IR 05000269/2021002
| ML21216A061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/2021 |
| From: | Eric Stamm NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Snider S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2021002 | |
| Download: ML21216A061 (18) | |
Text
August 4, 2021
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2021002 AND 05000270/2021002 AND 05000287/2021002
Dear Mr. Snider:
On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station. On July 27, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000269, 05000270, and 05000287
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000269/2021002, 05000270/2021002 and 05000287/2021002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-002-0023
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Oconee Nuclear Station
Location:
Seneca, South Carolina
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2021 to June 30, 2021
Inspectors:
J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Ruh, Resident Inspector
S. Bussey, Sr. Reactor Technology Instructor
C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Walker, Emergency Response Inspector
Approved By:
Eric J. Stamm, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Log Technical Specification Applicability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000287/2021002-01 Open
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, when the licensee failed to make operator narrative log entries for the entry and exit from TS limiting condition for operation (LCO)3.7.16, Control Room Air Conditioning Systems (CRACS), during maintenance affecting the single active failure protection design basis of the Unit 3 CRACS.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
Unit 3 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Standby shutdown facility on April 2, 2021
- (2) Keowee hydroelectric units on April 6, 2021
- (3) Emergency siphon system for Units 1, 2, and 3 on May 5, 2021, following system restoration due to replacement of 2ESV-2 float valve
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone 89: Unit 3 equipment room on April 22, 2021
- (2) Fire zone 85: Unit 1 auxiliary building 200 level hallway on May 13, 2021
- (3) Fire zone 112: Unit 3 control room on May 13, 2021
- (4) Fire zone 105: Unit 2 cable room on June 1, 2021
- (5) Fire zone 19: Unit 1 main feedwater pump area on June 10, 2021
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during a Unit 3 condensate booster pump swap and reactor coolant system dilution on April 16, 2021, and a Unit 2 reactor power increase from 99.6% to 100%
on April 19, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated team skill exercises on April 13, 2021, with the following scenarios: 1) Reactor coolant pump seal injection leak, loss of main feedwater with anticipated transient without scram and main turbine failing to trip; 2)
Loss of component cooling water at 100% power; 3) Degraded grid condition.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) High pressure service water system review
- (2) Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 2386700, Essential Siphon Vacuum Valve 2ESV-2 Failure on March 19, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1, 2, and 3 elevated Green risk on April 13, 2021, due to planned maintenance on elevated storage water tank, 'C' low pressure service water pump, and Keowee hydroelectric Unit 1 overhead emergency power path
- (2) Unit 1, 2, and 3 elevated Green risk on April 26, 2021, due to planned maintenance that drained the elevated water storage tank and replacement of 2ESV-2, emergency siphon float valve
- (3) Unit 1, 2, and 3 Yellow risk on May 20-25, 2021, due to safe shutdown facility (SSF)auxiliary service water pump inoperability caused by high vibrations during planned testing
- (4) Unit 1, 2, and 3 elevated Green risk on June 15, 2021, due to SSF maintenance
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) NCR 2376473, non-conservative inservice test and motor operated valve stroke times for 1,2,3HP-26 & 27
- (3) NCR 2371900, both Unit 3 control room air handling units powered from the 3XT motor control center
- (4) NCR 2383431, flood penetration 1-AB-X-07 in auxiliary building corridor found with missing seal foam in places
- (5) NCR 2386632, non-conservative application of effective reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) tube coil length in calculations
- (6) NCR 2381156, 3LP-2 stroke time shorter than design basis document minimum requirement
- (7) NCR 2387741, High differential flow recorded during PT/1/A/0600/013, 1B motor driven emergency feedwater pump surveillance test
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 110008, supply pump and miscellaneous equipment for alternate reactor building cooling
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) PT/2/A/0261/010, Essential Siphon Vacuum Test, on May 1, 2021, following replacement of 2ESV-2 (ESV Float Valve)
- (2) PT/0/A/0250/005, High Pressure Service Water Pump Functional Test, following restoration of elevated water storage tank, on May 4, 2021
- (3) PT/0/A/0400/005, Safe Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) Pump Test, on May 26, 2021, following replacement of the ASW pump motor due to high vibrations
- (4) PT/0/A/0160/006, Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test, on June 30, 2021, following replacement of 3C RBCU air outlet temperature sensor
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Keowee hydroelectric unit 2 testing per PT/2/A/2200/001, PT/2/A/2200/011, and PT/2/A/2200/022, on April 12, 2021
- (2) PT/1/A/0203/012 HPI/LPI/RBS Venting, on April 13, 14, and 28, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) 500kW diesel generator testing, WO 20447405-02
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system during the week of June 7, 2021.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Response Organization during the week of June 7, 2021.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level, Emergency Plan, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure changes during the week of June 7, 2021. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program during the week of June 7, 2021.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Emergency preparedness training augmentation and turnover drill E2021-01, on May 9,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 2 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 3 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 2 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 3 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 2 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
Unit 3 (July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) NCRs 2379921, 2371900, 1904745, 1812194, 1712759, and 1764697 relating to evaluation of both Unit 3 control room air handling units being powered from the 3XT motor control center
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Log Technical Specification Applicability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000287/2021002-01 Open
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, when the licensee failed to make operator narrative log entries for the entry and exit from TS limiting condition for operation (LCO)3.7.16, Control Room Air Conditioning Systems (CRACS), during maintenance affecting the single active failure protection design basis of the Unit 3 CRACS.
