IR 05000348/1986029
| ML20210C524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1987 |
| From: | Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210C462 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-86-29, 50-364-86-29, NUDOCS 8702090406 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20210C524 (7) | |
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i Report Nos.:
50-348/86-29 and 50-364/86-29 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Condu ted:
December 11, 1986 - January 10, 1987
?a [87 Inspectors:
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W.~ H. BradfoFd
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O' ate Signed (
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Approved by:
[W I!3o[f7 H. C. Dance, Sec' tion Chief Da'te~ Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection included:
monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, followup of plant events, engineered safety system inspection,- and RHR system isolation capability.
Results: Two violations were identified as a result of procedural and technical specification errors that resulted in disabling of the residual heat removal system isolation circuitry (Paragraph 9).
8702090406 8702O2, PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager B. Moore, Operations Supervisor J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management l
interviews throughout the report period and on January 12, 1987, with the general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Two violations identified in paragraph 9 will be
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discussed further in an Enforcement Conference on February 10, 1987.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required l
surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance l
with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed
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and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualified.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities.
Solid State Protection System Train B Operability FNP-2-STP-33.0B
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Test FNP-1-STP-41.3
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Power Range Functional Test N-43 CCW Pump 2A Monthly Operability Check FNP-2-STP-23.9
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TDAFW Pump In Service Test (TAVG 547 F)
FNP-2-STP-22.16
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personne!. parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
Calibration of various instrumentation was observed in the control room and throughout the plant during the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
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and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests.
The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic inubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The
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licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements were reviewed as events occurred.
The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foreman, and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.
The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures were followed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup of Plant Events (93702)
On January 8, 1987, at 6:35 a.m., Unit 1 tripped from 100% power.
The reactor operator observed indication on the control board that Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) 3370A had moved off of its full open position. A quick local investigation by the Unit 1 Shift Foreman revealed an air leak on the fitting to the valve operator.
The operator tripped the turbine manually which automatically tripped the reactor. All systems functioned as designed.
The air line fitting was repaired and all MSIVs were inspected.
The reactor was brought critical at 1:30 p.m., this same date.
On January 9,1987, at 9:34 a.m., Unit 1 tripped from 27% power due to low steam generator level trip. The low steam generator level trip was preceded
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by automatic tripping of "A" and "B" main turbine driven feed wager pumps on
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low suction pressure. All systems functioned as designed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Engineered Safety Systems Inspection (71710)
The inspectors performed various system inspections during the inspection period. Overall plant conditions were assessed with particular attention to equipment condition, radiological controls, security, safety, adherence to technical specification requirements, systems valve alignment, and locked valve verification.
Major components were checked for leakage and any general conditions that would degrade performance or prevent fulfillment of functional requirements.
The inspectors verified that approved procedures and up-to-date drawings were used.
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Portions of the following systems were observed for proper operation, valve alignment and valve verification:
Auxiliary feedwater system Chemical volume control systems Service water systems Boric acid transfer systems Containment spray system including chemical additive systems Residual heat removal system No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
RHR System Isolation Capability During the Unit I refueling outage beginning October 3,1986, Plant Change Notice (PCN) B-84-1-2753 was completed on RCS wide range pressure transmitters (PT) 402 and PT-403.
This design change provided adequate physical separation to satisfy the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97.
On October 13, 1986, Maintenance Work Requests (MWR) were released to carry out the change to the transmitters. MWR 141322 and 141323 were assigned to the Electrical Craft and the PCN was to be completed under these MWRs.
MWR 141324 was assigned to I&C and was to accomplish the testing and restoration of the pressure transmitters.
MWRs originally assigned to Electrical Maintenance (EM) for completion were reassigned to I&C due to work load. Prior to beginning the change, and as a precautionary measure, I&C technicians installed jumpers on PT 402 and 403 to prevent the inadvertent closing of the RHR loop suction valves.
These jumpers were installed using the initial steps of STP 201.16 and STP 201.17 which was attached to MWR 141324. These jumpers effectively caused the RHR automatic isolation capability to be inoperable.
