IR 05000269/1990011

Insp Repts 50-269/90-11,50-270/90-11 & 50-287/90-11 on 900325-0421.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities, 10CFR21 Program Review & Meeting W/Local Officials

ML15224A670
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/04/1990
From:	Binoy Desai, Shymlock M, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15224A669	List: IR 05000269/1990011 ML15224A668
References
50-269-90-11, 50-270-90-11, 50-287-90-11, NUDOCS 9005170002
Download: ML15224A670 (22)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos:

50-269/90-11, 50-270/90-11, 50-287/90-11 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.:

50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.:

DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Facility Name:

Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: March 25 - April 21, 1990 Inspectors-

-,~i P. H. Skinner, Senio/ Resident Inspector Ddte/Signed L. D. tert, Residep Inspector BDtd Signed B..besai, Reside Inspector Date igned Approved by-hyCh9ft 0e M.. Shymlofk,, iction Chief Date Signed W ision of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, 10 CFR Part 21 program review, meeting with local public officials and inspection of open item Results:

During this report period the inspectors continued to examine in detail a degraded electrical grid issue. This issue was initially identified by the licensee's Design Engineering department during the ongoing Design Basis Documentation effort. While all the implications of the issue are still being investigated, the licensee's promptly initiated interim corrective actions and proposed Nuclear Station Modification appear to be sufficient to resolve this particular proble The Design Basis Documentation effort continues to be a noteworthy strength in the licensee's program C)

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REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• B. Barron, Station Manager

• T. Campbell, Operations Manager D. Couch, Keowee Hydrostation Manager

• T. Curtis, Compliance Manager J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager B. Dolan, Design Engineering Manager, Oconee Site Office W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer

• E. LeGette, Compliance Engineer H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group B. Milisap, Maintenance Engineer D. Powell, Station Services Superintendent

• G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors:

• P Skinner

• L. Wert B. Desai

• Attended exit intervie. Plant Operations (71707)(71710)

a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification log and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument & electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during weekdays and on weekend Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the Licensee's Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift

inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included the following:

Turbine Building Auxiliary Building CCW Intake Structure Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Rooms Keowee Hydro Station During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1, 2 and 3 operated at 100 % power during the entire reporting perio b. Degraded Grid Voltage Issue Identified During Switchyard Design Basis Documentation Analysis Program Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/90-08 discussed a potential degraded offsite voltage situation which was identified by Design Engineering (DE) as part of the ongoing Design Basis Documentation (DBD) effor Further review of the issue by the inspectors and discussions with the licensee resulted in the determination that an LER should be submitted addressing conditions which occurred previously including one instance in which switchyard voltage decreased to approximately 210 KV for about 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> The inspectors concluded that this situation not only rendered the startup transformers unavailable as a source of offsite power but also resulted in the Keowee hydro unit overhead path being inoperable. TS 3.7.2(a) permits this hydro unit overhead path to be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the alternate power path (the Keowee underground path) is verified operable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the loss and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafte Since the inability of the startup breakers to close in with a grid voltage of 210 KV was not recognized at that time, the verification of the underground path was not performe Additional review and discussion on this issue has also led the licensee to conclude that TS 3.7.5 is the principle applicable TS requirement involved with this issu TS 3.7.5 lists specific

requirements to be satisfied if the reactor is to remain critical or be restarted following the loss of all 230 KV transmission line The current concern is a scenario in which the grid is degraded such that the startup breakers will not shut due to undervoltage but the voltage is above the External Grid Trouble Protection System (EGTPS)

setpoint, which provides for switchyard grid isolation, thus the 230 KV transmission system is not available as a source of power to the Oconee unit (Inspection Report 269,270,287/90-08 contains additional details.)

