IR 05000269/1982008
| ML20054D740 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1982 |
| From: | Andrews D, Cline W, Jenkins G, Taylor P NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Duke Power Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D736 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-82-08, 50-270-82-08, 50-287-82-08, NUDOCS 8204230339 | |
| Download: ML20054D740 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES o,'n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o
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Report Nos. 50-269/82-08, 50-270/82-08 and 50-287/82-08 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:
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D. L. Andrews Date Signed
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Date ' Sign d Approved by:
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N 1. Jenk'ns, Chief Date Sfgned Emergen Preparedness Section, Emergency Preparedness and Operational Support Division SUttt1ARY Inspection on March 9-12, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 228 inspector-hours on site in the area of a full scale emergency exercise.
Resul ts In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- A. C. Thies, Senior Vice President, Production and Transnission
- W. H. Owen, Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction
- H. B. Tucker, Manager, Nuclear Production
- R. M. Glover, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
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- C. C. Jennings, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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- C. T. Yongue, Station Health Physicist
- J, T. McIntosh, Superintendent of Administration
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- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services r
- M. Cartwright, Manager, Energy Information Services
- P. Abercrombie, Station Nurse
Other licensee employees contacted included several technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
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G. R. Wise, South Carolina Disaster Preparedness Agency
G. T. Woodard, Federal Emergency Management Agency
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J. Heard, Federal Emergency Management Agency
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NRC Resident Inspector
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- W. T. Orders j
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 11, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Exercise Scenario The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to detemine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on February 25, and March 8,1982.
Due to an unplanned outage on Unit 1 and continuing outage on Units 2 and 3 the licensee decided to modify the scenario to reduce the extent of inplant involvement in the exercise.
Following discussions between NRC and licensee representatives on March 8,1982, it was concluded that the inplant partici-pation, although reduced in length, would provide sufficient opportunity to fully exercise the inplant emergency organization.
The inspectors concluded that the scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local governmental agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
6.
Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to detemine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate
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staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response Organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the capability for long tem or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was demonstrated. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
7.
Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to detemine that the responsibilties for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I __
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The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and corporate assistance. The on duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Station Manager. The inspectors noted that during the initial response
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phase of the exercise the Shift Supervisor appeared to have too many duties assigned and was not able to spend much time in the Unit 3 control room (the simulated affected unit).
Due to the physical separation of the Unit 3 control room and the Units 1 and 2 control room, along with the shift supervisor's office, the Shift Supervisor was required to make numerous trips back and forth between these locations in carrying out his duties as Emergency Coordinator.
He was therefore largely unavailable to assist the Unit 3 operations personnel in diagnostic procedures and mitigating actions.
The problem appeared to be due, in part, to inadequate communication between the Unit 3 control room and the shift supervisor's office and, partly due to limited assistance available to the Shif t Supervisor from the operating staff of the unaffected units. The inspector stated that this problem could be alleviated by improving communications between units and by assigning a dedicated communicator to perform initial notification of the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite agencies. The licensee identi-fied the need for a dedicated on shift communicator during the exercise critique and agreed that some assistance in peripheral duties of the interim Emergency Coordinator should be provided. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-269/82-08-01, 50-270/82-08-01, 50-287/82-08-01).
8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources This area was observed to detennine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.C.
Offsite assistance resources utilized during this exercise included the Oconee County Rural Fire Protection Association, the Oconee Memorial Hospital, the Cannon Memorial Hospital, the Easley Baptist Hospital, the Oconee County Sheriff's Department and the South Carolina State Highway Pa trol. The inspectors observed that assistance resources were called upon and responded promptly to the assistance request as stated in the agreements between Duke Power Company and the various offsite organizations. The Oconee County Rural Fire Protection Association responded promptly to the Emergency Coordinator's request for offsite assistance in combating the simulated onsite fire. The responding fire protection personnel appeared to have a good understanding of their role in supplementing the onsite fire team. Medical support is discussed in paragraph 17. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
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9.
Emergency Classification System This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the implementing procedures. The systen appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided initial and continuing nitigating actions taken during the simulated emergency. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
10.
Notification itethods and Procedures This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup message to response organizations has been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augumented emergency response organization.
The initial notifications of the simulated emergency to the local counties appeared to take up too much of the Shift Supervisor's time for the level of emergency being simulated (Alert).
As noted in paragraph 7, there needs to be a designated communicator on shift to assist the Shift Supervisor in this area.
The inspector also noted that the Station fianager was not included in the initial notification.
Subsequent review of the notification procedure by the inspector revealed that the Station fianager is not listed for early notification of several events leading to an Unusual Event or Alert classi-fications.
Licensee representatives agreed to review the notification procedure to insure that the Station fianager is included for early noti-fication of all events which have a potential of escalating to a higher emergency class (50-269/82-08-02, 50-270/82-08-02, 50-287/82-08-02).
