IR 05000269/1989012
| ML15224A550 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1989 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A549 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-89-12, 50-270-87-9, 50-270-89-12, 50-287-87-9, 50-287-89-12, IEB-88-010, IEB-88-10, NUDOCS 8906160212 | |
| Download: ML15224A550 (11) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COCMMNISSION 101 MAARIET-A ST., N ATLANTA. GEORGIA 2023 Report Nos:
50-269/89-12, 50-270/89-12, 50-287/89-12 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License No DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: April 15 - May 19, 1989 Inspectors:
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P.H.Sk nner, Senior R sident Inspector Da't&/ igned eft Resident Inspector ate, ignCd Approved by:
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M. B. !hymlock-, Section ChiefDaeSged Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, safeguards and radiation protection, NRC Bulletins and inspection of open item Results:
A major strength was identified in the indepth evaluation conducted by the Design Engineering group during their functional evaluation of all valves required to be available to change position within the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The inspectors found the report of this review to reflect a very detailed examination of the operability aspects of the concerned valve The resolution of several potential problems discussed in the review should contribute significantly to greater reliability of these systems if called upon during an emergenc A weakness was identified in the lack of understanding by the operators of the Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS)
portion of the Integrated Core Cooling (ICC)
system. Although the RVLIS has been in operation for some time the operators have not been provided sufficient information to determine if a
"malfunction" indication causes the system to be inoperabl DR 0_PD P'DC
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative J. Brackett, Senior QA Manager J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer D. Havice, Instrument and Electrical Engineer
- C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer
- E. Legette, Assistant Engineer Compliance H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group J. McIntosh, Administrative Services Superintendent G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors:
- PH Skinner
- L.D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie. Plant Operations (71707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS), and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument &
electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekend Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensees Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift
- inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were
responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1/2 Spent Fuel Pool Room Intake Structure Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Construction Site During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe During this inspection report period all three Oconee units operated at 100 percent power with the only exception being a reduction in power on Unit 2 due to a runback. On May 7, 1989, Unit 2 ran back to approximately 60 percent power due to an apparently failed Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
flow transmitter (paragraph 2.c).
Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power on May 7, 198 b. Condenser Circulating Water Intake Vent Valves During a routine tour of the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) Intake structure the inspector observed preventive maintenance being performed on the operator of valve 3 CCW-28, a CCW intake vent valv These valves serve as high point vents during normal operation of the CCW system. The CCW system is designed such that on a loss of power situation (loss of CCW pumps),
gravity flow and a siphon effect will cause continued flow of CCW through the pipin This system is called the Emergency Condenser Cooling Water (ECCW) system. During such operation a vacuum is maintained (by steam air injectors) in the piping to sustain siphon flow from the lake level through the pump up to the intake piping level. If a CCW Intake vent valve were left open this could possibly prevent this siphon effect from functioning and result in loss of ECCW flo The ECCW system is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.4.5a whenever the reactor is above 250 degrees Discussions with the maintenance worker and Unit 3 Control Room operators indicated that the worker had permission to cycle the valve manually as necessary to complete the wor Although there is normally control room indication of these valves positions, in this case (and in other instances when the valve fails to operate) the
valve breaker was tagged open and valve position indication was not available in the control room. While the worker indicated he would only move the valve just off its seat and then immediately reclose it, the inspector noted no precaution on the work request (or in the generic maintenance procedure being utilized) warning the worker not to leave the valve ope Furthermore, the work request was not marked
"Technical Specification Related" as required by administrative procedure These valves are located outside the Protected Area fence and are not routinely checked by watchstander Although in this particular instance no loss of control of the valves position was noted, the inspector questioned the licensees operations staff regarding control of these valves to ensure adequate control of this TS required system. In response to the inspectors concerns the licensee initiated the following actions:
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Handwheels on the CCW vent valves were labeled with large red labels stating that Shift Supervisor's permission is required before operating these valve A letter was issued by the designated CCW system experts concerning the operability of the ECCW system which included a discussion of vent valve positio S-The licensee intends to add a requirement to verify the position of these valves locally to the outside non licensed operators'
log Efforts are being made to ensure that future work requests concerning CCW vent valves will be marked as TS relate The inspectors feel that these actions were very prompt and comprehensive and fully address the concern C. Unit 2 Runback On May 7, 1989, at 3:34 p.m., Oconee Unit 2 ran back from 100 percent power to about 60 percen The runback was caused by the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
flow transmitter providing signals to (Channel E) the Integrated Control System (ICS) apparently failing. The unit was quickly stabilized by the operators at about 65 percent powe The operators returned feedwater flow distribution between the two steam generators to its correct value (ratio shifted when RCS flow signal failed).
