IR 05000269/2023011
| ML23236A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2023 |
| From: | James Baptist Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Snider S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2023011 | |
| Download: ML23236A615 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - COMPREHENSIVE ENGINEERING TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2023011 AND 05000270/2023011 AND 05000287/2023011
Dear Steven M. Snider:
On July 20, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.
August 25, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000269, 05000270 and 05000287
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000269/2023011, 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-011-0027
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Oconee Nuclear Station
Location:
Seneca, SC
Inspection Dates:
June 26, 2023, to July 21, 2023
Inspectors:
P. Braaten, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer
D. Jackson, Senior Project Engineer
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Ruh, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inappropriate Procedure, Instructions and Evaluation for Online RBCU Cleaning Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000270/2023011-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.21M Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, when the licensee used an operating procedure and clearance that failed to address containment operability when breaching closed loop piping in containment during online reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) cleaning.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) (IP section 03.01)===
For each component sample, the inspectors reviewed the licensing and design bases. The inspectors reviewed a sample of operator actions, corrective action program documents, internal and external operating experience, test records, preventive maintenance records, work orders, aging management programs, and performed a walkdown of the component or procedure. Additional component specific design attributes reviewed by the inspectors are:
(1)2B Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU)
Compliance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), and TS Bases
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Design bases documents and calculations, including heat transfer capacity and design basis accident response capability
- (2) MOV-3-V-186, Unit 3 Condenser Vacuum Breaker Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)
Visual inspection during walkdown of component
Design bases documents and setup calculation assumption agreement with installed configuration
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Time critical operator actions (3)1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal
Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Design bases documents and calculations
Flow diversion and inventory control (4)2RC-67, Pressurizer Code Safety Valve
Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Upper, middle, and lower ring settings
Post event analysis and conclusions
- (5) DCSF, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Normal Battery
Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
Visual inspection during walkdown
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Protection and coordination
Battery sizing calculation revision
- (6) CT2, Unit 2 Startup Transformer
Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and Bases
Visual inspection during walkdown of various components in system
Environmental conditions
Design requirements
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Periodic testing, inspection, and post-test analyses
Protection and coordination
Conformance with manufacturer instructions for installation, maintenance, testing and operation (7)3B Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Pump
Visual inspection during walkdown of component
Surveillance testing & maintenance records
Design bases documents and calculations, including net positive suction head
Abnormal operation procedure controls during first-siphon operation and turbine building flood scenarios
Integration with water hammer prevention system
Modifications (IP section 03.02) (4 Samples)
- (1) EC 102450, Replace Unit 1 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Outlet Piping for "A" RCPM Air Coolers with Stainless Steel, Revision 3; EC 102458, Replace Carbon Steel LPSW Piping from 1B RCP with Stainless Steel Inside Cavities, Revision 7; EC
===102459, Replace Carbon Steel LPSW Inlet Piping to 1A RCP with Stainless Steel Inside Cavities, Revision 9
- (3) EC 408968, Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer (CT2) Open Phase Protection Equipment Installation & Tie-Ins, Revision 14
- (4) EC 411560, Lake Level Reduction Commissioning Project, Revision 1 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations/Screening (IP section 03.03)===
(1)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2004416, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for EC 112474, Modify U1 SSF RCS (2)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2352826, Revision to ONS UFSAR 6.2.1 - LOCA Long-Term Containment Response (3)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2420522, R017 Unit Runback (4)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2373422, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for EC 400480, Gardell CMSS upgrade (5)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2322877, 525 kV Switchyard 62B Breaker Failure Relay Replacement (6)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 1974647, EC 96547, Rev. 0, U1 Main Power System Protective Relaying Upgrade, Revision 1 (7)10 CFR 50.59 Screening; AR 2356028, EC 408968, Rev. 15, Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer (CT2) Open Phase Protection Equipment Installation & Tie-Ins, 09/14/21 (8)10 CFR 50.59 Screening; AR 2278976, Replace 30", Class F, Expansion Joint
Operating Experience Samples (IP section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2018-09: Electrical Arc Flash Caused By Foreign Material Damages Fire Door
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inappropriate Procedure, Instructions and Evaluation for Online RBCU Cleaning Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000270/2023011-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.21M Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, when the licensee used an operating procedure and clearance that failed to address containment operability when breaching closed loop piping in containment during online reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) cleaning.
