IR 05000348/1988026

Insp Repts 50-348/88-26 & 50-364/88-36 on 880811-0910. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Engineered Safety Sys Insp & Previous Insp Findings

ML20245D810
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	09/26/1988
From:	Dance H, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245D804	List: IR 05000348/1988026 ML20245D801 ML20245D806
References
50-348-88-26, 50-364-88-26, NUDOCS 8810070172
Download: ML20245D810 (11)

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UNITED STATES

. jP'52trob NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

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/. REGION 11 i N 'J

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o 101 MARIETTA STREET, E 'f~ AT L ANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/88-26 and 50-36/88-26 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 36291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 11 - September 10, 1988 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspect,rs: .  %, 7 22 G. F. Ma3well .

Date Signed

h C<D 27 ff e W."H. Miller Date Signed AccompanyingInsecgr: L. Modenos (August 15-19,1988)

Approv by: .  % 7[2 c hf g H.'C. Dance, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine onsite inspection involved a review of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, engineered safety system inspection, and previous inspection finding .

Results: Within the areas inspected, the following violation was identified:

Failure to follow procedures which resulted in an inadvertent off oil site cooler; gasand,release; trip ofloss dieselof cooling generatorto charging pump 2A bearing 1-2A - paragraphs 2.b. (1),

2.b.(2)and Unresolved item was identified involving inadequate fire protection protection features provided for service water motor operated

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valves - paragraph 2.b.(3).

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted D. N. Morey, General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Assistant General Plant Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve,;lanning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager i S. Fulmer, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 71881, 92700) Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented. These tours were performed to verify that systems, valves and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations

. personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; and all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was curren Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards and panels. During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert and aware of changing plant conditions. The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefing They observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.

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. . Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas. The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic. Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequat Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program 1 were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC - regulatory requiremen The areas reviewed included: operation and management of the plant's. health physics staff, "ALARA" implementation, Radiation Work Permits - (RWPs) for compliance to plant procedures, personnel . exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify  ;

complianes to radiation protection procedures, and control of j radioacthe materials. No discrepancies were note !

b. Plant Events j

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(1) Inadvertent Waste Gas Release

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On August 24,1988 at 1:58 a.m. the Unit 1 plant vent stack 'l radiation monitors, R-14, R-21 and R-22, alarmed due to l indication of a high concentration of radioactive ga .)'

Subsequent investigation indicated that the gas leckage was from a cation demineralized drain valve which had been previously inadvertently left ope When .the cation demineralized was i placed in service, letdown flow was drained to the waste holdup tank through the open demineralized drain valve.- The negative pressure of the auxiliary building HVAC system pulled this gas from various open connections in the drainage piping system and  ;

discharged the gas up the vent stac The first off site gas release calculations on August 24, 1988  :

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indicated that the release was 4.85 E-5 Rem / Hour noble gas which was below that which is required to be reportable. A release of

. 5.7 E-5 Rem / Hour noble gas or 1.7 E-4 Rem / Hour iodine release is

. reportabl A second evaluation by the plant staff found that

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.an error was made in the original calculation in that the 150' <

L elevation wind speed was used in lieu of the 35' elevation wind i I

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speed. Using the 35' elevation wind speed gave a noble gas concentration of 1.535 E-4 Rem / Hour which exceeded the criterion i of an unusual event. At 10:55 a.m. on August 24 the event was j reported to the NRC and Alabama and Georgia state agencie ,

Procedure, EIP-9, Radiation Exposure Estimation and l Classification of Emergencies, was promptly revised to help l ensure that the correct wind speed will be used in future dose  !

calculation j

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The root cause of this problem was the failure to follow procedures during the removal and addition of resin to the cation demineralizers. This resin was' replaced during the -

March - May 1988 refueling outage.- Procedure 1-S0P-50.4, Demineralized Resin Removal and Addition, requires drain valve l Q1G21V171 to be left in the closed position following the addition of resin to the demineralized. This failure to follow

