IR 05000269/2021010
| ML21260A064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/2021 |
| From: | James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Snider S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| T Francis | |
| References | |
| IR 2021010 | |
| Download: ML21260A064 (18) | |
Text
September 17, 2021
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 & 3 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2021010 AND 05000270/2021010 AND 05000287/2021010
Dear Mr. Snider:
On August 26, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000269, 05000270 and 05000287
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000269/2021010, 05000270/2021010 and 05000287/2021010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-010-0041
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3
Location:
Seneca, SC
Inspection Dates:
August 02, 2021 to August 20, 2021
Inspectors:
G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Ruh, Resident Inspector
G. Nicely, Contractor
Approved By:
James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Design Basis Functions Not Covered by MOV Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000269,05000270,05000287/202101 0-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a. Evaluated whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.
Specific Guidance b. Evaluated whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.
c. Evaluated whether testing of the sampled POVs was adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.
d. Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).
(1)1LP-19, 1A Reactor Building Suction Valve (2)1RC-4, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Block Valve (3)1LPSW-139, Unit 1 Low Pressure Service Water Nonessential Header Isolation Valve (4)2HP-26, 2A High Pressure Injection Valve (5)2PSW-6, Unit 2 Protected Service Water Supply Block Valve (6)3CCW-287, Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water Pump to Steam Generator Supply Block Valve (7)1LPSW-251, 1A Low Pressure Injection Cooler Low Pressure Service Water Control Valve (8)3CC-8, Component Cooling Return Block Valve (Penetration #54)
(9)3FDW-316, 3B Steam Generator Emergency Feedwater Control Valve
INSPECTION RESULTS
Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Design Basis Functions Not Covered by MOV Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000269,05000270,05000287/20210 10-01 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71111.21N.0 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Description:
Calculation OSC-4697, "NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Calculation for High Pressure Injection Systems," states that 1, 2, 3HP-026 are QA Condition 1 valves and "shall be capable of being automatically opened upon an [Engineered Safeguards] ES Signal to align the [High Pressure Injection] HPI pumps to the Reactor Vessel. The throttling of these valves is required from the control room to prevent runout of the HPI pumps, assure adequate
[Net Positive Suction Head available] NPSHa during piggyback operation, or maintain the
[Reactor Coolant System] RCS pressure and temperature within sub-cooling limits to prevent pressurized thermal shock of the RCS." Operations may attempt to throttle 1, 2, 3HP-026 following postulated small break loss of coolant accidents and steam line break events, several times shortly after the accident occurs, and then less frequently over the subsequent 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to obtain the required injection flow rate. If the motor operated valve (MOV) throttling approaches the thermal capabilities of the stator windings or rotor, then a cool down period would be needed to prevent damaging the motor.
Limitorque Technical Update (LTU) 93-03 discusses motor torque de-rating as a result of increased motor temperature, and further states that Reliance 3-phase motors are designed with thermal characteristics that result in less than or equal to a 75 degree Celsius (C)temperature rise in a) 15 minutes at full load running torque, or b) 10 seconds at locked rotor.
While the Oconee MOV program accounted for motor torque de-rating in accordance with the guidance in LTU 93-03 for the initial opening stroke of the valve, the potential to exceed the motor thermal limitations due to subsequent throttling was not considered. The MOV program guidance did not discuss how to demonstrate the acceptability of the MOVs with a throttling function, such as through calculation, testing, or limits placed on their operation to prevent exceeding the motor thermal limitations.
Because,
- the 1, 2, 3HP-26 valves were expected to be throttled many times during the first hour following postulated events and several times after that,
- the injection valve actuates on an ES signal and it was predicted to experience some time at locked rotor current at the beginning of the event due to bus voltage transients,
- throttling attempts in the same direction as the previous attempt would lack the benefit of the hammer-blow feature designed into Limitorque actuators, potentially resulting in longer time at locked rotor conditions,
- predicted ambient temperatures would be higher than that upon which the duty cycle was based,
- and the operators were not provided guidance to either limit the throttle attempts or provide for a cooling period, the inspectors were concerned the valve actuator motor could be vulnerable to failure prior to its safety function being completed due to overheating caused by required valve operation. The licensee performed an evaluation accounting for ambient temperatures, the predicted stall times and an expected number of throttle attempts, and concluded the MOV would remain below the motor insulation temperature rating and was therefore operable.