Included in the action statement requirements of TS 3.7.5 is the energization of the standby buses via the Lee gas turbine within one hour and a report to Region II. Since previously this degraded voltage condition was not recognized as a loss of the 230 KV system, these requirements were not met. The licensee will be submitting a 10 CFR 50.73 report addressing these previous TS violation Interim corrective actions taken by the licensee include:

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Implementation of procedural requirements to monitor/record switchyard voltage (230 KV yellow bus) at least once every two hour If voltage decreases to 22 KV or less (a very conservative value selected to ensure grid voltage will remain above 219 KV in all postulated scenarios) the following actions will be taken;

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The dispatchers will be contacted and efforts initiated to increase voltage to greater than 225.2 K The overhead path to the Keowee Hydrostation will be declared inoperable and the actions required by TS 3.7.2(a)

will be initiate The 230 KV transmission yard will be recognized as unavailable and TS 3.7.5 compensatory actions will be initiate TS 3.7.5 currently contains a requirement that all conditions of TS 3.7.1 (except the 230 KV line requirement)

be met to permit continued reactor operatio Since the degraded voltage causes the overhead Keowee path to be inoperable, TS 3.7.1 is not met. Consequently, TS 3.0 will be entered which requires the unit to be placed in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if the situation cannot be correcte Planned corrective actions include;

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An urgent Nuclear Station Modification (NSM)

will be installed to address the degraded voltage problem. Basically the NSM will utilize existing wiring from the 230 KV switchyard breakers synchronization circuitry to establish a 2 out of 3 (same phase on each of the three unit startup transformers) undervoltage

logic to detect the degraded grid conditions. The setpoint will be 221.5 KV (219 KV with one percent tolerance of the relays involved)

on the switchyard side of each of the startup transformer The undervoltage relays will be class IE qualified, and installed in safety-related enclosures within the cable roo On a 2 out of 3 detection of low voltage, alarms and indications will be provided to the control room operator If any single Engineered Safeguards (ES)

channel on any Oconee unit trips concurrent with this degraded voltage condition, the undervoltage section of the EGTPS will be actuate The EGTPS will cause a switchyard isolation and start the Keowee unit It is projected that the NSM will be installed on all 3 units by June 15, 199 TS 3.7.5 is currently under review by the license Proposed changes will be submitted to address specifically a degraded condition on the 230 KV gri The licensee is continuing to review past documentation submitted to NRC concerning degraded voltag If corrections are necessary they will be submitte Discussions on this issue have included system dispatchers. The dispatchers have been informed of both the required Oconee switchyard voltage and the proposed NS The inspectors have been involved throughout the development of these corrective actions and continue to closely follow this issu The licensee has stated that the Oconee units have been and continue to be protected from the degraded grid scenario, i.e. the undervoltage feature on the startup transformer breakers will not permit voltage which is too low to be provided to the safety loads in the plan The problem is that the "preferred" source (offsite power supply),

along with the Keowee overhead path were unavailable due to this undervoltage feature and this was previously not recognized. The NSM will correct thi An additional factor in this issue is the apparent lack of understanding on the part of onsite personnel concerning the importance of this preferred power supply as discussed in section 8.1 of the FSAR and the bases of TS 3.7. The significance of the unavailability of the offsite power supply and consequent entry into TS 3.7.5 were not emphasized to plant personnel previousl While these are concerns it should be noted that the safety significance of this degraded voltage scenario itself involves low probability events and simultaneous failure of reliable equipmen The inspectors continue to consider the ongoing DBD effort to be a substantial strength in the licensees program DE is dedicating significant resources and conducting thorough analysis during each portion of the program. This latest issue is another example of how

these efforts have directly resulted in increased plant safety through both a better understanding of TS and Design Basis requirements and the installation of modifications to correct specific weaknes.ses foun No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing (61726)

Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:

PT/O/A/620/16 Keowee Hydrostation Emergency Start Test PT/O/A/600/20 Standby Shutdown Facility Instrumentation Surveillance, Dated 2/7/89 PT/O/A/600/21 Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel-Generator Operation, Dated 9/26/89 PT/O/A/250/05 HPSW Monthly PT MP/O/A/1840/09 Coupling - Lubrication PT/3/A/0600/12 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Performance Test No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities (62703)

Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:

WR 93471 Repairs To 2HPSW-193 (Backup Cooling Water to Unit 2 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump)

WR 56921 PM On 16 Cylinder Diesel Generator WR 56922 PM On 12 Cylinder Diesel Generator WR 26906C Repair Air Line Fitting On Valve DA 8 WR 26875C Replace Wire For HP-26 Control Circuitry Light Indication WR 56780A Oil Change, Lubrication On 2C LPSWP WR 054289 Repairs To Steam Leak On 3HD-59 Line No violations or deviations were identifie.

10 CFR Part 21 Program Review (36100)

A review was made by the inspectors to determine if the licensee has established a program with implementing procedures and control to ensure the reporting of defects and noncompliances as required by 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncomplianc The procedure that addresses this process is contained in Nuclear Production Department Directive (NPDD) 2.8.1(s), Problem Investigation Process, Revision NPDD 2.8.1(s) was reviewed t o assure that all requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 21 were adequately addressed during review of identified problem The requirements appear to be incorporated in this procedur In addition, posting requirements were reviewe Posting met the requirements of 10 CFR 2 A review of various procurement documents was conducted to assure that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 were contained in these requisition No discrepancies were identifie No violations or deviations were identifie. Meeting With Public Officials (94600)

On April 16 and 17, the Chief of Reactor Projects Branch Number 3 and the resident inspectors met with local officials from Pickens and Oconee County respectivel A presentation was given by NRC personnel that consisted of an introduction of the residents and a brief description of the functions of the NRC in Washington, Region II and at the sit Also provided were names and telephone numbers of NRC supervisory personne Mayors from the local communities had also been requested to attend the meetings, but only one was in attendanc Following the presentation a time was provided to respond to any questions. There was a minimal number of questions aske The following local representatives were present at these meetings:

Pickens County - April 16, 1990 -

7:30 Mr. Neil Smith, Chairman Mr. Claude Marchbanks, Jr., Councilman Mr. Guy Waldrop, Councilman Mr. Robert Nash, Councilman Mr. Marion Owens, Councilman Mr. Sam Calloway, Councilman Mr. Bob Guerreri, Mayor, Town of Six Mile Oconee County - April 17, 1990 -

3:00 Mr. Norman Crain, Chairman Mr. Jerry Dyar, Councilman Mr. John Stone, Councilman Dr. Julius Earl, Councilman Mr. Mike Harper, Councilman A copy of the material that was distributed at the meetings is provided as Attachment.

Inspection of Open Items (92700)(90712)(92701)

The following items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate: (Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/89-31-02:

Keowee Overhead Emergency Power Path Inoperability Due to Improper Operation of the Switchyard Isolation System. This response to this violation was documented in correspondence from the licensee dated November 20, 198 In accordance with the corrective actions identified, the licensee has revised OP/O/A/1107/11, Removal and Restoration of Auxiliary Electrical System This revision identified as change Number 1 dated March 15, 1990, added in part, enclosure 3.16, 230 KV Switchyard Breaker Removal and Restoratio Training was also provided on the Switchyard Isolation System to the operations personnel and incorporated into the retraining qualification program for licensed operator The inspectors reviewed the changes to the procedures and the training provided to the operations personne Based on this review, this item is close b. (Closed) IFI 50-269,270,287/89-28-01: Hydrostatic Testing Procedural Issue This item addressed procedural deficiencies in Maintenance Procedure MP/O/A/1720/10, System/Component Hydrostatic Test Controlling Procedure which had been identified by the inspectors during observations of hydrostatic testin MP/O/A/1720/10 was revised in November 198 Included in the revision were explicit procedural controls to be utilized if testing was interrupted and then restarte These changes appear sufficient to correct the

primary concerns in this issue. Additionally a procedural compliance awareness program has recently been initiated onsite which should focus more attention on use of written procedures and further minimize recurrence of the observed problem. This item is close (Closed)

