IR 05000269/1996014
| ML15118A150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A149 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-96-14, 50-270-96-14, 50-287-96-14, NUDOCS 9612020138 | |
| Download: ML15118A150 (25) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos:
DPR-38, DPR-48, DPR-55 Report No:
50-269/96-14, 50-270/96-14, 50-287/96-14 Licensee:
Duke Power Company Facility:
Oconee Nuclear Site Location:
78128 Rochester Hw Seneca, SC 29672 Dates:
September 16-19, 1996 Inspectors:
W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader K. Clark, Public Affairs Officer E. Fox, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 9612020138 961115 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Oconee Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Reports 50-269, 50-270, 50-287/96-14 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise. The exercise was held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the State of South Carolina and several local governments on September 17, 1996. This report summarized the observations of the four members of the NRC inspection team as they observed selected portions of the licensee's response in key emergency response facilities during the exercis Control Room Simulator
The Operations Shift Manager assumed the responsibilities as the Emergency Coordinator (EC) following his declaring the Alert. The shift properly implemented their emergency procedure Technical Support Center (TSC)
Good command and control by the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC assisted the EC and his staff as they effectively mitigated the simulated acciden *
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC Director was effective in managing resources as directed by the TS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF Director was effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the emergency and providing information to Federal, State and local authorities responding to the radiological emergenc Media Center
This facility was effectively managed to provide timely and correct information to the medi Report Details Summary of Exercise Events This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties and partial participation by the State of South Carolina. The exercise,-which was evaluated by the NRC inspection team, was held from 7:00 a.m. to 12:32 p.m. on September 17, 1996. Player critiques were conducted by the licensee players in the Emergency Response Facilities following termination of the exercise. The NRC exit meeting was conducted on September 19, 199 VI. Plant Support P Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP P4.1 Exercise Scenario a. Inspection Scope (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's pla b. Observations and Findings The scenario was challenging and progressed from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency and then to a General Emergency. The scenario fully exercised the on-site and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercis c. Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective in testing the integrated emergency response capabilit P4.2 Onsite Emergency Organization a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergenc b. Observations and Findings The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined. The Operations Shift Manager assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator (EC) and other personnel assumed pre-established emergency responsibilities. The EC approved the notification message to the offsite authorities and concurrently
classified the Aler Following the classification of the Alert, the EC also directed the call-out of the emergency response organization to staff the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). Sufficient trained personnel then promptly responded to staff and then activate the ERF c. Conclusion The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilitie P4.3 Emergency Classification System a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the license b. Observation and Findings The licensee's Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided an emergency classification system. The Simulator staff used it effectively to classify the off-normal conditions as an Alert based on a reactor coolant system leak of greater than 160 gpm. At 9:40 a.m., the EOF Director upgraded the emergency classification to a Site Area Emergency based on the high readings of Radiation Monitors 57 & 58, an indication of the loss of the second barrier. At 11:15 a.m., the EOF Director declared a General Emergency based on the loss of sub-cooling, high radiation monitor readings, and the loss of containment coolin c. Conclusion The licensee's Emergency Action Level Table was effectively used by the EC and the EOF Director to properly classify the off-normal condition P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local governmental organizations and emergency perscnnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with procedure b. Observations and Findings The initial emergency notification to the State and local governments was made from the Simulator Control Room (SCR) beginning three minutes after the declaration. The first follow-up notification was made from the TSC. The remainder of initial notifications and follow-ups were initiated from the EO *II_
c. Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow-up notifications to the State and local governments in a timely manner with essential information. During the critique process, the licensee's evaluators noted a-number of errors with the notification forms to which management directed corrective action. The errors did not have a deleterious effect upon the offsite agencies in their response to the notification P4.5 Emergency Communications a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications from and between the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency communication b. Observation and Findings The inspectors observed that the Instal-phone Loop for communications with State and local governments within the Emergency Planning Zones was effective for the prompt transmission of emergency informatio Likewise, the Automatic Ringdown phones in the ERFs, the Station Private Branch Exchange (PBX), commercial phone lines, and the plant Gai-tronics were used by emergency response personnel for communicating emergency informatio c. Conclusion Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency respons P4.6 Public Education and Information a. Inspection Scope (82301)
An inspector observed how information concerning the simulated emergency was made available to the publi b. Observations and Findings Duke Power Company established a Media Center in the Duke Power Clemson Operations Center on Issaqueena Trail, Clemson, South Carolina. From this location they provided timely and accurate information to reporters and to the public via periodic news release c. Conclusions The Media Center and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that provided for the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the publi l
P4.7 Emergency Facilities and Equipment a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency respons b. Observations and Findings Control Room Simulator - An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the emergency response. The facility and equipment supported the crew as they implemented their emergency procedure Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated at 8:24 a.m. The facility layout provided for good communication between the EC and his primary staff. The EC and his staff interacted frequently as plant conditions were monitored and evaluated, emergency classifications upgraded when necessary, and accident assessment and mitigating activities were implemented. The TSC staff also identified and prioritized the repair activities for the Operational Support Center (OSC).
