ML20206H570
| ML20206H570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1987 |
| From: | Bellamy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Gallagher J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8704150390 | |
| Download: ML20206H570 (2) | |
Text
p) $O l APR 10 1987 Philadelphia Electric Company ATTN: Mr. J. W. Gallagher Vice President Nuclear Operations 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Gentlemen:
Enclosed for your review and consideration is a letter from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the NRC, and its enclosures, the Final Exercise Report for the October 9, ~1986 exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and the Remedial Exercise Report for the February 18, 1987 remedial exercise.
A number of significant problem areas identified by FEMA in Fulton Township, Pennsylvania were corrected and demonstrated during the remedial exercise on February 18, 1987. Two deficiencies identified by FEMA concerning alert and notification, and EBS messages by the Maryland State E0C, and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing capability will be addressed in a June 3,1987 remedial exercise. Several tasks that were not demonstrated at the Harford County, Maryland EOC during the exercise will also be addressed at the June 3, 1987 remedial exercise.
Should you have any questions concerning the enclosed material, please feel free to contact me at 215-337-5200.
Sincerely, Oricin21 E'pd By:
Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Emergency Preparedness and 87g41% h $ h 077 Radiological Protection Branch hD PDR Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls:
R. S. Fleischmann, Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station John S. Kemper, Senior Vice President, Engineering and Production W. H. Hirst, Director, Joint Generation Projects Department, Atlantic Electric G. Leitch, Nuclear Generation Manager i Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire i l
Eugene J. Bradley, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel Raymond L. Hovis, Esquire I Thomas Magette, Power Plant Siting, Nuclear Evaluations W. M. Alden, Engineer in Charge, Licensing Section Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) o / l NRC Resident Inspector NC")5 1 Comonwealth of Pennsylvania g (
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Philadelphia Electric Company 2 bec w/ enc 15 Region I Docket Room (with concurrerces) i DRP Section Chief
, -Robert J. Bores, DRSS l J. Schumacher, DRSS i
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RI:DRSS
, Schumacher Lazarus Bellamy 4/ 9 /87 4/6/87 4/ 10/87
! 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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I r, Federal Emergency Management Agency 4, ".o - ~ Washington, D.C. 20472 V2 \ \ n.-.
IDORANDUM EOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regu atory Caumission
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FROM: <. acinn Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards,
SUBJECT:
Final Exercise Report for the October 9,1986, Exercise of Offsite Radiologicar Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Peach Bottom Atomic Station Attached is a copy of the Final Exercise Report for the October 9,1986, exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. This exercise report was prepared by the Region III office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The following four deficiencies were identified as a result of this exercise:
State of Maryland
- 1. Sirens were sounded and the EBS was activated prior to the exercise and out-of-sequence. Because the process was not simulated during the exercise play, and therefore not observed, the State and risk counties did not denonstrate for evaluation the capability to canply with the 15-minute alert and notif1-cation requirement.
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- 2. 24-hour staf fing capability was not demonstrated.
- 3. Harford County, Maryland since many tasks required to be accomplished were not demon-strated for FEMA observation, FEMA Region III cannot state that there is adequate assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.
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2 The deficiencies identified for the State of Maryland and Harford County are scheduled to be addressed in a June 3,1987, remedial exercise. You will be notified as soon as the results of this exercise become available. In addition,,
a schedule of corrective actions for the remaining inadequacies in the State of Maryland.is attached.
Coninonwealth of Pennsylvania
- 4. Fulton Township, Pennsylvania Observation of a noinber of significant problem areas and a continued pattern of problems necessitate corrective actions. Examples are:
a) Initial notification of staff members was slow and
A never completed as all personnel could not be reached. ,
N b) Staffing at first and second shift positions was never '
completed as part of the plan.
c) Additional personnel in the EOC who were shifted to fill key staff positions did not have sufficient train-ing and knowledge to perform assigned tasks. ..
d) The Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) was not avail-able at this exercise nor the previous exercise.
e) The RadioliNical Officer, as acting EMC, operated in a vacuum. 'Ihe EOC staff provided no input, status, or assistance in fulfilling Township responsibilities.
f) EOC staff were not aware of which residents needed trans-portation assistance.
g) No briefings on use of dosimetry to emergency workers was conducted.
A remedial exercise was conducted on February 18, 1987, in Fulton Town-ship. You will be provided the results as soon as they beecme available. ,
If you should have additional questions, please contact Mr. Robert S.
Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachment
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T 3 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND REGIONAL ASSISTANCE C0tmITTEE REGION III EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION OPERATOR: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY LOCATION: PEACH BOTTOM TOWNSHIP, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT DATE: CECIMBER 1,1986 1
EXERCISE DATE: OJTOBER 9, 1986 -
PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Risk Counties of York, Chester, and Lancaster Thirteen Risk Municipalities State of Maryland .
Risk Counties of Cecil and Harford NON-PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS: None l
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4 e a TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Ph6E(S}
E xerc i s e Summa ry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -i v Background..........................................................v Participating Jurisdictions.........................................vi Observer Assignments................................................vil-vill Eval uat i on Cr i ter i a Us ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 x Exercise 0bjectives..........,......................................x-xy Exercise Scenario...................................................xvi
) Status of Prior Inadequacies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xvi i Exercise Objectives Not Adequately Demonstrated.....................xvill-xix Objectives Still to be Demonstrated.................................xx Exercise Reports................................................... 1-31 Emergency Operating Facility................................... 1 Joint Media Center............................................. 2 Red Cross Field Headquarters................................... 2-3 Ma ryl and St ate E0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 Cecil County............................................... 6-8 Harford County............................................. 8-9 Pennsylvania State E0C......................................... 10-15 Lancaster County and Mun icipal it ies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,3 2.16-26 York County and Municipalities............................. 26-30 Chester County and Mun ici pal i ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . 30-31 Inadequacies....................................................... 32-57 P roj ected Correcti ons , Ma ryl and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Atch 1 Projected Correcticas, Pennsylvania.................................Atch 2 ;
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f- 6 EXERCISE SLBMARY
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EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY The Emergency Operating Facility was adequate to support the liaisons from Maryland and Pennsylvania with appropriate communications equipment available. Utility personnel correctly declared a General Emergency at 1826. Protective action recomendations were not fonnulated until almost an hour later, with the Pennsylvania BRP nuclear engineer playing a key role in the development of the PARS. The utility's delay in providing PARS to the States resulted in some of the population being evacuated through the plume.
JOINT MEDIA CENTER The concept of providing a coordinated public information facility where a complete range of information about an incident, to include in plant activities, technical data about the reactor, projections of radiation releases', States activities and advices to the public, was only partially demonstrated since Pennsylvania provided a. liaison only and not a spokesperson to the Joint Media Center. Actual demonstration of 24-hour capability was not initiated by the utility or Maryland; although the.
utility has a considerable backup capability and a list of replacements.
The locati.on of the Joint Media Center may create a problem during an actual incident because the facility is located within the 10-mile EPZ.
RED CROSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS Basic problems in coordination of activities between the Red Cross and State and County Governments in Pennsylvania occurred since this function was demonstrated out of sequence. As stated in other exercise reports the Red Cross should be involved in scenario development and officially listed as an action location in the final scenario submitted to FEMA Region III.
MARYLAND STATE E0C Activation and staffing, facilities, communications systems were adequately demonstrated. Emergency Operations Management was conducted effectively.
The activation of the Public Alert and Notification System (sirens and EBS)
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was conducted prior to the start of the exercise. FEMA was not aware that l this process would occur out-of-sequence, as this was not included in the I scenario. Therefore, it was not observed. The alert and notification system activation was not simulated as part of the regular exercise play.
Maryland, Cecil County and Harford County did not. demonstrate the capability to comply with the 15 minute requirements established in FEMA REP-10. This procedure must be demonstrated during every REP exercise. Media Relations at the State E0C should be upgraded.
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7 r a STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE No 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated. When questioned about 24' hour staffing, personnel informed the evaluator that in-house resources were not available. This issue was originally considered a Deficiency that held up "350" approval of the Calvert Cliffs REP Plans. The problen was considered resolved but it is now evident that the same issue has resurfaced. Dose calculations were not performed by DHMH staff. An outside consultant,-using personal computer equipment directed dose assessment calculations.
