IR 05000348/1993026

Insp Repts 50-348/93-26 & 50-364/93-26 on Stated Dates. Violation Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plant Conditions Re Recent Listed Events

ML20059K848
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/04/1993
From:	Cantrell F, Morgan M, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K776	List: IR 05000348/1993026 ML20059K772
References
50-348-93-26, 50-364-93-26, NUDOCS 9311160214
Download: ML20059K848 (11)

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Utd!TED STATES y*

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.d NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN 11 y 8 101 MARIETTA 3TREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 7, ;j ATLANTA, GEoRGtA 30323-0199 *

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Report Nos.: 50-348/93-26 and 50-364/93-26

r Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 ,

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: September 25 - October 25, 1993 -i Inspectors: IM. 'h[M II/4/t3 ;

M. J. Morgan, Acting 0 Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

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VY WO M. A. Scott, Resident 6" ;pector H bl l93 Date S'igned Approved by: [M F16yd Sf Cantrell, Chief #/

///tA/93 Dat'e S'igned

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Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY ,

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Scope:

This special on-site inspection involved a review of plant conditions as'they related to recent events: 1) breaching of the control room (CR) pressure boundary while working on the shared CR air conditioning system; 2) erroneous !

stroking shut of the "A" service water (SW) isolation valve to the. "A"  ;

component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) when intending to stroke ;

test the "B" SW valve; and, 3) improper alignment of "B-train" CCW valves and a subsequent loss of CCW to the inservice spent fuel pool heat exchanger during miscellaneous CCW header valve testin ,

i Results:  ;

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One apparent violation with three examples was identified for failure of  :

licensee personnel to follow procedures which resulted in losses of I configuration control during maintenance and testing activities. These examples involved the loss of control room pressure boundary for approximately ,

two days, a loss of SW to the on-line CCW Hx for several minutes and the loss 'J of spent fuel pool cooling for approximately three hours, paragraphs 2.a., i 2.b., and j

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9311160214 931105 PDR ADDCK 05000348 G PDR ,

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REPORT DETAILS *

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1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Bayne, Supervisor, Safety Auu'it and Engineering Review B. Bell, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

• C. Buck, Technical Manager

• R. Coleman, Modification Manager P. Crone, Operations

• L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager .

H. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent  !

• Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant

• J. McGowan, Manager, Safety Audit and Engineering Review (Birmingham)

M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste

• C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager

• J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

• L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations ,

• J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager

• B. Yance, Plant Systems Performance Manager ,

• Attended the exit interview Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations i personnel, maintenance craftsmen, 'esting and vendor personne ;

Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap j Event Details t Adverse Effect on Control Room (CR) Technical Specification (TS) :'

Pressurization Capability i

On September 23, about 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the "A" train CR air conditioner (A/C) had been taken out of service for repairs, the licensee discovered that the A/C system suction and discharge fire ,

dampers were left open and a panel of approximately 12 square-feet !

on the A/C package had been removed. Removal of this. panel and !

existence of open fire dampers created a breach in the CR pressurization boundary. Although, the applicable TS limiting i condition for operation (LCO) was not mei., the licensee did not exceed the associated action statement. Details are documented in i Inspection Report (IR) 50-348,364/93-21, paragraph l The inspectors, upon review of licensee documentation and on-site observation of the location / area, noted that maintenance personnel .l

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failed to properly inform the operations staff of their intent to remove the "A" train A/C unit pane Craft personnel thought that they had accomplished all necessary pre-job tasks when work i authorization was received from the unit shift superviso .