Corrective Actions: The licensee generated NCRs 02393775 and 02394153 to address the identified performance deficiency. The licensee evaluated operability and determined that the applicable MOVs would be capable of opening automatically and being throttled from the control room and were capable of performing their specified safety functions for the required mission time.
Corrective Action References: NCRs 02393775 and 02394153
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to account for MOVs with a throttling operation required for the design basis safety function to be met within their MOV program was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee's failure to evaluate or limit the effects of the motor heat-up due to throttling operations of the valve did not ensure the reliability and capability of the component.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was associated with the design or qualification of a component and the component maintained its operability.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) required, in part, that the licensee must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish a program that ensured MOVs with a safety function to throttle would continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, since the MOV program was established in the late 1990's, the licensees program failed to evaluate the effect of throttling operations required to perform the valves safety functions on MOV motor thermal capabilities or otherwise limit motor heat-up effects.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 26, 2021, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Steven M. Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 19, 2021, the inspectors presented the initial inspection results to Mr. T.
Grant and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.02 Calculations
CNC 1205.00-00-
0057
Evaluation of Posi Seal Butterfly Valve Sizing
Methodology
CNC 1205.19-00-
0179
Kalsi Engineering Report 2919C, GL96-05 Periodic
Verification Program for Butterfly Valves with 316
Microseal Bearings (JOG Class D)
DPC 1205.41-00-
0006
JOG-AOV Position Paper (JOG-TD-01 Rev 2): Spring
Relaxation of Air Operators
OM 247. --0447
001
WEAK LINK ANALYSIS FOR 24" C & S BUTTERFLY W/
SMB-0-10 DMV-940
A
OM 247. -0449
001
GL 89-10 TORQUE CALCULATION INFORMATION FOR
DMV-936, DMV-937, DMV-938, DMV-939, DMV-940
05/03/1994
OSC -11860
Sizing and Setup Calculation for Oconee Ball Valve MOVs 1
OSC -11910
OSC-11910 Rev 0 KVAP for LPSW-251 -252
OSC -4671
UNITS 1 & 2 LPSW SYSTEM BENCHMARK
OSC -7175
JOG CATEGORY 1 AND CATEGORY 2 AIR OPERATED
VALVE LIST
OSC-10195
GL 89-10 Calculation for PSW Related Valves
OSC-10301
PSW System Overpressure Protection Analysis
OSC-10330
AOV Design Basis Capability Valve CC-8
OSC-10499
EPRI MOV PPM and JOG PV Classification - 2HP-026
OSC-10907
Evaluation of Stem Thrust Requirements for DMV-1462
Gate Valve Installed as 1,2,3PSW-6 at Oconee Nuclear
Station Using the EPRI MOV Solid and Flexible Wedge
Gate Valve Performance Prediction Methodology (PPM
Software Version 3.3)
OSC-11343
Evaluation of MOV Motors and ETAP Inputs
OSC-11581
U1/2/3 Keowee EPS and 100kV APS Voltage Analysis
OSC-2060
U2 APS Voltage and Fault Duty Analysis
OSC-4553