Description:
On April 17, 2023, the licensee began a planned maintenance activity on unit 2 to clean the heat exchanger tubes of the A RBCU in containment. This activity was being completed to proactively restore heat transfer capacity margin to the unit based on an observed declining performance trend during routine thermal performance testing. The licensee used operating procedure OP/2/A/1104/010 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW),enclosure 4.7 Isolation of LPSW to 2A RBCU (MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4) to perform the isolation.
The enclosure was intended for isolating a leaking RBCU and was focused on precluding the possibility of thermal over-pressurization caused by heating of water trapped between the supply and return isolation valves during an accident condition. As a result, the steps required operators to vent the RBCU piping to containment to avoid this adverse effect. The procedure steps were sequenced such that a 1 vent valve (2LPSW-532), was opened prior to closing and deactivating the 2A RBCU outlet valve (2LPSW-18). While in this configuration, a direct pathway existed from containment to the environment (Lake Keowee) through the LPSW outlet piping of a size capable of exceeding the limit associated with operability of containment. The duration of this condition was approximately no more than three hours based on available information. The procedure required operators to enter Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3 "Containment Isolation Valves," Condition C while the 1" vent valve was open, but this step was in error since the vent valve was neither a containment isolation valve nor associated with a particular containment penetration described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
The specified safety function impacted by breaching the LPSW system pressure boundary was actually containment itself per TS LCO 3.6.1 "Containment," Condition A, which has a 1-hour completion time for restoring containment operability before requiring the unit to be shutdown to Mode 3 within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the licensees topical report DUKE-QAPD-001-A, Quality Assurance Program Description, section D17.3.2.14, Document Control, the use of the enclosure and the errors it contained made it not appropriate for the circumstance that it was being used for.
Later, during the RBCU cleaning activity, the LPSW system was breached to a much larger extent to gain access to the tubesheet of the RBCU. While in this configuration, the 6-inch outlet LPSW piping penetration was isolated by the deactivated motor operated valve 2LPSW-18 and a second manual valve 2LPSW-81 by a clearance. These isolations were credited to permit continued operation by satisfying the required actions of TS LCO 3.6.3, Condition C, but, as previously discussed, TS LCO 3.6.1, Condition A was the proper condition to evaluate. Licensee procedure AD-OP-ALL-0200 Clearance and Tagging, section 5.5.29 required that "safety related clearances shall include consideration of TS adherence and LCOs," but the clearance did not identify applicability of TS LCO 3.6.1. Since the TS adherence error was not recognized, the clearance for the maintenance was ultimately an unrecognized compensatory measure used for maintaining the operability of containment during the maintenance period of approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Licensee procedure AD-OP-ALL-0105 Operability Determinations required a documented operability determination supporting basis and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for temporary facility changes that use compensatory measures to maintain operability of structures, systems or components (SSCs) affected by a deficient condition that may compromise the SSC's required capability. In this case, LPSW system breaches compromised the required leak tight barrier of containment, and the licensee implemented a change to the facility by modifying the design function of an RBCU outlet valve to be a closed leak tight valve in order to maintain containment operability. However, the suitability of these valves for maintaining containment operable was not formally evaluated by the licensee. Inspectors questioned whether leakage would be limited to less than or equal to the maximum allowable leakage rate (La) and if TS LCO 3.6.1 surveillance requirements would be satisfied by use of these valves. Inspectors noted that these valves were not described as containment isolation valves in the current version of the UFSAR and that 2LPSW-18 had been previously excluded from the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, leakage testing program on the basis that the closed loop LPSW system piping, containing the RBCU, in containment was designed to remain intact and operating throughout a post-accident period. When the licensee breached this closed loop and credited the valve isolation, the licensee rendered the exclusion basis for the LPSW outlet penetration valve invalid. Licensee procedure AD-LS-ALL-0008, 10 CFR 50.59 Review Process, section 5.1.10 indicated that Intentionally creating a deficient condition and corresponding compensatory action as a means of bypassing a technical specification LCO action statement, action time, or other license condition is prohibited. In this case, the licensee created a deficient condition affecting containment and bypassed TS LCO 3.6.1 by mis-applying TS LCO 3.6.3. Additionally, the licensee did not review the compensatory action under 10 CFR 50.59 to confirm it would not affect other ancillary aspects of the facility.