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, MARYLAND In both Harford and Cecil Counties, all personnel were very knowledgeable of their roles, evacuation routes, assembly areas and mass care centers. The assignment of local police personnel was very beneficial.
CECIL COUNTY Emergency response capabilities were well demonstrated at this E0C. One staff position was not filled during the exercise. Siren and EBS activation was demonstrated out-of-sequence. Consequently the 15-minute requirements established in NUREG-0654 and FEMA REP-10 could not be evaluated. Cecil County Mass Care and Decontamination functions were demonstrated in a more than adequate fashion.
'HARFORD COUNTY The Harford County E0C staff were in position at the EOC prior to notification of Unusual Event and activation and staffing was not observed.
Staffing of all positions noted in the plan was not complete since the County USDA Agent did not part:cipate. As stated above the Siren and EBS System was activated out-of-sequence, before the start of the exercise. ;
Assembly Centers and Access Control points were also demonstrated out-of- 1 sequence. Many of the tasks that should have been accomplished at the Site l and Genergal Emergency stages were completed earlier in the scenario; j therefore, the staff reaction during a more pressure packed environment, <
which is usually the case during site and general emergency, could not be evaluated. Since many of the functions required to be accomplished were not .l observed because they were carried out prior to exercise start or out of sequence, FEMA Region III cannot state that there is adequate assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE E0C The State E0C is an excellent facility. The Operations Officer effectively l managed the staff's emergency response functions and appropriate response l actions were accomplished in a timely manner. The activation of the Alert '
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i and Notification Systen was coordinated with the risk Counties and; based on County reports, the' objective to comply with FEMA's 15-minute requirement
~was accomplished. High level decision-making capability was marred when the Analysis Group improperly challenged the Utility's General Emergency declaration. This incident is described in greater detail in the exercise reports.
BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Activities conducted at BRP were accomplished in accordance with the plan.
Several new staff members will need additional training in the area of dose assessment. Staff members immediately informed PEMA of the utility's declaration of General Energency. There was no disagreement at BRP Headquarters with the utility's emergency classification level.
SAMPLING TEAMS, PENNSYLVANIA Two sampling teams were dispatched, (out-of-sequence) one water sampling team and one agricultural sampling team. Both teans displayed the adequate training and knowledge to get appropriate samples; however, the water sampling team did not have record keeping forms and did not know the maximum dose permitted with authorization.
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PENNSYLVANIA The State. Police demonstrated a good understanding of their responsibilities during a radiological emergency. As with previous exercises in Pennsylvania, traffic control devices were not available. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation should demonstrate their capability to support the State Police by providing these devices in future exercises.
LANCASTER COUNTY The Lancaster County Emergency Management Coordinator and his staff displayed a high degree of professionalism throughout the course of the exercise. All actions and responsibilities were carried out in accordance with the RERP and Standard Operating Procedures. The innovative approach to the demonstrations for Reception Centers, Mass Care Centers and Decontamination Stations should be incorporated into the RERP exercises throughout the Country.
' Two school districts from Lancaster county participated in the exercise; ;
Penn Manor School District and SOLANC0 School District. Both Districts and j
'one school from each adequately displayed the capability to protect the i students assigned. ;
The Quarryville Presbyterian Nursing Home is located outside the 10-mile EPZ but has opted to participate in the radiological emergency preparedness l program. 18 patients would require anbulance transportation. The home has )
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one ambulance available and could get five additional ambulances and two buses from Lancaster County. Private cars could also be utilized. There is need.for more formal procedures to ensure that sufficient ambulances are available to transport non-ambulatory patients should an evacuation of the home be necessary.
Seven municipalities in Lancaster County participated in the exercise. Six of the seven municipalities performed their emergency responsibilities adequately. Various inadequacies have been identified and are included in the exercise reports.
Fulton Township, the seventh municipality did not adequately demonstrate the capability to protect the health and safety of its residents. Specific -
problem areas have been noted in detail in the exercise report.
YORK COUNTY The York County E0C was granted an exemption from participation in the Peach Bottom exercise. They did participate to provide information and instructions from the state to field activities and municipalities within the 10-mile EPZ of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Two persons in Fawn Grove Borough did not have pagers with them when the County tried to notify the municipalities of the incident.
Reception and relocation center staffs demonstrated outstanding motivation-and enthusiasm. There is a need for more formal arrangements to procure needed supplies. Written plans and procedures were not available.
The Brogue Ambulance As'sociation did an excellent job in displaying monitoring and decontamination procedures. -
The Southeastern School District demonstrated adequate capabilities to respond to an incident. However, the superintendent opted to delay mobilization of school buses until General Emergency. The superintendent should review the state, county and district plans in order to respond as outlined therein.
Five municipalities in York County are within the 10-mile EPZ. All five ;
participated in the exercise and performed their assigned functions adequately. Several areas have been identified as problems and are included in the exercise reports.
CHESTER COUNTY Chester County was granted an exemption from participation in the Peach Bottom exercise. They did provide a communications link between the state and West Nottingham Township.
West Nottingham Township is the only municipality in Chester County affected by the 10-mile EPZ. Overall response was adequate; however, there was no ,
support from local officials. A prior inadequacy has not been addressed as telephone lists are still incorrect. ,
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. BACKGROUND Federal requirements dictate that periodic Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness exercises be conducted in support of nuclear power plants to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities. The exercises test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. The exercises simulate a coordinated response by State and local authorities along with the utility, to include mobilization of personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to deal with an accident scenario requiring responses up to, and including, evacuation. This was the fourth full participation exercise for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. The last full participation exercise was conducted on October 17, 1984. Two municipalities, Drunore Township and Little Britain Township, in Lancaster County did not participate in that exercise. However, on April 10,1985 a remedial exercise was conducted in which both municipalities participated and adequately demonstrated their capabilities.
The purpose of this report is to record the capabilities of State and local governments to respond to an accident at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Plant based upon actual demonstration or simulation of their abilities during the October 9,1986, joint full participation exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action will be identified from this exercise and corrective actions will be reconmended which would help to improve preparedness and response capabilities. Areas recommended for Improvement will also be identified which would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
The exercise was observed by a team which included individuals from FEMA Region III, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and the Regional Assistance Committee.
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e 6 o a PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS STATES Maryland Pennsylvania PLORE EPZ JORISOICTIORS Cecil County, Maryland Harford County, Maryland Chester County, Pennsylvania West Nottingham Township, Chester County Lancaster County, Pennsylvania Drumore Township, Lancaster County East Drumore Township, Lancaster County Fulton Township, Lancaster County Little Britain Township, Lancaster County Martic Township, Lancaster County Providence Township, Lancas.Uhr County Quarryville Borough, Lancadter County York County, Pennsylvania [W d
I DeltaBorough,YorkCounty'6nty Fawn Grove Borough, York Co Fawn Township, York County ';-
Lower Chanceford Township, York County Peach Bottom Township, York County .
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e s PEACH BOTTOM REP EXERCISE OCTOBER 9, 1986 EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS i
RAC Chairman James R. Asher, FEMA Pennsylvania State EOC Stephen Hopkins, FEMA, Team Leader E0F Charlie Amato, NRC Joint Media Center Guy Brackett, FEMA Red Cross Field Headquarters Dale Petranech, Red Cross BRP Bill Belanger, EPA Traffic and Access Co.ntrol, PA Bob Burk, USD0T Air Sampling Team Nate Carter, DOE Agricultural Sampling Team Cheryl Malina, USDA Chester County Craig Pattani, FEMA, Tean Leader West Nottingham Township Bill Curtis, FEMA Lancaster County Jan Lamb, FEMA, Team Leader Darryl Hammons, FEMA Mass Care and Decon Station Dale Petranech, Red Cross Quarryville Nursing Home John Devlin, CPR Drumore Township Frank Ferenchak, FEMA East Drumowe Township Al Henryson, FEMA Fulton Township John Benn, FEMA Little Britain Township Rick Bath, FEMA Martic Township Jim Sutch, CPR Providence Township Herb Fish, DOE Quarryville Borough Neva Elliott, FEMA SOLONC0 School District Quarryville Elementary School Neva Elliott, FEMA Penn Manor School District Martic Elementary School Jim Sutch, CPR York County Joe McCarey, FEMA, Team Leader.
