IR 05000269/1982004
| ML20050H861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1982 |
| From: | Bryant J, Ignatonis A, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050H492 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.K.2.10, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-269-82-04, 50-269-82-4, 50-270-82-04, 50-270-82-4, 50-287-82-04, 50-287-82-4, IEB-79-23, NUDOCS 8204140162 | |
| Download: ML20050H861 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES 8'
7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
E REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 o%g
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 j
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Report Nos. 50-269/82-04, 50-270/82-04 and 50-287/82-04 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 i
Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:
d maM, [1 3/5/8/4 W.Ordersg
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Dat6 Sfgned bfd 3/88 ',
ves A. Ignato Date Signed Approved by:
/ )N YJ~/5't C. Bryan't, 6e'ction Chief Date Signed ivision of Project and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on January 10 - February 10, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 184 inspector-hours on site in the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, refueling operations, and TMI action item verification.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Violation-Failure to secure equipment hatch during fuel handling (270/82-04-01)).
8204140162 820407 PDR ADOCK 05000269
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
- T. Cribbe, Licensing and Projects Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 10, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The violation as described herein was discussed with and acknowledged by management. The unresolved item, LPSW-256 was also discussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 12.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations througnout the report period, January 10 - Februa ry 10, 1982 to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift supervisors log, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were routinely perused.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel on day and night shif ts.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in the Oconee Station Directives. The complement of licensed
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personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by technical specifications. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis.
Theareas toured included but, were not limited to the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the protected area Unit 2 Reactor Building During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Oconee Unit 1 began the report period in a forced outage which began January 6,1982 to repair a generator hydrogen seal leak, feedwater heater leaks and to perform several balance shots on the main turbine.
After repairs were completed and the turbine was balanced to an acceptable condition, the unit was placed on line February 3, 1982. Power escalation testing was completed at the 75*. power plateau and 100* power was attained on February 6, 1982.
On February 9, 1982 a steam generator tube leak of approximately 0.11 gpm magnitude was identified in the "A" generator. The unit began a controlled shutdown at 8:54 a.m.
that morning, the generator was taken off-line at 2:21 p.m. and the reactor was subcritical at 3:41 p.m.
As the report period ends, the unit is in cold shutdown, entering what is scheduled to be a two week outage.
Details of the outage will be included in the resident l
inspector's next report.
Oconee Unit 2 continued what is scheduled to be a 103 day refueling /ISI outage throughout the report period. No major difficulties were experienced aside from a malfunction of the Babcock and Wilcox Automated Reactor Inspection System (ARIS), which resulted in the machine's computer controlled mast over-extending into the reactor vessel. The bottom of the mast impacted upon the vessel bottom, continued to drive such that the 5700 pound machine lifted itself from it's supports and leaned over against the
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refueling bridge.
Preliminary video inspection does not reveal any damage to the reactor vessel or the ARIS machine. As the report period ends, plans are underway to right the machine and analyze the reactor vessel for possible damage. The results of the analysis as well as the cause of the malfunction will be reported in a future report.
Oconee Unit 3 operated at full power throughout the report period with no major difficulties.
At the end of this report period, Oconee three has operated 157 consecutive days.
6.
Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical content.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed and test results were adequate.
The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Speci fica t.i on s, they. appeared to have received the required administrative review and they were performed within the surveillance frequency prescirbed.
Procedure Title PT/1/A/600/10 RCS Leakage PT/0/A/610/5A Solid State Breaker Trip Test PT/1/A/115/02 LPSW Valve Verification PT/0/A/200/44 Fuel Transfer System PT/0/A/230/15 HPI Motor Cooler PT/0/A/115/07 Reactor Building Spray PT/1/A/115/01 CCW Valve Verification PT/1/A/600/01 Periodic Instrument Surveillance The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N 18.7 Oconee Technical Specifications
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Oconee Station Directive Duke Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected, no items of non-compliance were identified, however, as identified in paragraph 12, entitled " Misaligned Valve, LPSW-256," an item concerning valve position remains unresolved.
7.
Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed throughout the report period to ascertain that the work was being performed by qualified personnel, that activites were accomplished employing approved procedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade.
Limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that technical specification requirements were satisfied.
Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to ensure that adequate fire protection, cleanliness control and radiation protection measures were observed and that equipment was properly returned to servie.
