IR 05000269/1982010
| ML20053B331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1982 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053B327 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-82-10, 50-270-82-10, 50-287-82-10, NUDOCS 8205280297 | |
| Download: ML20053B331 (17) | |
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UNITED $TATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 Q
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30M3
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Report Nos. 50-269/82-10, 50-270/82-10 and 50-287/82-10 Licensee:
Duke Power Company I
422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DRP-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oc nee site near neca, South Carolin Inspector:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief
/Datd Signed Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs
SUMMARY Inspection on March 6-8, 16-19, 1982 l
Areas Inspected This reactive, announced inspection involved 43 inspector-hours on site in the areas of HPI/ Makeup Nozzle area modification (Units 1, 2, and 3); request for relief from ASME Section XI on Main Steam system pipe welds (Units 1, 2 and 3);
once through steam generation tube leak repair (Unit 3).
Results No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- R. J. Brakcett, Station Senior QA Engineer
- C. B. Cheezem, Inservice Inspection Engineer
- R. T. Bond, Technical Service Engineer J. Crowe, QA NDE/ Welding T. Cribbe, License Engineer R. Rettew, Associate Engineer P. J. Earnhardt, Assistant Engineer C. G. Freeman, QC Supervisor NDE/ Welding Other Organizations Babcock and Wilcox, Nuclear Power Generation Division (NPGD)
H. W. Stoppelmann, ISI Coordinator / Level II Examiner L. Adams, Task Leader NPGD Service Dept.
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. T. Orders
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 19, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. By telephone, the inspector informed the licensee that the following new item was identified for fol-lowup action on future inspections:
Inspector Followup Item (50-269,270,287/82-10-01) - Relief Request From IWC-2430 Section XI Requirements on Main Steam Pipe Welds (paragraph 6).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Cracking in High Pressure Injection / Makeup Line (Units 1, 2 and 3)
On February 26, 1982, Duke Power Company (DPC) reported that thermal fatigue type cracks were found inside the Oconee 3 normal makeup line near the HPI nozzle in loop 3A2. The cracks were located inside the safe-end, upstream
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of the HPI nozzle on the cold leg of loop 3A and on the inner wall surface of the pipe extension piece between the aforementioned safe end and the first check valve on this line. The licensee stated that the worst crack appeared to have propagated to a depth of approximately 20*J of through wall thickness. One circumferential crack was observed in the safe-end to pipe weld.
In addition, the licensee stated that a radiographic examination identified loose or cracked thermal sleeves in the Oconee 2 makeup lines 2A2, 281 and 2B2. Through discussions with licensee representatives and B&W nondestructive examiners, conducted by telephone on March 3 and 5,1982, the inspector ascertained that crack indications, identified by ultrasonic examination in Oconee units 2 and 3, started in the ID wall of the safe-end at approximately 2 inches to 2 inches upstream of the safe-end to i ozzle weld joint and persisted for about six inches upstream into the pipe exten-sion piece where they stopped.
This condition was found over the entire ID circumference.
Ultrasonic examination procedure 151-120 Rev.13 was used to examine pipe welds joining similar and dissimilar materials.
The procedure was written to comply with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI and Section V, Article 5; 1974 Edition through the Summer of 1975.
A similar procedure (technique) was used to inspect Crystal River 3.
System calibration was performed on a ASME Section XI type block for range and amplitude. The area of interest was scanned with a 1/4" 2.25 Mhz transducer at a gain setting of approximately 14 db hot depending on the noise level produced by the material. At this setting indications with reflectors greater than 2:1 noise ratios were investigated.
Signal responses 250*o of reference level were evaluated. The cracked safe-end in unit 3 normal makeup line 3A2 was used as a work sample to demonstrate the UT procedure's capability to detect these types of crack indications.
Inservice inspections (nondestructive examinations) on each of the two normal makeup /HPI nozzles and related dissimilar metal welds (nozzle safe-end) as required by Section XI of the ASME Code have been performed on each of the three Oconee units.