Operational Support Center - The OSC was activated at 7:58 a.m. and provided an effective source of maintenance specialties for repair activities as directed by the TS Emergency Operations Facility -
The EOF was declared operational after minimum staffing was achieved at 8:31 a.m., or 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 8 minutes following the declaration of the Alert at 7:23 a.m. Full facility staffing was present and the EOF was declared activated at 8:47 c. Conclusion The ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that facilitated the emergency respons P4.8 Protective Responses a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and the protective action recommendations provided by the licensee to the Stat b. Observations and Findings Protective action recommendations made by the EOF Director were promptly and properly formulated and communicated to State authorities in a timely manne *III5 c. Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required PARs for the protection of the publi P4.9 Exercise Critique a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and portions of the controller/evaluator organization critique process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee managemen b. Observations and Findings The inspectors observed that the exercise participants demonstrated good ownership and support of the emergency preparedness program with their involvement in the critique process. The controller/evaluator organization identified the significant areas that created problems during the exercise. A formal presentation was provided to licensee management by the controller organization on September 19, 199 c. Conclusion The controller/evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing exercise performanc V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection summary to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19, 199 No proprietary information is contained in this repor PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED Licensee R. Bond, Work Control/Unit Work Manager B. Dobson, Modifications Engineering Manager G. Hamrick, Chemistry Manager B. Jones, Training Manager 0. Kohler, Operations Work Process Manager S. Nader, Mechanical Systems Manager J. Peele, Station Manager T. Pettit, Joint Information Center Manager M. Thorne, Emergency Preparedness Manager J. Twiggs, Radiation Protection Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objective and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED None
- LIST OF ACRONYMS USED EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator EP Emergency Preparedness ERF Emergency Response Facility FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency gpm Gallons Per Minute EOF Emergency Operations Facility OSC Operational Support Center RP Radiation Protection SCR Simulator Control Room SEN Station Emergency Manager TSC Technical Support Center Attachment (16 Pages):
M Scope and Objectives, and Narrative, Initial Conditic:,
Sequence of Events, and Time Line RaitoSPoeto
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise Scope SCOPE The 1996 Oconee exercise scheduled to be conducted on September 17th is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The 1996 exercise will involve full participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties and partial participation by the State of South Carolina. This participation will also include activation of the Alert and Notification System for Oconee (EAS and Sirens). This exercise will involve full participation of Oconee Nuclear Site's emergency response organization and will require activation of the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center. and Emergency Operations Facilit A critique involving exercise participants and controllers will be conducted prior to the formal cr~tm
. ;n- 'g Oconee Nuclear Site Management and the NRC. These o'.
t at Oconee Nuclear Sit A public critique will be held at the Duke Power Operations Center on September 18, 1996 at 140.1
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise Objectives EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION Demonstrate the ability to properly classify emergency situations in accordance with plant procedure NOTIFICATION TO OFFSITE AGENCIES (STATE/COUNTY/FEDERAL) Demonstrate the ability to notify counties and state within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing classificatio.
Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages
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transmitted to state and countie.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC not later than I hour after declaring one of the emergency classe EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff (TSC, OSC, EOF) and activate facilities as required by Figure B-8 in the ONS Emergency Plan after declaring an Alert or higher emergency classificatio.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the cloc.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Operations Shift Manager in the Control Room/TSC to the Emergency Coordinator in the TS.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the EOF Director in the EO COMMUNICATIONS Test onsite and offsite communications equipment: Selective Signaling SC State Decision Line Duke Offsite Radio System (FMTs and TSC/EOF) Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise Objectives COMMUNICATIONS (continued) Duke Onsite Radio System (OSC/OSC Teams) FTS 2000 System
- ENS AT&T Intercom Systems (TSC/OSC/EOF/Plant) ONS Plant Phone System Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations. organizations. and field personne.
Demonstrate the ability to provide current plant data to appropriate locations. organizations, and field personne SITE ASSEMBLY/ACCESS CONTROL Demonstrate the ability to account for onsite personnel within 30 minute.
Demonstrate the ability to locate unaccounted personnel determined by site assembl.
Demonstrate the ability to provide controlled access to the plant and EO SITE EVACUATION Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of non-essential personnel (planning process will occur and be demonstrated, evacuation of personnel will be simulated). EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Test adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and supplie RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND EXPOSURE CONTROL Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation level.3
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise Objectives RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND EXPOSURE CONTROL (continued) Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentration.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur.
Semi-annually, demonstrate the response to simulated elevated airborne and liquid sample.
Semi-annually, demonstrate the analysis of simulated elevated airborne and liquid sample.
Semi-annually. demonstrate the ability to obtain direct radiation measurements in the environmen.
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision (based on predetermined criteria) whether to issue KI to emergency workers and then to issue sam.
FIELD MONITORING/PLUME TRACKING/OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONS Demonstrate the ability to mobilize teams in the 10 mile EPZ to locate and track the plume for noble gases and radioiodine concentrations in a timely manne.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit field measurement data to the TSC/EO.
Demonstrate the ability to develop and provide offsite dose projections in accordance with site procedure PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with site procedure ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT/MITIGATION Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and determine/implement mitigation strategie.4
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise Objectives
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-00,0
. OFFSITE AGENCY ASSISTANCE Demonstrate county and state participation in exercises/drill Full (Counties) Partial (State) JOINT INFORMATION CENTER/PUBLIC INFORMATION Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear. accurate, and timely manne.
Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information release.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashio RECOVERY AND REENTRY Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of workers, equipment, et EXERCISE/DRILL MANAGEMENT The Annual Exercise will be scheduled during different seasons of the yea.
Drills will be under the control of a Drill/Exercise Director. Controllers/Evaluators will be utilized to keep the scenario on track and to allow for "free play". Critiques will be held after all drills/exercises to determine any corrective actions that may need to be mad.5
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise September 17. 1996 Narrative The exercise begins with all three Oconee units at 100% power. The site's Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) is out of service for it's annual preventative maintenance outage and will not be available during the exercis The weather forecast for Tuesday, September 17th, calls for winds from the SSW (= 180 - 1900)
with a wind speed of 0-2 mph. The low temperature for today is expected to be 660 F with a high of 930 F. A 60% chance of thunderstorms is expected toda At 0700 Unit I is operating at 100% power with no major problems. At 0710, control room personnel receive indications (alarms) of high vibration on the IB2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Pump parameters are indicative of a seal failure. Control Room Operators reduce power and secure the RCP. At 0715 additional seals fail due to debris and a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak of approximately 200 gallons per minute (gpm) is initiated. Vibration and mechanical damage to the RCP releases additional debris into the RCS resulting in Loose Parts Monitor alarms and eventual fuel damage (approximately 1M). Control Room personnel manually trip the reactor by procedur After verifying the RCS leakrate. t,- Ir)-
ins Shift Mnnafer rpviewvc the Emergency Classification Procedure and eJaies an Alert at approximately 0730. Procedure actions are initiated to notify offsite agencies (SC State. Oconee County, Pickens County. and NRC) and activate the site's emergency response organization. The SC State Warning Point, Oconee County LEC, and Pickens County LEC are notified of the Alert at 0745 (or within fifteen minutes after the declaration).
