IR 05000269/1982009
| ML20053E266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1982 |
| From: | Bryant J, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053E229 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-82-09, 50-269-82-9, 50-270-82-09, 50-270-82-9, 50-287-82-09, 50-287-82-9, NUDOCS 8206070748 | |
| Download: ML20053E266 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION ll d'['
101 MARIETTA ST,. N.W., SUITE 3100 o,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-269/82-09, 50-270/82-09, and 50-287/82-09 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspector:
6. c/b,.,-[%
[7 4/B#,//2 W. Orders p
V Date Signed Approved by:
.M 5//2/8'L hw J.,0.gBryant, Sec(j6n Chief, Division of Date Signed P oject and Resident Programs SultiARY
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Inspection on February 10 - March 10,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 176 inspector-hours on site in the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and station modifications.
Results Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in three areas; two items of noncompliance were found in one area (Violation:
Failure to follow procedure in calculating radioactive discharge; Violation: Operation with Axial Power Shaping Rods in violation of specification position limits).
8206070748 920525 i
PDR ADOCK 05000269
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. H. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
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- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included operations personnel, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 12, 1982, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The violations detailed
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i herein were discussed with licensee management who acknowledged their understanding.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-06):
Ineffective turnover practices. The licensee's increased emphasis on thorough operator turnovers in shift training and supplementing existing turnover check sheets with a
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detailed control board component status check sheet are key elements in the stations improved turnover techniques.
The monitoring of both R0 and NE0 turnovers indicates a sustained attention to detail.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (287/81-18-01):
Safety system cleanliness. The direct inspection of on going maintenance activities and the review of completed work packages indicates that the noted incident was isolated.
A-satisfactory understanding of the importance of system cleanliness exists among station maintenance personnel.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-03):
RPS instrument string inaccuracies.
Amendment Nos. 102,102 and 99 to the Oconee technical specifications reflect changes that revise calculated string errors used in the determination of reactor protective system setpoints and upgrades the format of the operational safety instrumentation table.
Local station surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate the setpoint changes. The inspectors verified that selected station procedures have been revised to incorporate the changes. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-269, 270, 287/81-27-01): Improper thread engagement.
Numerous plant tours by the inspectors indicate that the instances of improper thread engagement noted were isolated and that no
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general violation of work practices exist.
Furthermore, in a November 5, 1981 intrastation letter, the licensee proposed to increases the emphasis on thread engagement criteria in applicable maintenance training programs. The implementation of the proposed corrective action has been verified. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-269, 270, 287/81-07-05):
The review of outstanding work requests. The inspectors have determined that a computer listing of outstanding work requests provided on a periodic basis to the unit supervisors is an adequate means to detennine safety system status prior to unit start-up. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50 287/81-09-01):
Breach of reactor building containment.
The inspectors have reviewed the CS-6 valve failures.
IE Report 81-10 describes the cause of the valve failures and documents the violation that resulted. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (50-270/81-30-01):
Inadequate radiation surveys.
The licensee's corrective actions, detailed in the January 6,1982 response to this violation, are satisfactory.
The impbmentation of the specified corrective actions has been verified by the inspectors.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (50-270/81-32-02):
Failure to follow procedures. The licensee's February 5,1982 response to this violation is satisfactory.
The implementation of the specified corrective actions has been verified by the inspectors. This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified durir.g this inspection.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations throughout the report period, February 10 - fiarch 10, 1982 to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and aoministrative controls. Control
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room logs, shift supervisor logs, shift turnover records and equipment
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removal and restoration records for the three units were routinely perused.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, l
health physics, and performance personnel on day and night shifts.
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l Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at
shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as l
prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives.
Th complement of l
licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by technical specifications.
Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.
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Plant tours ware taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis.
The areas toured include but were not limited to the following:
Turbine building, auxiliary building, Units 1, 2, and 3 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1, 2, and 3 cable spreading rooms, station yard zone within the protected area, and Unit 2 reactor building During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Oconee Unit 1 began the report period at cold shutdown following the detection a of 0.11 gpm steam generator tube leak on February 9,1982.
The leaking tube was identified as 2-74 in the
"A" generator.
Following plugging maintenance, the unit was placed back on line February 26, 1982.
The unit reached full power on 11 arch 1,1982 when a severe turbine control oil leak forced a rapid reduction to 20% power.
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Temporary repairs were performed on the oil leak and the unit was returned to full power later that day.
The licensee had planned to take the turbine-generator off-line on Saturday liarch 6,1982 to make permanent oil leak repairs, but their plans were preempted when a 0.185 gpm steam generator tube leak was detected in the "B" generator.
The unit was taken
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off-line at 4:50 p.m. on liarch 6,1982.
Tube leak repairs are expected to take approximately 17 days, with an expected on line date of flarch 23, 1982.
RT and UT examinations of the HPI makeup lines which were suspect due to problems encountered at Crystal River, revealed no service induced degradation.