These code required examinations include surface or liquid penetrant (PT) and, volumetric or ultrasonic examination over the entire weld surface and the base material for at least one wall thickness beyond the edge of the weld. Listed below are the year and outage these examinations were performed:
UNIT 1 Nozzle Designation Year Outage 1A1 1975 1st 1A2 1978 4th UNIT 2 2Al*
1978, 1982 3rd and 5th 2A2*
1982 5th
- These safe-end to nozzle welds were examined during the recent ten year outage as required by the aforementioned code.
However, the area of interest examined per code requirements was free of the cracking condition described heretofore. The safe-end to pipe weld, where cracking was found is included in the ISI program but had not been scheduled for c : amination during this ten year interva.
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UNIT 3 3Al 1976 1st 3A2 1979, 1982 4th
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1982 a.
Initial Inspection on HPI/MU Line Cracking, units 1, 2 and 3 On March 6 and 7, 1982 at the Oconee site, the inspector reviewed construction radiographs and compared these with radiographs taken to determine, by comparison, the position of the thermal sleeve (TS)
inside the safe-end (SE) of the two (2) "doh e-duty" HPI/ makeup nozzles designated as A1, A2 and the two(2) single duty HPI nozzles designated as B1, B2.
This review confirmed the licensee's findings which were as follows:
Unit 2 Nozzle Radiography 2A1 No void between TS & SE, restaint weld buttons intact 2A2 Loose TS, restraint weld buttons missing 2B1 Loose TS restraint; weld buttons intact 282 Cracked TS in rolled area, about 75*; of ci rc umference Unit 3 Radiography 3Al No void between TS & SE; restraint Weld buttons in tact 3A2 Loose TS restraint; weld buttons missing 3B1 Slight void between TS and SE, restraint weld buttons intact 3B2 Same as 3Al above.
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In addition, the inspector observed liquid penetrant examination results, on video tape, for 3A2 normal makeup HPI nozzle bore.
The surface of the nozzle bore, including the knuckle area as viewed on the video monitor, appeared to be free of the thermal fatigue cracks. The j
restraining weld buttons on the lower half of the nozzle, viewed i
horizontally, at the 4 and 8 o' clock position looking into the nozzle were severely worn while those on the upper half, at 10 and 2 o'clocl-were intact. A small amount of mechanical type wear was observed on
the upper half of the nozzle bore which was believed to have resulted from the rotating action of the TS.
b.
Headquarters Meeting March 8,1982
l Following this inspection, the inspector attended a meeting held on March 8, 1982 at the NRC headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland between i
Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), B&W licensees, and NRC staff to discuss concerns relative to cracks found in the HPI/ makeup lines upstream of the HPI nozzle.
This finding involved Oconee units 2 and 3 and, Crystal River 3 (CR-3).
Parts found to contain cracks included a check valve at CR-3; and safe-ends, thermal sleeves and piping at both plants.
Other areas of concern included:
(1) The variations between design and as-built conditions, i.e., Oconee 1 has a doubie thermal sleeve which is a field modification implemented when it was discovered that the original sleeve length was too short; while at CR-3, contrary to design requirements, as-built pipe configuration showed that a 4-inch pipe extension piece between the HPI nozzle safe-end and the first check valve in the line had not been installed.
Instead, the valve was " butted" directly to the safe-end of the HPI nozzle; (2) Results of inspection findings; corrective actions, which include repair of failed parts / components and, an investigation to determine the root cause of the problem; (3) Justification for con-tinued operation of plants not yet inspected. Details of this meeting were documented in a report issued on March 15, 1982 by Operating Reactors Branch 4, Division of Licensing.
Table 1, was submitted by DPC during this meeting.
It describes inspections performed and the results.
c.
Second Headquarters Meeting on March 16, 1982.
On March 16, 1982 the inspector attended a followup meeting at NRC headquaters requested by NRR for review of the B&W licensees near and long term corrective actions at those plants where cracking had been found and for discussions regarding continued operation of B&W plants (ANO-1, Rancho-Seco) that had not yet inspected the suspect
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pipe sections.
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In this meeting, DPC provided an update of the. ongoing repairs,
inspection and evaluation of findings at Oconee Units 2 and 3.
Table 2 provides a synopsis of these inspection findings.
d.