The site's Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) are staffed and operational. Staffing of the site's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is in progress. At approximately 0815, after the Emergency Coordinator has completed a turnover with the Operations Shift Manager, the TSC is activated. The TSC is now responsible for Emergency Classification. Offsite Communications. and Protective Action Recommendation Site personnel are monitoring plant conditions and implementing appropriate response action The EOF completes turnover with the TSC and is activated at approximately 0840. The EOF is now responsible for Emergency Classification, Offsite Communications, and Protective Action Recommendations. Follow-up notifications are provided to the SC State EOC, Oconee County EOC, and Pickens County EOC at 0845 (or I hour after the initial notification). The site remains in an Alert classification. RCS leakrate increases to 450-500 gpm. Failed fuel percentage is approximately 3%.
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Annual Emergency Response Exercise September /1. 1996 Narrative Between 0915 and 0925. a Main Feedwater (MFW 1 line, which supplies water to the B Steam Generator. ruptures. Steam resulting from this failure severly damages 4160V switchgear located near the MFW line. This damage results in a loss of one of two main feeder busses (power source for the unit's auxiliary equipment) and two high pressure injection pumps. Without these pumps, the remaining high pressure injection pump is unable to maintain RCS inventory. Failed fuel percentage increase to z 4% and the subcooling margin reaches 0F. Containment radiation monitor readings increase. Within fifteen conditions exist for a Site Area Emergency classificatio At 0945, the EOF Director declares a Site Area Emergency. Notification of the Site Area Emergency classification is provided to the SC State EOC. Oconee County EOC. and Pickens County EOC by 1000 (or within fifteen minutes after the event is classified). Oconee and Pickens County coordinate activation of the Alert and Notification System (EAS and Sirens).
EAS and the Sirens are activated at 1015 (or within 15 minutes of the notification by the utility of the Site Area Emergency classification).
At 1100, damage from the earlier main feedwater line rupture results in a fault in the remaining feeder bus (power source) resulting in a loss of onsite and offsite power capabilitie "?i the loss of power no forced cooling flow is available tc U'a,.
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O personnel initiate actions to provide power to a High Pressure InJection Pump (HPIP) from switchgear that is powered from another unit. This task should be completed within forty minutes of the loss of power. The loss of power also affects cooling flow to the remaining RCPs, resulting in degradation of their seals and a decrease in the RCS inventor Between 1030 and I100. RCS inventory loss continues. Radiation levels in the containment are rising. The containment continues to hold pressure: no release is detected by the field monitoring teams or plant survey team With the inability to restore power conditions exist for a General Emergency classification at approximately 1115. The EOF Director declares a General Emergency at 1115 based on plant conditions and provides Protective Action Recommendations to SC State to evacuate a two mile radius and five miles downwind and to shelter all remaining sectors. The SC State EOC, Oconee County EOC, and Pickens County EOC are notified of the General Emergency classification and Protective Action Recommendations at 1130 (or within 15 minutes after the event declaration).
Within 15 minutes Protective Action Recommendations are determined by SC State and implemented by the countie Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 100% Power SSF is OOS for Annual PM (Diesel Generator torn down for maintenance)
I B LPSW pump OOS for train maintenance
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO due to IB LPSW pump maintenance - due back by 1700 on 09/19/96
7 day LCO due to SSF Annual PM entered on September 16, 1996 Unit 2 100% Power
'
"
-.