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However, when the shift supervisor received and approved the work

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authorization, the removal of the A/C panel was not listed as a i-l

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task item in the work package, and technical specification (TS) ,

requirements were not fully addressed by the job planne ,

For approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the operations staff was unaware of' :

the status of the CR pressure boundary and how it was affected by A/C maintenance activities. They became aware of the problem when a shift foreman toured the area and later questioned the shift _ ,

supervisor about work activities. The removal of the A/C panel and '

open damper arrangement resulted in an approximately 12 square r foot " hole" being created _in the CR pressure boundary. The TS :

requirement of maintaining at least 1/8 inch positive water 'l pressure during an emergency was seriously degraded. Subsequent t tests conducted by the licensee confirmed that a simulated !

boundary " hole" of as small as 2 square feet would have caused CR l pressure to fall to less than the nominally required TS pressure ;

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The licensee issued a licensee event report (Unit 1 LER 93-003) to !

document the specifics of this even l During this event, the licensee failed to comply with the following plant procedures:

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1) Admin 9strative Procedure (AP) 85, Conduct of Operations - <

Electrical Maintenance Group,_ Revision 0 requires a complete and concise description of work and the identification of all equipment parts to be removed. The procedure also ,

states that it is the responsibility of the journeyman and i job foreman to ensure that necessary procedures are at the i job sit j

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I 2) AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, Revision 21, requires work requests that '

provide sequenced planning, including applicable procedures and identification of limiting conditions for operation .

Furthermore, ' individuals performing the work shall follow !

the specifiec work sequence. If, during the conduct of maintenance, the worker finds that the sequence does not '

adequately delineate the activities which must be performed :

to accomplish the maintenance, the work sequence shall be ,

revised and "reapproved". l

3) AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, Revision 22, requires the operations staff to operate the j plant safely and to be aware of and responsible for the

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plant status at all time In addition, during this event, FNP failed to comply with the LC0 for TS 3.7.7 which requires two operable independent contro1~ room emergency air cleanup systems during all modes of operatio i

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The applicable surveillance requirement 4.7.7 states, in part, ,

that each control room emergency ventilation system shall be {

demonstrated operable by verifying that the system maintains the i control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operatio i Furthermore, this event was similar to past events described in IR v 50-348,364/91-10, paragraphs 2.a and 3 [ service water to the CR ;

cooler misalignment and the unauthorized alignment of reacto :

water storage tank to the containment sump]; IR 50-348,364/91-19,. l paragraph 2.b.(3) (diesel generator rendered inoperable due to !

improper air start valve alignment); and IR 50-348/364/92-19, paragraph 4.a. (unauthorized removal of rod control system stationary gripper coil fuses by electrical maintenance i personnel).  ;

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This event was identified as the first example of apparent violation 50-364/93-26-01, Personnel errors result in losses of .

configuration control during performance of maintenance and '

testing activitie b. Personnel Error Resulting In Erroneous Operation of the Service i Water To "2A" Component Cooling Water Isolation Valve On September 23, while performing M0 VATS testing on the "SW to

'28' CCW heat exchanger isolation valve", (Q2P16MOV31308); the "SW to '2A' CCW heat exchanger isolation valve", (Q2P16MOV3130A) was ,

inadvertently stroked shut during testin I During the testing of 3130 " bravo", 3130 " alpha" was erroneously .

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operated because jumpers that were intended to bypass the handswitch for the " bravo" valve were erroneously installed on termination points associated with the " alpha" valve. The ,

termination points were incorrectly identified on the M0 VATS test

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procedure data sheet. When the jumpers were installed, as directed by the data sheet, a M0 VATS engineer noted that a contact had 1 energized. At the same time, M0 VATS field personnel observed the

" alpha" valve stroking shut. Approximately three minutes later, control room personnel were notified of the problem and the *

jumpers were removed. An LC0 was entered and the control room operators reopened "3130A".

The M0 VATS procedure did not require independent review of the transfer of plant drawing information to the vendor data sheet Information had been incorrectly transcribed from the plant drawings to the vendor's data sheet by an' individual enginee This was identified as a personnel error and a procedural :

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The licensee intends to revise the vendor's procedure and the equivalent plant test procedure, FNP-0-EMP-1501.06, to include

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provisions for independent peer review of work prior..to performance of field activitie ;

During this event, the licensee failed to comply with the following plant procedures:

1) AP-16, Conduct cf Operations - Operations Group, Revision !