Followup Inspection on HPI/MU Line Cracking Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3; March 17 through 19, 1982 This inspection effort was devoted to:
(1) review and evaluation of corrective actions taken to repair Oconee Unit 3 normal makeup /HPI 3A2 safe end, related piping and TS shown to contain cracks; (2) unit 1 once through steam generator (OTSG) tube leak repair.
l (1) 3A2 Makeup Nozzle Area Repair, Unit 3.
At the time of this inspection the cracked safe-end and pipe
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extension piece had been removed. The surface examination (PT) of the nozzle bore and inner radius had been performed, see Fig. #1.
The cracking condition observed on the inner surface of the safe-end is shown on Fig. #2.
The replacement parts had been reconciled, the TS had been hard roll expanded and weld fabri-cation had been complete except for some re-radiography on one of i
the welds which required repair. Fig. #3 shows the newly designed i
thermal sleeve modification used to repair the 3A2 nozzle area.
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This design incorporates a safe-end modification to facilitate thermal sleeve installation from the extension of the RC Piping.
The outboard portion of the thermal sleeve / safe-end interface area is hard roll expanded and the inboard thermal sleeve / nozzle
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interface area is contact roll expanded. The outboard end of the thermal sleeve also incorporates a flange designed to prevent the
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sleeve from entering the reactor coolant system in the unlikely event that the roll expansion is lost during operation.
The modification on 3A2 nozzle area was controlled through B&W's Field Change Authoritation (FCA) No. 04-3737-02, "HPI/MU Nozzle Repair Pump Leg 3A2," and Oconee, Nuclear Station Modification (NSM)
No. ON 1982 Revision 2A. Requirements of ASME,Section XI, 1974
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Edition with addenda through Summer 1975 were invoked for the
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installation of the new SE and TS. The code of record for the fabrication and testing of the new welds, identified on ISO 64 revision 10 system 51A, was USASB31.7 Code for Pressure Piping, Nuclear Power Piping,1968 Edition and Errata dated June,1968. A l
new baseline was performed on the new welds in accordance with requirements of ASME Section XI.
Process control which was verified by observation and/or measurement was documented on process record TN/3/A/1982/2/A revision 1.
Documents referenced in the FCA-included:
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51-1131820-03 HPI Makeup Nozzle Modification (3A2 RC Pump Leg)
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32-1131821-00 NSS-9 Makeup Safe End Reconciliation
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32-1131822-00 NSS-9 Replacement Thermal Sleeve Evalu-ation 32-1131823-00 NSS-9 Makeup Nozzle Evaluation
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Reports certifying conformance witn structural and design require-ments of applicable codes were included in the aforementioned FCA.
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The inspector reviewed a sample of the above documents and records for completeness, clarity and accuracy.
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l This work was performed on the following Work Requests (WR):
No. 954638
" Remove TS and SE"
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No. 954568
" Remove Existing TS Machine Existing SE
and Install New TS".
This WR was issued for units 2 and 3.
J No. 954728
" Perform Work Per NSM, ON/1982". This WR was applicable to all three Oconee Units.
I Within these areas the inspector reviewed a san,? e of the above l
documents and records for completeness, clarity and accuracy. In addition, the inspector reviewed radiographs for the new safe-end
to nozz'e weld DOC 3F 51A-64-24B.
Results of ultrasonic inspec-tions on new welds 23A and 24A were also reviewed. This inspec-tion will be used as the baseline information for future ISI inspections.
(2) 381 HPI Nozzle Area Repair At the time of this inspection, March 18, 1982, work activity on 381 HPI nozzle TS had been completed.
The TS had been hard roll-expanded and the pipe that was cut for inspection and rolling
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purposes had been rewelded.
The work had been performed on WR 521138 and procedure TM/3/A/4000/112 " Temporary Procedure to Cut, Roll-Expand and Reweld Makeup Nozzle on 3B1 RC Pump Leg".
Through discussions with B&W and licensee representatives the
inspector ascertained that a visual inspection performed to determine the conditior; and location of the sleeve, disclosed that
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there was no gap between the TS and the ID of thc,afe-end.