r.CO due to IB LPSW pump maintenance - due back by 1700 on 09/19/96
7 day LCO due to SSF Annual PM entered on September 16, 1996 Unit 3 100% Power 3B LPSW pump OOS for train maintenance
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO due to 3B LPSW pump maintenance - due back by 1700 on 09/19/96
7 day LCO due to SSF Annual PM entered on September 16, 1996 Weather Forecast Winds from the SSW (z 180 - 1900) with a wind speed of 0 - 2 mph. A low temperature of 66' F is expected with a high temperature of 930 F. A 60%
chance of thunderstorms is expected toda.1
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 00:00 07:00 Unit @ 100% Power 00:10 07:10 High vibration alarms received on the 1B2 RCP
Pump parameters indicate a #1 Seal Failure Operations Response:
Operations will begin reducing reactor power to secure 1B2 RCP
Operators initiate AP/l/A1l700/16, Abnormal RCP Operation 00:15 07:15 IB2 RCP #2 and #3 Seals fail due to debris from the #1 Seal 200GPMRCS leak initiated Vibration and mechanical damage to the RCP releases debris into the RCS resulting in Loose Parts Monitor alarms and eventual fuel damage 1z % Failed Fuel exists at this time Operations Response:
Operators initiate AP/1/A/1700/02, Excessive RCS Leakage
Manually trip Reactor Conditions exist for an Alert classification 00:30 07:30 Operations Shift Manager (OSM) reviews RP/O/B/1000/01, Emergency Classification, declares an ALERT. based on a Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier - RCS Leakrate > Makeup Capacity of one HPI Pump in normal makeup (= 160 gpm)
with letdown isolated NOTE: No Protective Action Recommendations are required for this classificatio.2
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEQ UECE OF EVENTh 09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 00:30 07:30 OSM initiates RP/O/B/1000/02, Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure, RP/O/B/ 1000/09, Procedure For Site Assembly, and RP/0/B/1000/15A, Offsite Communications From The Control Roo TSC/OSC/EOF Activation is initiated Site Assembly is initiated 00:45 07:45 Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State are notified of emergency classification 00:50 07:50 TSC/OSC staffed at u
EOF staffing in progress 01:00 08:00 Site Assembly completed Site Assembly should be completed 30 minutes after start; if required. process for locating personnel is initiated 2% Failed Fuel exists at this time 01:15 08:15 TSC Emergency Coordinator and OSM complete tunover using guidelines in RP/0/B/1000/02, Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure, and RP/0/B/1000/19, Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure TSC Activated z01:30 z08:30 EOF minimum staffing requirements satisfied - EOF declared operational. Information gathering process between the following positions is initiated:
TSC EOF Control Room Ops Interface Group TSC Offsite Communicator State-County Communicator TSC Dose Assessment Liaison Rad Assessment Group Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
.0917/96 Drill Real Time Time 01:30 08:30 NRC notified of event using ENS; ERDS activated and sending data to NRC Headquarters NRC notification and ERDS activation should occur within one hour after event declaration 01:35 08:35 EOF Director contacts TSC Emergency Coordinator and begins turnover process using guidelines in RP/O/B/ 1000/20, Emergency Operations Facility Director Procedure, and RP/0/B/1000/19, Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure 01:40 08:40 EOF declared Activated EOF is now responsible for Offsite NotificationsiEmergency Classification/Protective Action Recommendations 01:45 08:45 Follow-Up Notification provided to Offsite Agencies RCS Leak Rate increases to = 450-500 GPM 3% Failed Fuel exists at this time 02:15-09:15-lB MFW Line ruptures (pipe failure) and damages ITE 4160V 02:25 09:25 switchgear along with the Main Feeder Bus #2 (MFB)
Results in a MFB #2 Lockout
MFB 2 is severiv damaged
MFB 1 cover damage can be seen
ITE Switchgear Lockout occurs
lB HPI Pump is lost
lTD Switchgear is partially damaged due to debris from I TE resulting in I TD Switchgear Lockout
IXI0 Loadcenter (fed from ITE) is also damaged 4.1t
Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 02:15-09:15-
Water around switchgear/load center is a personnel safety 02:25 09:25 hazard
RxB Pressure increases Whenever RxB Pressure > 3 psig, ES Channels 1-6 actuate resulting in a Load Shed
Condensate Booster Pumps cavitate and stop Operations Response:
Operators initiate AP/1/A/1700/1 1, Loss of Power
Operators continue in EOP, and perform ES Section 505
Operators secure any remaining Hotwell pumps to stop water running out of pipe break
Operators initiate rapid cooldown