Description:
Section 9.4.1.1 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report describes the CRACS design as being redundant trains, designed to ensure that no single failure of an active component within these systems will prevent proper control area environmental control. Manual action is credited to realign systems, restart load shed equipment, or return the systems to service for other reasons. For Unit 3 control room cooling, the two air handling units (AHUs) are both normally powered from the 3XT 600-volt motor control center (MCC) via the 3X4 load center (LC). During a design basis accident with loss of offsite power, the 3X4 LC is load shed and the 3XT MCC is automatically transferred to the non-load shed 3X6 LC. In the event the automatic transfer fails, manual action to restore power to the AHUs from 3X4 is accomplished by AP/3/A/1700/036, Degraded Control Room Area Cooling, and AP/3/A/1700/011, Recovery from Loss of Power. In the above manner, two sources of power are normally available for accident mitigation.
Inspectors identified that routine online maintenance affecting the normal alignment of these power sources was historically not being evaluated or tracked in operator narrative logs as affecting operability of the CRACS per technical specification (TS) 3.7.16. For example, on February 20, 2020, the 3X6 LC was removed from service for preventive maintenance. This maintenance left the CRACS vulnerable to a single active failure of the 3X4 LC power source to re-close following a load shed with no specific manual operator action that would restore cooling, contrary to the design basis previously described. This maintenance activity duration was approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> while TS 3.7.16, condition A, has a required action time of 30 days when only one train remains operable. Since the maintenance duration did not exceed the required action time, the LCO was not violated. Licensee procedure AD-OP-ALL-0112, Operations Log Keeping and Chart Recorders, required operators to track the TS LCO in the operator narrative logs, but no log entry was made.
Concerns with the AHUs sharing the 3XT MCC were previously identified in 2001, 2005, 2016, and 2021 by NCRs 1712759, 1764697, 1812194, and 2371900 respectively. Generally, these NCRs discussed the potential to lose all power to the 3XT MCC during breaker and switch operations supporting maintenance or post-maintenance testing. Past operating experience demonstrated that equipment problems can cause 3XT MCC power to lose power when transferring the power supply from 3X4 LC to 3X6 LC or vice versa. A loss of power during transfer causes a loss of CRACS function (both trains inoperable) and necessitates entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 and a potential plant shutdown. These NCRs specifically recognized there was reliance on one source of power during breaker PMs which created a vulnerability to lose both trains from a single failure. These evaluations were focused on avoiding single point vulnerabilities in terms of operational risk and missed the opportunity to identify that actual system operability per TS 3.7.16 was potentially impacted during the maintenance.
Corrective Actions: Narrative logs were updated, changes were made to OP/3/A/1107/014, Removal and Restoration of 4160V Switchgear and 600V Load Centers, and operator training requests were initiated regarding TS 3.7.16.