The NRC resident inspector was not notified of the Notification of Unusual Event or the Alert classification. The requirements and responsibility for notification of the resident inspector needs to be clarified (50-269/82-08-03, 50-270/82-08-03 and 50-287/82-08-03).
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The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational and was activated during this exercise to warn the public of the significant simulated events occurring at the Oconee site. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
11.
Emergency Communications This area was observed to detennine that provisions exist for prompt com-munications among principal response organization and emergency personnel as
l required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.F.
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The inspectors observed emergency communications among the onsite emergency response centers, the onsite and licensee's offsite support groups and between the onsite energency centers and the Crisis fianagement Center (near-site Er.ergency Operations Facility).
Several communications related weaknesses in the licensee's facilities were noted:
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Prior to activation and staffing of the Technical Support Center the shift supervisor, acting as the emergency coordinator, was required by his assigned functional responsibilities to spend most of his time at the Units 1 and 2 control room area. Updates of Unit 3 status were passed to him by telephone. This procedure appeared to be cumbersome i
and required excessive time to complete update briefings, b.
ihe Technical Support Center (TSC) was distributed among three dif-ferent rooms near the Units 1 and 2 control room.
No provisions had i
been made for intercommunications between these areas so that update
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briefings conducted in the main portion of the TSC were not heard in the other two areas. This resulted in part of the TSC staff being
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uninformed concerning the current status of the simulated emergency.
c.
The NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) in the Unit 3 control room was inoperable.
d.
At two different times during the exercise there were reports to the control room that emergency announcements could not be heard in some areas of the plant.
Survey results of IE Bulletin 79-18 should be reviewed to insure adequacy of corrective actions (79-BU-18)
f e.
The communciator in the TSC appeared to need assistance in keeping up with all messages and informatior, being passed into and out of the TSC.
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The quantity of information being received by the Health Physics manager in the TSC appeared to be too much for one individual to handle r
efficiently and still review all data for significant trends.
Addi-
tional communications support should be provided to the Health Physics manager.
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Additional telephone lines are needed at the news center for Duke Power Company and flRC use.
The licensee identified some of the above noted communications problems during the critique of the exercise on 11 arch 11,1982. The area of emergency communciations and licensee's corrective actions in this area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-269/82-08-04, 50-270/82-08-04,50-287/82-08-04).
j 12. Public Education and Information i
This area was observed to detemine that infomation concerning the simulated emergency was made availabe for dissemination to the public as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(B)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.G.
i Infomation concerning emergency actions had been distributed to the residents within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ); however, an inspector noted that the brochure containing this information did not list the call letters or numerical dial locations of radio and television stations which would be carrying emergency infomation. To prevent con-fusion during an emergency, specific radio and television stations which 3;
will broadcast emergency information within the EPZ should be specified (50-269/82-08-05,50-270/82-08-05,50-287/82-08-05).
I There was a delay of about one and one-half hours between the time the news media center was announced as being established and the actual time that the i
center was ready for occupation and use. This caused some delays and confusion among the news media personnel. This problem was identified by the licensee during the exercise critique.
During a simulated evacuation of the near-site facilities (CMC and News Media Center) a General Emergency was declared. The actual news release of this significant event was not disseminated for about two hours following the declaration. The inspector noted that the licensee's media represent-atives at the corporate office in Charlotte, NC should have made this infomation immediately available for dissemination rather than waiting for the near site media center to be re-established following the simulated evacuation.
Licensee representatives have agreed to review this area and make appropriate changes to their procedures to correct this problem (50-269/82-08-06,50-270/82-08-06,50-287/82-08-06).
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Emergency Facilities and Equipnent This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support in emergency response are provided and maintained as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.H.
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The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise, a.
Control Room - The inspector observed that control room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available to the Emergency Co-ordinator and the response to the simulated emergency condition was prompt and effective. The inspectors had no further questions in this area, b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the emergency coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothly; however, several problems related to the TSC were observed:
(1) There appeared to be too much activity and noise immediately around the Emergency Coordinator's table with the number of individuals working at that area. The licensee should consider some rearrangement of the main room of the TSC to reduce noise and confusion near the Emergency Coordinator (50-269/82-08-07, 50-270/82-08-07,50-287/82-08-07)
(2)
Status boards and displays were located in such a manner that they could not be readily seen by TSC personnel.
In addition, the status displays need to be improved in the areas of trend displays and historical accident information. This problem was identified by the licensee during the exercise critique.
(3)
Communications from the TSC to the other response facilities were inadequate and there was an evident need for assistance for the communicator. This area is discussed in paragraph 11.
c.
Operations Support Center (0SC) - The OSC was staffed promptly upon activation by the Emergency Coordinator. The inspector observed that teams were fonned promptly, briefed and dispatched efficiently.
Overall, OSC Operations were considered adequate.
d.
Crisis Management Center (CliC) - The CMC, which is the licensee's terminology for the near-site Emergency Operations Facility described in NUREG 0654, was activated and staffed following the simulated alert.
