ML15224A620

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Insp Repts 50-269/89-37,50-270/89-37 & 50-287/89-37 on 891127-1201.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp,Including Observation of Work & Work Activities & Review of Actions Re Unit 3,2nd Interval Request for Relief
ML15224A620
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/10/1990
From: Blake J, Coley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15224A618 List:
References
50-269-89-37, 50-270-89-37, 50-287-89-37, NUDOCS 9002020232
Download: ML15224A620 (8)


See also: IR 05000269/1989037

Text

% REGL4

UNITED STATES

o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

V ,t :~ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.:

50-269/8.9-37, 50-270/89-37, and 50-287/89-37

Licensee:

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270,

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47,

and

and 50-287

DPR-55

Facility Name:

Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection C

e

November 27 -

December 1, 1989

inspecto :

-

/0 /o

%-'-.

oley

Date Signed

Approves by

4 ;AI I//

4/ $

.

3

lake, Section Chief

bate Signed

M t

als and Processes Section

ng neering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of inservice inspection

(ISI)

and included observation of work and work activities, and review of

licensee's actions regarding

a Unit 3,

2nd Interval,

request for relief

(No. 89-08) on 3A2 and 3B1 reactor coolant pump flange stud holes.

Results:

During the inspector's observation of ultrasonic examination work, two areas of

concern were identified. Violation 50-287/89-37-02, paragraph 2.a., documented

that the 2nd interval inservice inspection plan has not been properly reviewed

in that:

calibration block number 40367 designated for Item Number B05.050.012

Weld Number 3PSP-1 did not have a surface finish that represented the pipe to

be examined (surface cracks and material separations were observed in the

calibration block).

The calibration block also was not the same nominal

diameter or the same

nominal thickness as the pipe to be

examined.

In

addition, the calibration block did not contain calibration notchreflectors as

required. Each of the calibration block criteria described above are required

by ASME Section XI, Appendix III, supplement 7.

900202022) 9011-7

0

DC

II

2

Unresolved

Item

50-269,270,287/89-37-01,

paragraph 2.a.,

documents

that

ultrasonic examinations performed on dissimilar metal welds at Oconee are

conducted using the shear wave

mode of sound transmission (shear

wave

transducers).

As

a result of the intergranular stress corrosion cracking

problem experienced on boiling water reactors, longitudinal wave transducers

have been found necessary to properly examine dissimilar metal welds if Inconel

base material is involved or if

alloy 82 or 182 are used as a wel.d butter or

filler material.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the licensee had not been able to identify

the materials in the dissimilar metal welds at Oconee.

The licensee also

.stated that, with the exception of the centrifugally cast stainless steel

reactor coolant piping at McGuire and Catawba,

all dissimilar welds at these

sites were also examined with shear wave transducers.

0Il

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  • T. Coleman, Quality Assurance (QA), ISI Coordinator
  • B. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
  • A. Gladney, Corporate Quality Assurance
  • W. Hunt, Corporate Quality Assurance
  • E. LeGette, Compliance Engineer
  • E. Miller, Corporate Quality Assurance Technical Superintendent
  • R. Morgan, Site Quality Assurance Manager
  • R. Sweigart, Acting Station Manager
  • T. Tucker, Corporate Quality Assurance

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

  • L. Wert, Oconee Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview

2.

Inservice Inspector (ISI) Observation of Work and Work Activities -

Unit 3

(73753)

The inspector observed the ISI work and ISI-related activities, indicated

below, to determine whether examination activities performed on systems

and components containing reactor coolant, inside containment, were being

conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory require

ments,

and licensee commitments.

The applicable code for ISI is the

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME

B&PV)

Code,

Section XI,

1980 edition with addenda through Winter 1980.

Duke Power Company (DPC)

nondestructive examination (NDE)

personnel were

performing the liquid penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT), radiography

(RT),

visual (VT),

and the ultrasonic (UT)

examinations with Babcock and

Wilcox (B&W)

personnel providing technical assistance to DPC personnel

during the UT of components not totally familiar to the DPC personnel.

Steam generator tubing eddy current (EC)

examination data collection was

being accomplished by DPC personnel with (B&W) and

DPC

personnel

performing independent analysi.s of the data.

The inspector observed the following three methods of examination to

determine if the ISI-related activities were conducted in accordance with

approved procedures by qualified and certified personnel knowledgeable of

the examination methods,

selection, and operation of the test equipment

for specific materials and components.

2

a.

Volumetric examination of welds using the manual (A-Scan) technique

The inspector observed calibration activities and portions of the

in-process ultrasonic examinations being conducted

on the items

indicated below.