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The jumpers were not removed when the PCN was completed.
MWR 141322 and i
141323 were sent to the I&C foreman for review.
During his review of
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STP 201.16 and STP 201.17 he failed to observe the documentation that the l
jumpers were installed. The STPs were voided on the cover sheet and the body of the procedures was discarded. The jumpers remained in place because no formal mechanism remained to ensure that the jumpers would be removed.
i On October 30, 1986, MWR 141324 was initiated to perform test and restoration of PT 402 and 403.
This required the use of STP 201.16 and 201.17. When the I&C craftsman started to install the required jumpers in i
the Solid State Protection System, he found the jumpers already installed.
He consulted the I&C foreman and was directed to proceed with the work in i
accordance with the specified procedures. There was no investigation as to why jumpers were already installed.
The test and restoration STPs were performed successfully and the jumpers placed by these STPs were removed, leaving the first set of jumpers installed.
Operations personnel were not informed that these jumpers were still in place and that the operation of the RHR system was impaired.
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On November 16, 1986, at 9:42 a.m., during RCS heatup, the RHR loop suction h
valves ~were re-energized as required by procedure. On November 17, 1986, at
- 4:40 p.m., the unit entered operational mode 4 with the loop suction valve
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' automatic i solation capability of both RHR trains inoperable.
On-November 18,1986, at 11:14, the RHR system was secured in accordance with normal startup procedure and the loop suction isolation valves.were closed.
The unit entered mode 3 at 11:44 p.m., on November 18, 1986, and remained in this Mode until November 20, 1986, at 3:42 a.m., when Mode 4 was entered.
Mode 5 was entered on 9:42 a.m., on the same day.
The ' RHR ' system train A and B was. rendered inoperable when the jumpers were placed on PT 402 and PT.403 as delineated by Technical Specification 1.18.
The plant was technically in a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) even though this ECCS system was capable of performing its intended function of Icw pressure injection into the reactor coolant system if required.
The RHR loop suction isolation capability was-inoperable from 4:40 p.m., on
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November 17, 1986, until 9:42 a.m., on November 20, 1986; a total of 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> and 2 minutes. The licensee issued Licensee Event Report (348/86-022)
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There were two instances when the jumpers should have been found. In the first instance, an inadequate review was conducted on the MWRs (141322 and
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_ 141323) and the attached STPs (201.16 and 201.17) which indicated.that -
jumpers.had been installed and not removed. The second instance occurred when the I&C Technicians did find and report the jumpers to their foreman and no investigation was initiated.
L Quality control measures were not met in that section 3.0 of AP-31 " Quality
Control Measures" requires that the first line supervisor (foreman) always has the primary responsibility for controlling the quality of work performed
by those over whom he has supervisory responsibility.
I 10 CFR 50.59 requires a safety evaluation to be performed prior to making safety system modifications.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires
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procedures to be established and followed.
Administrative Procedure (AP) 52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, implements
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TS 6.8.1 and requires that work will be performed in accordance with the l
specified work sequence on the MWR.
Contrary to these requirements, on October 13, 1986, electrical jumpers were installed on the RHR isolation
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l circuitry without having the work specified on MWR 141322 and 141323 and
without performing a safety evaluation.
Consequently, the electrical jumpers were not controlled.
This is a violation (348/86-29-01).
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TS 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an operational Mode unless the conditions of the Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) are met without the reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements.
TS 3.0.3 requires that when an LCO is not met, that within one hour, action shall be initiated to place the Unit in a Mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, at least Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at least Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. TS 3.5.3 requires one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem to be operable in Mode 4.
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requires two independent ECCS subsystems shall be operable in Mode 3.
Contrary to these requirements: 1) the Unit entered Mode 4 on November 17, 1986, at 4:40 p.m. and Mode 3 on November 18, at 11:44 p.m., with neither ECCS subsystem operable; 2) after entering Mode 3, the unit was not placed in Hot Shutdown within seven hours and Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This is a violation (348/86-29-02).
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