ML15118A268
| ML15118A268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A267 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-97-14, 50-270-97-14, 50-287-97-14, NUDOCS 9711250354 | |
| Download: ML15118A268 (5) | |
Text
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Energy Corporation Docket No. 50-269.270.287 Oconee 1, 2 and 3 License No. DPR-38,47,55 During an NRC inspection conducted from September 7, to October 18. 1997.
violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below:
A.
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated in accordance with approved procedures and that one of the procedure types is nuclear safety-related periodic test procedures.
Technical Specification 4.6.7, requires a safety-related test which demonstrates the start and electrical connection of a Lee Station combustion turbine every 18-months.
Oconee Procedures PT/1A/0610/06. 100 KV (Kilo Volt) Power Supply From Lee Steam Station, Revision 14, and OP/O/A/1107/03A, Oconee Nuclear Station and Lee Steam Station, Revision 5 and Lee Steam Station Operating Procedure. Emergency Power or Back-up Power to Oconee, effective January 4. 1997, are collectively, safety-related periodic test procedures that implement Technical Specification 4.6.7.
Contrary to the above, the station was not operated in accordance with periodic test procedures in that, on June 20. 1997. Lee Station operators were in the process of performing the Lee Operating Procedure for implementation of Technical Specification 4.6.7. and intending to perform steps 6.1.5, "close 89-3 switcher" and then 6.1.6 "opening 89-2 switcher."
Instead, the operators reversed the steps and performed step 6.1.6 prior to 6.1.5.
This resulted in the Lee Station to be first separated from the grid and then being reconnected and ultimately causing a loss of power to the Oconee Unit 1 main feeder buses and subsequently a Keowee Hydro Units emergency start signal from the main feeder buses.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
B.
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires in part that the station be maintained in accordance with approved procedures and that these procedures be provided with appropriate instructions. One of the procedure types is for normal operation of the complete facility and of all systems and components involving nuclear safety of the facility.
Alarm Response Guide SA1/E-04. 600V (volt) SWGR (switchgear) 1X Lockout Relay, Revision 7, specifies the normal nuclear safety operation of the Keowee Hydro Units, a part of the complete Oconee facility, for reacting to a Switchgear 1X lockout.
Contrary to the above, instructions in Alarm Response Guide SA1/E-04 9711250354 971117 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR
Contrary to the above, instructions in Alarm Response Guide SA1/E-04 were not appropriate in that they required a Keowee operator on June 23.
1997, to reset a Switchgear 1X lockout with the Keowee Hydro Units Air Circuit Breakers 5 and 7 transfer scheme in automatic, which caused an unanticipated circuit response and blown fuses.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
C. Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires in part that the station shall be maintained in accordance with approved procedures and that these procedures will be provided with appropriate instructions. One of the procedure types is for preventive maintenance which could affect nuclear safety.
Procedure IP/O/A/2001/003B. Inspection and Maintenance of DB-50, DB-25 and DBF-16 Air Circuit Breakers, dated July 23, 1996, specifies the preventive maintenance activities for the DB-25 breakers, specifically for the Keowee Hydro Units' field flash breakers. The DB-25 vendor recommendations are contained in Westinghouse Electric Corporation Publication I.B. 33-850-1 and 2E. Instructions for De-ion Air Circuit Breakers Types DB-15, DB-25, DB-F, and DBL-25, 600 Volts AC (alternating current), 250 Volts DC (direct current), effective May 1965.
Contrary to the above, the station was not maintained in accordance with approved maintenance procedures with appropriate instructions, in that a vendor recommendation in Publication I.B 33-850-1 and 2E to "Check for over-adjustment [of contacts] by manually pulling the moving contact away from the stationary contact, with the breaker in the closed position. It should be possible to obtain at least 1/64-inch gap between the contacts", was not incorporated into Procedure IP/O/A/2001/003B.
This missing step resulted in a June 20, 1997, Keowee Hydro Units' field flash breaker failure mechanism not being initially evaluated.
Subsequent performance of this step on July 17, 1997, resulted in the verification of adequate adjustment.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
D.
10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equi pment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, as of October 7, 1997, corrective actions were not taken to preclude similar failures of automatic recirculation valves
on emergency feedwater pumps due to foreign material. Specifically, on February 2, 1997, the automatic recirculation valve failed to open when required on a Unit 1 motor driven emergency feedwater pump due to foreign material on the main seat. The same failure occurred on a Unit 3 motor driven emergency feedwater pump on February 24, 1997, and on October 7, 1997.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
E.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material, and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, although calculations had been documented and corrective actions completed that affirmed all unqualified insulation had been removed from the reactor buildings, additional unqualified insulation was found to be present from January 28. 1997. to October 18, 1997, in the Oconee reactor buildings. thereby indicating that corrective actions had not precluded repetition.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
F.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V. states that activities affecting
- uality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or rawins, of.a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomp ished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, and drawings.
Contrary to the above. from September 15. to September 26. 1997. the station was not maintained and operated in accordance with approved procedures, in that operation of a crane to lift materials over the Unit 1 borated water storage tank was performed, with Unit 1 above cold shutdown, without a procedure. This activity had not been evaluated and could have potentially impacted the operation of the borated water storage tank and spent fuel pool.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
G.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion III, and Duke Power Company Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program (Duke 1-A), collectively require that design changes be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design such as by the performance of a suitable testing program.
0II
Contrary to the above, in October 1996 for Unit 2. and March 1997 for Unit 1, a set point desi n chan e for an overvoltage relay. Westinghouse Electric Corporation style SV 292B402A10, in the voltage regulator circuitry for the Keowee Hydro Units, was developed and implemented outside the Oconee design change process and without verifying the design change adequacy. Specifically, Calculation KC-Unit 1 and 2-2023, Analysis of Keowee Voltage Regulator Settings, approved in June 1995 and Calibration Procedure IP/O/A/2005/003, Westinghouse WTA Voltage Regulator Test, approved June 11, 1996, lowered the relay set point from 100 to 70 volts without any post-modification testing.
This post-modification testing omission resulted in an unanticipated relay cycling phenomena created by the design change remaining undetected until June 1997.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
H.
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station shall be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
System Radiation Protection Manual II-1, 3.1 states that all personnel who enter the Radiation Control Area or a Radiation Control Zone in the restricted area of the station shall be issued and required to wear thermoluminescent dosimeters and self-reading pocket dosimeters or electronic dosimeters when in these areas.
Contrary to the above, on September 26. and October 1. 1997, the station was not maintained and operated in accordance with approved procedures in that two individuals were observed separately inside posted radiation areas on these different dates without procedurally required dosimetry.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Energy Corporation, is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:
Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) the corrective steps that will be taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper
should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response. then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 17th day of November 1997