LER 269/89-06:

Single Component Failure Could Render Emergency Power Switching Logic Inoperable Under Certain Design Basis Accident Scenario This LER was reported in correspondence dated March 31, 198 It concerned the identification of a single failure to a relay or a relay contact in the Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL)

that could falsely sense power on the startup bus and prevent an automatic swap to the standby power sourc Since the EPSL systems are identical for all three units, this finding was applicable to all units. The licensee developed and implemented an urgent Nuclear Station Modification (NSM)

to correct the wiring configuratio This NSM has been completed on all unit In addition, a Self Imposed Technical Audit on the Power Distribution System (including EPSL)

has been completed with no additional significant findings. Based on this action, this item is close (Closed)

LER 269/89-14:

Overhead Emergency Power Path Rendered Inoperable Due to Management Deficiency When Certain PCBs Were Removed From Servic This LER was issued by the licensee in correspondence dated October 20, 198 As corrective actions for this LER, the licensee has generated appropriate changes to OP/O/A/1107/11, Removal and Restoration of Auxiliary Electrical Systems to incorporate guidance to correctly isolate PCB's when removed from servic In addition training has been provided to Operations Personnel on the use and purpose of the Switchyard Isolate Test pushbutton A Design Basis Document Analysis of the 230 KV switchyard is in progress and should be complete by mid 199 Based on the review of the corrective actions, this item is close (Closed) LER 269/89-17:

Transfers of Contaminated Resins to Onsite Chemical Treatment Pond Result in Technical Specification Violations Due to Inappropriate Action, Failure to Follow Procedur This LER was submitted in correspondence dated December 18, 1989. The planned corrective action for this item was to change the applicable chemistry procedure and for management to discuss this occurrence with supervisors of the chemistry grou These actions were completed on January 2 and 5, 1990, respectivel The inspector reviewed documentation showing that this action had been complete This LER is similar to the problem identified in LER 269/89-07 dated April 4, 1989 which also addresses a release to a chemical treatment pond in excess of TS limits. A review of this LER indicates that the corrective actions taken as a result of the previous LER would not have prevented the problem in this repor Based on this action, this item is close f. (Closed) LER 287/89-02:

Reactor Trip Due to Turbine/Generator Tri This LER was transmitted to the NRC in correspondence dated April 5, 198 As a result of this trip, a water hammer occurred in the Main Steam Turbine Bypass piping which damaged three supports. The cause of the event at the time of occurrence was unknown. Followup of the corrective action has attributed the trip of the generator to have been caused by the out of calibration condition of a device in the generator regulator called Underexcited Reactive Ampere Limit (URAL).

The devices on Units 1 and 2 were tested and found to be acceptabl The Unit 3 URAL was calibrated and, in addition, the voltage regulators were cleaned. The hangers on the steam line were repaired and an analysis on the piping subjected to the water hammer was performe The results of the analysis indicted that no damage to the piping was identifie The cause of the water hammer was attributed to the collection of water in the bypass lin Engineering concluded that the water accumulated due to a steam trap not functioning properly or being clogged up with some foreign materia Subsequent to the event, the traps operated properly with no indications of water accumulatio Based on the review of the actions taken by the licensee, this item is close. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 23, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Attachment:

Meeting With Local Officials Outline

ATTACHMENT NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MEETING WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS Apr. 1990 I. Purpose of meeting: Introduce local NRC people Provide an introduction to the role of the NRC Provide phone numbers to NRC offices D. Answer questions II. NRC Overview Background:

1. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 started AEC Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 change AEC to Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Energy Research and Development (ERDA).

ERDA subsequently incorporated into the Department of Energy (DOE).