Decontamination Station / Hospital Cy Wengrovitz, CPR Reception / Mass Care John Devlin, CPR Delta Borough /Peachbottom Township Bob Linck, FEMA Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Grove Township Sam Wilson, CPR Lower Chanceford Township Hugh Laine, FEMA Southeastern School District Fawn Grove Elementary School Sam Wilson, CPR vii
Maryland State E0C Rick Kinard, FEMA, Team Leader Dave Thomas,' FEMA Department of Health Carol Hertzenberg, ANL Traffic and Access Control Bob Burk, USDOT -
Radiation Sampling Jerry Combs, DOE Agriculture Sampling KC Chung, ANL, George Goforth, CPR' Cecil County John Tatar, ANL, Team Leader Dick DiTu11.0, CPR Harford County Marty Frengs, FEMA, Team Leader Sam Nelson, ANL vili i
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EVALUATION CRITERIA USED The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local governments' response during this exercise was evaluated in relationship to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan, Annex E - Fixed Nuclear Facilities, dated November 1981 and the draft Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Accidents at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station for Chester, Lancaster and York Counties, along with the various municipal Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
The State of Maryland and local governments' response during this exercise was evaluated in relationship to ths State of Maryland's Radiological Emergency Plan and for Fixed Nuclear Plan which is Annex 0 of the Maryland Disaster Assistance Plan; and draft Appendix 2 of that plan, which is site specific to Peach Bottom; and the draft Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Fixed Nuclear Facilities of Cecil and Harford County.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE MARYLAND
- 1. Ridi6166idil'E64F65669 Pli65 To demonstrate the adequacy and capability of implementation of State, plume and ingestion zone county radiological emergency response plans.
- 2. A66idi6t'Asissi646f
- a. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the State' accident assessment system, to include adequacy of equipment, personnel staffing and competency skills and with respect to reporting, dose projection, field measurement, actions for coordination, communication and decision (s) for recommended protective actions.
- b. To demonstrate the activation, staffing and functions of the Ingestion Pathway Coordinating Center ((IPCC).
- 3. H6tifi65ti66 568 06mm6ni65ti665 -
- a. To test and demonstrate the adequacy of the PBAPS notification and alert procedures in the following areas:
- 1) Notification by PBAPS to State and county government.
- 2) Notification by the Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency (MEM&CDA) to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Division of Radiation Control (DRC), plume zone and ingestion zone county emergency operations centers (E0C),
selected State Departments / Agencies, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), contiguous States, and the American Red Cross.
- 3) Notification by Plume Zone and Ingestion Zone Counties and State Departments / Agencies of emergency response staff personnel. -
- b. To test and demonstrate the ability of key emergency response personnel in implementing notification procedures in the event of an accident at PBAPS to include continuing notification and coordination,
- c. To demonstratethe ability of State and County authorities to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the PBAPS. To include operability of prompt notification system sirens.
- d. To demonstrate the ability of State and County authorities to provide the public within the PBAPS plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone of the plant periodic updates of emergency status.
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- e. To test and demonstrate the adequacy of external communication systems from PBAPS, State, and county emergency operations centers and field locations. Federal agencies and contiguous states system wil.1 also be checked.
- f. To demonstrate timely feedback to the AAC, ECC, and EOF from the counties and the state EOC on the status of protective action implementation and of other situations affecting county operations.
.. '4. 06fnini68 i68 066Fd16sti66
- a. To demonstrate the ability of key (state. county) emergency response personnel to initiate and coordinate timely and effective decisions-with respect to an accident at PBAPS.
- b. To demonstrate the capability of Federal, state, and county emergency response agencies to. identify and provide resource requirements.
- c. To demonstrate the capability of State and county governments in coordinating (internally / externally) actions, needs, and status of situations between organizations for the purpose of acquiring support and evoking appropriate decisions.
- d. To demonstrate the level of support and participation provided by the responsible elected / appointed officials.
- 5. PF6tE6tivE~Acti66s ,
- a. To demonstrate the capability of State, county and State Departments / Agencies emergency response systems to make decisions and ,
to implement the following protective actions:
1)' Take Shelter (limited)
- 2) Evacuation (limited)
- 3) Access Control (limited)
- 4) Food, water, milk, and livestock feed control (limited)
The ingestion zone counties will demonstrate ingestion zone operations in support of Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH), and to provide information to the public as necessary. l
- 6. Parallel' Action's ,
l To demonstrate the capability of the State, county and State Departments / Agencies emergency response systems to make decisions and to implement the following parallel actions.
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- a. Emergency Medical Services: (not to be exercised).- l b .' Radiation Exposure Control s
- 1) To, demonstrate methods and resources for distribution, issuance,
'and administering of potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers.
, 2) To demonstrate methods and resources for distribution of dosimetry to emergency workers. '
i 3) To demonstrate personnel monitoring, equipme,t monitoring, and decontamination procedures. -
- 4) To demonstrate the methods and capability of State, county, and i local emergency personnel for keeping radiation exposure records. .
. c. Law Enforcement and Crim.e Prevention (not to be. exercised).
- d. Mass Care (Limited) 4
- 1) To demonstrate the capability of the State and County emergency response system to provide food, clothing and shelter for i evacuees to include evacuation center operations.
Reentry and Recovery (not to be exercised) e.
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- 7. Public'Information
, To demonstrate the State and county Public Information Program and the-adequacy of the interface of State, county, and PBAPS public information systems with the news media.
- 8. Emergency Operations ~ Center
! a. To test and demonstrate the adequacy of the emergency operations j center with respect to space, comfort, and function for managing a fixed nuclear facility incident.
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- b. To test and demonstrate the adequacy, appropriateness, and j effectiveness of the internal comunications systems within the E0C,
, to include maps and displays. ,
! c. To demonstrate the adequach of staffing ~and. competency of staff.
- d. To test and' demonstrate the adequacy of access control and security means for EOC. i 1 j i
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- 1. To demonstrate the ability to activate state, county, and municipal E0Cs in a timely manner.
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- 2. To demonstrate the adequacy of the public alert and notification
- system. Public alert and notification for this exercise will be the
! sounding of sirens and activation of the emergency broadcast system (EBS).
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- 3. To demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process by state, i
county, and municipal governments.
1 4, To demonstrate the adequacy of communication systemsa among and within
! emergency response organizations and between designated facilities and i fie,ld activities, i 5. To demonstrate that the state and county emergency management agencies i
have the capability to provide an ' alert signal .and informational or instructional message to the public within 15 minutes. This demonstration will not, however, be tied to a protective action
, announcement. It will include notification of the risk counties, their i subsequent notification of the respective municipalities, confirmation of municipal notification, activation of the sirens and broadcast of an j EBS informational message. The ability to conduct route alerting, if
! necessary, will be demonstrated by the dispatch of one municipal route alert sector team in each of the three risk counties.
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- 6. To demonstrate the internal message and information flow (collection,
- analysis, and dissemination) in the state, county, and municipal E0Cs.
! 7. To demonstrate the ability of the Department of Environmental Resources and the Department of Agriculture to take environmental samples and
- transport the samples to collection points.
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- 8. To demonstrate the abilities of state, county, and municipal governments to provide traffic control and to control access into the EPZ and effectively perform a coordinated evacuation (out-of-sequence).
- 9. To demonstrate the operational knowledge and support from state, county,
- and municipal elected and appointed public officials regarding plan familiarity, operations process, and decision-making.-
. 10. To demonstrate the capabilities of state, county, and municipal .
i governments to implement emergency response plans to protect the.
public's health and safety.
- 11. To demonstrate the existence and adequacy of emergency facilities i and equipment to support the emergency response.
