to a Site Area Emergency was identified as an
exercise weakness.
The licensee committed to provide training and
demonstrate corrective actions at a February 1990 drill.
Exercise Weakness 50-269,
270, 287/89-29-04:
Failure to make a timely
emergency classification.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for
notification of State and local response organizations and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup
messages to response organizations were established.
This area was
further observed to assure that means to prcvide early notification to the
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedure were
established and available for use in providing information reaardina the
simulated emergency condition to Federal,
State,
and local response
organizations,
and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
organization.
An inspector observed that the Alert notification exceeded the 15 minutes
time criteria. The selective signal system in the simulator control room
was believed to be inoperable. The communicator stated that he could not
obtain an outside line for direct dealing when trying to use the alternate
telephone. The communicator then requested the plant switchboard operator
to initiate the call.
The operator could not reach county or State
response centers.
The notification message was finally transmitted by the
Unit 1 control room by radio to the counties.
The state was in turn
notified by one of the counties.
As a result the notification for the
Alert,
communication took approximately 21 minutes longer than the
15 minutes criteria (a total of 36 minutes).
The telephone systems at the
simulator do not mimic these used in the plant.
Different instructions
are needed to make notification calls.
The Site Area Emergency
notification from the TSC was accomplished within the 15 minutes criteria.
The failure to notify within 15 minutes at the Alert classification was
identified as an exercise weakness. The licensee committed to demonstrate
timely notifications of offsite agencies at a future drill.
Exercise Weakness 50-269,
270,
287/89-29-05:
Failure to make timely
offsite notifications at the Alert classification.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
6
8.
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt
communications
among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
and
specific guidance promulgated
in Section II.F of
The inspector observed communication within and between the licensee's
emergency response facilities (Control Room Simulator, TSC, and OSC) and
between the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC. Adequate
onsite communication were observed and no problems were observed in
communication between the TSC and the field monitoring teams.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and specific quidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing,
and operation of the
emergency response facilities and observed the use of equipment at the
facilities. Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the
exercise included the Simulator Control Room, OSC, and the TSC.
a. Simulator Control Room - The inspector observed that following review
and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Simulator Control
Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required
response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were
available and followed. Problems associated with prompt notification
are discussed in Paragraph 7.
The location of the simulator limited the number of personnel and
precluded overcrowding.
Simulator Control
Room personnel
demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system
for the Alert declaration. The use of the simulator was considered a
positive enhancement to the exercise.
b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed
following notification by the Shift Supervisor of the simulated
emergency conditions. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of
their emergency duties, authorities,
and responsibilities.
The
facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the
assigned staff.
Inspection disclosed the followina additional findings, namely:
(1) The transfer of duties from the Simulator Control Room to the
TSC was definite with the exception of the request to retrieve
the scratch plate (This is discussed further in Paragraph 6),
7
(2) Briefinas of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with
change in plant status and related emergency conditions;
(3) accountability was accomplished in 30 minutes which is
within the accepted time guidance Operative Support Center - the
OSC was promptly staffed following the request by the Simulator
Control
Room (Emergency Coordinator).
The inspector observed
that teams were assembled, briefed, and dispatched.
The OSC
Supervisor appeared to be coanizant of his duties and
responsibilities.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods,
systems,
and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were is use as required
by
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status,
damage caused by the simulated seismic event,
and an
assessment of radiological hazard to onsite and offsite personnel
resultina from the accident.
Onsite and offsite radiological environmental monitorina teams were
dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within
the influence of the simulated plume.
Radiological effluent data was
received and reviewed in the TSC.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
11.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concernina the simulated
emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to
(7),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Public information was not evaluated during the subject exercise.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were
brouaht to the attention of management and documented for corrective
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV. F of Appendix E to
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
8
The
licensee conducted
a series of post-exercise critiques on
September 28, 1989.
Critiques were held with players, controllers, and
management. The management critique was attended by exercise controllers,
observers,
and the NRC representatives.
Findinas identified during the
exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action
on identified findinas will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique was detailed,
and addressed both substantive
deficiencies, and planned improvement items. The conduct of the critique
was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidances cited above.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
13.
Followup Items (92701)
(Closed) Exercise Weakness
50-269,
270,
287/88-09-01:
Incorrect
classification of an emergency declaration.
Inspection of the revised
emergency classification procedure for Alert and Site Area Emergency
action levels regardina loss of shutdown function and changes to the
Emergency Plan (Volume A) indicate a clear definition for Alert and Site
Area Emergency classifications.
(Closed)
IFI 50-269,
270,
287/88-09-02:
Failure to brief offsite
monitoring/sampling teams prior to deployment to assigned offsite areas.