Acceptance criteria employed for this review included but were not limited to:
Station Directives Administrative Policy Manual Technical Specifications Title 10 CFR Detailed below are 9 of 29 maintenance activities which were observed and/or reviewed during the report period.
Applicable Work Request Procedure Component 21290 MP/0/A/1800/1 1-HP-221 MP/0/A/1200/2 21685 MP/0/A/1600/01 2-B Seal Supply
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MP/0/A/1800/01 Filter 21783 MP/0/A/7200/2B 1-FDW-215 21569 IP/0/A/3006/1 1-FDW-45
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r 21765 MP/0/A/1200/2A 1-FDW-268
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611068 MP/0/A/1200/68 2-LP-36 50261B N/A 1-B2-RCP 21517 MP/0/A/1800/1 1-B Seal Supply HP/0/A/1600/1
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21779 MP/0/A/1310/8 1-A-RCP
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Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifed.
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8.
HPI Piping Cracks On February 5,1982, Oconee Nuclear Station was made aware of make-up system piping cracks which had been identified on Crystal River 3.
The cracks had
been identified during the performance of a visual inspection of the make-up system, to identify the source of reactor coolant system leakage.
Subsequent to becoming aware of the Crystal River cracks, the licensee performed dye penetrant tests on the applicable suspect welds on Oconee Unit 2.
The results of the tests did not reveal any abnormalities. Though further analysis is currently being contemplated on Unit 2, as well as on Unit 1 during it's ongoing forced outage, the extent and schedule is, at the j
close of this report period, uncertain.
9.
Broken Holddown Springs Subsequent to being notified on thy 16, 1980 that Toledo Edison had discovered several broken holddown springs at Davis-Besse I, Duke Power began inspecting all spent fuel assemblies and core verification video tapes in order to identify similar problems at Oconee.
Of 1217 assemblies inspected at that time, five assemblies were identified as having broken springs; 1D47,1D17,1C43, 3C33 and 1030.
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Coincident with the identification of the problem.
Duke Power initiated a
three-fold precautionary program to facilitate expeditous identification of
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broken springs. The program consisted of the following:
(a)
Increased frequency of control rod exercising (b) flodified loose parts monitoring practices
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(c) Entailed radio chemistry analysis intended to identify control rod damage, j
Subsequent refueling outages have entailed ongoing video examinations of spent and reload fuel assemblies in order to detect the presence of more s
broken holddown springs. During the ongoing Unit 2 outage, four assemblies
i were identifled as having broken springs, three of which are to be reloaded.
The assemblies are reload assemblies IK3, IJC,1KX and spent assembly 0G0.
These are the first broken holddown springs to have been identified at Oconee since itay 1980.
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The probable failure mechanism of the most recently identified broken holddown springs is reported to be fatigue cracking, initiating at an existing surface flaw.
The broken holddown springs in those assemblies to be reloaded will be replaced.
The precautionary and surveillance measures as previously discussed are ongoing.
The results of the safety analysis concerning the safety implications of power operations employing a core with broken springs, as reported to the flRC, does not reveal any increased risk to the public health and safety.
j 10.
Thermal Shield Bolts
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On January 22, 1982, three thermal shield bolts were observed to have broken
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heads during a visual inspection of the Oconee Unit 2 core support assembly.
The attachment bolts for shock pad Y-2 were also discovered broken.
Ultrasonic testing revealed crack indications on a total of 24 of the 96 thermal shield bolts. The apparent cause of the bolt failures, is as was i
the case on Oconee Unit 1, intergranular stress corrosion cracking. An evaluation was performed concerning the safety implications of the thermal
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shield bolt failures on Oconee Unit 1 (R0-269/81-11).
The results were
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reported in previous correspondence, and are considered applicable to the recent Oconee 2 failures.
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The thermal shield bolts will be replaced with stud and nut assemblies as they were on Oconee Unit 1.
The shock pad, Y-2, has been removed, not to be replaced.
B&W and Duke Power are evaluating the shock pad failure to determine cause and ultimate resolution.
The broken thermal shield bolts were inspected, their replacement was planned and at the close of the report period, 83 of the 96 replacement studs have been installed.
The resident inspector will monitor the activity and report same in his next report.
11.
Equipment Hatch On January 17, 1982 Oconee Unit 2 was at cold shutdown with defueling in progress.
At 3:40 p.m.
that date, it was detected that the reactor building equipment hatch, which is required by technical specification 3.8.6 to be closed and secured during fuel handling, was standing open at the bottom by 4 "to h".