The Smart Automatic Signal Selector (SASS) System which is designed to detect such a failure and automatically shift the ICS input to the good or valid sensing device did not shift to the other channel in this cas The SASS determines an invalid input signal by detecting a difference or mismatch between the redundant inputs (in excess of a specified value) along with detection that the invalid signal is changing in
excess of a predetermined rate of chang The SASS had on several occasions prevented trips or transients by shifting ICS inputs to a good instrument channel on a failure. In this case it appears that a mismatch between the two signals apparently caused the SASS to take itself out of automatic mode and remain selected to the current channel until operators shifted the input Indications to the control room operators of an existing mismatch is provided by a computer alarm which is generated from analog mismatch point Since the computer updates only once per 5 seconds and SASS signals change much more rapidly a transient mismatch could exist without an immediate alarm to the operator in the Control Room. A mismatch computer alarm was received in the control room about two seconds after the runback was initiate It should be noted that a failure of SASS to switch channels on an instrument failure merely places the operating unit in the same situation that existed before the licensee installed SAS The licensee is reviewing several alternative methods to improve SASS indications, to the control operator Additional information on the exact cause of the failure and repairs to the affected equipment will be made during the Unit Two refueling outage scheduled to start on May 20, 198 d. Reactor Vessel. Level Monitor System The inspectors reviewed the instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling installed as required by NUREG 0737 section II. This system is not addressed in TS at this tim The installation of this equipment is complete and is operational at this time but TS requirements have not been approved by the NR A proposed TS amendment was submitted by the licensee in correspondence dated March 15, 198 The review of this system indicated that although the operators have been trained on the system, it has not been utilized sufficiently for the operators to have confidence that it will be a source of useful informatio In particular, the reactor vessel level instrumentation system (RVLIS)
portion can display the word "MALFUNCTION" for this function. The cause of this malfunction can be a variety of different problems some of which will cause RVLIS to be inoperabl The operators are not trained to analyze these faults to determine operability and request assistance from the instrumentation and electrical (I&E) technicians to resolve this questio The problem is that if the I&E personnel determine that the instrumentation is still operable the malfunction indications remain illuminated and a subsequent malfunction could occur which could render the RVLIS inoperable without the knowledge of the operations personne The licensee is reviewing this proble This item is identified as an Inspector Followup Item (50-269,270,287/89-12-01):
Resolution of Malfunctions Associated With RVLI *
No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed wor The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
TT/3/A/0610/02 Emergency Power Switching Logic 3X5, 3X6 Interrupt (Unit 3 NSM 2799)
PT/0/A/0400/05 (Safe Shutdown Facility) Auxiliary Service Water Pump Performance Test OP/O/A/1600/10 SSF Diesel Generator Idle Start (after governor replacement)
PT/O/A/0150/22D Individual Valve Functional Test (Unit 2)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 56628A Preventive Maintenance on 3CCW-28 Operator (MP/O/A/1210/10)
WR 051328 Hydrostatic Testing of 'A' Low Pressure Injection Line (Unit 2) (MP/O/A/1720/10)
WR 050231 Replacement of Rotating Assembly in Auxiliary Service Water Pump WR 051350 Hydrostatic Testing of Portions of,'2A' Low Pressure Injection and Reactor Building Spray Lines (U-2)
No violations or deviations were identified 5. Safeguards and Radiological Controls Activities (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included review of portions of the licensee's physical security activities. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts. The inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and other organization On.May 9, 1989, the inspector attended a portion of a meeting the licensee conducted with representatives of local law enforcement agencie The licensee made presentations on security policies and procedures, response capabilities, Oconee Nuclear Station facilities, and emergency preparedness and radiological consideration Question and answer sessions and station tours were also conducte Attendance by area law enforcement officials was very goo The sheriffs of both Pickens and Oconee counties, several FBI agents, and representatives from virtually every municipality -in the area were in attendanc No violations or deviations were identifie. Safe Shutdown Facility Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (TI 2525/100)
During the inspection period the inspectors completed the requirements of Temporary Instruction 2515/100:
Proper Receipt, Storage, and Handling of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oi The inspection was performed on the Oconee Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF)
diesel generato Oconee Nuclear Station utilizes the onsite Keowee Hydro Station as its emergency power source and does not rely on emergency diesel generators. The SSF is designed to maintain any or all of the Oconee units in hot shutdown following certain fire, flooding or security event The SSF diesel generator provides power to the SSF and its associated systems. The SSF is not designed as single failure proof and there are currently no approved Technical Specifications on its operations. The licensee, while not formally committed to the regulatory requirements on emergency diesel generators, appears to be fulfilling many of those requirements relating to the SSF diesel generator To meet the objectives of the Temporary Instruction (TI), the inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the SSF diesel generator fuel oil system and observed operation of the SSF diesel and fuel oil sampling on several occasion Discussions were held with the responsible onsite engineers and technicians as well as the DPC general office diesel generator coordinator. The survey sheets as required by the TI were completed and forwarded as directe The inspectors verified that the licensees programs on the SSF diesel generator fuel oil system meet or exceed the objectives stated in the T During the walkdown of the fuel oil system and observation of diesel operation, the inspectors had concerns over the alignment of the fuel oil filter switch and noted problems with the fuel oil strainer selector valve position and labeling. These concerns are discussed in Inspection Report 269,270,287/89-1 No violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup of NRC Bulletins (92703)