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' 12. To demonstrate notification procedures to risk school districts. School districts will assess emergency procedures for alerting students and appropriate protective action (simulated). Unmet needs will be assessed and reported through the districts to the county emergency management coordinator (out-of-sequence).
- 13. To demonstrate accident assessment capabilities by the state and their decisions based on that assessment.
- 14. To demonstrate the ability to coordinate, communicate, and cooperate in in the area of public information.
- 15. To explain the procedures for the issuance of dosimetry and KI and associated record-keeping at each county and municipal -risk E0C
- 16. To demonstrate the operation of one reception center and one mass care center in Lancaster County.
- 17. To demonstrate monitoring and decontamination procedures at one mass care center and at one decontamination / monitoring station for emergency workers in Lancaster County.
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SCENARIO CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS Projected Actual Time PA Time MD 1600 Alert 1606 1601 1800 Site Area Emergency 1814 1825 2000 General Emergency 1845 1850 Evacuation Implemented 1926 1930 2010 4
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STATUS OF PRIOR INADEQUACIES During the last Peach Bottom exercise held on October 17, 1984, two Category "A" deficiencies were sited: 1. two Lancaster County municipalities, Little Britain and Drumore Townships would not allow federal observations;
, 2. Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Grove Township E0C did not demonstrate that
! adequate protective measures could be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
On April 10, 1985, a remedial exercise was held to correct these Category "A" Deficiencies. Drumore and Little Britain Townships demonstrated an adequate capability to implement their plans; and Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Grove Township adequately activated their joint E0C and implemented the 1 offsite plans; thereby eleminating the Category "A" Deficiencies.
- Forty-nine (49) Category "B" deficiencies were also identified during the October 17, 1984 exercise. Forty-four (44) of these Category "B" deficiencies were adequately corrected during the exercise held on October 9, 1986.
- The following Category "B" deficiencies have not been adequately addressed:
West Nottingham Township [ ..
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- 7. Some of the phone numbers on the Township's call lists were not
. correct. These lists should be regularly checked for accuracy. f Fulton Township ,
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- 13. The Township did not exercise staffing requirements as per its plan.'*
An official not so designated acted as EMC. The designated EMC made no attempt to prepare the Operations Room for readiness and was not f
available to serve as a key staff member. The Deputy EMC went to another facility and performed the sole function of route alerting.
- 14. No 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> manning capability was demonstrated.
- 16. Additional training and familiarity with the Township plan ta include responsibilities and communications systems available and use of those systems is needed for the E0C staff.
Cecil County
- 41. One of the County's designated radio stations did not activate its EBS because this was an exercise and not an actual emergency.
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EXERCISE OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED MARYLAND Objective 1. was not adequately demonstrated in Harford County since all E0C staff and field emergency workers were mobilized prior to the start of the exercise. Activation and staffing did not occur in accordance with the County Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
Objective 2a-Accident Assessment has not been adequately demonstrated. DHMH staff informed the evaluator that they do not have the necessary in-house resources to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing capability; but instead would rely on federal assistance. This issue was originally considered a deficiency that held up "350" approval of the Calvert Cliffs REP Plans. The problem was considered resolved for the Calvert Cliffs 350 approval but it has resurfaced during the Peach Bottom exercise.
Objective 3.a.3, and 3.b, were not demonstrated in Harford County. All emergency response positions were staffed prior to notification of an Unusual Event; therefore, staff notifications could not be observed' by the evaluator.
Objective 3.c., notification to the Public has not been adequately addressed. The Alert and Notification System (sirens and EBS) was activated prior to the start of the exercise. FEMA was not aware that this process would occur out-of-sequence as this was not included in the scenario submission. Since the activation of the Alert and Notification system was not observed prior to the exercise and was not simulated during the exercise, the State and risk counties did not meet the requirements of NUREG-0654 and FEMA REP-10.
Objective 3: This objective was only partially demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. 1he Analysis Group improperly challenged the Utility's General Energency declaration.
Objectives 1, 6, 9, 10, 15 were not adequately demonstrated in Fulton Township.
1 Initial notification of personnel was slow and never completed. All staff members could not be reached. Staffing of first and second shift positions was never completed.
Staff members present did not have sufficient training and knowledge to perform assigned duties. '
The Emergency Management Coordinator was absent for second exercise.
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There was no coordination between the acting EMC and' emergency response staff.
E0C staff members were not aware of who needed transportation assistance.
No briefing or discussions were given on Radiological Exposure Control.
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. o OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE DEMONSTRATED 1988 will be the final year in the Peach Bottom Six-year Cycle of objectives to be demonstrated. The following objectives must be addressed in 1988:
- 1. Schools
- 2. Medical
- 3. After Hours Exercise
- 4. Unannounced Exercise
- 5. Ingestion Pathway Exercise PENN$YLVARIA
- 1. After Hours Exercise
- 2. Una pounced Exercise
- 3. Ing tion Pathway Exercise w
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EXERCISE REPORTS EMERGENCY.0PERATING FACILITY .
OVERVIEW With one exception, mobilization of the Maryland and Pennsylvania E0F representatives occurred in a timely manner, and in accordance with the pl ans. The Harford County representative was pre-positioned, having arrived
> prior to the Alert declaration. The utility declared the E0F functional within 90 minutes of the Alert. The E0F facilities were adequate to support
- the Maryland and Pennsylvania personnel present. They had immediate access
- to all information sources, including the Site Emergency Coordinator. The available communciations systems including telecopiers, performed satisfactorily. Press releases and other informational functions were performed at the Joint Media Center, not the EOF.
Utility personnel correctly followed Emergency Procedure 101, and declared a General Emergency at 1826 The basis was fuel damage indicated by a high radiation reading in the primary containment (dry well) and pressure of 10 psig. There was no release to the environment at the time, and no protective action recommendations (PARS) were made. Protective action.
recommendations were not formulated until almost an hour after the General Emergency declaration. The Pennsylvania BRP nuclear engineer played a key role in developing the appropriate PAR, which called for an evacuation out to two miles in all sectors, and out to five miles in the downwind sectors (based on Emergency Procedure 317-1, logic tree). The utility staff's delay, however, resulted in some of the population evacuating through the plume. After the release began, dose projections were made, and the recommended evacuation distance was increased to 10 miles. Deposition and ingestion dose commitments were made, and food-chain PARS were developed.
Utility dose assessors incorrectly used a conservative dose model; the Site Emergency Coordinator recognized the error and ordered it corrected. Field i and Pennsylvania teams and were used data were received from both ut,lity where available in preference to plant information in calculating projected doses. There was no evidence as to whether the utility staff considered recommending the use of KI. Maryland and Pennsylvania both accepted the PARS but applied different policies in implementing them.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The Utility declared General Emergency at 1826. However, at that time no protective action recommendations were given and no actual release was occurring. When protective action recommendations were given, almost an hour later, an actual release was occurring; thereby failing to minimize dose to evacuees.
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JOINT MEDIA CENTER OVERVIEW The coordinated concept of providing a Media Center where the media can obtain a complete range of information about an incident including in-plant activities and technical data about the reactor and plant measurements and projections of radiation releases, State activities and advices to the public by both affected states was not supported since Pennsylvania provided a liaison only and not a spokesperson in the Joint Media Center. Staffing on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis was not demo,nstrated. Philadelphia Electric has considerable back-up capability and a list of replacements. Maryland did not immediately identify who would replace thea. PE provided an excellent, well-trained clerical staff with plenty of dupiicating, telecoping, and typing facilities including word processing.
The building housing the Joint Media Center is adequate; however, no backup power is available. The location of the Joint Media Center is a problem since it is situated within the 10-mile EPZ. Access by the media would be restricted by Pennsylvania Access and Traffic control plans. In addition,
, the facility may have to be relocated if and when an evacuation is
" directed. While no private places for interviews were directly identified, there are offices which would provide this if needed in a real event and coordinated with persons using offices for conferencing. All communications are by telephone. This is considered adequate due to the triple redundancy available. The informational function of the center was limited to the briefings held for the media present. Press releases were generated at the State EOCs and were provided to the media center for information purposes and were made available to the media present. The briefings were well
- handled but were not complete without a spokesperson from Pennsylvania. PE had artists present who created displays which were used to explain the particular plant problem. This was a nice added feature of the briefings.