Fuel handling was immediately suspended, a maintenance crew was dispatched, the equipment hatch properly sealed and defueling recommenced by 6:35 p.m.
Oconee Technical Specification 3.8.6 requires the following:
"During the handling of irradiated fuel in the reactor building at least one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be closed.
The equipment hatch cover shall be in place with a minimum of four bolts securing the cover to the sealing surfaces."
Contrary to the above requirements, on January 17, 1982, for a period of 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />, fuel handling transpired on Oconee Unit 2 with the equipment hatch unsecured.
This is a Violation.
(270/82-04-01)
12. 111saligned Valve LPSW-256 On February 7,1982 at 6:30 a.m. low pressure service water (LPSW) valve LPSW-256 was found throttled by approximately 50% during the performance of an LPSW valve verification test. The valve, a 10 " manually operated gate, is on the outlet line of the Unit 1, "B", low pressure injection (LPI) decay heat cooler. The normal operating position of the valve is full open and is verified to be in that position pursuant to the unit pre-critical checklist.
An investigation is underway in order to determine when the valve was misaligned and if, with the valve throttled, the system would have functioned as designed if called upon to do so. Pending the results of that investigation, this item will remain Unresolved.
(82-04-02)
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13.
Eouipment Misalignment At 12:14 a.m. on January 1, 1982, Oconee Unit 1 main turbine tripped as the result of a moisture separator high level signal. Reactor power was 18'o, below the 20*. power level necessary to arm the Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip an ticipa tory trip circuitry, thus no reactor trip occurred.
An I&E technician affected supposed repairs to the applicable equipment and the turbine generator was placed on line at 12:12 p.m. that date.
At 12:44 p.m.
the main turbine tripped initiating an anticipatory reactor trip from 22?; power.
Once again, the trip was attributed to moisture separator high level. Another I&E technician investigated the cause of the trip and detected that the level detectors controlling moisture separator level were valved out of service.
The level controllers were returned to service, reactor restarted and the turbine generator placed on line at 6:56 p.m. that date.
At 7:07 p.m. the main turbine tripped again, initiating a reactor trip from 20*e power. The trip was once again attributed to moisture seperator high level. Although it was detected that a fitting had been inadvertently left off one of the level controllers discussed above, licensee personnel indicate that instrument air line blockage (oil residue) prevented the level controller from functioning, not the missing fitting.
The instrument air lines were purged, the fitting replaced, reactor restarted and the turbine generator was placed a on-line at 11:48 p.m.
At 2:37 p.m. on January 2,1982 the main turbine tripped initiating an anticipatory reactor trip from approximately 27?s power.
The trip was attributed to a loss of-stator coolant signal.
Investigation revealed the stator coolant discharge pressure switch, PS-216, was valved out of service, leading to the plant trip. PS-216 was valved back into service, and plant recovery ensued.
The above detailed events constitute an apparent disregard for sound maintenance practice. The equipment involved is not safety-related, nor did the events result in any undue risk to public safety.
They do, however, reveal an area warranting immediate licensee and inspector scrutiny.
Discussions with Oconee management reveals that efforts are underway to ef fect measures to preclude maintenance inadequacies akin to the foregoing.
The resident inspector will monitor the licensee's progress in implementing these measures.
14.
TMI Action Items Categorized below are those TMI Action Items which were required to have beem implemented prior to and by January 1, 1982.
Certain items such as auxiliary feedwater system short-term modifications have been at least
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partially verified by the inspectors, but not previously reported.
This type of item as well as others that have been completed by the licensee are addressed below, and are considered to be closed by the inspector unless indicated otherwise.
II.B.1.3 Reactor Coolant System Vent Procedures As reported in the previous inspection report, (number 82-01), the reactor coolant system (RCS) high point vents have been installed, but are not operational on Oconee Unit 1.
The same type of modifications have been partially completed on Units 2 and 3.
The licensee RCS vent design and system operation is under review by NRR (NRC staff letter to the licensee dated January 18, 1982).
Therefore, since the design has not yet been accepted, the licensee has not developed any new emergency procedures reflecting use of the RCS vents.
However, there are plans to incorporate RCS vent information into the existing emergency procedures.
II.B.4 Training for Mitigating Core Damage On February 4, 1982, the inspector held discussions with the licensee's training department personnel pertaining to the implementation of their program on training for mitigating core damage.
