IR 05000348/1986015

Insp Repts 50-348/86-15 & 50-364/86-15 on 860711-0810. Violation Noted:Failure to Verify Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Flow Paths Prior to Entering Mode 2

ML20212Q055
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/19/1986
From:	Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212Q039	List: ML20212Q037 ML20212Q047 ML20212Q055
References
50-348-86-15, 50-364-86-15, NUDOCS 8609030392
Download: ML20212Q055 (7)

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>R RE T UNITED STATES

'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[" , REGION 18 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET. * * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/86-15 and 50-364/86-15 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 In;pection Conducted: July 11 - August 10, 1986 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspect s: VI.trv" C /

W. h. Bradford Date Signed w

7 M onsdr t Approved by: B.R<. / ( )b H' C. Dance, Vection Chief

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Da/eSigned fd I Dgte Sfgned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, onsite inspection included monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, and followup of plant event .

Results: One violation was identified - Failure to; verify auxiliary feedwater system flow paths prior to entering Mode PDR ADOCK 05000340 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

, Licensee Employees Contacted J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager B. Moore Operations Supervisor J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview

> The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management inter-views throughout the report period and on August 11, 1986, with the general

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plant manager and sele:ted members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspecte . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed technical specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test' instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualifie The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

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STP-80.1 - Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Tes STP-8 Diesel Generator IC Operability Tes STP-33.0B - Solid State Protection System Train S Operability Tes STP-2 A.C. Source Verificatio STP-3 Unit Start-up Technical Specification Verificatio UDP- Start-up Of Unit Following An At Power Reactor Tri UDP- Shutdown Of Unit From Minimum Load To Hot _ Standb UDP- Shutdown Of Unit From Hot Standby To Coid Shutdow UDP- Start-up Of Unit From Cold Shutdown To Hot Standb On August 4, 1986, the licensee discovered Unit 1 Fire Protection Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems surveillance requirements of Technical Specifica-tion (TS) requirements 4.7.11.2.C.2 and 4.7.11.2.C.3 had not been completed on tim The Unit 1 surveillance schedule had been signed off to show completion of the required surveillance test procedure (STP), FNP-1-STP 626.0,when only a partial STP had been complete The licensee immediately declared all technical specification related clappers inoperable and stationed appropriate fire watche Mechanical maintenance completed the surveillance requirements and the system was returned to normal. This is considered to be an isolated even Inasmucn as this was licensee identified, cor rected promptly and was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have' been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation, a Notice of Violation will not be issued in accordance with the NRC enforcement criteri No other violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and i were in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from s service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;

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functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning i cot ponents or systems to service; quality control records were maintained;

! activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials

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were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;

and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed

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to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system

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performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzer Repairs 2C -

Charging Pump Rotor Replacement 28 -

Charging Pump Motor Replacement DG-10 -

Breaker (2B Motor Driven AFW Pump) Preventive Maintenance 1A -

Charging Pump Rotor Replacement Unit 2 -

Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers Troubleshooting IB&lC -

Charging Pump Gear Reducer 011 Coolers Fowling No violations or deviations were identifie . Operctional Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Cunditions for Opera-tions (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed as events occurre The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problem The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures

! were followe On July 22, during a technical specification verification start-up of Unit 2

! activities on July 12, 1986 following a cold shutdown, the inspector found Auxiliary Feedwater System surveillance requirement TS 4.7.1.2.2d had not been met prior to entry into Mode 2. This is a violation (364/86-15-01).

At the time of the inspection Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 6% power. The tech-nical specification surveillance requirement directs the licensee to demonstrate the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system prior to entry into Mode 2 following each cold shutdown by performing a flow test to verify the normal flow path from the condensate storage tank through each auxiliary feedwater pump to its associated stem generator. The licensee immediately corrected the error by performing the necessary surveillance test (FNP-2-STP 22. 19).

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4 Follow-up of Plant Events (93702) On August 1, at about 12:30 p.m. , with Unit 1 at 99% reactor power, while performing Unit 2 Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 24.2 " Service Water Pumps C, D, and E Inservice Test" (This STP changes service water flow and pressures), a charging pump lube oil high temperature alarm was received in the control roo Local lube oil temperature and reduction gear temperature on the IB charging pump (the in service pump) was monitored. Lube oil temperature was remaining constant, and reduction gear temperature was slowly increasing. At 12:38 p.m., with 155F reduction gear oil temperature, the IB charging pump was secured and the 1C charging pump was placed in service. Licensee procedures require the charging pump be secured at oil temperature of 160F. A 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was initiated on the IB charging pump, [ Note: 1A charging pump was tagged out for maintenance and could not be placed in service.]