The CMC appeared to operate efficiently following staffing and provided support to the TSC and the offsite Emergency Centers during the exer-cise. The inspectors noted that in some cases incorrect information was displayed on the status boards and that some data displays and maps need improvement. The licensee identified this problem during the exercise critique. The inspectors had no further questions in this are.-
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14. Accident Assessment This area was observed to detemine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite con-sequences of a radiological emergency conditon are in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B. and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. I.
The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of the radiological hazards to both onsite
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and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
At the Oconee Plant the engineering accident assessment team functioned to analyze the plant equipment status during the accident and to make recommendations to the site
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Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to r
plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to termi-nate the emergency conditon. The radiological assessment group provided
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continuous updates on inplant radiation hazards and potential releases of l
radioactive materials. This group was supplemented by field teams to
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measure actual radiation levels and activity concentrations in the environ-ment during releases of radioactive materials.
The inspector observed that the radiological assessment group did not have an adequate means to estimate activity concentrations in containment or a I
method of determining potential offsite exposure rates based on activity in
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l containment. This information is important to factor into the protective action decision making process.
A licensee representative stated that
appropriate procedures would be developed in this area (50-269/82-08-08, 50-270/82-08-08,50-287/82-08-08).
l The inspectors noted that offsite nonitoring teams did not appear to have a good understanding of radio communication protocol and message verification
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techniques. The inspector stated that although this problem did not appear to affect the efficiency of the monitoring teams during this exercise, the
team members should be aware of the need to mi inize radio transmission i
during an emergency to facilitate rapid deployment information to all field
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teams, and to insure effective monitoring coverage and correct information transfer through message verification techniques. This area will be
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reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-269/82-08-09, 50-270/82-08-09, f
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50-287/82-08-09).
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Protective Responses This area was observed to detennine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in i
place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
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During the initial site assembly and accountability there appeared to be a problem in accounting for all onsite personnel within a reasonable time.
Part of the difficulty was apparently related to the fact that some personnel were admitted to the site to continue critical-path work on the units in outage. These designated personnel were exempt from the account-ability process; however, some of these individuals assembled at their accountability stations in accordance with plant procedures. A licensee representative stated that in an actual emergency no one would be allowed plant access during a sir.iliar situation. The exemption of outage workers from participation in the exercise had been coordinated in advance with the ins pectors. A subsequent accountability of onsite personnel was conducted later in the exercise and was considered adequate. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
16.
Radiological Exposure Control This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendation as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.K.
The inspectors observed that exposure control measures were utilized throughout the exercise and included dosimetery distribution to offsite support groups participating in onsite activities.
Radiation surveys were conducted in the emergency facilities on a routine basis. Offsite surveys were conducted downwind from the plant during the simulated release of radioactive materials.
Exposure guidelines were censidercd in all emergency team operations.
There appeared to be too much simulation of onsite health physics activities and the exercise controllers did not provide information concerning plant radiation levels directly to the survey teams. This prevented the full demonstration of health physics personnel capability during the exercise.
In addition, some samples requested from the reactor coolant system and containment atmoshpere were simulated to the extent that the capability of the onsite teams in this area was not demonstrated. The inspector stated that exercise simulations should be minimized so as to exercise to as great extent as possible all of the emergency organization.
Exercise controllers should be stationed at enough places within the plant to provide the appropriate inputs for all emergency teams and each control-ler should be indoctrinated in providing exercise information which may not have been pre-planned during scenario preparation.
17. Medical and Public Health Support This area was observed to detemine that arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.-
47(b)(12},10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0634,Section II.L.
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The medical portion of the exercise involved three simulated injuries occurring sircultaneously within the plant. The plant first aid team responded promptly to the simulated event and were accompained by a health physics representative.
First aid treatment of the simulated injuries appeared to proceed efficiently; however, the inspector noted that the health physics technician accompanying the team appeared to be unsure of his role in this exercise.
This appearance was also attributed, to some extent, to the fact that contanination infonnation on each injury was lef t at the scene by an exercise controller, which precluded the demanstration of contamination monitoring by the health physics technician.
As noted in paragraph 16, simulation of actions by energency team meirbers should be minimized and controllers should be present at each scene to provide exercise information.
In this case the contamination data should have been supplied following the surveys of the sinulated injuries.
Three local hospitals participated in this exercise; however, Oconee Memorial Hospital in Walhaila, SC was the only one sent a simulated contaminated patient. The other twu patients were decontaminated prior to dispa tching them for redical treatment.
Oconee "emorial Hospital was the only exercise observed by the inspectors.
Hospital personnel at Oconee Meriorial appeared to have a good understanding of contamination control techniques and proceeded to treat the simulated contaminated patient ef ficiently and ef fectively. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
13.
Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the energency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.
A fonnal Duke Power Company critique of the emergency exercise was held on Udrch 11,1982 with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and NRC personnel attending.
Deficiencies and weaknesses in the emergency preparedness progran, identified as a result of this exercise were presented.
Followup of corrective actions taken by Duke Power Company for identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be accom-plished through subsequent NRC inspections.
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