There were no Rumor Control activities in the Media , Center.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The Joint Media Center is located within the 10-mile EPZ. Access to the Center will be restricted by Traffic and Access Control Plans. In addition, The Joint Media Center will have to relocate if and when'an evacuation is directed. Consideration should be given to finding a new location for the Center to make it more accessible to the media and to remove the need to relocate this important facility during an evacuation.
RED CROSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS OVERVIEW The York County Chapter serves as host for Red Cross Field Operations. The Headquarters served as a hub for the supervision of all Red Cross activities in the affected area. Basic communications problems were caused when two risk counties in Pennsylvania demonstrated their mass care facilities out of sequence. The problems were compounded when support elements were not in 2
place to effectively support Red Cross exercise operations. The Red Cross Chapters were not notified of school evacuations, which were also played out of sequence. Neither the County nor the State E0Cs in Pennsylvania were activated at the time.
The Red Cross estimate of total evacuees needing mass care is considerably less than the States'. Red Cross has notified all states of their estimates, but state organizations prefer to use their own. While the states are responsible for determining the estimated number of people they are expected to care for, it should be pointed out that the Red Cross initial plans for support are based on their own statistics, not on the states.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. Basic communications problems were caused when two counties in Pennsylvania played mass care demonstrations out of sequence. The problems were compounded when support elements were not in place to effectively support Red Cross operations.
- 2. The Red Cross estimate of total evacuees needing mass care is considerably less than the number the States have assumed for planning purposes. The American Red Cross and the States should continue to establish dialogue concerning mutual support in mass care in order to resolve the inadequacy. ;-
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- . o MARYLAND' STATE'E0C OVERVIEW Activation of the Maryland State.E0C occu'rred in a prompt manner, although P when the utility made declarations of a Site Area Emergency and General Emergency, the notification .to the State E0C was not very timely. Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated through the presentation of-a i roster and double staffing of some positions. Emergency operations
! management was conducted effectively. The facilities were adequate although a relocation of the public information function should be considered to give
- it better access to the operations area. Communications systems to other jurisdictions were adequate with back-up systems available and_ operating.
Public alerting and instruction activities were performed out-of-sequence or were untimely due .to underutilization of available communication systems.
Protective _ actions were implemented in support of the two risk counties.
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Media relations need to be upgraded.
I i PROBLEM AREAS j 1. The utility's notification to the State EOC of the Site and General i Emergency classifications was not timely, taking in both instances, i approximately twenty minutes. At the Site Emergency declaration the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene liaison at the State EOC 1 reported that his department had recieved the change of classification information from the utility almost immediately after it had been declared. This situation is clearly not the fault of personnel at the State E0C; however, the Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency should pursue this problem with the utility.
- 2. Sirens were sounded and the EBS was activated prior to the exercise.
FEMA was not aware that this process would occur out-of-sequence as this was not included in the sceriario; therefore, it was not observed.
It is undbrstood that the entire statewide EBS network was involved and that the Governer participated, as well. However, since the process was not observed prior to the exercise and it was not simulated as part of the regular exercise play, the State and risk Counties did not i demonstrate the capability to comply with the 15-minute alert and
! notification requirement established in FEMA-REP-10. This procedure needs to be demonstrated at every REP exercise.
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l 3. The public information function was somewhat of a weak point. It was evident that the PIO is certainly a qualified individual. It is equally apparent that he is not as well-versed as he should be about the specific procedures for responding to a nuclear power plant
{ incident. The PIO was not aware of the S0P written for his position
- and thus his knowledge of the resources available to him was limited, i especially from a communications standpoint.
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- 4. Physical arrangements established for the PIO were somewhat awkward.
The PIO liaison in the operations room is poorly positioned to be able 1
to read important information on the status boards. In addition, if the PIO function was located immediately adjacent to the operations area in a room with direct visual access, it would preclude the need j for an individual moving back and forth with information.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE
- OVERVIEW Staff mobilization for the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
'was not observed, since the exercise started during working hours. While the staff present were capable and well informed, round-the-clock staffing was not fully demonstrated. Emergency operations management was conducted s fairly infonnally, as the working group at DHMH was relatively small.
Facilities were-limited but adequate to the occasion. Communications were ,
fairly good overall, apart from the fact that it turned out not to be possible to set up a desired conference call between DHMH, the E0C at Pikesville and the E0F at the plant. Dose projection was demonstrated from both plant data and field team results; however, dose assessment
. calculations were conducted under the direction of an outside consultant using computer equipment brought in for the occasion. The ingestion Pathway Coordinating Center was physically not demonstrated, but their basic capability was shown using a table-top approach. Protective action recommendations were arrived at, reviewed, and updated in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, and utility personnel, but release of protective action recommendations was not fully coordinated between the States. -
1 PROBLEM AREAS i
- 1. When questioned about twenty-four staffing capability, the federal i observer was informed that DHMH does not have the necessary in-house
- resources but instead would rely on federal assistance. This issue was
! originally considered a deficiency that held up "350" approval of the i Calvert Cliffs REP Plans. The problem was considered resolved but it is now evident that.It has resurfaced. DHHH should work to address 3 this issue as quickly as possible.
- 2. Dose assessment calculations were conducted under the direction of an outside consultant using computer equipment brought in for the occasion. In future exercises,,the DHMH staff should conduct their own calculations, t
i 3. Conference call capability on the Peach Bottom Green phone should be effected among DHMH, the E00 at Pikesville, and the EOF at the plant in
- order that all critical decisionmakers can talk to each other. ,
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. o MARYLAND TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL OVERVIEW Harford County was observed out-of-sequence and locations were manned prior to the scheduled start of the exercise. In both Harford and Cecil Counties all personnel were very knowledgeable of their roles, evacuation routes, assembly areas and mass care centers. In Cecil County (at all three locations) flares were placed and all traffic entering the plume zone was stopped, informed of the exercise and told that if an accident actually occurred they would not be allowed to enter the zone beyond that point.
Additionally, a flyer was given to each motorist informing them of the purpose of access control points, and the exercise, in general. Also, at each location evacuation route signing was posted. In both counties use of local police personnel was very beneficial.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. One of the access control locations in Cecil County (No. 3) was not.
updated with regard to a route designation change from a state route (Rte 269) to a County Road (Liberty Grove Road). There should be a scheduled review of access control points on a continuing basis to update nomenclature.
MARYLAND FIELD MONITORING TEAM OVERVIEW The Maryland Field Monitoring Team performed in a very professional manner.
They arrived at their assigned location quickly. Their large, powerful vehicle was fully equipped for monitoring responsibilities. The team was familiar with the area and sampling points. The team demonstrated good procedures with all instruments. Radio communication was continuous and reception was good. Outdated KI was the only problem during the exercise.
PROBLEM AREA
- 1. The expiration date on the bottles of KI carried by the monitoring team was 1982. It is well past the date for this important radioprotective drug to be replaced; this should be done as soon as possible.
4 CECIL COUNTY E0C OVERVIEW The Cecil County E0C was fully operational within thirty minutes of the
. declaration of the Alert. The USDA County Extension Agent position was not staffed for the exercise. Emergency Operations Management was excellent.
Appripriate staff were consulted when decisions had to be made. The E0C has enough space and equipment to more than adequately provide for 6
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emergency operations. The Cecil County E0C had communications and back-up communication links to all relevant organizations. One problem did occur in the operation of the blue phone direct line to PBNPS. A conference was held and a decision was made at the General Emergency declaration not to implement protective actions based on no release at the time and wind direction. The decision was made in conjunction with the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and consultation among staff at the E0C. When protective action recommendations were given later in the General Emergency, and the Governor directed an evacuation, the Cecil County EOC staff did evacuate the public as directed. No radiological release information was provided to Cecil County. EBS and siren activation occurred out-of-sequence due to a state mandated time frame, resulting in a problem in public alerting during the exercise. Access control was initiated out-of-sequence at the request of the evaluator. Lists of mobility impaired were available. Ingestion pathway actions were not tested in the scenario.