Maximum Differential Pressures for LPSW Valves
OSC-4643
GL 89-10 Review for RC Valves
OSC-4697
NRC GL 89-10 Calc for HP Injection Systems
OSC-5599
GL 89-10 MOV Calculation for Unit 3 Gate and Globe
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Valves at Oconee
OSC-5674
GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV CALCULATION FOR
UNIT GATE AND GLOBE VALVES AT OCONEE
OSC-5675
MOV Calc for U2 Gate and Globe Valves
OSC-5760
GL 89-10 MOV Calculation for Unit 1 Butterfly Valves at
Oconee
OSC-5930
U1 Motor Starter Control Circuit Voltage
OSC-6030
GL 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Review
of 1/2/3CCW-287
OSC-6039
GL 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of LPl
Valves
OSC-6143
U2 Motor Starter Control Circuit Voltage
OSC-7184
Calc for U1/2/3 Gate and Globe Valves
OSC-7562
FDW-315/316 Capability Evaluation
OSC-7608
AC Power System ETAP Model Base File
OSC-7913
Evaluation of EPRI MOV Methodology For 2LP-19 & 2LP-
20, 1LP-19
OSC-7938
FSAR Section 5.2.3.4 - ROTSG Steam Line Break Tube
Loading Boundary Condition
OSC-8034
Design Input Calc MOV Electrical Analysis
OSC-8176
GL 89-10 Review for Valves CCW-268 and CCW-287
OSC-9239
JOG CLASSIFICATION OF OCONEE'S GL96-05 MOV
POPULATION
OSC-9305
Handwheel Capability Evaluation on 1,2,3 FDW-315/316
Corrective Action
Documents
231288,
2387272,
2393029,
2387269,
01550917,
2119055,
297905,
2018376,
2046837,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2041498,
2158333,
22316,
2345137,
2379507,
2343949,
2343959,
2343569,
2344871,
1905975,
1904970,
2343949
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21 POV DBAI: 2HP-26 has incorrect diagnostic test
frequenc
21 DBAI - Incorrect UFSAR reference in section 6.3.3.4
21 POV DBAI - LPI Room Deficiencies
21 POV DBAI: Fastener Materials Incorrect on OM
Drawing
21 POV DBAI items noted during walk down of 3CC-8
21 POV DBAI MOV Calculation References Need
Updating
21 DBAI POV Inspection; UFSAR Sec 5.4.6.4.1
discrepancy
Deficiencies in AOV calc OSC-10330
21 DBAI: Issue with LPSW-251/252 Travel Stop Set
Proc
CCW-287 Calculations Need to Be Revised
21 DBAI - Improper pipe class listed on drawings
21 DBAI: Incorrect Valve Group label in OSC-11910
21 DBAI: Error in OM 245.2388.001 weak link calc
21 DBAI: Mean seat diameter in calcs for 1RC-4 and
21 DBAI Limitorque Letter on MOV Jog Limitations
21 DBAI: ETAP Non-Compliance with AD-IT-ALL-0002
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
FDW-316 Limit Switch Cable Entrance Sealing
21 DBAI OSC-4553 normal operation pipe break
Improper as-left closed position for 1CC-8 & 2CC-8
21 DBAI Overload Heaters for 1/2/3 RC-4 incorrect
21 DBAI THERMAL CONSEQUENCES OF JOGGING
MOVS
21 DBAI - RC-4 SET-UP CALC ORIGINAL TEST
DATA
21 DBAI-Unverified Assumption in OSC-2060
OSC-9305 Hand Wheel Capability - 1,2,3 FDW-315/316
21 DBAI: IST Plan passive failure discussion revision
21 DBAI LIMITORQUE HBC OPERATOR
EFFICIENCIES
21 DBAI REVIEW MEAN SEAT DIAMETER DEF. IN
GUIDANCE DOC
21 DBAI - RE 3.03 design criteria not met when
updated
Drawings
B62-440674A
DPM 1205.00-
0014.001
Kalsi KVAP 4.2 Installation, Verification and Users
Manual
EQMM-1393.01-
N03-01
Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual
Equipment Type: Limit Switch Manufacturer: NAMCO