B. Organization: Commission -

5 member group Chairman

-

Kenneth Carr Commissioners -

Thomas Roberts Kenneth Rogers James Curtiss Forrest Remick Licensing Boards Scientific Advisory Committees Various Program Offices NRC Regional Offices Region II, Atlanta, Ga. (Responsible for Southeastern states including Puerto Rico).

C. Some of the functions and responsibilities 1. Support international agencies 2. Safety research and standards development Regulation of nuclear waste 4. Regulation of commercial nuclear power plant -

both construction and operation Public information source -

The local public information source is located at the Oconee County Public Library in Walhall REGION1 II ORGANIZATION ADUNSTRATOR S. E9NME DEPUTY J. WIHOkN DI" SOf fM O D(YIUOf REACTOR PROJECTS R&TnmRA(TIw SAFETY DI A. GiBSON AnD SAFEGUARD DI L REYES DEPUTY C. HEHL DEPUT E. MERSCHOfT DIR. J. STOHR

• DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS ORGANIZATION DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS DI L REYES DEPUTY C. IIEIII REACTOR PROJECTS BRANCH NO. 3 CHIEF A. HERDT PROJECTS SECTION PROJECTS SECTION NO. SA NO. 3B CHIEF I. SHYMLOCK CHIEF K. BROCKMAN CATAW lA HATCH McGUIRE VOGTLE OCONEE

• NRR ORGANIZATION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGUIATION DIR. THOMAS E. MURLEY ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR PROJECTS INSPECTION &

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT J. PARTLOW DIV. OF ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY mef mcs a DIV. OF EATOf eac. rnanAr. nL 1/B OPERATIONAL IVINT/

L.B MATWWSk R 3-3

• mei

. IERS pm0. HGL ocom DIV. OF RBACTOR INSPECTION AND SAFEGUARDS M. r RaDmAn DIVISION OF acros PROI. m/IV/V DIV. OF IJCENSES PERFORMANCE AND QUAIJTY EVALUATION

REGION U OBJECTIVES Codet Imally hapectui protrams v"le are h-depk sad wsoutive to*

• Confirm Icensed focities an deied, but, and op.ted to meet safety isvels hwmt b regi otions ad Wot lcensed activative we condActed within kensed condion * Vi complance w regulon

• Amure sedy identiacion of potectid problems and eaesiy puru odepots correctiv ations hphla dw-Sbcewasg program t * Tradae safety v e

hko cene

"

ements

• Dealope solty duaion based on sound ngpcles for two. mm hterface responshiti Eforce WC rules and reguluons to

• Assre prompt and effective corrective oction when potentid problems a identifie * knpoe enforcement sanctions appropriate to noncomplance circumstanc C

SALP OVERVIEW OCONEE (8/1/87) TO (1/31/89)

PLANT OPERATIONS

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS I

MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

SECURITY/SAFEGUARDS

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT

SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION

NRC TELEPHONE NUMBERS

RESIDENT OFFICE AT OCONEE (803) 882-6927 REGIONAL OFFICE IN ATLANTA (404) 331-4503 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER IN WASHINGTON (202) 951-0550

UNITED STATES

'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Governmental and Public Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20655 NRC MISSION -- TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY The Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates the civilian uses of nuclear materials in the United States to protect the public health and safety, the environment and the commnon defense and securit This mission is accomplished through:

licensing of nuclear facilities and the possession, use and disposal of nuclear materials; the development and implementation of requirements governing licensed activities; and inspection and enforcement activities to assure compliance with these requirement The NRC was created as an independent agency by the Energy Reorganization Act, signed into law October 11, 1974, which abolished the Atomic Energy Commission. The NRC, which took over the regulatory functions of the AEC, formally came into being on January 19, 197 The Energy Research and Development Administration, also created by the Energy Reorganization Act, took over the other functions of the AEC and is now part of the Department of Energ When he signed the legislation, President Gerald Ford said, in part: "The highly technical nature of our nuclear facilities and the special potential hazards which are involved in the use of nuclear fuels fully warrant the creation of an independent and technically competent regulatory agency to responsible for the licensing and regulation of the nuclear industry under the ass re de uat pr te tio o pu lic he lth an sa ety N C w ll b ea de l provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. This means that NRC will be fully empowered to see to it that reactors using nuclear materials will be properly and safely designed, constructed and operated to guarantee against hazards to the public from leakage or acciden NRC will also exercise strengthened authority to assure that the public is fully safeguarded from hazards arising from the storage, handling and transportation of nuclear materials being used in power reactors, hospitals, research laboratories or for any other purpose."