Procedure

Calibration

Item and ID Number

Number

Block

Component

B05.050.012 (3PSP-1)

ISI-120

40367

Pressurizer Spray

Terminal

End

to

Safe-end

B05.050.012A (3PSP-1)

ISI-120

40406

Pressurizer Spray

Terminal

End to

Safe-end

B09.011.081 (3PSP.3)

ISI-120

40406

Pressurizer Spray

Piping

B05.050.011 (3PHB-17)

ISI-120

40414

Pressurizer Surge

Nozzle to Safe-end

B05.050.009 (3PSL-10)

ISI-120

40414

B-Hotleg Surge

Line Nozzle

B09.011.101 (3PSL-01)

ISI-120

40399

Pressurizer Surge

Terminal End

B06.040.001 (3RPV

Ligaments)

ISI-104

40390

Reactor Vessel

Flange

B02.040.004 (ISI

OCN3-004)

ISI-130

40305

Steam Generator 3B

Lowerhead to Tube

Sheet

B03.130.004 (3SGB

WB50-1)

ISI-130

40305

3B (Y-Z Axis)

Outlet Nozzle

B03.140.004 (3SGB

WB50-1)

ISI-130

40305

3B (Y-Z Axis)

Nozzle Inside

Radius

B03.140.003 (3SGB

WB50-2)

ISI-130

40305

3B (W-Z Axis)

Nozzle Inside

Radius

Procedure Calibration

Item and ID Number

Number

Block

Component

(cont'd)

B03.130.003 (3SGB

WG50-2)

ISI-130

40305

3B (W-Z Axis)

Outlet Nozzle

B05.050.011A (3PHP-17)

ISI-120

40399

Surge Nozzle

Safe-end

During the inspector's observation of calibration activities, two

areas of concern were identified. The first concern dealt with one

of the calibration blocks (Cal.

Blk

No.

40367)

that was to be

utilized for the examination of dissimilar metal weld 3PSP-1,

Item

No. B05.050.012.

The inspector noted that calibration block

number 40367 had apparent surface cracks and material separations on

its outside diameter surface.

In addition, the block was not the

same nominal diameter or the same nominal thickness as the calibra

tion block that was going to be used on the opposite side of weld

(3PSP-1)

Item No.

B05.050.012A or the piping to be examined.

These

concerns were discussed with the B&W examiner who was acting as a

technical adviser to Duke and who subsequently noted that the block

also did not have notches that were required by ASME Section XI,

Appendix III, Supplement 7, and the examination procedure.

The inspector reviewed the Oconee Unit 3, 2nd Interval,

Inservice

Inspection Plan and discovered that the calibration block had been

improperly designated

as the calibration block to

use for the

examination of Item

No.

805.050.012.

Duke

Power Company,

Quality

Assurance Program,

Procedure QA-513,

Rev. .6, states, in part, that

the Quality Assurance Engineer shall

prepare each

Inservice

Inspection Plan and that each plan shall include a detailed listing

of welds or components to be examined including their classification,

category and item number, required examination procedure, and

calibration standards to be used. In addition, paragraph 5.6 of the

Quality Assurance

Program

Procedure

requires that the Quality

Assurance Engineer or his designee,

in writing, shall review each

Inservice Inspection Plan or Summary Report for conformance to the

ASME Section XI, Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifica

tion, and other licensing commitments.

The finding described above

was reported to Oconee's management as Violation 50-287/89-37-02,

"Inadequate

Technical

Review of Oconee's

2nd Interval

Inservice

Inspection Plan."

The

second area of concern observed,

during the calibration of

dissimilar metal welds listed above, was that DPC and B&W ultrasonic

examiners were using the shear wave mode of sound transmission (shear

wave transducers) to examine dissimilar metal welds at Oconee Nuclear

Station.

As a result of the intergranular stress corrosion cracking

4

problems experienced

on Boiling Water

Reactors in the early to

mid-1980's,

angle

beam

transducers which

produce

refracted

longitudinal wave mode of sound transmission have been found to be

necessary to properly examine dissimilar metal welds in some 600

series base materials or when alloy 82 or 182 are used as-a weld

butter,and/or filler material.

Upon finding that Duke

Power was using shear wave transducers to

examine all dissimilar metal welds at Oconee.

McGuire and Catawaba

Nuclear Stations, with the exception of the centrifugally cast

stainless steel reactor coolant piping to component nozzles at their

McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, the inspector requested that

the licensee identify what materials were. involved in Oconee's

dissimilar metal welds.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the

licensee had not been able to provide the inspector with this

information.

This item was

reported to Oconee's management

as

Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/89-37-01,

"Ultrasonic Examination of

Dissimilar Metal Welds Using Shear Wave Mode Transducers."

b.

Radiocraphic .Review of 1ST Class 2 Piping Welds

Radiographs of the ISI welds listed below were reviewed by the

ins

or.

These radioQraphs were compared to the requirements of

the licensee's approved radiographic procedure, NDE-12, Rev. 7

Item No.

Weld No.

Size

C05.021.309

3-03-3FWD-74-A

24" dia. x 1.218" thk.

C05.021.360

3-01A-23-04

26" dia. x .875" thk.

C05.021.372

3-01A-24-02

26" dia. x .875" thk.

C05.021.378.

3-01A-24-03

26" dia. x .875" thk.