Model/Series: EA-180, Revision H or Later
O EE-138-31
E/D UNIT LPSW. LINE "A" TO TURB BLDG. HEADER
VLV # 1/14/165
O EE-138-50
ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM LOW PRESS SVC WATER
SYS DECAY HEAT COOLER A FLOW INSTRU SAFETY
POWER
O EE-152-01
E/D - RB EMERG. SUMP OUTL ET VLV. #1/53/46
O FD-102A-01-01
FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE INJECTION
SYSTEM BORATED WATER SUPPLY & LPI PUMP
SUCTION
O FD-102A-01-02
FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE INJECTION
SYSTEM (LPI PUMP DISCHARGE)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
O FD-124A-01-01
FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE SERVICE
WATER SYSTEM TURBINE BUILDING (LOW
PRESSURE SERVICE WATER PUMPS)
O FD-124B-01-01
FLOW DIAGRAM OF LOW PRESSURE SERVICE
WATER SYSTEM (AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICES)
O-2439C
West Penetration Room Elevation 809-3 Auxiliary
Building
O-422H-22
Instrument Detail LPSW Flow Control to Decay Heat (LPI)
Coolers 1A
ODUK-0251.00-
0001-001
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1/2/3 AOV Test Set-up
Sheets
OM 251.--0758.001, AOV Vendor Data
OEE-150
Elementary Diagram 1RC-04
OEE-251-06
Elementary Diagram 2HP-26
OFD-121D-03-01
Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System
OFD-131A-02-02
Flow Diagram of Protected Service Water (PSW), (Steam
Generator & HPI Pump Motor Cooling Service)
OFD-133A-02-05
Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System
(SSF Auxiliary Service)
OFD-144A-3.2
Flow Diagram of Component Cooling System Reactor
Building Heat Exchangers
OM 201.-
0378.001
14"- 150 pound O.S.Y Gate Valve
D9
OM 245-2444
Seismic Weak link report for 6 inch 1500# Class Borg
Warner with AMB-1-40 Limitorque Actuator, DMV-1692
OM 245.--
2443.001
Valve Assembly - 6 Inch 1500LB. Gate C.S. Sched. 160
Motor Oper
DI
OM 245.--
2592.001
DMV-1462 - NPS 6 (DN 150) Bolted Bonnet Gate Valve
(Forged) C/W Electric Actuator
D0G
OM 245.--
2660.001
DMV-1462 - Design/Seismic/Weak Link Report
B
OM 245.--
2663.001
DMV-1462 Gate Valve Internal Design Information for
OM 245.-
PORC Block Valve 1RC-04 Component Drawing
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2012.001
OM 247.--
282.001
O/L For Item 02B-566 8 IN 150LB BF VLV. W/Bettis Fail
Closed Air Op
OM 247.--
0302.001
Installation and Maintenance Instruction Manual POSI-
SEAL High Performance Butterfly Valves
08/19/1987
OM 247.--
27.001
I/B - For Bettis Air/Spring Actuator and KE Gear Box for
Item #02B-566
O-2422W-7, Instrument Detail Component Cooling Return
Penetration - Outside Block Valve CC-8
OM 247.-0425-
001
24" Plain Wafer Service Water System Tricentric Stop
B
OM 247.-0425-
2
24" Plain Wafer Valve & Actuator Assembly
A
OM 251. --
0715.002
ASSEMBLY DRAWING FOR 8" VALVE, DMV-1118
OM 251.--
0780.001
DMV-1332 6X4 45 Actuator 657-End Diaphragm Actuated
Control Valve W/Cavitrol III Cage
OM 251.--
0782.003
Instruction Manual for Type 657NS Diaphragm Actuator
00A
OM 251.-
0715.001
Outline & Assy Drawing 8" Q-Ball Control Valve ANSI
Class 300 w/ 150 Flanges w/ Pneumatic Actuator
E
OM 251.0818.001 HP Injection Valve 2HP-26 Component Drawing
OM 251.0818.001 HP Injection Control Valve 2HP-26
D1
ONTC-1-LP-019
ONTC-2-PSW-
0006
Test Acceptance Criteria Data Sheet for Valve 2PSW-006
