IR 05000269/2021010
| ML21260A064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/2021 |
| From: | James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Snider S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| T Francis | |
| References | |
| IR 2021010 | |
| Download: ML21260A064 (18) | |
Text
September 17, 2021
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 & 3 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2021010 AND 05000270/2021010 AND 05000287/2021010
Dear Mr. Snider:
On August 26, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000269, 05000270 and 05000287 License Numbers: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Report Numbers: 05000269/2021010, 05000270/2021010 and 05000287/2021010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-010-0041 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3 Location: Seneca, SC Inspection Dates: August 02, 2021 to August 20, 2021 Inspectors: G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector A. Ruh, Resident Inspector G. Nicely, Contractor Approved By: James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Design Basis Functions Not Covered by MOV Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.
Systems NCV 02 05000269,05000270,05000287/202101 0-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a. Evaluated whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.
Specific Guidance b. Evaluated whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.
c. Evaluated whether testing of the sampled POVs was adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.
d. Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).
- (1) 1LP-19, 1A Reactor Building Suction Valve
- (2) 1RC-4, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Block Valve
- (3) 1LPSW-139, Unit 1 Low Pressure Service Water Nonessential Header Isolation Valve
- (4) 2HP-26, 2A High Pressure Injection Valve
- (5) 2PSW-6, Unit 2 Protected Service Water Supply Block Valve
- (6) 3CCW-287, Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water Pump to Steam Generator Supply Block Valve
- (7) 1LPSW-251, 1A Low Pressure Injection Cooler Low Pressure Service Water Control Valve
- (8) 3CC-8, Component Cooling Return Block Valve (Penetration #54)
- (9) 3FDW-316, 3B Steam Generator Emergency Feedwater Control Valve
INSPECTION RESULTS
Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Design Basis Functions Not Covered by MOV Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.0 Systems NCV 2 05000269,05000270,05000287/20210 10-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Description:
Calculation OSC-4697, "NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Calculation for High Pressure Injection Systems," states that 1, 2, 3HP-026 are QA Condition 1 valves and "shall be capable of being automatically opened upon an [Engineered Safeguards] ES Signal to align the [High Pressure Injection] HPI pumps to the Reactor Vessel. The throttling of these valves is required from the control room to prevent runout of the HPI pumps, assure adequate
[Net Positive Suction Head available] NPSHa during piggyback operation, or maintain the
[Reactor Coolant System] RCS pressure and temperature within sub-cooling limits to prevent pressurized thermal shock of the RCS." Operations may attempt to throttle 1, 2, 3HP-026 following postulated small break loss of coolant accidents and steam line break events, several times shortly after the accident occurs, and then less frequently over the subsequent 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to obtain the required injection flow rate. If the motor operated valve (MOV) throttling approaches the thermal capabilities of the stator windings or rotor, then a cool down period would be needed to prevent damaging the motor.
Limitorque Technical Update (LTU) 93-03 discusses motor torque de-rating as a result of increased motor temperature, and further states that Reliance 3-phase motors are designed with thermal characteristics that result in less than or equal to a 75 degree Celsius (C)temperature rise in a) 15 minutes at full load running torque, or b) 10 seconds at locked rotor.
While the Oconee MOV program accounted for motor torque de-rating in accordance with the guidance in LTU 93-03 for the initial opening stroke of the valve, the potential to exceed the motor thermal limitations due to subsequent throttling was not considered. The MOV program guidance did not discuss how to demonstrate the acceptability of the MOVs with a throttling function, such as through calculation, testing, or limits placed on their operation to prevent exceeding the motor thermal limitations.
Because,
- the 1, 2, 3HP-26 valves were expected to be throttled many times during the first hour following postulated events and several times after that,
- the injection valve actuates on an ES signal and it was predicted to experience some time at locked rotor current at the beginning of the event due to bus voltage transients,
- throttling attempts in the same direction as the previous attempt would lack the benefit of the hammer-blow feature designed into Limitorque actuators, potentially resulting in longer time at locked rotor conditions,
- predicted ambient temperatures would be higher than that upon which the duty cycle was based,
- and the operators were not provided guidance to either limit the throttle attempts or provide for a cooling period, the inspectors were concerned the valve actuator motor could be vulnerable to failure prior to its safety function being completed due to overheating caused by required valve operation. The licensee performed an evaluation accounting for ambient temperatures, the predicted stall times and an expected number of throttle attempts, and concluded the MOV would remain below the motor insulation temperature rating and was therefore operable.