C05.022.013

3-01A-24-02L

26" dia. x .875" thk.

C05.022.009

3-01A-23-04L

26" dia. x .875" thk.

C05.022.015

3-01A-24-03L

26" dia. x .875" thk.

c.

Eddy Current Examination

The inspector

observed

B&W

performing

the

3600 rotating coil

examinations listed below.

With the exception of these enhanced

examinations, all

steam generator

(SG)

tubes designated

for

examination with the bobbin coil (9210 in SG-A and 9226 in SG-B) had

been completed and all eddy current data evaluated by B&W and Duke

Power.

S G

Row No.

Column No.

Position

B-Hotleg

120

105

8th support plate

B-Hotleg

122

103

8th support plate

B-Hotleg

123

103

14th to 15th support

plate

B-Hotleg

82

124

14th support plate

The inspector reviewed qualification documentation for a select sample of

examiners audited during the examinations previously observed.

The

qualification and certification records for the following personnel were

reviewed:

Company

Examiner

Method-Level

DPC

H.A.D.

RT/Level II

DPC

G.E.H.

UT/Level II

B&W

J.S.S.

EC/Level IIA

DPC

J.L.R.

PT/Level II

Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified

except as noted in paragraph 2.a. above.

3.

Review of Oconee Unit 3 Request for Relief No. 89-08

Duke

Power Request for Relief No.

89-08,

dated October 13,

1989,

was

reviewed by the inspector.

This untimely relief request addressed

reoortable indications found in reactor coolant pumps 3A2 and 3B1 main

flange stud hole threads. The damage to the stud hole threads was not due

to cracks in the base metal or pitting caused by boric acid corrosion but

instead was

more characteristics of damace dore durig the process .01

removing the studs.

The damage to the five threads on reactor coolant

pump casing 3A2 was typical of damage seen after removing a stuck stud.

The damage to the three threads on reactor coolant pump casing

3B1 was

tyical

of damace due to stud handling during removal and installation.

The discrepant conditions were found ouring tne 9th outage for Unit 3 in

the Spring of 1987. Oconee Unit 3 is presently in the 11th outage.

At

the time of discovery, engineering justifications were written and the

condition on both main flanges accepted based on the fact that a main

flange stud would be installed in each of the two holes in question and

tensioned normally.

Although credit would not be taken for these studs

for operability purposes,

the licensee felt that. their actions were

conservative based on a letter from B&W (Serial

No.

SGBM-85-507,

dated

July 9, 1985),

stating that damaged threads in one stud hole would not

affect the safety or operability of a reactor coolant pump since each pump

has been evaluated for 19 of 20 studs in-place.

However,

the inspector

was concerned over this relief request for the following reasons:

a.

Why was the condition not reported by a relief request in 1987 when

it was found?

b.

Why did drawings accompanying the Relief Request have handwritten

notes on

them indicating that Fermanite

may

be used to seal the

flange?

.The inspector held discussions with the Supervisor of Maintenance Engineer

ing, the Maintenance Engineer for the reactor coolant system, and the ISI

6

Coordinator

(QA

Engineer)

and reviewed

documents

provided by these

individuals. The licensee's responses to the above inspector's questions

are as follows:

a.

The licensee did not report the discrepant conditi.ons in 1987 because

maintenance engineering and the ISI QA Engineer at the time concluded

that,

since

the discrepancies were not

service-induced but

mechanically induced, they were not reportable to ASME Section XI.

b.

Discussions with the Supervisor of Maintenance Engineering revealed

that the handwritten notes on the licensee's drawings concerning

fermanite were no longer applicable.

During the 1982 to 1985 time

period, all Bingham reactor coolant pumps at Oconee had the pump

casing seat re-machined and a new stainless steel/graphite

typ'e

gasket was installed in lieu of the old stainless steel/asbestos type

gasket previously used. Fermanite injection ports were also removed

durino the above pump casing refurbishing efforts and set screws were

installed in their place.

In the time period since this work was

performed,

no leaks have been observed in the pump casing sealing

surface.

The

NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR)

will evaluate the

licensee s request for relief from the ASME

Code requirements.

However a

complete copy of the B&W evaluation analysis (Document

No.

31-1153263-00)

should be forwarded to NRR for their review as required by ASME Section XI

Paragraph I WB-3125.

Within the areas examined, violations and deviations were not identified.

4.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 1, 1989, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas

inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

During discussion of the violation listed below,

the Corporate Quality

Assurance Technical Superintendent requested that the Inspection Report

reflect that a Babcock and Wilcox examiner discovered concurrently with

the inspector the fact that the calibration block did not have calibration

notch reflectors.

(Open) Violation 50-287/89-37-02, Inadequate Review of Unit 2, 2nd Period,

2nd Interval, Inservice Inspection Plan, paragraph 2.a.

(Open) Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/89-37-01, Ultrasonic Examination of

Dissimilar Metal Welds Using Shear Wave Mode Transducers, paragraph 2.a.