| Site | Start date | Title | Description |
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ENS 57090 | Browns Ferry | 25 April 2024 03:15:00 | Automatic Reactor Scram with Eccs Actuation | The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
On 4/24/2024 at 2215 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram. The cause of the scram is currently under investigation. The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) remain open with the main turbine bypass valves controlling reactor pressure. The reactor feedwater pumps are in service to control reactor water level.
Primary containment isolation systems (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all components actuated as required. Following the reactor scram, due to reactor water level reaching minus 45 inches, both high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) initiation signals were received, and both initiated as designed. All safety systems operated as expected.
This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), `Any event that results or should have resulted in emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), `Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
This event requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), `Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B): 1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip. 2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). 4) ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) - high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI). 5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).
All safety systems operated as expected. At no time was public health and safety at risk. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Units 2 and 3 were not affected. |
ENS 57032 | Waterford | 16 March 2024 19:49:00 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater and Main Steam Isolations | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1449 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station was operating at 100 percent power when a manual reactor trip was initiated due to main feed isolation valve (FW-184B) and main steam isolation valve (MS-124B) going closed unexpectedly.
Emergency feedwater (EFW) was automatically actuated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted as expected.
This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour nonemergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass valves and the atmospheric dump valve on loop '2'. There is no primary to secondary system leakage. The cause of the isolations is still being investigated. |
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IR 05000382/2023010 | Waterford | 31 January 2024 | Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000382/2023010 | |
NUREG-2194 Volume 2, Rev. 1, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Plants, Volume 2: Bases | | 31 January 2024 | NUREG-2194, Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Plants, Volume 2: Bases | |
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