Corrective Actions: The licensee generated NCRs 02393775 and 02394153 to address the identified performance deficiency. The licensee evaluated operability and determined that the applicable MOVs would be capable of opening automatically and being throttled from the control room and were capable of performing their specified safety functions for the required mission time.
Corrective Action References: NCRs 02393775 and 02394153
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to account for MOVs with a throttling operation required for the design basis safety function to be met within their MOV program was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee's failure to evaluate or limit the effects of the motor heat-up due to throttling operations of the valve did not ensure the reliability and capability of the component.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was associated with the design or qualification of a component and the component maintained its operability.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) required, in part, that the licensee must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, since the MOV program was established in the late 1990's, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 26, 2021, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Steven M. Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 19, 2021, the inspectors presented the initial inspection results to Mr. T.
Grant and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21N.02 Calculations CNC 1205.00-00- Evaluation of Posi Seal Butterfly Valve Sizing 2
0057 Methodology
CNC 1205.19-00- Kalsi Engineering Report 2919C, GL96-05 Periodic 0
0179 Verification Program for Butterfly Valves with 316
Microseal Bearings (JOG Class D)
DPC 1205.41-00- JOG-AOV Position Paper (JOG-TD-01 Rev 2): Spring 0
0006 Relaxation of Air Operators
OM 247. --0447 WEAK LINK ANALYSIS FOR 24" C & S BUTTERFLY W/ A
001 SMB-0-10 DMV-940
OM 247. -0449 GL 89-10 TORQUE CALCULATION INFORMATION FOR 05/03/1994
001 DMV-936, DMV-937, DMV-938, DMV-939, DMV-940
OSC -11860 Sizing and Setup Calculation for Oconee Ball Valve MOVs 1
OSC -11910 OSC-11910 Rev 0 KVAP for LPSW-251 -252 0
OSC -4671 UNITS 1 & 2 LPSW SYSTEM BENCHMARK 13
OSC -7175 JOG CATEGORY 1 AND CATEGORY 2 AIR OPERATED 8
VALVE LIST
OSC-10195 GL 89-10 Calculation for PSW Related Valves 2
OSC-10301 PSW System Overpressure Protection Analysis 2
OSC-10330 AOV Design Basis Capability Valve CC-8 1
OSC-10499 EPRI MOV PPM and JOG PV Classification - 2HP-026 0
OSC-10907 Evaluation of Stem Thrust Requirements for DMV-1462 0
Gate Valve Installed as 1,2,3PSW-6 at Oconee Nuclear
Station Using the EPRI MOV Solid and Flexible Wedge
Gate Valve Performance Prediction Methodology (PPM
Software Version 3.3)
OSC-11343 Evaluation of MOV Motors and ETAP Inputs 4
OSC-11581 U1/2/3 Keowee EPS and 100kV APS Voltage Analysis 1
OSC-2060 U2 APS Voltage and Fault Duty Analysis 27
OSC-4553 Maximum Differential Pressures for LPSW Valves 6
OSC-4643 GL 89-10 Review for RC Valves 7
OSC-4697 NRC GL 89-10 Calc for HP Injection Systems 15
OSC-5599 GL 89-10 MOV Calculation for Unit 3 Gate and Globe 35
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Valves at Oconee
OSC-5674 GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV CALCULATION FOR 39
UNIT GATE AND GLOBE VALVES AT OCONEE
OSC-5675 MOV Calc for U2 Gate and Globe Valves 39
