IR 05000348/1988008
| ML20151W377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1988 |
| From: | Bradford W, Dance H, Miller W, Moore P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W365 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-88-08, 50-348-88-8, 50-364-88-08, 50-364-88-8, NUDOCS 8805030384 | |
| Download: ML20151W377 (9) | |
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UNIT ED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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Report Nos.: 50-348/88-08 and 50<364/88-08 f
Licensee:
Alabama Power Company 600 North-18th Street
Birmingham, AL - 36291
- Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March II, through April 10, 1988
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Inspection at Farley ite ea 0 than, Alabama Inspefors:
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W.'H.., Bra ford Date Signed
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WJ H. Mill (r Date Signed
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Contributin
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20/97 Inspect
.B. Moore,beWtorInspector(April 6-8,1988)
06te Signed l
i Oper onal Pr gram Section Approved by:
W
/f Dr te Signed
H. C. Danc(, Section Chief a
Division of Reactor Projects i
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine onsite inspection involved a review of monthly j
surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety i
verification, engineered safety system inspection, radiological protection i
program, physical security program and review of emergency operating procedures.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8005030304 880428 PDR ADOCK 05000348 Q
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REP 0kT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Explayees Contacted J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
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J. K. Osterheltz, Unit Supervisor, Administrative L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R
H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor
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L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager
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S. Fulcei', Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review
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Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection tcope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on April 8,1988, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspection during this inspection.
3.
Liccnsee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) This area was not inspected.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met, test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel, and personnel conducting the test were qualified.
Portions of the following test activities were observed or reviewed by the inspectors:
2-STP-4.9 Charging Pump 2C Monthly Operability Check 2-STP-11.10 RHR 2B Monthly Operability Test
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2-STP-16.8 Containment Spray Pump 2A Monthly Test 1-STP-18.5 Containment Mini-Purge and Exhaust Valve Inservice Test 2-STP-20.0 Penetration Room Filtration System Train A Quarterly Operability and Valve Inservice Test 2-STP-21.1 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Inservice Test 1-STP-22.18 Auxiliary Feed Automatic Valve Position Verification 0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test 0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 1C Operability Test 1-STP-256.8 Steam Generator Water Level Response Time Test (LT-475, LT-485 and LT-495)
2-STP-302.0 AMSAC Functional Test 1-STP-610.1 Snubber Functional Test (Snubber CS2-R134)
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
~ d systems and components Station maintenance activities of safety-relt e
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with TS.
Items considered during the review included: verification that limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; approved procedures were used; completed work was inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and, radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were also reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
MWR 149100B Repair oil leak on diesel generator 1-2A MWR 150417A Repair oil leak on diesel generator 1-2A MWR 150720 Replace motor and pump for service water pump 1C MWR 157483 Replace 2 inch and smaller carbon steel pipe to and from battery room 1A charging room cooler KdR 161669 Replace motor driven auxiliary feedwater system discharge check valve MWR 162174 Repairs to "B" train control room fire dampers MWR 164982 Support sand jetting on service water pioing t, and from 600V load center 1E room cooler MWR 167100 Test thermal overload of breaker FV-Y2 auxiliary feedwater pump discharge valve 3764C MWR 174465 Inspect pole shaft welds and cam alignment on breaker EC-12, containment cooler 10 high speed fan MWR 175134 Repair to "A" train control room fire dampers
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0-50P-0.6 Limitorque MOV Lubrication and Valve Steam inspection (MOW Nos. 3393 and 3394)
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2-SOP-7.1 RHR 2B Lube Procedure i
0-SOP-9.1 Containment Spray Pump (28) Lube Schedule
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0-MP-28.194 GE 4.16 KV Circuit Breaker (Breaker 08-01)
1-MP-3100 Replacement of Installed Auxiliary Building Train
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Batteries (HWR 137541)
On April 7, 1988 the inspectors noted that the service water piping on the
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121' elevation to the 600V IE load center room cooler had been dis-
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connected from the room cooler and disconnected from the large supply and return piping on the 100' elevation of the auxiliary building.
Neither the open piping on the 100' and 121' elevations nor the open piping to the room cooler were protected to meet the class "C" system requirements of procedure FNP-0-AP-44.0, Cleanliness of Fluid Systems and i
Associated Components, as stipulated on KdR 164982. At about the same l
time on April 7 the licensee also identified portions of the service water
i system which were open due to construction activities. To prevent future
problems the licensee has initiated action to require system engineers to
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instruct the craft personnel on the importance of following all of the instructions on the-work requests (HWR's).
This will include the clean-
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liness requirements for piping systems. This violation of station proce-dures meets the NRC guidelines for licensee identified violation and j
therefore no citation will be made.
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No other violations or deviations were identified, j
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report
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period. Also, the operability of selected emergency systems was verified,
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tagout records were reviewed and prcper return to service of affected components was verified.
Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel
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building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to
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observe plant equipment conditions, including f'.uid leaks and excessive
vibrations and general housekeeping efforts.
The inspectors verified
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_ compliance with selected limiting condition for operation (LCO) and results of s el e c te.d surveillance tests.