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procedures is identified as violation 348/88-26-0 The licensee has counseled the personnel involved and all operations personnel are to be reinstructed in the necessity of following procedure Further evaluation by the licensee using Procedure EIP 29, Long Term Dose Assessment, and NRC Reg Guide 1.111 which contain a refined dose calculation method indicated that the release was 100% elevated release and the 150' wind speed was the appropriate wind speed to us Therefore, this event was actually not a reportable even (2) Charging Pump 2A Bearing 011 Cooler Supply Valve Closed On July 17, 1988, prior to removing charging pump 2B from service for maintenance, charging pump 2A was operated to verify operabilit Nine minutes after starting pump 2A a high temperature alarm was received in the control room. Pump 2B was immediately restarted and pump 2A was secured. Investigation revealed that the lube oil temperature for pump 2A was approximately 150*F (high alarm set point is 140'F) due to supply valve Q2P17VC-3A from the component cooling water (CCW)

system for charging pump 2A bearing and gear oil cooler being in the closed positio This valve is required by procedure 2-SOP-2.1D, Returning Charging Pump 2A To Service After Maintenance, to be in the open position to provide cooling for the oil coole Upon further investigation the licensee found that pump 2A had

. been removed from service on July 14, 1988 for pump lubricatio The tagging order, clearance No. 88-562-2, listed the valves to be realigned. Valve Q2P17VC-3A to the oil cooler was not on the tagging order but is located approximately 2 feet from one of the valves on the tagging orde It appears that valve Q2P17VC-3A was inadvertently closed during the tag out operation. Log readings taken prior to the tag out indicated a CCW flow through the oil cooler of 69 gpm. The first reading taken following restoring this pump to service on July 15 indicated a flow of 43 gpm. This indicates that the valve was closed during the tag out operation.

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In addition to failing to follow the valve tag out and alignment procedures is the fact that the acceptance criteria on the "A Man Log Sheets" were incorrect. During the previous refueling outage of October - December 1987 the cooling water supply for the charging pumps oil bearing coolers was changed from the service water system to the component cooling water system. The water flow indicators for the coolers had also been changed-from

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a pressure difference indicator reading in psi (d) to a gpm indicator. The former acceptance values on the log sheets of 25 maximum and 10 minimum had not been changed to indicate the new required values of a flow greater than 62 gpm. This log sheet was' revised on August 23, 1988, to ' reflect the new instrumentatio The principle cause of this event was the failure to follow the tag out procedure which resulted in the closure of. a valve which was not reopened when restoring the system to service. This is identified as another example of failure to follow procedures, Violation 348,364/88-26-0 (3) Appendix R - Fire Protection / Safety Shutdown Discrepancy During a design review of a modification to an electrical duct bank containing electrical cables for the service water system, the licensee's design engineering firm (Bechtel) identified several cables to service water valves which do not meet the fire protection separation requirements of Appendix R. A fire in Unit 1 Fire Area 56, Train A switchgear room of diesel generator building, could cause the spurious operation or closure of valve Q1P16V549-A which controls return service water flow from both trains to the river. A fire in Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004, 155' elevation of auxiliary building, could cause the spurious operation or closure of valve Q2P16V549-A which controls return service water flow from both trains to the river. Closure of either of these valves could result in the ,

loss of the service water system for the affected unit since the '

return flow path would be blocked by the shut valv .

As interim correction, the licensee promptly verified valves Q1P16V549-A and Q2P16V549-A open and removed power to these valves. These valves are to be maintained in this condition by means of the operations " Tag Out" procedure. Removal of power to these valves was verified by the inspector This discrepancy is identified as Unresolved Item *

No. 348,364/88-22-02 pending further review by the Region II fire protection staff during an inspection scheduled for the week of September 26, 198 *An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to dctcrmir.c whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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i MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with licensee requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedure to ensure that administrative controls were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedure Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was. within the specified requirements of Technical Specifications, any identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service. The following specific activities were observed:

1-STP- Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Control Leakage Test 2-STP- Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test 1-STP-2 CCW Pump 1A Quarterly Inservice Test 1-STP-2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Valve Inservice Test 2-STP-2 Auxiliary Feed Pump 2A Annual Inservice Test 2-STP-2 Service Water Pumps 20, 2E, and 2C Inservice Tes STP-24.11 Service Water Cyclone Separator Valve Inservice Test 2-STP-33.1B Safeguards Test Cabinet Train B Functional Test 1-STP-33.2A Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Test 0-STP-8 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test 6-STP-8 Diesel Generator IB Operability Test 2-STP-8 Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test 0-STP-8 Diesel Generator 2C Operability Test 1-STP-8 Inservice Test on Fuel Oil Pumps to Diesel Generator 2C Day Tank 0-STP-125 Service Water Pond Seepage Test 1-ETP-1301 Charging Pump Suction Line Venting Evaluation (2 5-10 Day Evaluation) Diesel Generator 1-2A Trip