The Nuclear Regulatory Commnission is headed by five Commnissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year term The Chairman of the Commnission is Lando W. Zech, Jr. The other Commnissioners are Thomas Roberts, Kenneth M. Carr, Kenneth C. Rogers, and James R. Curtis Three Basic Functions Performed by Agency The NRC has about 3200 employees and a budget of over $400 million to carry out the three basic functions listed below. In addition, the NRC is responsible for licensing the export and import of nuclear facilities, equip mnent and material Licensing - The agency reviews and issues licenses for the construction and operation of wuQear power plants and other nuclear facilities and it licenses the possession and use of nuclear materials for medical, industrial, educationaT and research purposes. Regulatory authority for nuclear materials licensing has been transferred to 28 states under the NRC's Agreement States Progra Inspection and Enforcement - The NRC conducts various kinds of inspections and investigations designed to assure that licensed activities are conducted in compliance with the agency's regulations and other requirements, and enforces compliance as necessar Regulatory Research and Standards Development - The NRC is mandated by law to conduct an extensive confirmatory research program in the areas of safety, safeguards and environmental assessment. In addition, the agency establishes regulations, standards and guidelines governing the various licensed uses of nuclear facilities and material The Commission has offices in Washington, D.C., and suburban Maryland. Its five regional offices are located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Glen Ellyn, Illinois; Arlington, Texas; and Walnut Creek, Californi Beginning in late 1981, the role of the NRC's regional offices was expanded in order to bring more of the agency's staff closer to the licensees and public most affected by the agency's regulatory responsibilities. In addition to their inspection and enforcement responsibilities, the regional offices have responsibilities for reactor operator and materials licensing, review and approval of reactor operating license amendments and for the issuance of certain orders and fine Three Operating Offices Conduct Major Regulatory Activities The first major reorganization of the NRC since it was established in 1975 was implemented in April 1987. The reorganization reflected changes which had taken place over the previous 12 years--progressively less involvement with the construction of large, complex nuclear facilities and a greatly increased involvement with the operation and maintenance of these facilitie Three operating offices direct the conduct of the NRC's major regulatory functions:

Office of Nuclear Reactor Reulation - The primary responsibilities of this office are to conduct the inspection and licensing activities associated with operating power reactors that are necessary to protect the public health and safety and to establish a sound regulatory framework for the future. The Office also is responsible for evaluating applications to build and operate new power reactors, for inspection and licensing activities related to the con struction and operation of research and test reactors and for licensing reactor operators. In addition, the office is responsible for conducting inspections of NRC-licensed activities under its jurisdiction to assure that they comply with all NRC regulations and requirements. Important elements of this program,

as it applies to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants include residen-t-Tnspection and systematic assessment of licensee perforimance (SALP).