ONTC-3-CCW-
287
Test Acceptance Criteria for Valves 3CCW-287
OSS-0254.00-00-
1000
Design Basis Specification for the Emergency Feedwater
System
OSS-0254.00-00-
1003
Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System
OSS-0254.00-00-
22
Design Basis Specification for Component Cooling
System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Changes
NSM ON-52972/0
Add New Line from LPSW Line "B" to Non-Essential
04/15/1996
Engineering
Evaluations
OM 245-2388-
001
Seismic Weak-Link Report for 14" 150# Powell Gate
Valve for 1,2LP-19. *20, -21 -22
OM 247. --0443
001
SEISMIC ANALYSIS AND DESIGN REPORT FOR 24"
C&S BUTTERFLY (DMV-940)
A
Miscellaneous
1RC-04 2018-11
Performance Test Comments and Trending Report
11/04/2018
Technical Correspondence - Posi Seal Interference-Fit for
Soft Seals
A
2HP0026 2019-
11-15
Performance Test Comments and Trending Report
11/15/2019
AD-PI-ALL-0300
21 ONS NRC POV (MOV) Readiness Assessment
06/03/2021
System Health Report High Pressure Injection System
Q1-2021
OM 251. --
29.001
I/B -(VIEWABLE) DMV-1118 FOR 8" Q-BALL W/BETTIS
ACT
OM 308.0453.001 Cutler Hammer MCC Manual
Replace 1RC-04 with SB-0-25
03/24/1999
OSS-0254.00-00-
001
Design Basis High Pressure Injection Systems
OSS-0254.00-00-
28
(MECH) DESIGN BASIS SPEC FOR THE LOW
PRESSURE INJECTION AND CORE FLOOD SYSTEM
(LPI)
OSS-0254.00-00-
1033
Design Basis Reactor Coolant System
OSS-0254.00-00-
1039
(MECH) DESIGN BASIS SPECIFICATION FOR THE
LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
PO 96580_1RC-
Purchase Order for 1RC-04 Replacement Actuator
05/07/2008
PO-
NM8796_2HP-26
Purchase Order for 2HP-26
2/02/2002
Post Test
Evaluation for
10/03/2014
Post Test
07/26/2016
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Evaluation for
QuikLook Test
data for 1CC-8
10/28/2020
QuikLook Test
data for 2CC-8
11/11/2017
ONS Reply to NRC Notice of Violation: EA-2021-004
2/19/2021
RC ONS
System Health Report Reactor Coolant System
Q1-2021
TR-658951_1
2HP-26, Wylie Labs Test Report - 2HP-26
2/17/1995
Procedures
AD-EC-ALL-1117
Design Analyses and Calculations
AD-EG-ALL-1013
CONDUCT OF PLANT ENGINEERING
AD-EG-ALL-1431
AIR OPERATED VALVE SCOPE AND
CATEGORIZATION
AD-EG-ALL-1432
Air Operated Valve Design Basis Review
AD-EG-ALL-1433
Air Operated Valve Testing Requirements
AP/0/A/1700/025
Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating
Procedure
EP/2/A/1800/001
0Q
Unit 2 EOP Enclosures 5.41-5.46
IP/0/A/3012/007
A
DIAGNOSTIC TESTING AIR OPERATED VALVES
USING TELEDYNE/QUIKLOOK SYSTEM
PD-EG-ALL-1430
Air Operated Valve Program
PT/1/A/0152/012
Low Pressure Injection System Valve Stroke Test
PT/1/A/0251/022
1LPSW-251 and 1LPSW-252 Travel Stop Verification
PT/1/A/0251/023
LPSW System Flow Test
RE-3.03,
Relaying
MCC Breaker and Overload Heater Selection
Work Orders
01908400
10/06/2010
2106524
3CCW-287 Perf As Left VIPER
07/28/2016
20132208 07
1RC-04 Performance Surveillance Test
03/27/2019
20132208-01
IRC-04 Actuator Replacement
2018
20158924
2HP-26 Valve Stroke Test
11/22/2019
296240
3FDW-316 PM/Perform As Found Diag
03/03/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20303678 05
2HP-26 Performance Surveillance Test
2/01/2019
20447195,
20360984-07,
295942-01,
20360984,
20375910-06,
2027566-01
PT/1/A/0152/017
1RC-04 Stroke Test
05/19/2021