IR 05000348/1986020

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Insp Repts 50-348/86-20 & 50-364/86-20 on 861011-1110.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Surveillance Observation,Monthly Maint Observation, Operational Safety Verification & Unit 1 Refueling Outage
ML20214V272
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/26/1986
From: Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V264 List:
References
50-348-86-20, 50-364-86-20, NUDOCS 8612090602
Download: ML20214V272 (7)


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.. [>R CE o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y n REGION 11 g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 'e , ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-364/86-20 a'nd 50-364/86-20 Licensee: Alabama P.ower Company

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600 North 18th Street'

Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket No'.: 50-364 License No.: NPF-8 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 11 - November 10, 1986 Inspection at F riey site near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors: ,

o  !!Date N J/Signed trL W. H Bradford ll ft$

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H. C. Dance, Section Chief Ddte Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, onsite inspection entailed, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, and Unit I refueling outag Results: There were no violations or deviations identifie .

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861209060'2 861128 PDR ADOCK 05000348

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REPORT-DETAILS

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. . Licensee Employees-Contacted:

4- J. D..Woodard, General Plant Manage D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D.-Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager -

R. D. Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager  :

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

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B. Moore, Operations Supervisor.

4 J. E. Odom,. Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor

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T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor

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J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

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L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor

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R. H. Marlow, Technical. Supervisor

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, L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager

! J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

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0ther licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, ' maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne ,

2 Exit Interview

. The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

. interviews throughout the report period and on November 11, 1986, with the

! general plant mae.ager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee did not identify as

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proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

! ' Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

h L Monthly' Surveillance Observation (61726)

!' 'The inspectors ooserved and reviewed Technical Specification required l . surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance

.with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that
' limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test;

that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and ' resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualified. The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities: ,

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> .STP-33.1A -

Safeguards Test Cabinet Train "A" Functional Test STP-2 "B" Tra'in Control Room Ventilation System Operational Test <

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'STP-16.10 -

Containment', Spray System Check Valve Flow Test A-Train

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STP-160-14 ' Main Steam, Main Feed Water, Auxiliary Feed Water, S/G Blow Down and Chemical Injection - Loop C. Inservice

. Hydrostatic Test

,STP- Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirement

~STP-7 TechnicalSpecificatfon'ValveSurveillance No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) .

Station maintenance activities of safety,-related system's and components were

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observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with s

approved procedures, regulatory , guides, industry codes and '

standards, and J, were in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were conside[ed during the review: limiting conditions for operations were met while compohents or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained priorrto initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved ' procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Unit I reactor vessel level measurement system -

reactor vessel modifications (PCN's-85-1-3133, 3135, 3137, 3194)

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Local leak rate testing of containment electrical penetrations

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Unit 1 charging pumps piping modifications (PCN-86-1-3763)

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Unit 1 environmental qualification inspections of qualified motor operated valve operators (MOV) per 1EN-86-03 s

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. MOV - 3131 - RCP motor cooling discharge (MWR-154787)

MOV - 8808A - Accumulator tank 1A discharge valve (MWR-154737) i MOV .8812A --RHR containment Sump and Suction.(MWR-154713)

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MOV -L 8131A - Charging pump suction header (MWR-1554754)

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Service water small diameter piping-inspection;(PCN-84-1-2914)

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"MSIV test cylinders (PCN 84-1-2643) '

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SPDS hardware installation (PCN 84-1-2719)

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' Reroute control cable-for PCV-444B (PCN-85-1-3205)

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Containment spray check valve test line (PCN-85-1-3350) ,

-: Cooling of 7300 process cabinets (PCN-86-1-3754)

~ During this Unit I refueling outage the licensee discovered three incidents Lin which the -wrong coils had been installed in solenoid valves. These incidents are as follows:

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'On October 21, 1986 the . solenoid valves were replaced on A, B, and C -

Steam Generator blow-down valves. The-valves failed to' operate due to

! blown fuses in: the control circuits. Investigation revealed that AC r coils had been installed instead of DC coils.