OSC-5760 GL 89-10 MOV Calculation for Unit 1 Butterfly Valves at 14
Oconee
OSC-5930 U1 Motor Starter Control Circuit Voltage 17
OSC-6030 GL 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Review 3
of 1/2/3CCW-287
OSC-6039 GL 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of LPl 10
Valves
OSC-6143 U2 Motor Starter Control Circuit Voltage 16
OSC-7184 Calc for U1/2/3 Gate and Globe Valves 5
OSC-7562 FDW-315/316 Capability Evaluation 3
OSC-7608 AC Power System ETAP Model Base File 15
OSC-7913 Evaluation of EPRI MOV Methodology For 2LP-19 & 2LP- 2
20, 1LP-19
OSC-7938 FSAR Section 5.2.3.4 - ROTSG Steam Line Break Tube 6
Loading Boundary Condition
OSC-8034 Design Input Calc MOV Electrical Analysis 0
OSC-8176 GL 89-10 Review for Valves CCW-268 and CCW-287 0
OSC-9239 JOG CLASSIFICATION OF OCONEE'S GL96-05 MOV 7
POPULATION
OSC-9305 Handwheel Capability Evaluation on 1,2,3 FDW-315/316 0
Corrective Action AR 02147020,
Documents 02231288,
2387272,
2393029,
2387269,
01550917,
2119055,
297905,
2018376,
2046837,
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2041498,
2158333,
22316,
2345137,
2379507,
2343949,
2343959,
2343569,
2344871,
1905975,
1904970,
2343949
Corrective Action NCR 02391898 2021 POV DBAI: 2HP-26 has incorrect diagnostic test
Documents frequenc
Resulting from NCR 02392228 2021 DBAI - Incorrect UFSAR reference in section 6.3.3.4
Inspection NCR 02392469 2021 POV DBAI - LPI Room Deficiencies
NCR 02392590 2021 POV DBAI: Fastener Materials Incorrect on OM
Drawing
NCR 02392664 2021 POV DBAI items noted during walk down of 3CC-8
NCR 02392677 2021 POV DBAI MOV Calculation References Need
Updating
NCR 02392740 2021 DBAI POV Inspection; UFSAR Sec 5.4.6.4.1
discrepancy
NCR 02392749 Deficiencies in AOV calc OSC-10330
NCR 02392752 2021 DBAI: Issue with LPSW-251/252 Travel Stop Set
Proc
NCR 02392767 CCW-287 Calculations Need to Be Revised
NCR 02392771 2021 DBAI - Improper pipe class listed on drawings
NCR 02393029 2021 DBAI: Incorrect Valve Group label in OSC-11910
NCR 02393389 2021 DBAI: Error in OM 245.2388.001 weak link calc
NCR 02393635 2021 DBAI: Mean seat diameter in calcs for 1RC-4 and
NCR 02393775 2021 DBAI Limitorque Letter on MOV Jog Limitations
NCR 02393843 2021 DBAI: ETAP Non-Compliance with AD-IT-ALL-0002
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
NCR 02393947 FDW-316 Limit Switch Cable Entrance Sealing
NCR 02393991 2021 DBAI OSC-4553 normal operation pipe break
NCR 02394063 Improper as-left closed position for 1CC-8 & 2CC-8
NCR 02394110 2021 DBAI Overload Heaters for 1/2/3 RC-4 incorrect
NCR 02394153 2021 DBAI THERMAL CONSEQUENCES OF JOGGING
MOVS
NCR 02394201 2021 DBAI - RC-4 SET-UP CALC ORIGINAL TEST
DATA
NCR 02394203 2021 DBAI- Unverified Assumption in OSC-2060
NCR 02394292 OSC-9305 Hand Wheel Capability - 1,2,3 FDW-315/316
NCR 02394392 2021 DBAI: IST Plan passive failure discussion revision
NCR 02394431 2021 DBAI LIMITORQUE HBC OPERATOR
EFFICIENCIES
NCR 02394615 2021 DBAI REVIEW MEAN SEAT DIAMETER DEF. IN
GUIDANCE DOC
NCR 02394619 2021 DBAI - RE 3.03 design criteria not met when
updated
Drawings B62-440674A 600V MCC 1XSF 18
DPM 1205.00- Kalsi KVAP 4.2 Installation, Verification and Users 0
0014.001 Manual
EQMM-1393.01- Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual 13
N03-01 Equipment Type: Limit Switch Manufacturer: NAMCO
Model/Series: EA-180, Revision H or Later