Corrective Action References: 2379921
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to track applicable technical specification LCOs as required by section 5.1.1.9 and 5.1.3.3 of AD-OP-ALL-0112, was a performance deficiency. This requirement was not satisfied because operators failed to identify and track LCO 3.7.16 during maintenance affecting the single active failure protection design basis of the Unit 3 CRACS.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, this failure was indicative of a weakness with the licensees implementation of the design basis of the CRACS, resulting in misapplication of TS and could have led to missed TS required actions if the vulnerability remained unrecognized.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was strictly an administrative requirement to track inoperable equipment and did not result in an actual degraded condition representing a loss of probabilistic risk assessment function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. In this case, on multiple occasions, the licensee identified CRACS single failure vulnerabilities in terms of plant operational risk but did not thoroughly evaluate the conditions relative to the systems design bases and TS operability.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1.a, Procedures, required, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities related to procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 1(h),
Administrative Procedures, required procedures addressing log entries, which was partially implemented by AD-OP-ALL-0112, Revision 0. AD-OP-ALL-0112, section 5.1.1.9 and 5.1.3.3, required, in part, that operators make log entries of entry and exit from TS LCOs. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to make operator narrative log entries for the entry and exit from TS LCO 3.7.16, Control Room Air Conditioning Systems, condition A on February 20, 2020.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 27, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Steven Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 11, 2021, the inspectors presented the Emergency Preparedness Program inspection results to Steven Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
OP/0/A/1600/005
SSF Normal Power
Calculations
OSC-10816
ONS TCCA A and B Area Basis for AD-EG-ALL-1520
005
Calculations
OSC-9314
NFPA 805 Transition Risk-Informed, Performance-Based
Fire Risk Evaluation
006
Calculations
OSC-9375
ONS Fire PRA - Fire Scenario Report
009
Calculations
OSC-9659
Oconee Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment for Units 1, 2
And 3
011
Drawings
O-0310-FZ-011
Fire Protection Plan Fire Area & Fire Zone Boundaries Plan
at EL. 796+6 &El. 797+6
Drawings
O-0310-FZ-013
Auxiliary Building - Unit 2 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area &
Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 809+3
Drawings
O-0310-K-011
Fire Protect Aux Building Unit 2 EL 809+3
Drawings
O-0310-K-09
Auxiliary Building & Reactor Building - Unit 3 Fire Protection
Plan & Fire Barrier, Flood, & Pressure Boundaries Plan at
EL. 796+6 &El. 797+6
Drawings
O-0310-L-001
Fire Protection Plan & Fire Barriers, Flood, & Pressure
Boundaries Plan at EL 775+0
Drawings
O-0310-S2-015
Unit 2 Cable Room Sprinkler System Plan
Drawings
O-0939
Electrical Equipment Layout Turbine Building Below El.
796+6 Column Line 21 to 27
Fire Plans
CSD-ONS-FS-
018
Standard Operating Guide 18 Pre-Fire Plans
Fire Plans
CSD-ONS-FS-
20
Standard Operating Guide 20 Key Equipment List by Fire
Zone
Fire Plans
CSD-ONS-PFP-
Pre-Fore Plan for U1 Turbine Building Elevation 775
Fire Plans
CSD-ONS-PFP-
Pre-Fire Plan for Auxiliary Building Elevation 796
000
Procedures
AD-EG-ALL-1520
Transient Combustible Control
Procedures
AD-EG-ALL-1540
Fire Protection Nuclear Capability Assessment (NSCA)
Procedures
AP/0/A/1700/025
Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure
71111.11Q Corrective Action
2378827
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Simulator Exercise Guide SAE-R290
71111.11Q Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-0111
Operations Communications
71111.11Q Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-1000
Conduct of Operations
71111.11Q Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-1001
Conduct of Abnormal Operations
71111.11Q Procedures
AD-OP-ONS-
0002
Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance
003
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/1/A/1700/002
Excessive RCS Leakage
017
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/1/A/1700/014
Loss of Normal HPI Makeup And/Or RCP Seal Injection
2
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/1/A/1700/020
Loss of Component Cooling
013
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/1/A/1700/029
Rapid Plant Shutdown
014
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/1/A/1700/034
Degraded Grid
014
71111.11Q Procedures
AP/2/A/1700/001