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On August 16, 1988, while performing surveillance test procedure 0-STP-80.1, Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test, the system operator assigned to the diesel generator building noticed that the on-service strainer had a high delta pressure of 16 ps The operator started to shi'it lube oil strainers as required by procedure He opened the equalizing valve, connecting the off-service and on-service strainers, and left this valve open until the vent line from the off-service strainer was warm. The equalizing valve was closed prior to attempting to shift from the on-service trainer to the off-service straine The selector valve was

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difficult to move and when the valve was finally moved to about the {

halfway point the' diesel trippe !

i The most probable cause of this event appears to have been an air lock in the off-service strainer which caused a momentary loss of pressure in the lube system that was sensed by the shutdown pressure i switch when the off-service strainer was placed in service.' On _i May 16, 1988 the off-service strainer was cleaned and may not have been properly vented. However, the operator also failed to follow procedure 0-50P-38.0, Diesel Generators, Section 4.12 in that the-equalizing valve connecting the on-service and off-service strainers was closed prior to shifting tu the off-service strainer. This apparently failed to properly vent the strainer which caused a momentary lube oil pressure loss. The failure to follow procedures is identified as another example of Violation 348,364/88-26-0 Jumper Installation - Minor Departure 88-1987 On August 12 while conducting Unit 2 surveillance test 2-STP-33.1B, Safeguards Test Cabinet Train B Functional Test, the licensee found that the solid state protection system failed to operate relay K619 limit switch contact 33/8. This contact is designed to prevent motor cycling of MOV 3046 in the component cooling' water system to the reactor cc31 ant pumps. Subsequent review by the licensee indicated that this is a standard design feature but is only required for motor operated valves which have motor operators that have gears which

" relax" after valve closure. If the MOV gearing relaxes after closure and a close signal is still present, the torque F ' itch will close, re-energizing the motor, driving the gears and opening the

' torque switch again. Contact 33/8 prevents this repeated cyclin However, the motor operator for MOV 3046 has high speed gears that is not susceptible to relaxation. To eliminate the problem the licensee has installed a jumper to bypass this contact and has issued minor Departure 88-1937 to document and justify the jumper installatio This minor departure was approved by the plant staff and an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was performed. Surveillance test 2-STP-33.1B was satisfactorily completed following installation of the jumpe ;

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. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and corrective l actions and had no further question l 4 Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with TS. Items considered during the review included: verification that limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; approved procedures were used; completed work was inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or celebrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to

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service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and, radiological and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were also reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following maintenance retivities were observed / reviewed:

MWR-142753 Inspect and replace end cover bolts with stainless steel bolts on Room Cooler for Containment Spray Pump 2A l MWR 143849 Inspect and Clean (rod-out) Room Cooler for Containment Spray Pump 1A MWR's 143856, Inspect and clean (rod-out) Room Cooler for Charging Pump 2B 166903, 166904 MWR 175163 Installation of conduit in Auxiliary Building for security modification (PCN B-86-2-3515)

MWR 179035 Replace existing 1/2" pipe sensing line on Service Water Pump 2D with a stainless steel sensing line MWR 181132 Investigate slow start on Diesel Generator 2C from air header No. 2 MWR 181164 Repairs to Diesel Generator 2C totalizer MWR 181167 Repairs to surveillance start timer for Diesel Generators MWR 181216 Replace Waste Gas Compressor 1B Damaged Rebar During a review of MWR 175163 the inspectors inspected four penetrations which had been core drilled for installation of conduit through the wall separating Units 1 and 2 in the west cable chase. It was noted that one penetration, No. 05-155-16, contained three steel rebars that had been cut through and several which had been damaged during the core drill operation. The inspectors interviewed licensee and contractor personnel, reviewed various construction documents and identified the following sequence of event . Work was initiated on the core drills for these four penetrations on August 27, 198 During the preparation for the core drills the contractor noted that rebar was in the location of the proposed core drill location The design organization (Bechtel) was advised and approval was granted on August 29 to permit one horizontal rebar per ,

wall face per core drill to be cu On August 29 the core drill operation was actually begu On September 2 while drilling penetration No. 5-155-16 on the Unit 2 face side, three diagonal rebars were cut. Two rebars were cut completely through and one was cut about 1/2 through. The core drilling was stopped. Design engineering performed an evaluation and determine that the cut rebars presented no major problems. The contractors chipped the Unit I wall face at the location of the core