The verifications were
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accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve
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positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of
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completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance
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with LCO action statements was reviewed as events occurred.
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t The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, l
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shift foremen and licensed operators.
These meeting and discussions l
provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing i
activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.
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Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Handswitch On April 6, 1988 during a tour of Unit 1 auxiliary building the resident inspector observed a handswitch for Unit 1
"B" steam generator blowdown valve A0V-7693B taped in the open position. This switch is located on a local panel. A systems operator was stationed directly in front of the panel to close the valve when notified.
Investigation indicates that the systems operator at the hand switch was an extra operator who was sent down to the switch while the regular operator could perform his routine duties.
The regular operator had received telephone instructions via the reactor operator from the shif t supervisor to open the valve and that a relief operator was on the way. The regular operator asked if he could tape the hand switch open. He was instructed not to tape the switch open.
The valve had to be held open because of a seal in contact in the closed circuit.
The extra operator may not have received instructions or may have misinterpreted the instructions and tape was placed on the hand switch.
The steam generator blowdown system is
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not a safety system; the operator who taped the switch was stationed
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directly at the panel to release the switch when notified and the unit was in a refueling outage with the core unloaded. The inspectors consider this to be an isolated event. To prevent future occurrences the licensee has issued written instructions to all operations personnel stressing the importance of following management verbal and written instructions, b.
Supply Fan for Containment Purge System Out of Service The containment purge system is designed to maintain containment atmosphere to permit safe and continuous access to the containment.
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The purge system contains a supply f an and an exhaust fan.
On March 30, 19SS the supply fan became inoperative due to damaged drive shaft and fan blades caused by a fan bearing failure. The licensee performed a safety evaluation, minor departure No. 88-1962, for operating the purge system without the supply fan.
The evaluation found that operating the purge system without the supply fan resulted in the elimination of prefiltering and heating functions which are not a safety concern but would require an alternate air supply.
Since the normal outside air supply was not available, the alternate supply was obtained by removing access doors and duct sections from the purge supply duct in the penetration rooms from which the purge exhaust fan could take suction. Doors to these areas were opened to aid in the air supply. Security guards and fire watches were posted
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as necessary to meet the required security and fire protection requirements.
The system dampers remain operable and the removed duct access covers can be replaced if penetration room integrity is required.
The inspectors have reviewed the licensee departure measures and verified their implementation.
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Gas Release On March 25 and 26, 1988 at 2:19 p.m.
and 7:50 a.n. respectively radiation monitors R-14 and R-22 in the Unit 1 plant vent stack went into high alarm.
Calculations by the licensee indicated that the release rates at site boundry were: March 25, 4.42 E-5 Rem /Hr total noble gee and 3.4 E-6 Rem /Hr total iodino dose rate; and, March 26, 1.03 E-5 Rem /Hr total noble gas and 2.37 E-6 Rem /Hr iodine dose rate.
The dose rate required for an emergency classification is a dose rate greater than 5.7 E-5 Rem /Hr noble gas or 1.7 E-4 Rem /Hr airborn radioiodine and particulates.
Therefore, these events were not required to be reported to the NRC. The licensee is evaluating these events to determine the cause of the release and Incident Report Nos.
1-88-93 and 1-88-94 have been prepared. The inspectors reviewed this event and assigned the event to the Region 11 staff for further evaluation.
This event will be discussed further in Report No. 348, 364/88-10.
No violations or deviations were identified 7.
Radiological Protection Program (71709)
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Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirement.
The areas reviewed included:
organization and management of the plant's health physics staff,
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implementation, Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of vadioactive materials.
t On March 29, 1988 at approximately 12:50 p.m.
a nuclear helper became unconscious apparently suffering from heat stress while performing work in the spent fuel pool room.
Upon investigation it was also found that the individual's hair was contaminated to approximately 30,000 dpm.
She was taken to Southeast Alabama Medical Center by the licensee's ambulance where she was decontaminated, treated and released to return to work. A
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Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 1:00 p.m. due to the transporting of a contaminated injured individual to a medical f acility.
The NOUE was terminated at 3:25 p.m.
The inspectors reviewed this event and verified that the licensee followed the appropriate notification and emergency procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Physical Security Program (71881)
Licensee's compliance to the approved security plan was reviewed by the
inspectors.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews with
security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the f acility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included:
organization of the security force, establishment and
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maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones, access control, and badging procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
. Natural Circulation Cooldown (25586)
A region based inspector reviewed the licensees actions to implement the requirements of Generic Letter 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown.
This review included the following documents:
FNP-1-ESP-0.2, Rev. 4, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding; FNP-1-ESP-0-4, Rev. 5, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding; FNP-1-ESP-1,1, Rev. 4, SI Termination; FNP-2-EST-0-2, Rev. 4, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding;
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FNP-2-ESP-1.1, Rev. 5, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding;
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FNP-2-ESP-1,1, Rev. 5, SI Termination; FNP-0-AP-74 Rev. 2 Development and Maintenance of t' ops; Emergency Procedures Lesson Plan, E-0 Series ERPs, Loss of all A/C c
Power, OPS-523028 (LRP-88), dated 04-88; Initial License Simulator Training, OPS-525, Emergency Operations, OPS-52504, week 6 day 3, dated 04-87; Natural Circulation, OPS-30913B, dated 07-85.