22, requires the operations staff to operate the plant '

safely and to be aware of and responsible for the plant status at all time l 2) Maintenance Procedure M-64, Writers Guide for Maintenance l Procedures, Revision 3, requires procedures to be written in !

such a way that steps can'be performed without the need to obtain additional information. The procedure also states i that in-plant components should be identified in the ;

procedure when the subject component is used infrequently, ;

has poor access, or is not labele l In addition, this event was similar to a past event described in .;

1R 50-348/364/92-35, paragraph 5.b. (wrong data used for i calibration of the nuclear instrumentation system).

This event was identified as the second example of apparent i violation 50-364/93-26-01, Personnel errors result in losses of-configuration control during performance of maintenance and testing activitie c. Isolation of Component Cooling Water To The laservice Unit 2 Spent ,

Fuel Pool (SFP) Heat Exchanger  !

On October 5, with all fuel removed from the core and stored.in SFP, operations personnel implemented a revised line-up of the CCW system to test a particular valve actuator. Operations subsequently received a high SFP temperature alarm because this line-up isolated CCW flow to the in-service "2A" SFP heat exchanger which allowed SFP temperature to rise above the alarm ,

setpoint of 130' F over a 3-hour time perio '

During the outage, Unit 2 was "defueled" and the RHR pumps. had been secured. The "2A" CCW pump, and the "2B" CCW heat exchanger were aligned to the "B" train CCW for SFP cooling. The "2C" CCW l pump, "2B" CCW pump, and the "2A" CCW heat exchanger were not in-service but were available for use. The "A" train "2C" CCW heat ;

exchanger was out of service for outage wor A tag-out (#93-2531-2), was established on October 2 for repair work (MWR 267845) o, MOV "Q2P17M0V3047", the miscellaneous CCW header isolation valve from the main.CCW header. After work was completed a post-maintenance test (PMT) of the valve actuator was

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5 5-required. The vendor requested.that flow through the' valve be stopped for the test. The tag-out was modified, on October 5, to i establish a different lineup for the requested PMT. . This revision-to the clearance boundaries, (i.e., closing of valves

"Q2Pl7V008B", . "V009B", and "V009C"), isolated the only source of cooling for the SFP heat exchange Although queried by the SF0 about these valves prior to -;

modification of the tag-out, the control, board operators were not directly consulted about the revised line-up prior to issuance of the tag-ou The tag-out was reviewed by three SR0 licensed supervisory l personnel and during the review, an SF0 recognized a discrepancy with the positioning action of some. of the valves; however, he did not correct it. During positioning of the valves and associated attachment of the tags, the non-licensed operator questioned the SF0 about a discrepancy in the "as-found" CCW valve positions and the tag-out (i.e., one of the CCW valves to be positicned shut was already shut). The SF0 assured the 50 that discrepancies between the tag-out and actual valve position were not a problem. At -

about 5:36 a.m., the valves were shut and tagged. Once the revised tag-out was completed, flow from the "2A" CCW pump to the -

"2A" SFP heat exchanger was cut-off, thus eliminating the.only available SFP heat sink for removal of residual heat from the recently off-loaded fuel assemblies. (Fuel off-load was completed on October 3).

Over the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, pool temperature rose approximately 40* and peaked between 135 and 140*F. At about 4:00 a.m., a non-licensed-operator recorded SFP temperature at about 92*. This reading was ;

within a log acceptance band of 68 to 120*F and the reading had an 8-hour frequency so the next scheduled reading was to be taken at 12:00 noon. At about 7:40 a.m. the CR received an' alarm for high SFP temperature (130*F), and immediately dispatched an operator to investigate. At about 7:45 a.m., SFP room personnel noticed higher than normal temperature and humidity conditions and -

reported these conditions to the CR. At about 8:30 a.m.,

operations identified the source of the problem and restored CCW flow to the SFP heat exchanger. This action stopped ~the temperature rise at about 9:15 a.m. and SFP heat exchanger outlet i temperature dropped to about 101*F. By 10:30 a.m., bulk SFP temperatures had dropped to below 130*F. No TS limits were ,

exceede In addition to the loss of CCW cooling for to the SFP, the operating "2A" CCW pump, (the "B" train pump), was inadvertently i run using only the mini-flow recirculation flow path during a i 3-hour period from 5:36 a.m. to about 8:30 a.m. The flow path '

recirculates CCW discharge directly back to the pump suction which l could result in pump damage from overheating if run for extended periods. When operations discovered this flow condition, the "2A"

