IR 05000269/1998014
| ML15261A362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15261A361 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-98-14, 50-270-98-14, 50-287-98-14, 50-369-98-14, 50-370-98-14, 50-413-98-14, 50-414-98-14, NUDOCS 9810290179 | |
| Download: ML15261A362 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-413, 50-414, 50-369, 50-370, 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos:
NPF-35, NPF-52, NPF-9, NPF-17, DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Report Nos:
50-413/98-14, 414/98-14, 50-369/98-14, 370/98-14, 50-269/98-14, 270/98-14, and 287/98-14 Licensee:
Duke Energy Corporation Facilities:
Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations Location:
Duke Energy Corporation P. 0. Box 1007 Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1007 Date:
August 24 - 28. 1998 Inspector:
W. Stansberry, Safeguards Inspector Approved by:
G. Belisle, Chief Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9810290179 980922 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/98-14, 50-414/98-14, 50-369/98-14, 50-370/98-14, 50-269/98-14, 50-270/98-14, and 50-287/98-14 This announced inspection was conducted in the area of Plant Support by a regional safeguards specialist. The specific area evaluated was the Access Authorization Progra Plant Support
The licensee had implemented and staffed an organization that was capable of managing and implementing the Access Authorization Program requirements (Section S1).
- The background investigation process.adequately developed and verified the background elements before granting unescorted access (Section Sl).
- The psychological evaluations of applicants were properly administered and supervised (Section S).
- The behavioral observation program was implemented according to licensee commitments and regulatory requirements (Section Sl).
- The grandfathering, reinstatement, updating, transfer, and temporary unescorted access authorization elements were efficiently maintained and
'proficiently managed (Section S).
- The documentation and management of the denial, revocation, and appeals process was a strength in the Access Authorization Program (Section S).
- The protection of personal information by the Access Services Group was adequate (Section S).
- Audits of the Access Authorization Program were thorough, concise, and timely (Section S1).
- Personal access authorization records were maintained according to the Access Authorization Program commitments and regulatory requirements (Section Sl).'
- REPORT-DETAILS S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Access Authorization a. Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the Duke Power Company Nuclear Access Authorization.Program (AAP) to verify that the program met 10 CFR 2.55, 73.56, 73.57, 73.71, and Regulatory Guide 5.6 b. Observations and Findings (1) AAP Administration and Implementation The inspector conducted an inspection of the AAP requirements of Inspection Procedure 81700, "Physical Security Program for Power Reactors."
Duke Power's Nuclear Policy Manual, Nuclear System Directive 218, "Duke Power Company Nuclear Access Authorization Program,"
Revision 4; two Access Services Procedures. "180-Day Temporary Access Authorization Administration" and "Pre-Access PADS Search and Set-Up Process"; and Nuclear System Directive 222, "Personnel Access Data System (PADS)" provided the implementing requirements for the licensees'
AAP. These documents outlined the criteria for the general and specific requirements for unescorted access (UA); psychological evaluation; temporary UA authorization (UAA); evaluation criteria for UA:
reinstatement; update; transfer of UAA; continual behavior observation program; grandfathering; contractor and vendor requirements; protection of personal information; audits; and records. The inspector reviewed.