At the close of the report period, tube plugging maintenance is ongoing.
Oconee Unit 2 continued a refueling /ISI outage throughout the report period.
The licensee performed UT and RT inspection of the normal and emergency makeup lines which were suspect due to problems found at Crystal River and Oconee Unit 3.
Results of the inspections revealed that the 2A1 line is fault free, the 2A2 line has a mis-positioned thermal sleeve and apparant thermal fatigue cracking; the 2B1 line themal sleeve is mis-positioned, but t
there does not appear to be any themal fatigue cracking; and the 2B2 l
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thermal slee~ is cracked.
At the close of this report period, repair l
efforts had not begun, but will be completed prior to start-up.
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Oconee Unit 3 began the report period at 100% power, but was forced to shutdown on February 15, 1982 when a steam generator tube leak of 0.06 gpm magnitude was detected.
The leaking tube was identified as tube 2-4 in the
"A" generator.
During the maintenance outage the licensee inspected the HPI lines which were suspect due to problems encountered at Crystal River. The inspection l
revealed a mis-positioned thermal sleeve and thermal fatigue cracking in the
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safe-end to pipe weld area on the 3A2 line.
RT and UT inspection revealed the 3Al and the 3B2 lines to be fault free, however the 3B1 line thermal sleeve appears to be mis-positioned.
Repair efforts are currently underway to replace the def '
e components.
On-line date is uncertain pending the HPI repairs.
6.
Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment'of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical content.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration canpleted and test results were adequate.
The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications, they appeared to have received the required administrative review and they apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribed.
Procedure Title
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PT/1/A/600/13 Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater
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PT/0/A/0203/06 LPI System Performance PT/0/A/610/17 GP 7 Control Rod Withdrawal
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PT/1/A/600/12 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater PT/0/A/600/18 Emergency Feedwater Operability
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PT/0/A/251/6 HPI Check Valve Functional
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i PT/0/A/305/01 Reactor ihnual Trip Test PT/0/A/600/15 CRD Movement i
PT/0/A/250/05 HPSW Pumps PT/0/A/290/3 Turbine Control Valve Novement PT/0/A/290/4 Turbine Valve Hovement PT/1/A/600/10 RCS Leakage
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IP/0/A/310/12C RB Isolation CH-5 IP/0/A/310/14A ES ANALOG CH-A IP/0/A/310/14B ES ANALOG CH-B IP/1/A/305/3D RPS CH-D ON mINE The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N18.7 Oconee Technical Specifications Oconec Station Directive Duke Adniinistrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected r:0 items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed throughout the report period to ascertain that the work was being performed by qualified personnel, that activities were accomplished suplcying approved procedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade.
Limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that technical specification requirements were satisfied.
Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to ensure adequate fire protection, cleanliness control and radiation protection measures were observed and that equipment was properly returned to service.
Acceptance criteria employed for this review included but was not limited to:
l Station Directives
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Adninistrative Policy Manual Technical Specifications Title 10 CFR.
Detailed below are 11 of 48 maintenance activities which were observed and/or reviewed during the report period:
llork Request Component / System r
23803
"A" Turbine Building Sump Pump 23802 Valve MS-84
23801 Emergency Feedwater - level
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23767 IT Transformer 23770 Emergency Feedwater - flow 23780 1 LT-5 23729 Valve LPSil-4 23711 Valve LPSil-566 23712 1A-EHC Pump 23702 Valve Building Spray-3 23701 Reactor Building Spray Pump Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Axial Power Shapino Rods Six of the sixty-nine control rod assemblies on each of the Oconee units are part length rods, called Axial Power Shaping Rods or APSR's.
As their name implies, these APSR's are employed to assist in shaping the axial flux profile.
The APSR's are not automatically positioned as are the regulating control rads, but are positioned by the operator within the guidelines of applicable procedures and the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.2.5, to maintain and acceptable axial flux distribution.
The basis of the APSR position limits is to prevent fuel cladding damage
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from exceeding the safety limit should a LOCA occur.
According to licensee analysis, all core parameters; tilt, imbalance, control rod position and APSR position, would have to be at their limits and all the emergency uncertainty factors at their maximum values for the linear heat rate to exceed the limit.
Technical Specification 3.5.2.5 requires that position limits, as specified therein for regulating rods and axial power shaping rods be adhered to.
If the position limits dictated therein are exceeded, action must be taken imediately to achieve acceptable rod position, with acceptable position required within two hours.
On February 27, 1982, Oconee Unit 1 was escalating power after a forced outage to repair a steam generator tube leak.
At 8:00 a.m. that day, reactor power was 51% and the APSR's were 36.5% withdrawn.
As power was escalated while leaving the APSR's at 36.5%, the APSR position limits detailed in Technical Specification 3.5.2.5 were violated.
This occured, according to the licensee at 11:30 a.m. that date.