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CCW pump was unisolated and operators checked critical pump ~l parameter l A satisfactory " warm to the touch" temperature check lof pumped :

water, through the "2A" CCW pump was immediately performed in !

order to investigate possible thermal stresses to the pump. - From !

external appearances, the pump appeared to be in good operating conditio The resident inspectors were immediately notified of the event and '

on follow-up, observed the pump in its normal configuration. The inspectors obser/ed no pump bearing lube oil discoloration, no- ;

abnormal pump bearing temperatures, and no mechanical seal damage / leakage. Logged motor bearing temperatures indicated no-temperature rise during the period of mini-flow operatio .

i After reestablishing a normal CCW system lineup, the licensee i returned the "2A" CCW pump to-operation and continued to monitor :

pump parameters. An MWR was written to physically investigate for o

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any possible pump damage. Maintenance and engineering support personnel took vibration readings and these readings were -

determined to be norma During this event, the licensee failed to comply with the following plant procedures:

1) AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, Revision

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22, requires the operations staff to operate the plant safely and to be aware of and responsible for plant status at all time ;

2) AP-14, Safety Clearance and Tagging, Revision 13, requires ,

careful evaluation of the work to be performed, by the ,

preparer of the tag order, to assure proper isolation. The procedure also states that the tagging official will .

carefully review the tag order to assure that execution of the order is acceptable with regard to its effect on plant statu ,

In addition, this event was similar to several past events described in IR 50-348,364/92-12, paragraph 8 (power removal to a wrong unit low-pressure safety injection system valve, calibration i on a wrong unit "SW to diesel generator building" differential pressure switch and removal of a wrong unit SW pump motor breaker); IR 50-348,364/93-06, paragraph 3.a. (operation of a ,

wrong unit auxiliary feedwater flow control valve " local / remote transfer switch" during testing); IR 50-348,364/93-08, paragraph 8 (removal of a wrong unit D/G breaker); and IR 50-348,364/93-19; i paragraph 3.c. (misalignment of CCW to the miscellaneous CCW l system header). '

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This event was identified as the third example of apparent violation 50-364/93-26-01 Personnel errors result in losses of configuration control during performance of maintenance and testing activitie .

3. Exit Interview Inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on October 25, with the plant manager and selected members cf his staff. The inspection .

findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio On October 26, F.S. Cantrell, Section Chief, Region II Division of Reactor Projects, discussed the report findings with Mr. R.D. Hill, Plant General Manager and obtained mutually acceptable availability dates for this enforcement conference to be held thereby allowing the .

licensee to explain his position on these _ issue Mr. Hill stated that he would discuss the company's position on this issue at a future dat *

ITEM NUMBER APPARENT VIOLATION DESCRIPTION 50-364/93-26-01 Personnel errors result in losses of l configuration control during ;

performance of maintenance and testing activitie . Acronyms and Abbreviations l

A/C -

Air Conditioning <

AP -

Administrative Procedure .

CCW -

Component Cooling Water CR -

Control Room ,

D/G -

Emergency Diesel Generator 'q DRP -

Division of Reactor Projects i DRS -

Division of Reactor Safety FNP -

Farley Nuclear Plant  ;

I&C -

Instrumentation and Controls LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation LER -

Licensee Event Report MOV -

Motor-0perated Valve MOVATS - Motor-0perated Valve Actuator Testing System 3 MWR -

Maintenance Work Request NCV -

Non-cited Violation j NOV -

Notice of Violation PMT -

Post-Maintenance Testing .

SF0 -

Shift Foreman Operating  !