]A HPI Pump is only HPI Pump available: 1HP-409 cannot be manually opened resulting in the need to perform a rapid cooldown
Maintain feedwater flow to Steam Generators with Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFWP)
02:25 09:25 Predicted OSC Response:
Assess damage to ITD/1TE 4160V Switchgear
Investigate damage toMFB 1 02:30 09:30 1RIA-57 and 58 indicate 2 32/16 R/hr Subcoohng Margin 0 F e 4% Failed Fuel exists at this time Conditions exist for a Site Area Emergency classification Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise
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Drill 96-04 SEQUENCE OF EVEWTS -
09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 02:45 09:45 EOF Director declares Site Area Emergency based on Loss Of Any Two Barriers; RCS Leakrate > Available Makeup Capacity As Indicated By A Loss Of Subcooling (Loss of RCS Barrier) and RIA-57/58 32/16 R/Hr (Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier)
NOTE: No Protective Action Recommendations are required for this classificatio :00 10:00 Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State notified of upgrade in emergency classification 03:15 10:15 Oconee County and Pickens County activate EAS and Sirens (Alert and NotificauonL 6,swani 04:00 11:00 RCS inventory loss combined with damaged fuel clad from RCP fragments causes continued core cooling degradation and higher containment radiation levels MFB # 1 Lockout Occurs due to ground fault Broken piece of bus faulted inside cover
Loss AC power exists Standby busses are operable on Units 2 and 3 since the power failure only affects Unit I MFBs Operations Response:
Operators initiate AP/l/A/1700/11, Loss Of Power
Maintain feedwater flow to Steam Generators with Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFWP)
Predicted OSC Response:
Connect and power HPI pump from Aux Service Water Switchgear (40 minutes)
Repair MFB #1
@&~ 1115 conditions exist for a General Emergency Classification Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS 09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 04:15 11:15 EOF Director declares a General Emergency based on Prolonged Loss of all Offsite Power and Onsite AC Power - MFB I and 2 de-energized AND SSF fails to maintain hot shutdown AND indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring, OR Loss of RCS Barrier - RCS Leakrate > available makeup capacity as indicated by a loss of subcooling AND Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier - Coolant activity 2 300 pCilml DEI (or RIA-57/58 32/16 R/Hr) AND Potential Loss of Containment Barrier - RB pressure 10 psig and no RBCU or RBS
Protective Action Recommendations should be:
Evacuate 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwins Oconee County AO, Fl; Pickens County AQAl; Shelter the remaining sectors Oconee County Dl, El, D2, E2, and F2; Pickens County B1, C1, A2, B2, and C :30 11:30 Offsite agencies notified of upgrade in emergency classificatio Initial Protective Action Recommendations provided to offsite agencies 04:45 11:45 Offsite Agencies activate EAS and Sirens (Simulated) and provide Protective Actions to public Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 SEQ UENCE OF EVENTS 09/17/96 Drill Real Time Time 04:30-11:30-Activities in progress should include:
07:00 14:00
Recovery of MFB I and AC power
Establish RCS cooldown to LPI as per EOP
Connect and power HPI Pump form Aux Service Water Switchgear
Follow-Up Notifications to Offsite Agencies every hour or if additional protective actions are required 07:00+
14:00+
Exercise terminated Oconee Nuclear Site 1996 Emergency Response Exercise Drill 96-04 09/17/96 TIME LINE 07:00 (00:00)
Unit @ 100% Power 07:10 (00:10)
High vibration alarms - I B2 RCP 07:15 (00:15)
200 GPM RCS Leak occurs due to seal failure
- 1% Failed Fuel Conditions for an Alert exist 07
- 30 (00:30)
Alert declared Site Assembly initiated ERO activated 07:50 (00:50)
TSC/OSC Staffed EOF staffing in progress 08:00 (01:00)
Site Ass.1y completed 2% Failed Fuel 08:15 (01:15)
TSC activated z08:30 (01:36)
EOF operational 08:40 (01:40)
EOF activated 08:45 (01:45)
RCS leak rate increases to ; 450-500 gpm 3% Failed Fuel 09:15-09:25 (02:15-02:25)
IB MFW line ruptures ITE/ITD damaged MFB #2 Lockout occurs 09:30 (02:30)
IRIA-57/58 reading 32/16 R/Hr Subcooling Margin < 0' F Conditions exist for Site Area Emergency
= 4% Failed Fuel 09:45 (02:45)
Site Area Emergency declared 10:15 (03:15)
Sirens and EAS activated 11:00 (04:00)
MFB #I1 Lockout occurs Loss of AC power exists R(B pressure increases (@
10 psig conditions exist for a General Emergency
- 11
- 15 (04:15)
General Emergency declared/
PAR s determined 11:00-14:00 (04:00-07:00)
Recovery activities continue/Exercise terminated after State/County objectives satisfied 1