Some dosimetry was available at the E0C, but the E0C is well outside the plume EPZ. Media briefings were conducted in a professional manner. The scenario demanded no reentry and recovery operations.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The blue phone direct line to the PBNPS did not operate at the E0C during the exercise,.but it did operate at the Cecil County communications center. The system should be checked out and repaired.
- 2. The E0C received notification of the Site Emergency at 1853. Part of the problem was a 10-minute delay between the communications center and the E0C, but there is another 38 minute delay between the declaration of the Site Area Emergency and when it was received by the communications center which is unaccounted for.
- 3. After the recommendation for evacuation by the Governor, no simulation of the sounding of sirens and EBS was demonstrated. This is in part due to the fact that having conducted that operation out of sequence by state mandate, the EMC did not think a simulation of it was necessary.
- 4. The County USDA Agent did not participate in the exercise.
CECIL COUNTY DECONTAMINATION OVERVIEW The Susquehanna/ Chesapeake Job Corps Center is used for the Decontamination Station. There are accommodations there for about 1600 Job Corps students.
Permanent staff including emergency medical personnel are available round the clock. It makes an ideal location for use as a decontamination station because of the facilities available. It is located two miles outside the 10 mile EPZ. The Bainbridge fire station, located on the Job Corps Center, 7 ,
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was manned by about 14 county public health personnel including nurses.
County police were used for traffic control. Cecil County Public Health personnel arrived at 1945. The decontamination center was efficiently set up. A member of the County Public Health Department assumed immediate command and should be comended for the actions he took in establishing and managing the station.
CECIL COUNTY, MARYLAND, RELOCATION CENTER, PERRYVILLE HIGH SCHOOL OVERVIEW The Mass Care Center was managed by the Red Cross, although the High School Principal was on location. There was coordination in management of the shelter. Evacuees are to report to the decontamination center before reporting to the mass care center. The exact time at which the emergency staff arrived was not observed because of timing sequences. The high school is adequate to accommodate about 600 evacuees. The High School Principal stated that the student enrollment is 540 and a two day food supply is on hand. Cots and blankets are to be provided by the Red Cross via York, Pennsylvania, Red Cross Office.
PROBLEM AREA
- 1. It is recommended that the Cecil County E0C provide the Relocation Center periodic updates on the status of the emergency.
HARFORD COUNTY E0C OVERVIEW The Harford County E0C personnel performed many of their designated responsibilities during the exercise far earlier than they are supposed to during an actual event. Not only did this violate the schedule of actions established by the plan, but it precluded observation by the federal evaluator, who arrived about 15 minutes prior to the Alert declaration. The actions which were performed prematurely at the County Emergency Management Coordinator's initiative included: E0C staff notification and mobilization, E0C activation, establishment of access control points, and assembly center activation. In addition, the public alert and rotification system was activated prematurely, as explained under the State E0C section of this report. Although the State is considered primarily responsible for this decision, there was no simulation of this function by the County staff at the appropriate time in the exercise. As a result, the exercise objectives associated with these actions were not adequately demonstrated.
Full first-shift staffing was not complete, as the USDA extension agent did not participate. The EMC stated that 24-hour staffing capability was available, and an actual shift change occurred for several positions. The 8
E0C facilities, communications equipment and backup systems were adequate to support E0C operations. Route alerting by State and county police vehicles was not activated during the exercise. Dosimetry equipment and KI were distributed and utilized.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The USDA Extention Agent was not present for the exercise.
- 2. Since many tasks required to be accomplished were not observed because many responsibilities were carried out prior to exercise start or out
. of sequence, FEMA Region III cannot. state that there is adequate assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.
q, REM PTION CENTER, HARFORD COUNTY OVERVIEW
- The reception center was adequately staffed by trained personnel. Maps and directions to mass care facilities were available and provisions swere made for traffic and access control. No problem areas were noted.
RELOCATION CENTER', HARFORD COUNTY OVERVIEW Activation and staffing of the relocation center o urred in a timely manner. The staff present were adequate ~ to providehall needed emergency functions. They had the requisite backgrounds and % 3 raining to meet the emergency requirements. Second and third shift personnel were identified.
The relocation center was located at least five miles outside the 10-mile EPZ and could handle 250 evacuees. Facilities werelavailable to handle more.
evacuees if necessary. There was enough food 'cupplies on hand to feed 1500' people for three to four days. Adequate comunications were available. . No i
problem areas were gotcd.
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'9ECONTAMINATION STATION, HARFORD COUNTY .
OVERVIEW i The decontamination station is located in the Fallston High School. The procedures and equipment ward adequate; however, only the monitoring of people was actually demeastrate6. Monitoring of equipment and vehicles was discussed with no actual demonstration. There are no provisions for contaminated washwater. Approximately 60 persons per hour could be'taken care of at this station.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. Monitoring personnel should ansider a demonstration of monitoring and decontamination of equipment and vehicles at the next exercise.
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- PENNSYLVANIA STATE E0C OVERVIEW Activation of the E0C, and notification and mobilization of the E0C staff occurred in accordance with the emergency plan and exercise objectives. The Operations Officer effectively managed the staff's emergency operations, and appropriate re.ponse actions were accomplished in a timely manner. High-level decision-making capability; however, was marred when the Analysis Group improperly challenged the utility's General Emergency declaration.
This incident is described in greater detail below.
The State E0C is an excellent,. fully-equipped facility. More than adequate communications capability was demonstrated by a variety of primary and backup systems. Appropriate protective actions (full EPZ evacuation) were determined and implemented by State officials in accordance with the plan.
After receiving BRP's recommendation, the Analysis Group quickly concurred, and the PEMA Director simulated contacting the Governor for his official decision. The action was also coordinated with the Maryland E0C.
The decision to activate the public Alert and Notification system was made by the PEMA Director prior to the formulation'of protective actions, as permitted by the plan. The siren-sounding and EBS activation times were coordinated with the counties. Based on county reports to the State E0C, l the objective to comply with FEMA's fifteen minute time allowance for completion of this action was b:conplished. The appropriate state organization representatives at the E0C coordinated the state responsibilities necessary to implement traffic and access control.
PEMA's PIO supervised the Emergency News and Information Center, located adjacent to the E0C. Plan procedures were followed in coordinating the flow of information between the E0C and the near-site Joint Media Center, which was staffed by another liaison. A tctal of 13 news releases, covering the major events, were prepared at the energency news and information center.
They were transmitted via high-speed telefax to the Joint Media Center for.
distribution. The news items were generally clear and appropriate to the situation. Rumor control numbers were also established.
There was no evidence at the State E0C of actions to implement Ingestion Pathway protective measures, other than for farm animals, but this was not a specific objective. It was also not an objective to demonstrate reentry and recovery, pending the development cf FEMA guidance.
As stated above, the Analysis Group at the E0C, consisting of tr.e PEMA Director, a BRP liaison, and an NRC regional representative, inappropriately questioned the utility's General Emergency declaration. The PEMA Director announced that plant conditions did nct appear to justify a General Emergency, and quoted a critical containment pressure which later proved to be incorrect (the actual figure is considerably lower). The Operations staff was instructed to notify the risk counties, which had received the ,
General Emergency notification directly from the utility, to disregard the f I
utility's messages until further notice from PEMA. The Analysis Group deliberated for 20 minutes before acknowledging the General Emergency status. i 10
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The Analysis Group, which is. responsible for considering protective action l
recomendations, was not supported in its challenge of the utility's General Emergency declaration by the State's technical experts. The staff at BRP Headquarters and BRP's nuclear engineer at the EOF accepted without question the utility's General Emergency. declaration (the EPA and NRC RAC members, evaluating at BRP Headquarters and the EOF, respectively, also agree that it i was a correct classification).
The Analysis Group was therefore wrong both in fact (there was no basis for
- a challenge, and they had incorrect technical data) and .in principal . (only the State's technical experts, BRP, could conceivably .be justified in questioning a utility emergency classification). The result was a 20-minute
' delay in implementing the offsite state and local- General Emergency response actions. This is not considered a Deficiency, only because there was no
- release at the time, and no protective action recommendation. A more
! intangible consequence; however, is the damage to PEMA's credibility at the i local level.