SFP -

Spent Fuel Pool  :

S/G -

Steam Generators SNC -

Southern Nuclear Operating Company i S0 -

Systems Operator .j I

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Systems Operating Procedure SS -- Shift Supervisor SNC -

Southern Nuclear' 0perating Company STAR -: "Stop", "Think", "Act", " Review" STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure SW -

Service Water System TS -

Technical Specification URI -

Unresolved Issue  ;

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ENCLOSURE 2 l

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Fedsm! Register / Vel. 57..No.133 ( Friday. July 10. 1992 / Natices l 30752

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l Aconssess: Send comments to:The 1 in pnot reviews for the Yankee Nuclear _ guides currently being developed or Secretary of the Comnussion. ;

Power Station.ne plant was licensed tmprovements in all published guides an encouraged at any time. Written Nuclear Regulatory Commissio .

before the requirement for issuance of Washington, DC 20555. ATIN:  !

comments may be submitted to the Fmal Environmental Statemen Docketag and Service Branc t Regulatory Publications Branch., '

Agencies andPersons Consulted Division of Freedom of Informats and Hand deliver comments to: One White

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The NRC staff reviewed the lice ea Publications Semees. Office of Flint North.11555 Rockville Pik request and did not consult other Admimstration. U.S. Nuclear R atorY Rockvtlle. MD between 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 i

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agencies or person Commissio Washingto DC .055 p.n. Federal workday Regulatory guides are ava able for Copies of comments may be examined finding of No Significant impact inspecnon al the Commissi 's Public at the NRC Public Document Roon 2120 l The Commission has determm not Document Run 2120 L S et N L Street. NW. (Lower Level).  ;

to prepare an environmentalimp ct ashington. DC. Copies issued Washington.DC r statement for the proposed exe ptio guides may be purcha from the post rusmesa esponssATlost CoWTACT:

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Based upon the foregoing eni amental Government Pnnting O ce at the  :

assessment. we conclude that e current CPO price. Inf rmation on James Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nucle ar Regulatory +

proposed action will not have current GPO prices y be obtained by Commission. Washington, DC 20555 significant effect on the qualit of the contacting the Supe tendent of l human environmen Documents. ernment Printing 0 01-506-2741).

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x 3708 suretsasswfant poconssATiose:  !

For further details with re ect to this Office. Post Offi  :

action. see the application f r exempbon Washington, DC 5-7082. telephone dated May 22.1992, which 1 available Background (202) 512-2249 o (202) 512-2171. lasued  !

guido may als be purchased from the ne NRC's current policy on on s .i e Do ent Roo NationalTe ,calInformat2on Service enforcement conferences is addressed in l 2120 L Street. NW., Wash' on. DC

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n a stan order basis. Details on Section V of the latest revision to the 20555. and at the local pu lic document this service sy be obtamed by wnting GeneralStatement of Poligy and room at Greenfield Co umty Co!!ege, NTIS. 5 ort Royal Road. Springfield. Procedure for Enforcement Actions."  !

1 College Drive. Greenfi I VA 2216 (Enforcement Policy)10 Cm part l

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Massachusetts 0130 sppendix C that was published on A ry: 5 ILS.C. 552(a Dated at Rockville.M land.this 2d day et Rockvttle. Maryland, this 30th day February it.1992(57 FR 5791).The ,

Da of July 198 of jun 199 Enforcement Policy states tha , '

For the Nudear Regul tory Commissio F the Nuclear Regulatory Commissio *' enforcement conferences will not normally be open to the public." I N FaucBey, Jr., a.ra ,g, piraces,,

However.the Commission has decided l iceofNuclectRegulatoryResearc to implement a trial program to sco nm it a$d ronm to Pmiect Doc.92-18224 Filed 7 9-02:IL45 am)

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Directomte. Division fRrectorProjecta- determine whether to maintain the !