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On October 25, 1986 the solenoid valve was replaced on CCW to excess

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letdown heat exchanger. valve HV-3095. This valve. subsequently failed

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to operate because an AC coil in place of a DC coil had been installed.

t - - On October 21, 1986 the solenoid valve was replaced on containment cooling valve HV 3999A. The replacement valve had a DC coil instead of c the proper AC coil.

is Investigation revealed that the solenoid valves procured from the store room L had the proper documentation and were direct replacement parts with correct .

part numbers. However, the white tag packaged with the valve contained-different information than the name plates on the units. The' technicians .

failed to recognize thi The store room found that if no voltage was

- specified when the solenoid valves were reordered that ASCO provides a 120 .

VAC/60 Hz coil only. The licensee has initiated corrective action which  !

consists of store ' room investigation of each. solenoid valve in stock for '

proper voltage identification when reordering; a training program for I&C and electrical maintenance personnel which stresses proper verification of

solenoid valve replacements, and since the part number does not identify l' coil voltage, electrical drawings mest be consulted to verify that the . electrical circuits agree with the coil replacemen In case of

, . questionable. valve nomenclature, the foreman must be notifie In as much

! as this installation error was licensee identified, was corrected promptly L *

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with measures to prevent recurrence and was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation, a notice of violation will not be issue The inspectors had no further question . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and . conducted discussions with control room operations during the report period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifi-cations were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumenta-tion, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry result The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed as events occurre The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed variou- .hift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen and licensed operator These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problem The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures were followe No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow up of Plant Events (93702)

During the Unit I refueling outage the "B" service water train had been tagged out and drained. The "A" train remained in service. Various modi-fications were being made to the system which included change out of certain 2 inch and under carbon steel piping to stainless steel; change out of service water cooling to CCW for cooling to the charging pumps gear oil coolers; certain large diameter service water piping was opened for inspection of clams; and certain heat exchangers were opened for inspection of clams and cleanliness.

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On October 15, 1986,-at 4i30 p.m., a large amount of water started pouring out of the service water. piping openings into the Unit 1 component cooling water pump room. Water also poured out of the service' water openings in the rad side of the auxiliary building. 'The amount of water was estimated to be in excess of 50,000 gallon ~

The licensee initiated immediate corrective action to stop 'the flow of water by closing certain valves in the "B" service water system and to ascertain if a valve between "A" and "B" trains had started to leak. The Unit 1 Shift' Supervisor had the "A" train ' service water pumps shut down and immediately. initiated priorities to restore the "A" train to service as soon

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as possible. - The licensee utilized FNP-1-A-A0P-10.0 " Loss of Train "A" OR

"B" Service Water".

The licensee determined that water entrained in a large loop seal downstream of the discharge valves of the service water pumps was responsible for the flooding. Service water was restored by "A" service water train at 6:31 There were no further leaks reported and all systems were returned to normal operatio The control . room air conditioning is supplied from Unit 1 service wate The licensee. declared a LC0 and started ramping laad down on Unit-2 in preparation for going into hot-stand by. mode. When the service water was restored, the LCO was cleared and the unit returned to full power operatio . Cooling water to Unit I spent fuel coolers was off during this time. Spent

. fuel pool temperature was 100*F at- the start and increased to 126*F before service water was restore The. water 'in the component cooling water pump room was not contaminated l

ant. was pumped via sump pumps to turbine building sumps and to discharg The water on the floors of the rad side of the auxiliary building was stored in tanks until it could be sampled, treated and release The licensee response to the incident was good and demonstrated proficiency in their knowledge of the plant. No violations or deviations were identifie No violations or deviations were identifie . Refueling Activities (60710)

The inspectors witnessed refueling activities of Farley Unit The inspectors observed these activities from the control room, reactor building and spent fuel pool to verify that activities were being accomplished in accordance with TS, license conditions, and NRC requirement The inspectors observed the refueling to verify the following: Direct communication was established between the control room and reactor buildin E

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6 Staffing requirements were in accordance with T Control of personnel access to the spent fuel pool areas was establishe Changes to procedures were made in accordance with administrative procedure The licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling area Radiological control were maintained in accordance with approved procedure Appropriate procedure steps and QA hold points were signed of The 10 year In Service Inspection (ISI) was scheduled for the reactor vessel during this outag The lifting rig used to lift the upper and lower internals was damaged while attempting to lift the lower internals. This lift was not accomplished. The ISI of the reactor vessel has been delayed until the next refueling outage. The licensee repaired the lifting rig and set the reactor vessel upper internal No violations or deviations identified.

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