PROBLEM AREAS l 1. E0C activation and staff mobilization were performed at the Alert stagc, rather than at Site Area Emergency, as the plan specifies. This
- was done on a trial basis. If state officials decide to adopt this i policy, the plan should be modified accordingly.
l 2. The Analysis Group at the State EOC improperly and incorrectly
. challenged the utility's declaration of General Emergency, resulting in i a 20-minute delay in implementing offsite General Emergency response actions. Analysis Group members should ' review their role, relative to the responsibilities and authorities of BRP and the utility, regarding i emergency classification. The Analysis Group should refrain from
- second-guessing the state's designated technical experts regarding .
onsite matters in the future.
BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION, PENNSYLVANIA i
! OVERVIEW k As the exercise began during a norma _1 workday afternoon, staffing was j already complete, except for one key staff member who was out of town on j official business. BRP's EOF representative, a nuclear engineer, was in Washington, DC. He was notified after the Alert was declared, and he proceeded directly to the E0F. This was a good demonstration of staff mobilization when an important individual is out of town. An alternate also j was sent to the E0F at the proper time.
Emergency operations management was effective. All necessary maps and data were available, and the facilities were adequate for the needs of BRP. Two important telephone links did not operate properly, but backup systems were
- satisfactorily substituted.
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Dose assessment was performed using hand calculations, and a computer dose assessment program (IRDAM) was demonstrated. The evacuation recommendation was based on a potential for release, not on an ongoing release, so the dose assessment function ~was complicated by a very uncertain source term. BRP's dose calculations did not appear to match well with the Utility's, although no errors in the calculation were evident. The computer and hand calculations agreed with each other, indicating that the information used by~
the utility was not the same as that used by BRP. The discrepancy was not identified during the exercise, but was explained satisfactorily in the i post-exercise briefing. The problem was with plant parameters; BRP's dose calculations were done correctly.
Several new BRP staff members did not appear to be well-trained in the dose calculation procedures. Such staff members .should receive additional training. Radiological monitoring teams did not play in the sequence of the exercise. However, communications with the teams and apprcpriate protective measures were simulated. The protective action recommendations made by BRP for the general public were appropriate. Upon receiving the utility's general emergency notification at 1827, BRP immediately notified PEMA, as the plan specifies (there was no disagreement with the utility's emergency classification).
The evacuation recommendation came at 1920, almost an hour later. During that time, both BRP and Maryland (by telephone) expressed concern that the plant was in an uncontrolled condition, and monitored the plant status closely. When the evacuation recommendation came, it was precautionary and based on plant conditions. BRP immediately concurred and forwarded the ,
recommendation to PEMA.
r The evaluation of the off-site performance, as well as the control of the conduct of the exercise, were compromised by several related scenario problems--an on-site scenario was unavailable to both the controller and evaluators, and incomplete distribution of last-minute scenario changes resulted in significant differences between the evaluator's and controller's off-site scenarios. This prevented the problem concerning dose calculations fronr being identified and analyzed during the course of the exercise.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. Two primary communications system components, the dedicated telephone line linking BRP Headquarters with the State EOC, and the dedicated line linking the utility with BRP and Maryland's accident assessors, did not function properly. Both lines should be repaired and tested periodically to assure they remain in operating condition.
12 O
- 2. Several new BRP staff members were not adequately familiar with the dose calculation procedures. Additional training should be provided.
WATER SAMPLING TEAM, PENNSYLVANIA OVERVIEW The collection of water samples was demonstrated by a one-member DER team.
The initial notification was not performed, as the demonstration occurred out-of-sequence, but the team member verbally described a satisfactory mobilization procedure. Adequate water sampling equipment is pre-distributed to DER personnel who are assigned this responsibility. The team member observed had the equipment in his vehicle. An equipment check is.not utilized as minimal equipment'is needed. Proper sampling technique was demonstrated, and the sample was transported to the specified laboratory for analysis.
Radio communications with the DER Regional Office in Harrisburg were adequately demonstrated. The team member was aware of the locations of dead spots, and how to use the repeater. This was not demonstrated as such locations were not encountered during the demonstration. A back-up radio was not provided. . .
Radiological exposure control was not fully adequate. The team member was provided with appropriate self-reading dosimeters and was adequately familiar with their use, but he was not provided with a dose record form, KI or a permanent reading dosimeter. He was aware of the location of the radiological decontamination station where he was to report, but he was not familiar with the maximum dose allowed without authoriztion.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The water sampling team member was not provided with a back-up means of communication. Back-up communications should be available, and demonstrated in future exercises.
- 2. Radiological exposure control for the water sampling team was not fully l adequate. Record forms, KI, and permanent record dosimeters were not provided, and the team member was not familiar with maximum dose permitted without authorization. The necessary equipment and KI, and-appropriate training, s,hould be provided. j AGRICULTURAL SAMPLING TEAM, PENNSYLVANIA OVERVIEW The agricultural sampling team was comprised of two state milk sanitarians from the Department of Agriculture. Prior to deployment, the team was ,
briefed on sampling locations,, types of samples to be taken and exposure l control procedures. Team members did have the proper equipment for taking milk, water, feed, pasture, soil and vegetation samples. The Standard l
. 13
Operating. Procedures for sample taking were included in the kits.
Agricultural sampling team members were very familiar with the region being monitored and experienced no difficulty in locating the sampling locations.
They demonstrated the proper technique for sample collection. The samples were delivered to the State Bur. eau of Radiation Protection Laboratory in Harrisburg for analysis. The issuance of communications equipment to the team was simulated for this exercise. However, twelve two-way radios, issued by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency are available for the team's use. The team members were issued CDV-138 (0-200 mr) and CDV-742 high range (0-200 R) dosimeters for use during the exercise. KI and TLDs were simulated. Team members have been trained in the proper use of this equipment. Additionally, they-were knowledgeable of the locations of the various decontamination centers in Lancaster and York Counties. No problem areas were noted.
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL, PENNSYLVANIA OVERVIEW Six traffic and access control points, manned by the Pennsylvania State Police, were evaluated. They are designated in the plans as #11, #12, and
- 34 in York County, and #40, #48, and #69 in Lancaster County. The evaluator was not able to locate Post #62 in Lancaster County, due to the route identification problem described below.
The exercise scenario called for this activity to be performed out-of-sequence from the main exercise events. A prelinimary briefing was held at the York Barracks at 1000, where the troopers received their assignments, information packages, and dosimetry. Most of the troopers were from counties other than those involved in the exercise and were not familiar with the area. The access and traffic control post locations were identified only by route numbers. Some officers (as well.as the evaluator) experienced difficulty in locating the secondary "LR" and "T" routes. To make locating the posts easier, it is recommended that local road names be used in addition to route numbers. Additionally, effective June 1,1987, Pennsylvania is changing its LR (legislative route) system to a SR (State Route) system, and all of the route numbering will change.
All officers demonstrated good understanding of their duties. They had adequate information concerning the evacuation routes and reception center locations, and each had a listing of local tow truck operators who could be called upon to clear traffic obstructions. All troopers had dosimetry and were sufficiently familiar with radiological exposure control procedures.. l As with previous Pennsylvania traffic and access control demonstrations, traffic control devices (signs, barricades, cones, etc.) were not available at the posts. It continues to be a recommendation that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation demonstrate their responsibility to support the PSP by providing these devices in future exercises.
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PROBLEM AREAS 1 'Some troopers, being unfamiliar with the area, had difficulty locating their assigned posts, which'were identified only by route numbers. To make locating the posts easier, it is recommended that local road names be used in addition to route numbers.
- 2. The PA DOT. did not participate in the establishment of access and traffic control points during the exercise. It is recommended that, in future exercises, D0T should demonstrate their capability to support PSP by providing barricades, cones, signs, etc.