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards - This office is responsible for licensing fuel cycle facilities such as uranium mills and fuel fabrication plants; for licensing the possession and academic, medical and commercial uses of radioactive materials; for regulating the packaging of radioactive materials for transport; for developing agency-wide policies governing the safeguarding of nuclear facilities and materials at fixed sites and nuclear materials in transport from radiological sabotage, theft or diversion; and for reviewing the application of physical security and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for the use of V.S.-origin nuclear material in foreign countries. The office also is responsible for directing the implementation of the agency's responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste PolicyAct of 1982 which governs the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes; the Low-Level Radio active Waste Policy Act of 1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 which govern the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes; and the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, as amended. In addition, the office is responsible for inspection policy and for conducting inspections of materials licensees in compliance with all NRC requirements and regulations; and for assuring the implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement at licensed facilitie Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research - This office has three primary respon sibilities: (1) to plan, recoimend and implement programs of nuclear regulatory research, standards development and resolution of safety issues for nuclear power plants and other facilities re ulated by the NRC; (2) to develop and promulgate all technical regulations; (3) and to coordinate research activities within and outside the agency including appointment of staff to committees and conferences. The office also coordinates NRC staff participation in standards-related activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and serves as a principal point of contact for the Commission with the American National Standards Institute and technical and professional societies on matters concerning nuclear standard Operating Data, Enforcement, Special Projects Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data - This office analyzes and evaluates operationalsft data associated-with NRC-licensed activities to identify issues that require NRC or industry action. It also identifies agency requirements for operational data and related technical information and provides the NRC focal point for coordination of generic operational safety data and systems with the industry and other agencies. In addition, AEOD manages and conducts the support functions for the NRC's Committee to Review Generic Requirements. Its other responsibilities include the development and management of the reactor performance indicators program and the management and direction of programs for diagnostic evaluations and investigations of significant operational events, and the conduct of technical training for the NRC staff through the Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tennesse This office also is responsible for developing policy and maintaining capability for and initiat+nrg the NRCs response to incidents and accidents involving NRC licensed facilities and materials. When necessary, the NRC Operations Center is activated and an emergency response team from a regional office is dispatched to the scene. The NRC's role is to (1) monitor and evaluate the situation; and (2) provide advice and information to the licensee, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

other Federal agencies, State and local governments and the publi Office of Enforcement This office develops policies and programs for enforcement of NRC requirements. It manages major enforcement actions and assesses the effectiveness and uniformity of enforcement actions taken by the regional offices. Enforcement powers include notices of violation, fines, and orders for license modification, suspension or revocatio Investigators, Advisory Committee and Licensing Boards Serve the Commission Two separate offices, reporting directly to the Commission, are responsible for investigations of possible wrongdoin Office of Investigations - This office is responsible for the conduct of inves tigations of licensees, applicants, contractors or vendor This responsi bility includes investigating all allegations of wrongdoing by individuals or organizations other than NRC employees and NRC contractor In addition, the office keeps abreast of inquiries and inspections and advises on the need for formal investigations. It also keeps other components of the agency informed of matters under investigation as they affect safety matter Office of Inspector and Auditor - This office is responsible for the conduct of investigations of alleged wrongdoing by NRC employees and NRC contractor The Office of Inspector and Auditor also provides the Commission with independent reviews and appraisals of internal programs and operations and a capability to verify facts to assure continued maintenance of the integrity of all agency organizations, programs and activitie Three independent groups serve the Commission. They are:

Advisory cormnittee on Reactor Safegu ards -

This statutory body of 15 Scientists

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iers revi and makes recommendations to the Commission on all applications to build or operate nuclear-power reactors and on related nuclear safety matter Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste - An independent advisory committee established by the Commission to provide it with advice and recommendations concerning all aspects of nuclear waste management for which the NRC has responsibilit Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel - Three-member licensing boards are drawn fro this pane They are made-up of lawyers and others with expertise in various technical and environmental fields to conduct public hearings on applications to build and operate nuclear power plants. and other matters related to the possession and use of nuclear facilities and material Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel - Three-membter appeal boards are selectted from this panel to review ind-ividual licensing board decision For Additional Information, Contact:

Office of Governmental & Public Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (301) 492-0240 Regional Public Affairs Offices Region I -

631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 (215) 337-5330 Region II -

101 Marietta Street Suite 3100 Atlanta, GA 30323 (404) 331-4503 Region III -

799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 (312) 790-5500 Region IV -

611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 (817) 860-8100 Region V -

1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 (415) 943-3700 NUREG/BR-0099, Rev. 3 March 1989