(Open)
IE Bulletin Number 88-10:
Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. The licensee responded to this Bulletin in correspondence dated April 3, 198 This response contained information concerning all three Duke Power Company site The information pertaining to Oconee, in part, identified three molded-case circuit breakers installed in Unit As requested by step 2 of the bulletin, the licensee performed an analysis justifying continued operation (JCO)
until the breakers can be replaced with acceptable breaker Replacement will occur during the next refueling outage or other outage of sufficient duratio The JCO/Operability Determination identified as PIR # 1-89-0051 dated April 21, 1989 has been reviewed by the inspector This JCO identified the following: For circuit breakers 1 HP 409 and 1 HP 410:
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A subsidiary of the licensee purchased these breakers and the general policy of this company is to purchase directly from original manufacturer Thevalves/breakers have operated properly since being placed in service on October 24, 198 The valves supplied by these breakers have been tested at least twice since installation and have shown proper operatio The full load current and starting current for the valve operators is much less than the rating of the breaker The breakers are fed from a safety related motor control center (MCC)
and an analysis indicates that all breakers associated with this MCC are fully coordinate The breakers have been investigated in accordance with NUMARC initiatives with no indication of the breakers being previously used or refurbishe The breakers are scheduled to be replaced during an outage of sufficient duration to allow replacement and subsequent testin For the circuit breaker providing power to the KSF-2 static inverter:
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This breaker is currently not serving a safety related function but will be replaced with an equivalent traceable safety related breake Based on the review of the material provided, the inspector considers the actions proposed by the licensee to be acceptabl No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspection of Open Items (92702, 92701, 92700)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate:
a. (Closed)
Violation 269/87-51-01:
Failure to Follow Procedures Associated With Freeze Sealing Safety-Related Piping. This violation was responded to in correspondence dated February 29, 1988 which stated that corrective actions were to be completed by December 1, 1988. The corrective actions to be taken were to develop an enhanced procedure to provide better guidelines and controls for all freeze plug operation Maintenance Procedure, MP/O/A/1800/14, Freeze Plugging - Metal Pipe -
Using Liquid Nitrogen, was issued February 22, 1989 and was reviewed by the inspector Based on this review this item is close b. (Closed) Violation 269,270,287/88-25-01:
Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures to Operate and Maintain the Piggyback Portion of the High Pressure Injection (HPI)
System as Required by Technical Specification 6.4.1.k. The response to this violation was provided in correspondence dated January 12, 198 The corrective action taken to avoid further violations has been completed as describe Part of this corrective action was for the licensee to conduct a review to verify the operability of all valves which are required to be available to change position in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS).
This review was completed and is documented in a memo dated February 21, 198 The review was performed by the Design Engineering group and resulted in the identification of several potential problems, and recommendations which require further evaluation by the licensee to resolve these problem Pending a review by the inspectors of the resolution of the problems identified and actions taken based on the recommendations, this is identified as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269,270,287/89-12-02:
Review of Actions Taken Based on the Findings of the Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Functional Evaluation dated February 21, 198 C. (Closed)
Violation 287/88-28-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure OP/3/A/1102/10, Enclosure 4.2, Hot Shutdown Conditions to 250 Degrees/350 PSI Conditions, Resulting in a Violation of TS 3.1. The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated October 28, 198 The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and based on this review, this item is close d. (Closed) Deviation 269,270,287/88-35-02:
Failure to meet Commitment Associated With Violation 269/87-51-01. This deviation was responded to in correspondence dated March 3, 1989. The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and based on this review, this item is close (Closed)
LER 269/87-01, Revision 1:
Failure To Comply With ISI Program On PALS Syste This report was issued by the licensee upon identifying that testing of certain Post Accident Liquid Sampling (PALS) system valves, identified in the inservice test program (IST),
was not being conducted as require As part of the corrective actions the licensee re-evaluated the specific valves and determined that they should not have been included in the IST program. Based on this evaluation the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC dated April 13, 1987 that removed the valves concerned with the PALS system from the IST program. Also this LER discussed problems experienced to date on the installed PALS system, plans for the new design of the system and schedule implementation informatio A commitment was made to publish a schedule for implementation on Units 1 and 2 by January 1, 198 The licensee submitted a letter to NRC dated January 3, 1989, which identified the schedule for Units 1 and 2 to be completed by April 1, 1990 and August 1, 1990, respectivel Based on the actions taken by the licensee this item is close (Closed) LER 287/88-05: A Unit 3 ALERT Was Declared Due To A Loss Of Power Which Disabled Decay Heat Removal Capability. As a result of the occurrence described in this LER, the inspectors cited the licensee for a failure to provide an adequate procedure (See IR 50-269,270,287/88-28).
The actions discussed in this LER will be reviewed during the review of the actions taken in response to the violation. This LER is being closed for administrative reason. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May, 19, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph IFI 269,270,287/89-12-01 Review of Actions Taken Based on the Findings of the Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Functional Evaluation dated February 21, 1989
IFI 269,270,287/89-12-02 Resolution of Malfunction Associated With RVLIS Licensee management was informed that three previous violations and one deviation discussed in paragraph 8 were closed during this inspection.