At 12:10 p.m. , the reduction gear oil temperature on 1C charging pump had risen to 153F. Emergency measures were immediately taken to cool the 1C charging pump reduction gear oil cooler by placing ice on the cooler, running demineralized water over the cooler, and increasing air circulation in the charging pump room. 1C reduction gear oil temperature stabilized when the;e emergency measures were taken. 1C charging pump was also declared inoperable placing the plant under section 3.0.3 of the Technical Specifications at 1:35 p.m. Rampdown of Unit I was commenced. Power was reduced to about 30% power and held at that leve B charging pump was restored to operable status at 4:30 p.m., following cleaning and flushing of the lube oil cooler and associated piping. A significant amount of mud was removed from the IB cooler during the flushin Unit 1 was now placed back under the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 with one charging pump operabl Following the return of IB charging pum; '.a service the 1C charging pump was secured and its cooler was cleened and lines flushed. A large number of small Asiatic clams along wi.h a significant amount of mud i was removed from f e cooler. 1C charging pump was restored to operable status and the charging pump LCO cleared. Oil temperatures were

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monitored throughout the evening. Unit I was ramped up on the morning i of August The licensee believes that the performance of STP 24.2 and the pressure increase required in the service water system for performance of the STP and resulting flow increase may have dislodged mud and clams from low velocity sections of the syste The licensee is following up on the charging pump problem and has formed a task force to generate recommendations to prevent recurrence of the problem.

I The resident inspectors followed this event and discussions between licensee and regional management occurred following the power reduction to assure the service water system was operabl .

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b. A Unit 2 reactor trip occurred at 12:39 p.m., on August 4, while performing Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) FNP-2-STP-22.0A, Solid State Protection System Train "A" Operability Test. Earlier both Unit 2 reactor trip bypass breakers had been racked out to troubleshoot why

"A" bypass would not close during the performance of the STP. The "UV Block Bypass" pushbutton had malfunctioned, not letting voltage get to the UV coil, and as a result the "A" train bypass breaker would not close. The pushbutton was repaired, the bypass breakers were racked in, and surveillance testing was resume As STP 33.0 specified in a series of procedural steps, "A" bypass breaker was closed, reopened and reclosed. When attempting to trip "A" bypass breaker using the "UV Block Bypass" pushbutton, the reactor trip breakers opened in addition to the "A" train reactor trip bypass breake Investigation by th- licensee revealed that both "A" and "B" trains momentarily had Solid State Protection System (SSPS) general warning alarms when the "A" bypass breaker was opened. The "A" train of the SSPS had a preplanned general warning alarm when the "A" bypass breaker was closed as part of the STP. It was believed by the licensee and proven within a reasonable doubt that the "B" train of SSPS received a general warning signal upon the mechanical opening of the "A" bypass breaker. The opening of the "b" contact in the "B" bypass breaker dropped out a relay in SSPS to give a "B" train general warning alar The reactor tripped when both trains momentarily had general warning alarms. The licensee replaced disconnect blocks in the "B" bypass breaker to correct the contact problem in addition to replacing dis-connect blocks in the "A" bypass breaker and "A" and "B" train reactor trip breaker All systems functioned as designed following the tri Unit 2 was returned to power operation on August 5, 198 c. On August 5, at 9:05 p.m. , Unit 1 tripped from 99% power on a low steam generator level coincident with steam flow greater than feed flow. The trip was caused by failure of a card in the Steam Generator Water Level Control circuitry causing the closure of the 1C feed regulating valve. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed following the reactor trip on a low low Tavg and steam flow greater than 40%. The protection system sensed a large steam flow on one steam generator because a high steam flow bistable was locked in due to testing. All systems functioned as designed. The unit returned to power operation on August d. On July 17, the licensee decided to shutdown Unit 2. Two of the three charging pumps were inoperable and a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was in force. 2C charging pump had been placed out of service for replacement of the l rotating assembly. 28 charging pump motor failed on an electrical

! ground on July 17. The 2C charging pump was returned to service and

Unit 2 returned to power operation on July 21. The 2B charging pump is I still out of service pending repair of the charging pump moto __ . .

6 During this reporting period the if censee made three 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports, one report regarding accidental actuation of the Unit 1 penetration room filtration system and two reports regarding inadvertent control

, room chlorine detector alarms which caused control room ventilation isolatio '.

! No violations or deviations were identified.

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j 8. Licensee Plans For Coping With Strikes (92709)

i l The licensee strike plan was revlewed since contract negotiations are j currently in progres The review verified:

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The minimum number of qualified and proficient personnel are available j to ensure proper plant operation and safet The contents of the plant strike plan are consistent with and meet j regulatory requirement Plant security will be maintained at a level consistant with proper l

plant integrity and operatio I

The inspector had no further question I

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