Moreover, the sleeve could not be moved through a push pull technique even though a force of between 80 and 120 lbs was applied. A PT test showed no evidence of cracking on the suspect inner surf aces, i.e., safe-end pipe extension. The weld buttons showed no evidence of wear associated with TS movement. A review
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of ultrasonic test results performed to establish baseline data on the new welds identified as B4.5.52 and B4.5.53 showed them to be
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free of recordable indications.
These tests were performed in accordance with previously accepted NDE ASME Section XI type procedures.
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l An inspection plan to monitor these areas will be developed prior
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to the next refueling outage of Oconee 3 and further detailed
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analyses will be performed to try to determine the root cause of the problem. This statement was contained in part in a memorandum from W. 0. Parker, Jr., to H. R. Denton dated March 12, 1982.
j (3) Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) Tube Leaks, Unit 3 i
i On February 15, 1982 Unit 3 was shutdown when the leak rate in 3A OTSG l
increased from.01gpm to ' 03 gpm.
Results of a bubble test, eddy current and visual examinations showed tube 2-4 to be leaking.
The
hole in the tube was located about 31 inches above the 15th support
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plate.
The tube was stablized from the top and explosively plugged from the bottom. During the examination of 150 additional tubes, as
required by Technical Specifications, tube 75-118 was found to have a
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52?4 through wall indication. Records show this tube was examined in December 1980 and was found to contain a 25?s through wall indication at the 14th support plate.
Tube 75-118 was explosively plugged from
the top and bottom. This information was obtained through discussions with cognizant license personnel and a review of licensee Incident Report #1193, and Reportable Occurence report R0-287/82-03.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Request for Relief From ASME Section XI Requirement IWC-2430 on Main Steam,
Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater Piping (Units 1, 2 and 3)
On March 11, 1982 the licensee submitted to NRR a relief request relative to
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l ASME Section XI paragraph IWC-2430 requirement. This requirement states in
part that:
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Examinations that reveal unacceptable structural defects..
i shall be extended to include an additional number of components i
in the same category approximately equal to that number initially i
examined. In the event further unacceptable structural defects
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are revealed, all of the same components in the other streams of j
the system shall be examined.
The basis for this relief request was based on the fact that the Main Steam, Main Feedwater, and Auxiliary Feedwater piping systems at Oconee were originally constructed to meet the requirements of USAS B',1.1 Code.
This code did not require volumetric inspection of pipe welds with thicknesses
'0.-750" wall thickness, which included approximately 40?s of the welds in these systems. Oconee began commercial operation before ASME Section XI i
required a preservice inspection of this Quality Group piping. Because of these combined circumstances, volumetric inspection (radiography (RT)), is
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now being conducted for the first time on many of these welds in accordance
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with applicable code inservice inspection requirements.
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i The licensee stated that in the current inservice inspection plan, the
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Oconee 2 refueling outage requires the volumetric (RT) inspection of
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thirteen (13) welds on the Main Steam (MS) systam.
Seven of these welds were not volumetrically inspected during construction.
Three welds inspected during this outage have been found to contain unacceptable fabri-
cation flaws.
Two of these three had not been inspected volumetrically during construction.
The third was radiographed during construction.
The construction radiograph of this weld revealed a fabrication flaw (slag) that appeared to be acceptable, but the improved quality of the i
inservice radiograph showed that the original flaw included a rejectable,
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lack of penetration, indication that was not apparent in the construction
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RT.
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The weld under discussion is Oconee 2, DOC 2FISIO1AS-27.
It is a 26" X I
.875" pipe to pipe joint, fabricated with a backing ring.