At the completion of the cleaning activity, the licensee attempted to refill the 2A RBCU piping from the outlet direction while sequentially observing four different 1 vent valves for a solid stream of flow to indicate the piping was filled. Similar to the initial isolation sequence, while in this configuration, a direct pathway existed from containment to the environment through the LPSW outlet piping of a size capable of exceeding maximum allowable leakage rate for containment. The duration of this condition was approximately ten hours based on available information. A similar sequence of events was completed between April 18 and 19, 2023, for cleaning of the 2C RBCU.
Corrective Actions: The licensee developed actions to update operating procedures, design basis documents, evaluate licensee event reporting and to ensure any resulting compensatory measures are evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
Corrective Action References: ARs 2477886, 2477925, 2480047, 2480068
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: For the evolution of conducting online RBCU cleaning, the failure to utilize a procedure maintained appropriate for the circumstance per DUKE-QAPD-001-A, section D17.3.2.14, and failure to include consideration of TS adherence and LCOs during clearance development per AD-OP-ALL-0200, section 5.5.29, was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, operators used an enclosure of OP/2/A/1104/010 which was written for a different circumstance and neither the enclosure nor the developed clearance accurately considered TS LCO 3.6.1 adherence during the activity.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the performance deficiency created circumstances where breaches in containment exceeded the allowable leakage rate for containment operability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using the barrier integrity screening questions associated with reactor containment in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, subsection C, and because the finding represented an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment through valves, IMC 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity SDP was used. The finding was considered to be a Type B finding because it was not expected to have any impact on the core damage frequency of the facility. Based on IMC 0609 Appendix H, Table 4.1, and section 03.03 of IMC 0308, Attachment 3, Appendix H, small lines (less than 2.5 inches in diameter for pressurized water reactors with large dry containments) would not generally contribute to LERF. Since the open pathway during the vent/drain/refill evolutions was limited to approximately 0.75 inches in diameter and any leakage through isolation valves used during the cleaning process (while the cooling coil heads were removed) was not expected to resemble a leak path through a 2.5-inch diameter hole, the finding screened as Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. In this case, the licensee performed a first-time evolution for an activity normally performed during outages, and did not demonstrate the characteristic of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety functions would be maintained.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," required, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Contrary to the above, between April 17 and 19, 2023, the isolation and restoration procedures and instructions used for performing online RBCU cleaning were not appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, neither the operating procedure nor the clearance properly identified how containment TS operability would be impacted when breaching the pressure boundary of the closed loop RBCU LPSW piping in containment.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection results to Steven M. Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ONEI-0400-400
Revised Reactor Building Cooling Unit Requirements in
Support of 1-year Mission Times
2
OSC-11485