In addition, the inspector reviewed justification documentation for the aforementioned ESPs as well as licensed operator initial, requalification, and simulator training records.
A review of the Unit 1 ESPs indicated that they closely followed the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS). The documentation justification was complete and went as far as to Cocument
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each step whether or not there was a significant deviation from the ERGS.
The Unit 2 ESPs differed from the Unit 1 ESPs in two areas. First was the
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addition of core exit thermocouples and the inadequate core cooling monitoring system made during a previous Unit 2 outage. This provided for more accurate temperature readings and was reflected on the foldout page for subcooling margin and SI criteria. Second was that the order of the performance of the steps in FNP-2-0.2, Rev. 4, differed from those in the WOG ERG and the Unit 1 procedure. A careful review revealed that all i
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appropriate actions required by the ERG were covered in the Unit 2 procedure. The licensee indicated that the Unit 2 procedure is to be revised in the near future to more closely reflect the order of the steps
in the ERG and to provide congruence with the Unit 1 procedure. The Unit 1 procedure will be revised to reflect the installation of the core exit
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thermocouples and inadequate core cooling monitoring system during the current outage.
The recent installation of a Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) will be reflected by the generation of procedures that conform with the WOG ERG ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with S*.eam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS). The RVLIS as well as the core exit theraoccuple have already been installed on the simulator and operators have received training on the system.
Training for licensed' operators includes both classroom and simulator training for Natural Circulation Cooldown. It is includea in initial and requalification training for R0s and SR0s. The training includes the St.
Lucie event from which the Generic Letter was generated. Operators are required to perform a Natural Circulation Cooldown on the simulator on a i
yearly basis.
A review of training records of all licensed operators
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demonstrated that they had received the required training in both the
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classroom and the simulator.
Interviews were conducted with three licensed operators on the topic of Natural Circulation Cooldown. The inspector specifically asked questions on items that were identified in the justification documentation as being operator knowledge.
The interviews revealed no shortcomings in the abilities of the operators in this area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Compliance With ATWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62 - Unit 2 (TI 2500/20)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the ATWs rule, 10 CFR 50.62, and of the ef fectiveness of the QA controls applied to the installation of the equipment required to be installed but which were not safety related.
Alabama Power Company participated in the Westinghouse Owners Group Generic Design Program to meet the ATWs rule. This resulted in the design j
of a system, ATWS Mitigating Scram Activation Circuitry (AMSAC), which
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upon low-low (5*.) water level in two out of three steam generators, when turbine power is greater than 40%, will cause a turbine trip and actuation of all three auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The installation of this system
was completed for Unit 2 during the fif th refueling outage of October -
l December 1987. The system for Unit 1 is to be completed during the eighth
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refueling outage of March - May 1988.
AMSAC receives input from three steam generator level transmitters and two (
turbine pressure transmitters, receives power from an AMSAC l
uninterruptable power source, and transmits an output to start the
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auxiliary feedwater pumps, trip the turbine, and close the steam blowdcwn i
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and sample lines.
The inspectors conducted a walkdown inspection of the system and verified that the components were installed as indicated on the construction documents (PCN B-86-2-3837 and B-86-2-3839). Portions of the applicable completed work requests were reviewed to verify that the systems were installed under a QC program which required that the system installation be verified by an independent inspector.
The cor.:pleted system was functionally tested by MWR 149780 (2-PMP-1056) and 2-STP-302 QA, AMSAC Functional Test.
The system is operational and in service except for control room trouble annunciator light E-35 on the main control board.
This light has been disconnected due to an oscillating signal input from steam generator LT-473 which is greater than the consistency limits of the computer software.
Westinghouse is to provide the necessary modifications to correct this problem.
This item is addressed by licensee's minor departure 88-1313 and is being tracked by operations as an administrative LCO.
Until the modifications are implemented, the system is being monitored twice per week to verify that the operational trip functions ar?
being maintained coerational.
Existing procedure 2-SOP-36.4, 120V AC Distribution System has been implemented to verify electrical power is maintained to the AMSAC System and a procedure has been written to test and verify that the computer functions of the system are operation.
However, the following items are not yet covered by procedures:
Functional testing of the actuation signals.
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Maintenance and tests of the power system.
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Calibration cf turbine pressure transmitters PT-2446 and PT-2447.
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Four of the five operation shifts have received training on the AMSAC System.
The remaining shift crew and other operation employees are scheduled to receive this training by April 15.
The computer services group who maintain the system have received training on system function and hardware maintenance. The licensee commitment was to have the AMSAC operational in Unit 2 by the sixth refueling outage which is scheduled for March 1939. However, this system was insta led during the past outage and the required procedures are being prepared.
The NRC staff (NRR) are still reviewing the AMSAC Design for Farley and are scheduled to issue a SER in December 1933.
The inspectors will continue to review the licensee's completion of the AMSAC installation and will verify system operability during the normal resident inspection program. This item will remain open until issuance of the SER on the AMSAC system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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