The technique used to shoot the construction radiograph, taken about June 6, 1972, j
employed a double wall exposure with a No. 20 film side penetrameter and a AA type film. The ISI technique employed a finer grain type film (T) shot
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l sith a single wall exposure (panoramic) using a No. 15 film side penetram-I eter. The inspector reviewed both sets of films and ascertained that the rejectable indication, identified as lack of penetration (LOP), trailed off an apparent slag type indication. The slag indication, which was acceptable for this size of weld, was readily visible in both sets of films. However, the rejectable LOP indication, which was located in the 0-1 station measured about 1/8-inch in length, was visible in the ISI radiograph and appeared only as a faint light gray line that was barely visible after comparing both i
films and after knowing the approximate location. A reshot of this station taken with the original construction technique for comparison purposes
showed that no discernable changes had taken place in the indication between the time of the original radiograph, and the one taken now or ten years later.
i The licensee, in his relief request, stated that under paragraph IWC-2430 of
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Section XI another thirteen welds would have to be inspected. Moreover, the
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i relief request stated that "if another weld is found to contain a rejectable flaw, either service-induced or originally present from fabrication, the entire main *, team system (approximately 190 welds) would have to be inspected imposing a great hardship in terms of cost and manpower available to accomplish.
Therefore, flaws which can be characterized as fabrication flaws should not be considered in deciding whether additional inspection samples are needed."
Region II staff discussed the inspection findings with NRR and submitted its
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position on Class 2 welds with and without fabrication / baseline type radio-L i
graphs and, recommended that the licensee apply for a code interpretation on
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I IWC-2430 with regards to fabrication vs. service-induced defects.
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licensee has taken steps to repair those welds found to contain rejectable
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type indications.
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In addition to the aforementioned radiograph, the inspector reviewed radio-graphs for the following welds:
WELD NO.
SIZE SYSTEM DOC 2FISIO1A5-9 8" X.909" Main Steam DOC 2FISIO1A15-8 6" X.432 Main Steam DOC 2FISIO1A16-9 6" X.432 Main Steam The inspector stated this item would be identified as inspector followup item pending N1R's action on the submitted relief request.
The item is identified 50-269, 270, 287/81-10-01, Relief Request From IWC-2430,Section XI Requirements on Main Steam Pipe Welds.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie _ _
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OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SAFE END/ PIPE
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E PT UT NOZZLE THERMAL SLEEVE CRACK RADIOGRAPH INSIDE SPECIAL 1A1 OK Yes No (6)
1A2 OK No Yes Yes Yes 1B1 OK Yes No (6)
1B2 OK Yes No (6)
2A1 OK No Yes No Yes I4)
2A2 Loose Yes(2)
Yes No Yes 231 Loose No Yes No Yes 2B2 Cracked (5)
No Yes No Yes 3Al OK No Yes No Yes 3A2 Loose (4I Yes (3)
Yes Yes Yes(1I 3B1 Loose No Yes No Yes
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3B2 OK No Yes No Yes NOTES:
(1)
After PT (2)
6 longitudinal cracks; 1" - 2" length; started in safe end and runs into piping distributed 360* around.
No depth information.
(3)
>12 longitudinal cracks, N 6" long; started in safe end and runs into piping; distributed 360* around; 1 crack at 20% of wall thickness, other less.
(4)
Weld buttons missing, gap in rolled area N 1/16" - 1/8".
(5)
Cracked in rolled area.
(6)
To be done this outage.
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TABLE 2
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f4DE oconee 1 Use F vamina t ion Perfo rmed Resialts Commqn t,s
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1A1 II P I Dicha rge Line Normal Makeup ft i of all welds from f40 Voi'Is noz. to ist isolation vaIve.
PI of OD surface of too Cracks all welds from not to ist isolation valve.
UT of all welds f rom No Cracks noz, to 1st isolation valve.
IA2 Normal Makeup Iti - Same as 1A1 PT Weld fabri-One inch warning iino cut of noz ID about is cation in one to repai r constr uction inches in f rom sa fe-inch I i rie,
weld fabrication defcet, und (SE) to thermal sleeve IS and pipe No Cracks o< tension PT also ID of origina l one inch 1ine af ter cutting it open.
lit t liigh Pressure Safety RT-see 1A1 No Voids i nj ec t. i o n UI-ISI exam of SE to tio C rac k s pipe wold both sides.
PI - SAME 1A1 No Cracks 1B2 liigh Pressure Sa fety fl T-See 1A1 No Voids i nj ec t i on Weld button in-tact UT-Same a s IB1 No Cracks PI-Same as 1A1 No Cracks 1 of 3
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