The subject training program was initiated on May 6, 1981 and completed by October 21, 1981 for all licensee personnel. For the operations staff this training was included in the operator license requalification training. The course was of a three day duration followed by an administered examination as a requirement for successful completion.
The inspector selectively reviewed the operator training records and verified that the operators have received and completed the required training.
The subject material covered in training consisted of all topic areas addressed in H. R. Denton's letter dated March 28, 1980 with the exception of two topic areas. They were: (1) determination of pressurizer level if all level transmitters fail, and (2) determination of letdc..n flow with a clogged filter (low flow). The licensee requested from B&W more details on these topics so that they can be presented in the future.
Personnel in such departments as I&C, health physics, and chemistry have also received training commensurate with their responsibilities.
Their'
course was of eight hour duration followed by an examination.
All new licensee personnel receive appropriate training. In addition, the licensee is developing a Phase II training program which will be more site specific.
II.E.1.1.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Short-term Modifications l
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In response to NRR's evaluation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems, the licensee cor.mitted to perform the fo? lowing modifications per their letter dated April 3,1981:
1.
Replacement of existing manual valve LPSW-138 with an air operated valve which would fail open upon loss of AC power. This will provide coo?ing water to tne turbine driven EFP cooling water jacket upon loss of AC power.
2.
Addition of a branch line upstream of valves LPSW-137 and LPSW-138 to the existing cooling water inlet to the EFP turbine oil cooler including on air over operated valve, HPSW-184.
3.
Addition of a nitrogen backup system to supply air to all instrumentation associated with steam control valves MS-87, MS-126, and MS-129.
The inspector walked down the AFW system for Unit 1 and verified that the above described modifications have been implemented. The same modifications for. Units 2 'and, 3 have aiready been inspected and reported in inspection renort numtrsr 81-18.
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II.E.1.2.1.B.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation The inspector verified that the licensee has implemented safety grade system circuit modification on Unit 1 necessary to provide automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater ( AFW) system.
The modifications were performed through the implementation of Nuclear Station Modification 1394 work package.
The inspector reviewed the implementing procedures, work request, and field installation, and had no further questions.
The same modifications have been completed on Units 2 and 3, and arr reported in inspection report number 81-18.
II.K.2.10.8 B&W orders -- Safety-Grade Reactor Trip This item requires a safety grade anticipatory reactor trip on loss of feedwater pumps or turbine trip for B&W designed units.
The licensee's system design to meet the above requirement was approved by NRR and installed on Unit 1.
The modifications were performed through implementation of Nuclear Station Modification 1489 work package.
The i nspector reviewed NSM 1489, work requests, implementation procedures, and walked down the field installation for Unit 1.
The inspector had no further question _
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This modification has been completed on Units 1 and 3, and is ongoing for Unit 2 during this outage.
III.D.3.3.2 Inplant Radiation Monitoring l
This item, which requires the licensee to provide equipment, training, and procedures necessary to accurately determine the presence of airborne radioiodine in areas within the plant where personnel may be present during
an accident, applies only to applicants for a fuel-loading license.
Therefore, it is not applicable for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3.
However, similar requirements for operating plants have been met by the licensee and are reported in inspection report numbers 80-23, 80-20, 80-17 and 81-13.
l There was one exception in that the Emergency Count Room, which was still under construction, will be used as a backup facility for analyzing
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post-accident containment air samples (Inspection Report No. 81-13).
II.F.1.2.B.2 Iodine / Particulate Sampling This item requires continuous sampling of plant gaseous effluent for post-accident releases of radioactive iodines and particulates.
The inspectors have followed up on this item in the past and have reported their findings in inspection report numbers 81-13 and 82-01.
Per NRC letter so Duke Power Company dated October 15, 1981, the inspector interprets that the licensee has met the requirements of this item since NRR has reviewed DPC's submittals and stated that the licensee has no technical deviations from NRC stated positions. Therefore, this item is considered closed for all three Oconee units.
15.
IE Bulletin Review IE Bulletin 79-23, " Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transfonner" expressed concern on potential transfonner damage or failure due to improper circuit installation. This bulletin does not apply to the Oconee units because no emergency diesel generators are currently in use. The Oconee Nuclear Station relies on two Keowee hydro units for redundant onsite power.
However, this bulletin may apply to the diesel generator installed inside the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) which is currently under construction. Plans are to re-apply this bulletin upon completion of the SSF.
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