JWN/P.OdficeofN learReactor cong m current policy with regard to  ;

Regular 2on, enforcement conferences or to adopt a [

new policy that would allow most ;

[TR Doc. 92-16232 T' ed 7+92: 8 45 am) Two-Year Trial Program for s e e caos neo.es enforcement conferences to be open to : -l Conducting Open Enforcement attendance by all members of the public. .

Conferences;Poney Statement i

RW lasuance, Policy Statement  ;

Acescr. Nuclear Regulatory Avanabety Posidon Commissio ne Nucle Regulatory Commission ACTioet Policy statement, ne NRC is implementmg a two year - {

has issued a vision to a guide in its trial program to allow pubhc Regulatory de Series.This senes has susssaanr.ne Nuclear Regulatory observetion of selected enforcement been develo d to desenbe and make mmi gjs po3 gs conferences.Re NRC will momtor the available t the public such information on[

, C) e a program and determine whether to as meth acceptable to the NRC staff two. year trial program to allow selected establish a permanent policy for i forimple nting specific parts of the enforcement conferences to be open to c nducting open enforcement Commissi n s regulations, techniques auendance by all members of the c nierences based on an assessment of t used by .e staff in evaluatmg specfic generalpublic.nis policy statement the following cnteria:

proble- or postulated accidenta, and desenbes the two. year trial program data ne ed by the staffin its review of and informs the public of how to get (1)Whether the fact that the conference was open impacted the .

applica ons for permits and ifcense Informadon on upcoming open NRC's ability to conduct a meanmgful Reg' story Guide 8.7. Revision enforcement conference Instr' ctions for Recordmg and conferenes and/or implement the NRC's '

DATT.s:This trial program is effective on enforcement program:

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Repo > Occupauonal Radiation g Expo ure Data." desenbes an July 10.1992. while comments on the acce table program for the preparation. program are being received. Submit i heensee's participanon in rete . tion, and reportmg of reaards of comments on or before the completa die coderecs, of the trial program scheduled for July p)Whether the NRC expended a o pational radiation exposurea.it in udes copies of NRC Forms 4 and 5 1 . Comments received after this sigmficant amount of resources in

. 'will be considered if it is practical detailed instructions on completing making the conference public: and to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideranon only for com: rents (4)ne extent of publicinterest m Comenta and suggestions in opening the enforcement conferenc received on or before this date,

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nnection with items for inclusion in 11 W

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• • Tederal Resss6er / Vol. 57. No.133 / Fridey July 10,15E2 / Notloes 38'1E3 ;

L Criteria For Selecaiseg Open three catesones of hornnees mil be subject to peranar=1 acrecrung, that F.afoeceanent (WJ=amoes e-msal operatmg reactors, signa. hannars, posters, etc not larger -

Enforcement conferences mil not be hospitals, and othat f-men, which than 18" be permitted and that  !

open to the pubbeif the enforenant wdl cast of the re-ag types of disruptive persons may be remove ,

acen beg- ptM- heensee Each regumal office m2 contmoe to '

(1) Would be talan agamst an IL Announchrg Open Enforcement c nduct the enforomment conference indmdual, or d the acuan, though not h proceedues in accordance with s elponal praebee. The enforcement conference

.k he an d

bividual, has y As soon as itis determised that an enf rcement conference will be open to mH contmue to be a meeung between the NRC and the licensee. While the i

public observation, the NRC mil orally

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g enforcement corJarence is open for a y the hemee that the enforcement public observation. it is not open for  !

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fail wh R equested cuienn e mD be open to public that the Individual (s) involved be pubbe participatio bservauon as part of the agency's trial persons atteadmg open enforcement t & de- r (3)Is based on the fins *: of an NRC pmgmm and unMemn a cqy of confennces are nannded day 1) the

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l Office of m tio npwt or this Federal Register notice that outhnes apparent violations discussed at open the pmgram. Licensees wiB be asked to enforcement conferences are subject to

(4) m sa egti gumation,

, estimate the m:mber of partimpants it further trenew and may be subject to  !

pnvecy Act information, or other information which could be considend wdl bring to the enforcement confennee change pnar to any resulting so that the NRC can Schedule an  !