and found these directives and procedures to be well written and to have clearly defined the licensee's program requirements and regulatory requirement The inspector verified that the AAP was organized under the Manager',
Access Services (AS) at the General Office (GO). The AS group was responsible for the compilation, maintenance and distribution of the program. Site Security was responsible for the implementation and administration of the program for authorizing UA into their respective protected and vital areas. The GO and site Human Resources (HR) were responsible for processing all incoming and outgoing personne Site security, site HR. and AS personnel were responsible for adhering to the requirements of the Nuclear Security Manual, "Nuclear Security Badge Process Directive" during the information input associated with the Video Badging Network. The inspector also verified that the GO HR was responsible for the appeals and psychological assessments. Supplier Verification and.AS ensured contractor/vendor employees granted UA met the requirements of the AAP. The inspector determined that
administrators, implementors and staff personnel of the AAP were experienced and fully capable of administering their portion of the program. The inspector interviewed the AS staff and found them well trained and capable of performing the specific requirements the licensee tasked them to perfor Although the AAP had been centralized at the GO level, the licensee continued to use outside screening agents to conduct background investigations and credit checks. The licensee had reviewed the outside screening agents' programs to ensure that they met regulatory requirement (2) Background Investigations (BI) Elements
.The inspector determined by AAP record review and interviews with AS personnel that the licensee verified and developed information concerning employment, education, criminal history, military service, character references, verification of identity, and credit worthiness of individuals before granting UA to protected and vital areas. The licensee properly identified discrepancies between the screening
.applications and the results of the BI. Judicious actions to resolve issues were documented in the appropriate AAP personal file (3) Psychological Evaluation The inspector determined that the licensee used the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 1 and 2 psychological tests to evaluate applicants. Tests of licensee and contractor/vendor applicants were conducted and supervised by AS personnel at the GO and HR personnel at the sites. If there was more than one individual taking the test, there was a proctor in the test room. Evaluations were returned within three working days of the test (4) Behavioral Observation Program (BOP)
The inspector verified that personnel overviewing the BOP were required to have management and supervisory training. The inspector reviewed 73 manager/supervisor training records to assure that individuals were annually trained to have awareness and sensitivity and to detect and report changes in behavior that adversely reflected upon trustworthiness and reliability. During annual employee training, employees were informed of the arrest reportability requirement to report an arrest to their manager/supervisor immediately after the arrest and before entering the protected area of a nuclear sit (5) Grandfathering. Reinstatement. Updating. Transfer and Temporary UAA The inspector did not review grandfathering since most personnel currently in the program were granted UA after October 28, 1990. Any deficiencies of grandfathering found in active files would be eight years old. The inspector verified that the licensee had a program to determine the activities engaged in by an individual during an absence greater than 30 days from the BOP. If an individual was away from the BOP, for more than 30 days, before the individual's UA entry into the protected area, the licensee would verify that during the absence from the BOP, the individual did not engage in any activities that affected their trustworthiness and reliability. Individuals with an interruption of more than 365 calendar days and less than 5 years in their UAA were subject to a new BI and psychological evaluation. The licensee has approved provisions to accept UAA granted by other licensees. The transfer program was the major work effort of the AS group. They granted Temporary UAA when all other processing elements were completed, except the receipt of the results of the criminal history inquiry and military records check. Extensions of the 180-day temporary UA were only exercised if the criminal history and military records checks had uncontrolled delay (6) Denial or Revocation of Unescorted Access The inspector verified that the licensee had developed a review procedure that was available to employees whose employment was adversely affected when their UA was denied or revoked. The inspector found that there were 17 denials during 1997 and 11 to date in 1998. Nine denial revocations and appeals of denial/revocation records were reviewed. The review indicated that information was provided to affected individuals concerning the basis for denial or revocation of their UA. The individuals were provided the opportunity to provide any additional information and had a review process available which was independent and impartial. Unescorted access was not granted during this review process. The GO and HR were responsible for the appeal process and psychological assessment. Any derogatory information developed after granting UA was adjudicated by the Manager, Access Services and forwarded to site management to deny or continue access. The documentation and management of the denial, revocation, and appeals process was a strength in the AA (7) Protection of Personal Information The inspector conducted interviews with AS personnel and reviewed procedures and determined that information was not disclosed to persons other than those identified in the AAP. Personal information files were