At 3:22 p.m., the operator pulled the APSR's to 40.5% withdrawn (further into the restricted region) in order to clear a reactor imbalance alarm. At 7:45 p.m., another
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operator detected that the APSR's were in the restricted region of opera-tion.
The rods were immediately moved into the allowable operating position. Eight hours and fifteen minutes had elapsed with the rods in the restricted position.
Contrary to the requirements of Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.2.5, the Oconee unit 1 APSR's were operated in violation of the detailed position limits, furthermore, no action was taken during the 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> allowed in the limiting condition for operation to correct the situation. This is a Violation (50-269/82-09-01)
9.
Liquid Waste Discharge Subsequent to the Oconee Unit 3 tube leak, which was identified on February 15, 1982, the licensee employed procedure OP/0/A/1106/31," Control of Secondary Contaminatir.,n"in their efforts to minimize radioactive discharge from the secondary system to turbine building sumps and/or subsequent releases to the environment.
Pursuant to that procedure, the turbine building sump pumps are operated in one of two modes; automatic or ba tch release.
The pumps may be operated in automatic if:
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RIA-54 is operable (RIA-54 is the turbine building sump effluent moiitor)
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a continuous / composite sample is collected and counted each 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period
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the required dilution flow rate (DFR) does not exceed 10 cubic feet per second (CFS) for Units 1 and 2 or 5 CFS for unit 3.
The sumps must be batch released if the above requirements are not met.
Operations requests a turbine building sample using enclosure 5.5 to procedure OP/0/A/1106/31, " Turbine Building Sump Sample Request".
Health physics technicians then perfonn the sample / analysis employing procedure HP/0/B/1000/62/Q, and reports to operations the isotopic concentrations and a recommended discharge dilution flow rate (DFR).
Enclosure 5.3 of procedure HP/0/B/1000/62/Q, is a calculation sheet employed by the Health physics technicians to detennine the required dilution flow rate to prevent exceeding the requirements of 10 CFR 20.
On two occasions on February 20, 1982, operations executed turbine building sump discharge employing the sample results provided to them by health physics which indicated a required DFR of 0.0 CFS; the actual required DFR was 13.8 and 10.8 CFS respectively.
In examining the event the resident inspector found that the previously discussed calculation sheet was not employed in the calculation for either of the tuo releases, rather the health physics technicians involved, conjectured that the DFR was 0.
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Subsequently the licensee determined the radioactivity releases to be 0.627 curies for the first release and 1.58 curies for the second release.
Oconee technical specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated and maintained in accordance with written approved procedures.
Failure of the health physics technicians to employ the directive detailed in procedure HP/0/B/1000/62/Q, which in turn led to the inadvertent violation of procedure OP/0/A/1106/31, violates the content and intent of the specifi-cation. This is a Violation (50-287/82-09-01).
10. Thermal Shield Bolts
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As detailed in report 269/82-04, on January 22, 1982, three thermal shields -
bolts were observed to have broken heads during a visual inspection of the Oconee Unit 2 core support assembly. The attachment bolts for shock pad Y-2 were also discovered broken. Ultrasonic testing revealed crack indications on a total of 24 of the 96 thermal shield bolts.
Because of experience with Unit 1, broken thermal shield bolts were anticipated on Unit 2 and their replacement was completed during this report period.
Shock pad Y-2 was removed; the cause of it's failure is still under
evaluation.
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the repair effort to ensure that the work was being performed by qualified personnel and that activities were accomplished employing approved procedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade.
Upon completion of the ongoing evaluation to determine the failure mechanism associated with shock pad Y-2, the inspector will report the results and/or corrective actions.
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Subsequently the licensee determined the radioactivity releases to be 0.627 curies for the first release and 1.58 curies for the second release.
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Oconee technical specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated and maintained in accordance with written approved procedures.
Failure of the health physics technicians to employ the directive detailed in procedure HP/0/B/1000/62/Q, which in turn led to the inadvertent violation of procedure OP/0/A/1106/31, violates the content and, intent of the specifi-cation.
This is a Violation (50-287/82-09-01).
10. Thermal Shield Bolts As detailed in report 269/82-04, on January 22, 1982, three thermal shields bolts were observed to have broken heads during a visual inspection of the Oconee Unit 2 core support assembly. The attachment bolts for shock pad Y-2 were also discovered broken.
Ultrasonic testing revealed crack indications on a total of 24 of the 96 thennal shield bolts.
Because of experience with Unit' broken thermal shield bolts were anticipated
on Unit 2 and their replacement was canpleted during this report period.
Shock pad Y-2 was removed; the cause of it's failure is still under evaluation.
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the repair effort to ensure that the work was being perfonned by qualified personnel and that activities were accomplished employing approved precedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade.
Upon completion of the ongoing evaluation to determine the failure mechanism associated with shock pad Y-2, the inspector will report the results and/or.
corrective actions.
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