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drill to determine if any rebar was present. Concrete was removed to same depth as the location of the diagonal rebar on the Unit 2 face wall but no rebar was found. Therefore, the contractor assumed that no rebar was present. Core drilling resumed on September 7. Upon completion of the drilling it was noted that iebar was in fact located in the Unit 1 face wall and that one rebar had been cut completely through and three rebars had been cut about 1/2 throug Design engineering was advised of the situation and preliminary approval for all of the cut rebars was given on September 8. Formal approval will be incorporated into the PCN work package. However, verbal approval was received on September 1 The inspectors reviewed the concrete core drilling checklist required by Procedure 0-PMP-504, Installation of Piping and Tubing Systems, for these penetrations and the events associated with the construction activities. It appears that procedural adherence for cutting of this rebar was followed. The inspectors have no further questions at this time.

. Engineered Safety Systems Inspections (71710)

The inspectors performed various system inspections during the inspection

, period. Overall plant conditions were assessed with particular attention to equipment condition, radiological controls, security, ssfety, adherence to technical specification requirements, systems valve alignment, and locked valve verification. Major components'were checked for leakage and any general conditions that would degrade performance or prevent fulfillment of functional requirements. The inspectors verified that ,

approved procedures and up-to-date drawings were used. The systems were assessed to be operable in accordance with technical specifications, '

appropriate drawings, procedures, and the Final Safety Analysis Repor Portions of the following systems were observed for proper operations, valve alignment and valve verification:

Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Chemical Volume Control Systems

- Service Water Systens i Boric Acid Transfer Systems Containment Spray System Including Chemical Additive System Residual Heat Removal System No violations or deviations were identifie . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702) (Closed) 348,364/86-BI-03, NRC IE Bulletin 86-02, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Lin The licensee's letter of November 12, 1986 stated that Farley was not vulnerable to a single-

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failure of an air operated valve in the minimum flow recirculation lines to ECCS pumps. The inspector verified that the valves in the minimum flow lines from ECCS Pumps were motor operated valves in lieu of air operated and that these valves were maintained in the open position. Therefore, this item is close I (Closed) Violation 348, 364/88-19-01, Failure To Follow Procedures '

for Storage of Compressed Gas Cylinders. The licensee's letter of response dated August 4,1988 indicates the correctiive action take The cylinders were immediately secured and personnel have been retrained in the proper handling of gas cylinders. ' Subsequently, the inspector noted that the cylinders presently in use fit the available storage rack (Closed) Violation 348/88-19-02, Failure to Proviide Adequate Operability Inspections on 11 nit 1 Post Accident Containment Ventilation Filter Uni The licensee's letter of response dated August 4,1988 indicates the corrective action take All cover plates on the Unit 1 post accident containment verrtilation filter unit were inspected and tightened. The cover plates and flanges on the Unit 2 system were insper:ed and found to be properly secure Procedure 0-GMP-15.0 was revised to require all system bolts to be inspected to ensure tightness. The inspector verified that the procedure was properly revise (Closed) Violation 348/88-19-03, Failure to Provide Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Emergency Lighting System in Unit 1 Containment. The licensee's letter of response dated August 4,1988 indicates the corrective action taken. A revised safety evaluation report was obtained and reviewed by the plant operations review committee (PORC). The personnell involved have been counseled on the requirement to ensure that the safety evaluation developed by the design organization for design changes are valid. The inspector reviewed this action and had no further question . Exit Interview

. The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on September 12, 1988, with the plant t nager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detai The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material

reviewed by the inspection during this inspection.

I Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraph 6 were close ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 348,364/88-26-01 Violation - Failure to follow procedures which resulted in an inadvertent off-site gas release, loss of cooling to charging l

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, 10 ITEM NUMBER- DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE

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pump 2A ' bearing oil cooler, and trip of

- diesel 1-2A - paragraph 2.b.(1),

. 2.b. (2) and generator ,364/88-26-02 Unresolved Item - Inadequate fire protection features provided for Service Water Motor Operated' Valves controlling return flow in Service Water System - paragraph 2.b.(3).

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