O EE-138-31 E/D UNIT LPSW. LINE "A" TO TURB BLDG. HEADER 6
VLV # 1/14/165
O EE-138-50 ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM LOW PRESS SVC WATER 3
SYS DECAY HEAT COOLER A FLOW INSTRU SAFETY
POWER
O EE-152-01 E/D - RB EMERG. SUMP OUTL ET VLV. #1/53/46 8
O FD-102A-01-01 FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE INJECTION 72
SYSTEM BORATED WATER SUPPLY & LPI PUMP
SUCTION
O FD-102A-01-02 FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE INJECTION 62
SYSTEM (LPI PUMP DISCHARGE)
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
O FD-124A-01-01 FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE SERVICE 55
WATER SYSTEM TURBINE BUILDING (LOW
PRESSURE SERVICE WATER PUMPS)
O FD-124B-01-01 FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE SERVICE 70
WATER SYSTEM (AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICES)
O-2439C West Penetration Room Elevation 809-3 Auxiliary 61
Building
O-422H-22 Instrument Detail LPSW Flow Control to Decay Heat (LPI) 11
Coolers 1A
ODUK-0251.00- Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1/2/3 AOV Test Set-up 1
0001-001 Sheets
OM 251.--0758.001, AOV Vendor Data
OEE-150 Elementary Diagram 1RC-04 10
OEE-251-06 Elementary Diagram 2HP-26 16
OFD-121D-03-01 Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System 47
OFD-131A-02-02 Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW), (Steam 2
Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service)
OFD-133A-02-05 Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System 62
(SSF Auxiliary Service)
OFD-144A-3.2 Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System Reactor 18
Building Heat Exchangers
OM 201.- 14"- 150 pound O.S.Y Gate Valve D9
0378.001
OM 245-2444 Seismic Weak link report for 6 inch 1500# Class Borg 3
Warner with AMB-1-40 Limitorque Actuator, DMV-1692
OM 245.-- Valve Assembly - 6 Inch 1500LB. Gate C.S. Sched. 160 DI
2443.001 Motor Oper
OM 245.-- DMV-1462 - NPS 6 (DN 150) Bolted Bonnet Gate Valve D0G
2592.001 (Forged) C/W Electric Actuator
OM 245.-- DMV-1462 - Design/Seismic/Weak Link Report B
2660.001
OM 245.-- DMV-1462 Gate Valve Internal Design Information for 2
OM 245.- PORC Block Valve 1RC-04 Component Drawing 2
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2012.001
OM 247.-- O/L For Item 02B-566 8 IN 150LB BF VLV. W/Bettis Fail 0
282.001 Closed Air Op
OM 247.-- Installation and Maintenance Instruction Manual POSI- 08/19/1987
0302.001 SEAL High Performance Butterfly Valves
OM 247.-- I/B - For Bettis Air/Spring Actuator and KE Gear Box for 4
27.001 Item #02B-566
O-2422W-7, Instrument Detail Component Cooling Return
Penetration - Outside Block Valve CC-8
OM 247.-0425- 24" Plain Wafer Service Water System Tricentric Stop B
001
OM 247.-0425- 24" Plain Wafer Valve & Actuator Assembly A
2
OM 251. -- ASSEMBLY DRAWING FOR 8" VALVE, DMV-1118 0
0715.002
OM 251.-- DMV-1332 6X4 45 Actuator 657-End Diaphragm Actuated 2
0780.001 Control Valve W/Cavitrol III Cage
OM 251.-- Instruction Manual for Type 657NS Diaphragm Actuator 00A
0782.003
OM 251.- Outline & Assy Drawing 8" Q-Ball Control Valve ANSI E
0715.001 Class 300 w/ 150 Flanges w/ Pneumatic Actuator
OM 251.0818.001 HP Injection Valve 2HP-26 Component Drawing 1
OM 251.0818.001 HP Injection Control Valve 2HP-26 D1
ONTC-1-LP-019 1LP-019 14
ONTC-2-PSW- Test Acceptance Criteria Data Sheet for Valve 2PSW-006 1
0006
ONTC-3-CCW- Test Acceptance Criteria for Valves 3CCW-287 13