propnetar appropriately sized codemnes moc enforcement acten and (2) the

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I 8 The NRC wdl also nocfy appropnane We d hmph d opinion made by NRC employees at

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c,3 n overerposures willbe epen assuming the ce be ed 7 has been la7

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end im i scheduled and that it la open to pubhc represent final determmations or belief Individual's name. In additio $R Intends to announce open * * D" "8 * "'"I' "

enforcement conferences will not be enforcement conferences to the pubhc '8""W" "8'** A" *** ""

open to the public if the confennce will normally at least 10 workmg days su e ance t is ce. pene be conducted by telephone or the 8 " '" * * * * * "'* " ***

conference will be conducted at a advance of the enforcement conference through the followmg useh=- [ "PM e an WPoMy to submit written comments anonymously relatively smaillicensee's faciht (1) Nonces posted tn the h FinaDy. with the approval of the e c ments Document Rooms: will subsequently be forwarded to the Executive Director for Operation (2) tog. free telephone ==== ages: and enforcement conferences wiB not be (3) Toll-free electronic bauetm board meta d 6e 05cm of Enhat fu open to the public in specal cases message new and cuidendo where good cause has been shown after Pendm' g establishment of the toU-free Dated at Rockvdie, MD tbs 7th day of July balancmg the hen +'it cJ pub message eystema,the public may call 1M-observation against the potentialimpact (301) 492-4732 to obtain a recording of For the Nuclear Regdatory Commissio or the agency'a adorrmPnf SCtZnin a upcommg Open enforcetheDt Samuel ). Chil particular cas confennees. The NRC wiD issoe another Secretaryofthe Comadnio The NRC wdl stnve to conduct open Federal Regieter nobce after the toll-free [nt Doc. 92-te:33 Filed 74 42; 8.45 a.a)

enforcement conferences dunns the messege eypeems are establishe w,o coag n, two-year anal progract in accordance To assist the NRC in makmg mth the follomas thrse gosla: appropriate anangements to support

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(1) Appicxumately25 percent of all public observation o(enforr==mant ehphie enforoecent confermaa OFMCE OF PERSONNEL conferemos s. todividuals intensted m conducted by the NRC will be open for attending a particular enforcement em pubbe observacon; conference should notify the indrvideel Request for Clearance of a R

'

(2) At least one open ecfore*mt identified in the meetmg notice '

informadon Cotec5on to Add F RI conference wdl be conduc:ad in each of announcing the open enforcement 36-7 to OMS Camerance N the reponal ofhces and conference no later than five bums 0128

. [3] Open enforcement conferences days pnor to the enforcement will be conducted with a vanery of the conferenc Accecn Office of types of hcensee Managemen .

To avoid potentialbias in the H M d % hfed Acnoet Notim selection process and to attempt to meet Cmfemoces the three goals stated above,every in eccanience with enrrent practice, suassaany:in scoord with the fourth thgible enforcement cxmference enforcement conferences will contmue paperwork Reduc ' Act of1980 [ title ,

mvolvmg one of thne categones of to normally be held at the NRC regional 44. U.S. Code, 35), this notice  ;

heensees mH normaDy be open to the offices. Members of the public wiD be announces a est for clearance of a j public darmg the tnal progra allowed access to the NRC regional revreed info tion couectron. to add

)

However,in cases where there is an offices to attend open enforennt form R136- to the Appbcation for -

oragoing adjudicatory pih44 with conferences in accordance wnh the Refund of urement Dedactions  !

one or more teterrenors. enforcement " Standard Operating Fada For (CSRS). pM must have SP 2BC2  !

conferenus involving issues related to h% Security Suppen For NRC completely filled out and signed before  !

the subject matter of the ongoing Heanngs And Meetmgs" pubhshed pa ' a refund of retirement adjudication may also be opened.For November 1.1991 (58 Ilt 5ct).These co abutions.SF2832B must also be the purposes of this tnalprogram, the procedures provide that visitors may be ete if there are spot.se(s) or former  !

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