ML20212Q055
| ML20212Q055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1986 |
| From: | Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212Q039 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-86-15, 50-364-86-15, NUDOCS 8609030392 | |
| Download: ML20212Q055 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1986015
Text
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>R RE T
UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 18
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
%...../
Report Nos.: 50-348/86-15 and 50-364/86-15
Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, AL 35291
Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2
In;pection Conducted: July 11 - August 10, 1986
Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama
Inspect s:
VI.trv C
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W. h. Bradford
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Date Signed
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Approved by:
H' C. Dance, Vection Chief
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, onsite inspection included monthly surveillance observation,
monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, and followup of
plant events.
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Results: One violation was identified - Failure to; verify auxiliary feedwater
system flow paths prior to entering Mode 2.
8609030392 860020
ADOCK 05000340
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager
D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager
W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager
R. D. Hill, Operations Manager
C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager
R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager
L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager
L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
B. Moore Operations Supervisor
J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor
B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor
T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor
J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor
L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor
R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager
J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel,
maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management inter-
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views throughout the report period and on August 11, 1986, with the general
plant manager and sele:ted members of his staff. The inspection findings
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were discussed in detail. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any
material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed and reviewed technical specification required
surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance
with adequate procedures; that test' instrumentation was calibrated; that
limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and
were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test;
that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed
and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel
conducting the tests were qualified.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed
portions of the following test activities:
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STP-80.1 -
Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test.
Diesel Generator IC Operability Test.
STP-80.2
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STP-33.0B -
Solid State Protection System Train S Operability Test.
STP-27.1
A.C. Source Verification.
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Unit Start-up Technical Specification Verification.
STP-35.1
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UDP-1.3
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Start-up Of Unit Following An At Power Reactor Trip.
Shutdown Of Unit From Minimum Load To Hot _ Standby.
UDP-2.1
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Shutdown Of Unit From Hot Standby To Coid Shutdown.
UDP-2.2
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UDP-1.1
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Start-up Of Unit From Cold Shutdown To Hot Standby.
On August 4,
1986, the licensee discovered Unit 1 Fire Protection Spray
and/or Sprinkler Systems surveillance requirements of Technical Specifica-
tion (TS) requirements 4.7.11.2.C.2 and 4.7.11.2.C.3 had not been completed
on time.
The Unit 1 surveillance schedule had been signed off to show
completion of the required surveillance test procedure (STP), FNP-1-STP
626.0,when only a partial STP had been completed.
The licensee immediately declared all technical specification related
clappers inoperable and stationed appropriate fire watches.
Mechanical
maintenance completed the surveillance requirements and the system was
returned to normal. This is considered to be an isolated event.
Inasmucn
as this was licensee identified, cor rected promptly and was not a violation
that could reasonably be expected to have' been prevented by the licensee's
corrective action for a previous violation, a Notice of Violation will not
be issued in accordance with the NRC enforcement criteria.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and
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were in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during the review:
limiting conditions
for operations were met while components or systems were removed from
service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
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were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning
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cot ponents or systems to service; quality control records were maintained;
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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials
were
properly
certified;
radiological
controls were
implemented;
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and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed
to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was
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assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system
performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzer Repairs
2A
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2C
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Charging Pump Rotor Replacement
Charging Pump Motor Replacement
28
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Breaker (2B Motor Driven AFW Pump) Preventive Maintenance
DG-10
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1A
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Charging Pump Rotor Replacement
Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers Troubleshooting
Unit 2
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Charging Pump Gear Reducer 011 Coolers Fowling
IB&lC
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operctional Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report
period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency
systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building,
turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant
equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations.
The
inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Cunditions for Opera-
tions (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifications
were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve
positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of
completed logs, records, and chemistry results.
The licensee's compliance
with LCO action statements were reviewed as events occurred.
The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management
and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen
and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily
status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress,
as well as discussions of significant problems.
The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force
members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility
met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the
security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and
isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures
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were followed.
On July 22, during a technical specification verification start-up of Unit 2
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activities on July 12, 1986 following a cold shutdown, the inspector found
Auxiliary Feedwater System surveillance requirement TS 4.7.1.2.2d had not
been met prior to entry into Mode 2.
This is a violation (364/86-15-01).
At the time of the inspection Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 6% power. The tech-
nical specification surveillance requirement directs the licensee to
demonstrate the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system prior to entry
into Mode 2 following each cold shutdown by performing a flow test to verify
the normal flow path from the condensate storage tank through each auxiliary
feedwater pump to its associated stem generator. The licensee immediately
corrected the error by performing the necessary surveillance test
(FNP-2-STP 22. 19).
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7.
Follow-up of Plant Events (93702)
a.
On August 1, at about 12:30 p.m. , with Unit 1 at 99% reactor power,
while performing Unit 2 Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 24.2 " Service
Water Pumps C, D, and E Inservice Test" (This STP changes service water
flow and pressures), a charging pump lube oil high temperature alarm
was received in the control room.
Local lube oil temperature and
reduction gear temperature on the IB charging pump (the in service
pump) was monitored. Lube oil temperature was remaining constant, and
reduction gear temperature was slowly increasing. At 12:38 p.m., with
155F reduction gear oil temperature, the IB charging pump was secured
and the 1C charging pump was placed in service.