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for EC 96547, Unit 1
Main Power Relay Upgrade
OSC-11802
Deentrainment Study of CCW Discharge Piping
OSC-11804
Evaluation of Oconee Motor Protective Device Trip Times
During Open Phase Conditions
OSC-11939
Oconee PRA Analysis of Implementation Options for Open
Phase Condition Protection
OSC-11956
Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test
007
OSC-2280
LPSW NPSHa and Minimum Required Lake Level
OSC-2322
SSF Suction Supply Availability
OSC-4300
(Elec) Protective Relay Settings
OSC-5349
Minimum Lake Level Required to Maintain Sufficient NPSH
to the LPSW Pumps via Gravity Flow
OSC-6195
U1/2/3, SSF 125VDC Power System Battery and Charger
Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Analysis
OSC-6522
Turbine Building Flood CCW Reverse Flow Analysis
OSC-6550
Hydraulic Model of Condenser Service Water for Chillers A
and B
OSC-6577
CCW Turbine Building Flood Analysis
OSC-8064
ROTSG Long Term Containment Response Following a
Large Break LOCA
24
OSC-8064,
Appendix O
ROTSG Long-Term Containment Response Following a
Large-Break LOCA, ONS GOTHIC LBLOCA Cold Leg Break
Analyses with RBCU capacities adjusted for latest
AEROFIN Fouling Data
24
OSC-8508
Time Critical Valve Force Requirement Evaluation
Calculation [for 3V-0186]
Calculations
OSC-8769
Oconee PRA Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System
Notebook
Corrective Action
1774378,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
1884665,
286307,
25530,
2330063,
2392335,
2393844,
2401187,
2473099,
2317121,
278976,
278976,
2407202,
2474094,
294192,
2356028,
2333096,
2476828
CETI23: CLEAN/INSPECT SMALL OIL LEAK / 3HP-26
2476829
CETI23: INSPECT/REPLACE BROKEN, MISSING
ELECTRICAL COVER / 3HP-26
2477315
CETI23 - Restore Reference to OSS-254.00-00-2020
2477425
CETI23 Remove reference 2.5.2.1.2 (Duke Calc OSC-3610)
from OSS-0254.00-00-1035
2477474
CETI23 Reference Errors in DBDs OSS-254.00-00-1035 &
20
2477539
Non-Conservative Method Used in OSC-6550 for Change in
Solubility Calc
2477541
CETI23-Fusion records for NCR 02296030 and NCR
2356836 are incomplete records
2477607
CETI23 - error identified in OSC-11956
2477789
CETI2023 OSC-6195 has a conflict in regard to SSF battery
design margin
2477793
CETI23 - Issues with eRead communications provided to
OPS on CT2 OPP system
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2477797
CETI2023 SSF 125 VDC Essential Power System DBD has
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
misleading statement
2477882
CETI23: OSC-8508 contains unsubstantiated assumptions
2477886
Possible Seat Leakage Not Mentioned in RBCU Online
Isolation Procedure
2477908
CETI23 - RBCU LPSW Temperature Design Control
Concern
2477925
Questions Regarding T.S. Entry During Online RBCU
Isolation
2477974
CETI23 - Training package OP-OC-SF-062 contains
incorrect info
2478002
CETI23 NRC identified questions about GARDEL CDA
classification
2478374
CETI23 - NRC Observation on Alarm Response Guides for
2479288
CETI23 - TS SR 3.7.8.3 is Non-Conservative
2479310
Areas for Improvement in AP/11
2479324
OSC-11802 Contains Incorrect Methodology for Determining
Deentrainment
2479697
CETI23 - Typographical Error in 50.59 Eval Changes
Intended Meaning
2479861
CETI23 - ONS Calculation OSC-6522 should have been
made historical or superceded
2479874
OSC-11802 Does Not Account for Air Leakage Thru
Concrete Joints/Cracks
2479888
CETI23 - Unit 1 MPR 11U1 and 11U3 LED Illuminated
2479940
OSC-5349 Needs to Be Updated
2480022
CETI23 - UFSAR DESCRIPTION OF PZR CODE SAFETY
RING SETTINGS REQUIRES
2480047
Containment Inoperable for >1 hr during 2A RBCU Cleaning
Restoration
2480068
Unrecognized Comp Measure for Containment Operability
2480075
CETI23 - Questions on EC 406309 50.59 Evaluation
Conclusions
2480078
Area for Improvement in Controlling LPSW Pumps in TB
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Flood Scenarios
2480084
IST Functions for RBCU Isolation Valves Need to be
Evaluated
2480089
CETI23 - Updates to 1,2,3V-186 EV attributes