Inspection during the exercise disclosed that adequate briefings were
conducted for the offsite monitoring/sampling teams prior to deployment to
assigned offsite sampling locations
15.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 28, 1989,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
findinas listed below.
The licensee committed to provide training and
demonstrate
corrective actions to the exercise weaknesses
at a
February 1990 drill.
The licensee did not identify-as proprietary any of
the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this
inspection. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Description and Reference
50-269, 270, 287/89-29-01
IFI - Failure of the new administration
buildina elevator to switch to a fire
response mode (Paragraph 3).
50-269, 270, 287/89-29-02
Exercise Weakness - Failure to
demonstrate aggressive leadership and
use of available manpower resources
(Paragraph 3).
9
50-269, 270, 287/89-29-03
IFI - Failure to conduct timely wound
surveys and poor contamination control
during a simulated medical emergency
(Paragraph 3).
50-269, 270, 287/89-29-04
Exercise Weakness - Failure to make a
timely
emergency
classification
(Paragraph 6).
50-269, 270, 287/89-29-05
Exercise Weakness -
Failure to make
timely offsite notifications at the
Alert classification (Paragraph 7).
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives
I.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
A.
Scope
The Oconee exercise,
to be conducted on September
27,
1989,
is
designed to meet the exercise requirements of
10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.
The
1989 exercise
will involve limited participation by Oconee and Pickens
Counties
and
the State of South Carolina,
to receive
communications only.
The Duke Power Crisis Management
Center will not participate.
Limited drills will be held on September 26, 1989. A
separate
medical
drill
will
be
held
to
involve
transportation of a contaminated, injured patient to the
hospital. A separate fire drill will involve support by
the off-site fire department.
A formal critique involving Duke Power and NRC will be
held on September
28,
1989 at 1:00 P.M.
in
the Oconee
Office Building.
This critique will be closed to the
public and will be held at Oconee Nuclear Station.
B.
Exercise
Objectives
(Duke
Power
Company
Emergency
Organization)
Emergency Management
1.
Oemonstrate
the
ability
to
declare
emergency
classification in accordance with procedures.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and the
counties within
15
minutes
after declaring an
emergency
or
after
changing
the
emergency
classification.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff
the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert
or higher emergency class.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classes.
5.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30
minutes
in
a
simulated
emergency
and
provide
accountability for any not present at the assembly
locations.
6.
Demonstrate notification to all on-site personnel of
major changes in the emergency situation (emergency
class, TSC or OSC activation, etc.).
7.
Demonstrate access control measures to the plant
site, TSC, OSP, control room, and World of Eneray.
8.
Test
communications
equipment
among
on-site
emergency facilities including plant extensions, the
intercoms, and the on-site radio system.
9.
Test off-site communications equi ent to the county
and state warning points and
o NRC including the
Selective
Signaling
Syste ,
the
NRC
Emergency
Notification System, and/or outside telephone lines.
10.
Test
the adequacy and operability of emergency
equipment/supplies.
.11.
Demonstrate
precise
and
clear
transfer
of
responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the
Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the
TSC.
12
Demonstrate proper use of the Emergency Notification
Form and authentication methodology for messages
transmitted to states and counties.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to escalate, reduce the
level
of classification, or
close-out
from an
emergency using plant procedures as determined
by
the current plant conditions
Accident Assessment
14.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit and distribute
data using the Crisis Management
Data Transmittal
System in accordance with station procedures.
15.
Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment
tools:
1. Drawings
2. Data Display Boards
3. Maps
16. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and
control emergency worker exposure.
17.
Demonstrate
the
ability
to
determine
on-site
radiation
levels
and
airborne
radioiodine
concentrations.
18.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between
the field monitoring teams and the TSC.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site-dose projections
for a situation that is not specifically covered by procedure.
20.
Demonstrate the ability to locate on-site simulated radioactive
plume and to measure and determine if activity has moved beyond
the one-mile boundary.
Public Information
21.
Demonstrate
the
ability
to
provide
accurate
information to the news media in a timely manner and
to provide effective rumor control.
Plant Operations
-22.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and
provide mitigation strategies.
Medical Drill
23. Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical
emergency
involving
a
contaminated
patient
in
accordance with station procedures.
Fire Drill
24.
Demonstrate proper response by the on-site
fire
brigade to a simulated fire in accordance with
station procedures.
25. Demonstrate
the ability
to
request
and
obtain
fire-fighting support from the off-site department.
Corrective Actions
26.
Demonstrate resolution of previous exercise findings
(weaknesses/deficiencies) identified by evaluators.
(c:\\ons892\\scop&obj.892)
Rev. 4 / 09-25-89