Licensee procedures
require the charging pump be secured at oil temperature of 160F. A 72
hour LCO was initiated on the IB charging pump,
[ Note: 1A charging
pump was tagged out for maintenance and could not be placed in service.]
At 12:10 p.m. , the reduction gear oil temperature on 1C charging pump
had risen to 153F. Emergency measures were immediately taken to cool
the 1C charging pump reduction gear oil cooler by placing ice on the
cooler, running demineralized water over the cooler, and increasing air
circulation in the charging pump room.
1C reduction gear oil temperature
stabilized when the;e emergency measures were taken. 1C charging pump
was also declared inoperable placing the plant under section 3.0.3 of
the Technical Specifications at 1:35 p.m.
Rampdown of Unit I was
commenced.
Power was reduced to about 30% power and held at that
level.
1B charging pump was restored to operable status at 4:30 p.m., following
cleaning and flushing of the lube oil cooler and associated piping. A
significant amount of mud was removed from the IB cooler during the
flushing.
Unit 1 was now placed back under the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 with one
charging pump operable.
Following the return of IB charging pum;
'.a service the 1C charging
pump was secured and its cooler was cleened and lines flushed. A large
number of small Asiatic clams along wi.h a significant amount of mud
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was removed from f e cooler.
1C charging pump was restored to operable
status and the charging pump LCO cleared.
Oil temperatures were
monitored throughout the evening. Unit I was ramped up on the morning
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of August 2.
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The licensee believes that the performance of STP 24.2 and the pressure
increase required in the service water system for performance of the
STP and resulting flow increase may have dislodged mud and clams from
low velocity sections of the system.
The licensee is following up on
the charging pump problem and has formed a task force to generate
recommendations to prevent recurrence of the problem.
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The resident inspectors followed this event and discussions between
licensee and regional management occurred following the power reduction
to assure the service water system was operable.
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b.
A Unit 2 reactor trip occurred at 12:39 p.m.,
on August 4, while
performing Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) FNP-2-STP-22.0A, Solid
State Protection System Train
"A" Operability Test. Earlier both Unit
2 reactor trip bypass breakers had been racked out to troubleshoot why
"A" bypass would not close during the performance of the STP. The "UV
Block Bypass" pushbutton had malfunctioned, not letting voltage get to
the UV coil, and as a result the "A" train bypass breaker would not
close.
The pushbutton was repaired, the bypass breakers were racked
in, and surveillance testing was resumed.
As STP 33.0 specified in a series of procedural steps,
"A" bypass
breaker was closed, reopened and reclosed. When attempting to trip "A"
bypass breaker using the "UV Block Bypass" pushbutton, the reactor trip
breakers opened in addition to the
"A"
train reactor trip bypass
breaker.
Investigation by th- licensee revealed that both "A"
and "B"
trains
momentarily had Solid State Protection System (SSPS) general warning
alarms when the "A" bypass breaker was opened. The "A"
train of the
SSPS had a preplanned general warning alarm when the "A" bypass breaker
was closed as part of the STP.
It was believed by the licensee and
proven within a reasonable doubt that the "B" train of SSPS received
a general warning signal upon the mechanical opening of the "A" bypass
breaker.
The opening of the "b"
contact in the
"B" bypass breaker
dropped out a relay in SSPS to give a "B" train general warning alarm.
The reactor tripped when both trains momentarily had general warning
alarms.
The licensee replaced disconnect blocks in the
"B"
bypass
breaker to correct the contact problem in addition to replacing dis-
connect blocks in the "A" bypass breaker and "A" and "B"
train reactor
trip breakers.
All systems functioned as designed following the trip.
Unit 2 was
returned to power operation on August 5, 1986.
c.
On August 5, at 9:05 p.m. , Unit 1 tripped from 99% power on a low
steam generator level coincident with steam flow greater than feed
flow. The trip was caused by failure of a card in the Steam Generator
Water Level Control circuitry causing the closure of the 1C feed
regulating valve. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed following the
reactor trip on a low low Tavg and steam flow greater than 40%. The
protection system sensed a large steam flow on one steam generator
because a high steam flow bistable was locked in due to testing. All
systems functioned as designed.
The unit returned to power operation
on August 6.
d.
On July 17, the licensee decided to shutdown Unit 2.
Two of the three
charging pumps were inoperable and a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was in force.
2C
charging pump had been placed out of service for replacement of the
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rotating assembly.
28 charging pump motor failed on an electrical
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ground on July 17. The 2C charging pump was returned to service and
Unit 2 returned to power operation on July 21. The 2B charging pump is
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still out of service pending repair of the charging pump motor.
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e.
During this reporting period the if censee made three 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports,
one report regarding accidental actuation of the Unit 1 penetration
room filtration system and two reports regarding inadvertent control
room chlorine detector alarms which caused control room ventilation
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isolation.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Licensee Plans For Coping With Strikes (92709)
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The licensee strike plan was revlewed since contract negotiations are
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currently in progress.
The review verified:
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The minimum number of qualified and proficient personnel are available
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to ensure proper plant operation and safety.
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The contents of the plant strike plan are consistent with and meet
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regulatory requirements.
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Plant security will be maintained at a level consistant with proper
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plant integrity and operation.
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The inspector had no further questions.
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