0-1709
Three Line Diagram Transformers No. 2, 2T, & CT2
O-0325
Condenser Discharge Structure Units 1-3 Concrete &
Miscellaneous Steel Plan & Elevations
O-0336-A
Units 1-3 Condenser Cooling Water Pipe Emergency CCW
Discharge Pipe
O-0424-A
Piping Layout Miscellaneous Outside Yard Piping General
Layout
O-0510C
Piping Layout Miscellaneous Piping Sections and Details
Turbine Building
O-1400-I
Piping Layout Basement Floor Sections Turbine Building
OEE-71-01
Elementary Diagram Start-Up Trans. No. CT2 Diff. Lock-Out
Relay
OFD-100A-1.1
Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System
OFD-133A-02-01
Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System
(CCW Intake Pumps Discharge)
OFD-133A-02-02
Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System
(Normal Intake & Discharge)
OFD-133A-02-03
Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System
(Condensate Coolers)
OM 1300. --
0009.001
Elementary Diagram GEI-70357 364D900DA SH. 1
Transformer CT2
D4
OM 1300. --
0004.001
Vendor Drawing No. NP254501
OM 1300. --
0009.002
Station Service Transformer No CT2 Elementary Diagram
OM 1300. --
0012.001
CT2 Transformer G.E. Instruction Power Transformers
Drawings
OM-200-0150-
001
Vacuum Breaker Valve
Engineering
104170
Replace 30, Class F, Expansion Joint 3-C-MJ-0009 in EFW
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes
Supply
Clearance OPS-
2-23-LPS-2A
RBCU CLN-0661
DUKEONS008-
RPT-001
Study Report for Lake Keowee Water Level Reduction
IQ Review
Large Oil Filled Transformers
Guideline on Licensing Digital Upgrades
03/15/2002
Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition
Implementation
NRC Regulatory
Issue Summary
2002-22
Use of EPRI/NEI Joint Task Force Report, "Guideline on
Licensing Digital Upgrades: EPRI TR-102348, Revision 1,
NEI 01-01: A Revision of EPRI TR-102348 to Reflect
Changes to the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule"
11/25/2002
ON-1607.32-05-
03.EL_BECK RL
ON-1607.32-05-
03.EL_SEL RL
OP-OC-SF-062
Simulator Exercise Guide (SF-062)
11b
OSS-0254.00-00-
1035
(MECH) Design Basis Specification for Vacuum System
20
OSS-0254.00-00-
2000
(Elect) 4KV Essential Auxiliary Power System
OSS-0254.00-00-
2004
(Elect) 230 KV Switchyard System
OSS-0254.00-00-
20
(Elect) SSF 125 VDC Essential Power System
Miscellaneous
TI 2515/194, NRC
Temporary
Instruction
Inspection of Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative
Association with the Open Phase Condition Design
Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)
11/01/2017
AD-MN-ALL-0002
AP/0/4/1700/048
Loss of a Startup Transformer
Procedures
AP/0/A/1700/025
Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AP/1/A/1700/011
Recovery from Loss of Power
AP/1/A/1700/024
Loss of LPSW
AP/2/A/1700/010
Turbine Building Flood
AP/3/A/1700/027
006
CNM-1392.00-
0013.001
DOBLE Evaluation Criteria
EP/3/A/1800/001
0M, Encl 5.9
Unit 3 EOP, Enclosure 5.9, Extended EFDW Operation
2
IP/0/A/2007/001
Transformer Inspection and Maintenance
IP/0/A/2400/002
Substation Insulators, Lightning Arrestors, CCVT, and
Transmission Bus-Line Inspection and Maintenance
IP/0/A/3000/003
N
SSF Battery DCSF Service Test and Annual Surveillance
OP/0/A/1106/029
Control Room, Equipment Room, And Cable Room Chillers
OP/2/A/1102/020
D
SSF and Outside Rounds
103
OP/2/A/1107-02
Removal and Restoration of CP2 Transformer
OP/2/A/6102/014
Alarm Response Guide 2SA-14
PT-0-A-0160-006
Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test
PT/0/A/0120/033,
13.3
Time Critical Action Verification, Transfer of MDEFW
Suction to Hotwell
009
PT/3/A/0152/019
Vacuum System Valve Stroke Test
TE-MN-ALL-0002
Foreign Material Exclusion Level and Controls Screening
TE-MN-ALL-0202
Transformer and Apparatus Testing, Rev. 2
11/19/2021
Work Orders
20389789,
20458839,
20527603,
20416132,
20417510,
20551006,
20567981,
20583375,
236384,
20595716,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20383112-09,
20450277-01,
20450285-01,
20383112-01,
20450284-01,
209404-09,
209404-08,
209404-74,
209404-78