.stored in metal filing cabinets in a repository that had a metal door
and frame with a digital electric combination lock securing the doo The inspector discussed with the Manager. AS a vulnerability found in the security of the files in the repositor Working files outside the repository were under personal observation of the individual working the files or were temporarily stored in a locked office. Files were returned to the repository at the close of each working da (8) Audits The inspector reviewed three audits of the AAP: SA-95-07 (GO)(RA) AAP, SA-97-05 (FFD)(AAP)(PADS), and SA-98-32 (ALL)(RA). Audits were conducted by the Nuclear Generation Department, Operational Assessment Section, Regulatory Audits. Each audit had findings and recommendations and concluded that the AAP was adequately maintained and effectiv Audit SA-97-05 was the last audit of the PADS. Contractors and vendors were audited annually by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Duke Power Compan (9) Records The inspector's review of UAA personal files determined that individuals were properly informed about types of records that may be produced and retained, where such records were normally maintained, and the duration such records were retained. The applicants were informed of their rights to review information to assure its accuracy and completeness, circumstances under which the information may be released, and the right to withdraw consent for obtaining records and conducting background investigations. Personal records were retained for at least five year During this inspection, the licensee was purging 1992 terminated and denied UAA record c. Conclusion The licensee had implemented and staffed an organization that was capable of managing and implementing the AAP requirements. The background investigation process adequately developed and verified the background elements before granting unescorted access. The psychological evaluations of applicants were properly administered and supervised. The behavioral observation program was implemented according to licensee commitments and regulatory requirements. The grandfathering, reinstatement, updating, transfer, and temporary unescorted access authorization elements.were efficiently maintained and proficiently managed. The documentation and management of the denial, revocation, and appeals process was a strength in the AAP. The protection of personal information by the Access Services Group was adequate. Audits of the AAP were thorough, concise, and timel Personal access authorization records were maintained according to AAP commitments and regulatory requirement S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues (Closed) LER 369/98-01(S): Falsification of employment documentation of an individual who was granted temporary unescorted acces The inspector verified that the licensee investigated, documented and implemented corrective actions as described in the Licensee Event Report (LER), dated July 8, 1998. The corrective action of the Access Services Group to prevent the recurrence of this violation was appropriate and timely. This LER was a minor issue and was close Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results on August 27, 1998 to licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente Although reviewed during the inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee T. Keener, Security Manager, Nuclear General Office Regulatory and Industrial Affairs L. Keller, Technical Systems Manager, Nuclear General Office Regulatory and
"Industrial Affairs P. Fowler, Manager, Access Services INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors ITEMS CLOSED Closed 50-369/98-01(S)
LER Falsification of employment documentation
Input Concurrence Form SPECIAL INSPECTION BRANCH INPUT Facility:
Duke Energy Corporation Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations Docket / Report No /98-14, 414/98-14, 50-369/98-14, 370/98-14, 50-269/98-14. 270/98-14, and 287/98-14 Inspection Dates: August 24 - 28, 1998 o
IFS FORMS
PIM INPUT
The licensee had implemented and staffed an organization that was capable of managing and implementing the Access Authorization Program requirements (Section S1). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: Cl, C3
The background investigation process adequately developed and verified the background elements before granting unescorted access (Section S1).
TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: Cl, C3
The psychological evaluations of applicants were properly administered and supervised (Section S). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: Cl, B2
The behavioral observation program was implemented according to licensee commitments and regulatory requirements (Section Sl). TYPE: POS., SFA:
PS, ID: NRC, SMM: C1, B3
The grandfathering, reinstatement, updating, transfer, and temporary unescorted access authorization elements were efficiently maintained and proficiently managed (Section Sl). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM:
Cl, C3
The documentation and management of the denial, revocation, and appeals process was a strength in the Access Authorization Program (Section Sl).
TYPE: STREN., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: Cl, C3
The protection of personal information by the Access Services Group was adequate (Section S1). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: Al, A2
- Audits of the Access Authorization Program were thorough, concise, and timely (Section Si). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: C1, C3
Personal access authorization records were maintained according to the Access Authorization Program commitments and regulatory requirements (Section 1). TYPE: POS., SFA: PS, ID: NRC, SMM: CL, A3