Unit Runback
016
71111.11Q Procedures
EP/1/A/1800/001
U-1 EOP Immediate Manual Actions and Subsequent
Actions
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/2/A/1104/004
Operation at Power
26
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/2/A/1106/002
Condensate and FDW System
170
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/2/A/1106/002
C
2
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/2/A/6102/002
Alarm Response Guide 2SA-02
033
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/2/A/6102/008
Alarm Response Guide 2SA-08
037
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/3/A/1103/004
Soluble Poison Control
119
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/3/A/1103/004
B
Purification IXs
015
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/3/A/1106/002
Condensate and FDW System
170
71111.11Q Procedures
OP/3/A/1106/002
C
016
71111.11Q Work Orders
20199467
Calculations
OSC-7966
EWST Inventory for Turbine Building Flood
Corrective Action
Documents
2336744, 2326989, 2342922, 2373981, 2374940, 2374947,
2381804, 2374947
Drawings
OFD-124C-1.8
Flow Diagram of High Pressure Service Water System
(Radwaste Facility Portion)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
20418874, 20459011
Corrective Action
Documents
2386259
Miscellaneous
Clearance PRT-0-21-C LPSW PUOOS-0080
Miscellaneous
Clearance PRT-0-21-EWST OOS-0094(1)
Miscellaneous
Clearance PRT-0-20-K1 OH OSS-0267
Miscellaneous
Phoenix Risk Assessment 21W15
Procedures
AD-SY-ONS-0201 Security Operations
Procedures
PO-SY-ONS-
22
Keowee Hydro Station Security
Procedures
PO-SY-ONS-
23
Post 23
Calculations
OSC-11343
Evaluation of MOV Motors and ETAP Inputs
Calculations
OSC-11581
U1/2/3 Keowee EPS and 100kV APS Voltage Adequacy
Analyses
Calculations
OSC-11956
Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test
Calculations
OSC-6146
Post-LOCA Reactor Building Cooling Unit Capacity
Calculations
OSC-6560
Acceptable Stroke Time for High Pressure Injection Throttle
Valves HP26 and HP27
Calculations
OSC-7183
Control Room Area Cooling System (CRACS) Single Failure
Analysis
Calculations
OSC-7608
U1/2/3, AC Power System ETAP Model Base File
Calculations
OSC-8064
ROTSG Long-Term Containment Response Following a
Large Break LOCA
Corrective Action
Documents
1787325
Calculations
OSC-10744
ONS RB Component Evaluations Under PSW Conceptual
Design Event Scenarios
Calculations
OSC-10785
GOTHIC Containment Analysis Utilizing the PSW System
Calculations
OSC-10821
Evaluation of RBCUs for Heat Removal During a PSW Event 3
Calculations
OSC-9855
LPI Drop Line Pressure Transient Analyses
Calculations
O-0423-AA
Alternate RBCU Cooling RBCU Hale Pump and Hose
Layout
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
OFD-124B-1.2
Flow Diagram of LPSW System RBCUs
Drawings
AM/0/A/3007/066
Abnormal Procedure for Installation and Removal of RBCU
Hale Pumps and Hoses
Procedures
AP/0/A/1700/051
Alternate Reactor Building Cooling
Procedures
Instrument Certification for OCPRF28810
April 29,
20
Miscellaneous
ONTC-1-124C-
0001-001
HPSW System Test Acceptance Criteria
Miscellaneous
OSC-5945
HPSW Pump and Fire Protection Flow Test Acceptance
Criteria
Miscellaneous
20474125
Work Orders
OSC-2515
Verification of Emergency Feedwater System Flow Utilizing
MFW System Bypass
Calculations
2378213
Corrective Action
Documents
KFD-101A-2.1
Flow Diagram of Turbine Guide Bearing Oil System
011
Drawings
ONTC-1-121D-
0001-001
Test Acceptance Criteria for Motor Driven EFW Pumps 1A &
1B
Drawings
CSD-EG-ONS-
1619.1000
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program
Document - Oconee Nuclear Station
005
Miscellaneous
OM-201-3538.001 Kubota GL 11000 Diesel Generator (10KW Output)
000
Miscellaneous
OM-201-3543.001 I/B - Instruction Manual for Caterpillar C15 Generator Set
003
Miscellaneous
OM-201-3544.001 I/B - Instruction Manual for Baldor DG6E Diesel Power
Products Generator
000
Miscellaneous
OSS-0254.00-00-
1041
Design Basis Specification for the Keowee Turbine
Generator Cooling Water (WL) System
2
Miscellaneous
OSS-0254.00-00-
1043
(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Keowee Turbine
Guide Bearing Oil (GBO) System
013
Miscellaneous
PT/2/A/2200/001
KHU-2 Bi-Weekly Surveillance
27
Procedures
PT/2/A/2200/011
KHU-2 Turbine Guide Bearing Oil System Surveillance
014
Procedures
PT/2/A/2200/022
KHU-2 Control Valve IST Surveillance
011
Procedures
20447397, 20455745, 20460499, 20447405
Work Orders
MSPI Basis Document
71151
Procedures
440279, 2371900, 1904745, 1812194, 1712759, 1764697
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
OM 2303-16
Elementary Schematic and Dev. Int. Diagram
Drawings
OM 2303-17
Elementary Schematic and Dev. Int. Diagram
Drawings
OM 2303-18
Elementary Schematic and Dev. Int. Diagram
Drawings
Clearance OPS-3-19-EL-3X6 LC PM-1125
Miscellaneous
Operator Narrative Logs dated February 20, 2020
Miscellaneous
PT/3/A/0610/001
L
Load Shed Channel Verification
Procedures
20324132