IR 05000348/1986006

Insp Rept 50-348/86-06 & 50-364/86-06 on 860311-0410.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Enforcement Matters,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observation,Operational Safety Verification & LERs

ML20203N645
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	04/22/1986
From:	Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203N644	List: IR 05000348/1986006 ML20203N642
References
50-348-86-06, 50-348-86-6, 50-364-86-06, 50-364-86-6, NUDOCS 8605050577
Download: ML20203N645 (6)

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APR 2.* 1986

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Report Nos.: 50-348/86-06 and 50-364/86-06 4,

Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 11 - April 10, 1986 InspectionatliarleysitenearDothan, Alabama j Inspect rs: '

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/ B. R 'onser Date Signed Approved by: i e W -

AA H. C. Dance, Sehtion Chief Da'te Sfgned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 140 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, and licensee event report Results; No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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j-i . REPORT DETAILS 4 Licensee Employees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager j 0. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager

) R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent

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L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent J. E. Odom,. Operations Sector Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Sepervi',or J. B. Hudspeth, Document Ccntrol Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor

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J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office j personnel.

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! Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management 1 interviews throughout the report period and on April 10, 1986, with the general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection

, findings were discussed in detai The licensee did not identify as i proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

1 Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 348/85-17-02, Failure- to adequately describe work a sequence and changing work sequence on MWR-107514. Based on the licensee letter of response dated May 20, 1985, and a review of the corrective action, this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 348/84-23-03, Special Radiation Work Permit in SFP

Area. This item is closed based on the. stipulation in the Special Radiation Work Permit which allows the health physics technician to change protective

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clothing requirements as radiological conditions chang '

t (Closed) Unresolved Item 348, 364/85-44-02, Hydrogen analyzers out of

, tolerance. S'e paragraph 7 for details.

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2 Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; ,

that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualifie The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

STP-11 Moderate Temperature Coefficient Determination for C B

~<300 pp STP-1 RHR Valves Inservice Tes STP-22.16 -

T.D.A.F Pump Inservice Tes STP- RCP Seal Controlled Leakage Tes STP- Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirement STP-3 Safeguards Test Cabinet Train A Functional Tes STP-3 Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Tes STP-33.0B -

Solid State Protection System Train B Operability Tes STP-158 -

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leak <

Tes STP-1 Residual Heat Removal System Check Valves Inservice Tes No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with Technical specification The folicwing items were considered during the review: ' limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Adjustment of proximity switches on unit 2 fuel transfer mechanis A RHR bypass valve A0V-605A repai A containment spray pump breake V ACB inspectio service water pump replacemen Control rod drive containment electrical penetration repai Inverter maintenanc Service water battery modificatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, r: viewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. The inspectors verified the operability of ' selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveil-lance tests. The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed as events occurre The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen and licensed operator These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operating, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problem The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures were followe No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriat Licensee action, with respect to selected reports, were reviewed to verify that the event had been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specification; that corrective action was taken by the

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licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceede The inspector examined selected incident reports, logs and records and interviewed selected personnel. The following reports are considered closed:

Unit I LER-86-02 -

Technical Specification Action Statements not met when A and B Train Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzers on both

.i units were inoperable.

j Unit 2 LER-86-02 -

Both Post Accident H2 Analyzers inoperable due to '

missing tubin i

! In January 1986, during preventive maintenance and a maintenance and design 1

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review initiated by the licensee on the Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzers it

was noted that the reagent gas was not being admitted during containment sampling (Ref

Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/85-44 and 50-364/85-44.). At i the time, it was believed by the licensee that failure to admit reagent gas ,

during containment sampling was an error and that this error caused the '

analyzers to be calibrated incorrectly. The internal wiring of the analyzers

' was changed, upon incorrect recommendation of the vendor engineering staff, to admit the reagent gas during sampling. The Unit 1 Hydrogen Analyzers were modified on 1/25/86 and the Unit 2 analyzers were modified on 1/26/8 It was not recognized at the time that reagent gas flow in the sample mode

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was being compensated for during calibration. The licensee subsequently

? discovered that the design change was not necessary and that the analyzer would read low by a factor of 0.8 Thus, the analyzers had been out of tolerance since the implementation of the design change in late January.

TS 3.6.4.1 requires the monitors to be operabl Following discovery of the error on 2/14/86, the analyzers were restored to their original configuration and functionally tested for proper flow during

all modes of operation. All analyzers except the Unit 2B train analyzer

< were declared operable on 2/15/86. The Unit 2B train analyzer was declared operable at on 2/16/86.

. This event was a result of a misunderstanding of analyzer operation and an incorrect recommendation from the equipment vendor and an incorrect

determination by the licensee that a design change was necessary. The i licensee, however, while reviewing the as found conditions for reportability discovered the design change was not necessary and promptly restored the hydrogen analyzers to their original configuration. The licensee has also formed a task force to review the hydrogen analyzer design, application, documentation and maintenance.

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The health and safety of the public was not affected by this event because the post accident hydrogen analyzers are needed only after a loss of reactor coolant accident. Alternate sampling capabilities were available should the :

analyzers have been determined to be inoperable during an acciden Inoperability of the H2 analyzers is a violatio However, a notice of violation will not be issued to the licensee in that the criteria in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C were me The violation was identified by the licensee, it fits Severity Level IV or V, it was reported through an LER, measures were taken to correct the problem and prevent reoccurrence, and it was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensees corrective action for a previous violation. This item was identified as an unresolved itvim on inspection report 50-348/85-44 and 50-364/85-44. Information Meeting With Local Officials On March 11,1986 at 1:30 p.m., the resident inspectors and H. C. Dance of Region II met with Ashford Mayor Roy J. Hobb and other council members in Ashford to reestablish a communications link and to discuss mutual ir,terests.