287
OSS-0254.00-00- Design Basis Specification for the Emergency Feedwater 57
1000 System
OSS-0254.00-00- Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System 44
1003
OSS-0254.00-00- Design Basis Specification for Component Cooling 20
22 System
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Engineering NSM ON-52972/0 Add New Line from LPSW Line "B" to Non-Essential 04/15/1996
Changes Header
Engineering OM 245-2388- Seismic Weak-Link Report for 14" 150# Powell Gate 4
Evaluations 001 Valve for 1,2LP-19. *20, -21 -22
OM 247. --0443 SEISMIC ANALYSIS AND DESIGN REPORT FOR 24" A
001 C&S BUTTERFLY (DMV-940)
Miscellaneous 1RC-04 2018-11 Performance Test Comments and Trending Report 11/04/2018
21QN78-TC-01 Technical Correspondence - Posi Seal Interference-Fit for A
Soft Seals
2HP0026 2019- Performance Test Comments and Trending Report 11/15/2019
11-15
AD-PI-ALL-0300 2021 ONS NRC POV (MOV) Readiness Assessment 06/03/2021
HPI ONS System Health Report High Pressure Injection System Q1-2021
OM 251. -- I/B -(VIEWABLE) DMV-1118 FOR 8" Q-BALL W/BETTIS 4
29.001 ACT
OM 308.0453.001 Cutler Hammer MCC Manual 3
ONOE-11473 Replace 1RC-04 with SB-0-25 03/24/1999
OSS-0254.00-00- Design Basis High Pressure Injection Systems 61
001
OSS-0254.00-00- (MECH) DESIGN BASIS SPEC FOR THE LOW 63
28 PRESSURE INJECTION AND CORE FLOOD SYSTEM
(LPI)
OSS-0254.00-00- Design Basis Reactor Coolant System 51
1033
OSS-0254.00-00- (MECH) DESIGN BASIS SPECIFICATION FOR THE 57
1039 LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
PO 96580_1RC- Purchase Order for 1RC-04 Replacement Actuator 05/07/2008
PO- Purchase Order for 2HP-26 02/02/2002
NM8796_2HP-26
Post Test 10/03/2014
Evaluation for
Post Test 07/26/2016
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Evaluation for
QuikLook Test 10/28/2020
data for 1CC-8
QuikLook Test 11/11/2017
data for 2CC-8
RA-21-0019 ONS Reply to NRC Notice of Violation: EA-2021-004 02/19/2021
RC ONS System Health Report Reactor Coolant System Q1-2021
TR-658951_1 2HP-26 , Wylie Labs Test Report - 2HP-26 02/17/1995
Procedures AD-EC-ALL-1117 Design Analyses and Calculations 9
AD-EG-ALL-1013 CONDUCT OF PLANT ENGINEERING 4
AD-EG-ALL-1431 AIR OPERATED VALVE SCOPE AND 2
CATEGORIZATION
AD-EG-ALL-1432 Air Operated Valve Design Basis Review 1
AD-EG-ALL-1433 Air Operated Valve Testing Requirements 2
AP/0/A/1700/025 Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating 67
Procedure
EP/2/A/1800/001 Unit 2 EOP Enclosures 5.41-5.46 8
0Q
IP/0/A/3012/007 DIAGNOSTIC TESTING AIR OPERATED VALVES 0
A USING TELEDYNE/QUIKLOOK SYSTEM
PD-EG-ALL-1430 Air Operated Valve Program 2
PT/1/A/0152/012 Low Pressure Injection System Valve Stroke Test 43
PT/1/A/0251/022 1LPSW-251 and 1LPSW-252 Travel Stop Verification 19
PT/1/A/0251/023 LPSW System Flow Test 30
RE-3.03, MCC Breaker and Overload Heater Selection 6
Relaying
Work Orders 01908400 PM 3CC-8 Actuator 10/06/2010
2106524 3CCW-287 Perf As Left VIPER 07/28/2016
20132208 07 1RC-04 Performance Surveillance Test 03/27/2019
20132208-01 IRC-04 Actuator Replacement 2018
20158924 2HP-26 Valve Stroke Test 11/22/2019
296240 3FDW-316 PM/Perform As Found Diag 03/03/2020
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
20303678 05 2HP-26 Performance Surveillance Test 12/01/2019
20447195,
20360984-07,
295942-01,
20360984,
20375910-06,
2027566-01
PT/1/A/0152/017 1RC-04 Stroke Test 05/19/2021
15