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LANCASTER COUNTY E0C.
i l OVERVIEW i
Activation and staffing occurred in an efficient manner. However, Lancaster l County was instructed by PEMA to inform all municipal E0Cs, decontamination stations and mass care facilities, as well as Lancaster County E0C staff to j fully activate at the Alert stage in accordance with new plan change
- procedures. The EMC was not aware of a plan change and called PEMA for clarification. The plan presently calls for full activation at Site Area
! Emergency. If officials decide to adopt this policy, plans must be changed I to reflect full activation at the Alert stage. Checklists with actions to j
be taken at each stage of an emergency will.have to be adjusted as well.
The Emergency Management Coordinator is an effective manager and insured l
that appropriate responses were taken in a timely manner. Even though many i actions usually accomplished at Site Area were done at the Alert stage.
) It should also be noted-that the EMC and his staff displayed a high degree i of professionalism and swift reaction capabilities during the siren and EBS activation and the notification of General Emergency which was declared at-
! 1826. At 1845 the Utility notified Lancaster County E0C of a General ~
! Emergency. Just after the Utility notified Lancaster County of the General j Emergency, PEMA informed the counties to Ignore any information coming j directly from the utility. At 1849 PEMA informed Lancaster County-to activate the sirens at 1855. At that time they were still at Site Area i Emergency, based on PEMA's instructions for the counties to ignore any information relayed directly to them by the utility.
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! In spite of the' confusion generated by the PEMA instructions, notification of the siren and EBS activation times to the municipal E0Cs was accomplished and verified by 1852. Sirens were activated at 1855 and EBS announcements i followed at 1858.
t i At 1852 PEMA advised Lancaster of a General Emergency declared by the
! utility at 1826. LEMA verified the General Emergency at 1856 with PEMA.
1 Public alerting and instruction proceeded according to the plan and in fact was activated within six minutes of the notification to do so.
1 The Emergency Operations Center (E0C) had sufficient space, furniture, i lighting, and telephones to effectively conduct emergency operations.
Housekeeping facilities allow for extended operations, and there are agreements in place to house and feed additional personnel at a hotel
- j adjacent to the E0C if necessary. A backup generator' insures continuing i
electrical power to the E0C. A status board was posted in a clearly visible l location and was updated frequently as significant events unfolded. Maps I showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation center sites, access j control points and radiological monitoring points were posted and clearly i visible. The population by evacuation area, along with an estimate of congregate care needs, is part of th'e County plan. The plan was referred to i .
frequently during exercise.
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J The Lancaster County E0C has adequate primary and secondary comunications links to the State, Utility and locals. Additional communication links with adjacent counties and states was available by " networking" through the utilities communications line. The Lancaster County radio system provided l.
direct access with local Emergency Operations Centers, police, fire, ambulance and hospitals.. Direct EBS transmission was available and demonstrated through the RPU unit. The message center operated efficiently, e
logging and distributing messages appropriately. The County's communications system (both personnel and equipment) displayed its ability j to respond rapidly to fast-changing and unexpected (and inexplicable) j scenario events.
Ingestion Pathway demonstrations.were not an objective of the exercise.
- However, the County Agricultural Agent sent several radio announcements out to inform farmers in the area how to protect themselves and their stock.
Dosimetry equipment in Lancaster County has been prepositioned to the local 4
E0Cs. .TLDs and KI were delivered to the Quarryville -E0C for pick up by each municipality when needed (siinulated).
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!' A Public Information Officer (PIO) is designated.and that individual effectively served as spokesperson for Lancaster County during the REP i Exercise. No press briefings were held because no press representatives 4
were present; however, the PIO did siraulate media briefings during the course of the exercise. The information that would have been presented was complete and accurate. The PIO presented data in a non-technical manner, using maps and other visuals to enhance his presentation. The PIO was in
.l close contact with the Emergency Coordinator and other County emergency personnel during the exercise to insure the consistency and accuracy of the information disseminated. There was adequate space and communications
, equipment available for the press, and additional space and communications
!- capability could be made available if necessary. A rumor-control telephone was established and staffed during the course of the exercise.
The entire staff at the Lancaster County E0C performed their assigned tasks l in an outstanding, professional manner. No problem areas were noted at this E0C. -
RECEPTION CENTER WILLOW STREET V0-TECH, LANCASTER COUNTY i
i OVERVIEW i County and Township personnel performed their assigned tasks in an excellent manner. The Mannhiem Township Emergency Management van was on scene and i communciations. existed with all participating players. A police vehicle was equipped with a repeating tape and loud speaker system that was used to explain what was happening and processing procedures. The Reception Center ,
also had a Red Cross First Aid station and a procedure for monitoring vehicles but 'they were not mentioned in the plan.
- PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The repeating tape announcement system is an excellent approach to inform evacuees of needed information. This concept should be explored 17 l
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' and utilized at other receptions centers throughout the state. FEMA should share this concept with other States in Region III and with FEMA National Headquarters.
- 2. The excellent First Aid Station and monitoring capabilities; although a redundancy to existing programs, should be included in the county plan.
MASS CARE CENTER, STRASSBURG /LAMPETER SCHOOL COMPLEX, LANCASTER COUNTY OVERVIEW The red Cross performed the mass care function in an excellent manner. No problems were encountered. RACES, County Government, and Rescue Vehicles also performed well'. The County HAZ-MAT Van was used for monitoring and decontamination purposes. Proper equipment was used by knowledgeable personnel. Vehicles were checked and if found contaminated, were stored in
, a designated area until disposition by the E0C staff was obtained. No problems were noted.
EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION STATION, WILLOW STREET, LANCASTER COUNTY
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OVERVIEW The Willow Street Volunteer Fire Department demonstrated that they could effectively perform the radiological monitoring and decontamination responsibilities as outlined in the plan. The Fire House had charts on the walls that outlined personnel monitoring procedures and PAG levels. The l players know their responsibilities and performed them well. Vehicles were monitored, and if found to be contaminated they were stored in a special area, and the County E0C contacted to determine a course of action. All
- previous discrepancies were corrected and all objectives met. A vast improvement over the previous exercise was noted.
QUARRYVILLE PRESBYTERIAN NURSING HOME, LANCASTER COUNTY j OVERVIEW The existing plan was reviewed by nursing home staff, but limited exercise play was accomplished. The nursing home administrator advised that the facility is located beyond the EPZ and presently cares for 338 patients -(138 re.;uire extra care, 200 residential). 120 of the total are ambulatory. 18 i ' tients would require ambulance transportation, which is to be furnished by che County. Precise arrangements have not been made. The home owns one ambulance and the County would furnish five ambulances and two buses in the event of an evacuation. Staff cars and personal vehicles owned by residential patients could also be used. Comunications is primarily by
- commercial telephones to the local E0C (Quarryville) and to Lancaster County E0C. RACES was available for backup. Trained radoiological personnel are l
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available, but were not exercised. 24-hour communications and trained nurses and physicians are available. Overall impression was that this nek facility and capable staff could handle a radiological emergency effectively.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. There is a need for more detailed procedures for the home to obtain sufficient ambulances to _ transport non-ambulatory patients in the event an evacuation is required.
PENN MANOR SCHOOL DISTRICT OVERVIEW The Penn Manor School District was notified by the Lancaster Emergency Management Agency of the out-of-sequence activities at the-Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Station. All notifications and verification calls were accomplished in a timely manner and in accordance with the RERP. The notification list used by the Superintencent was complete and accurate. The Martic Elementary School, which conducted the simulated evacuation, carried ,
out all pre-evacuation checks as specified in the plan. This included securing entrances and windows, testing the emergency lighting system, inventoring the cafeteria supplies, etc. The Marticville Middle School was fully prepared to handle its own students and the 358 evacuees, (simulated) who arrived at 1043. Evacuees would be assigned to the gym and cafeteria areas, medical services would be provided as needed and procedures for parents to pick up their children were described. All_ aspects of the emergency plan were exercised in a professional manner by the participants.
Obviously considerable planning, training and practice had gone into preparations for the management and protection of the students in this school district.
SOLANCO SCHOOL DISTRICT OVERVIEW The initial notification was made from the County to the Superintendent's office. The Superintendent immediately notified key officials according to the plan. The plan was current and a copy was in use by all praticipants.
Throughout the course of the exercise, the Superintendent very capably directed all operations and kept everyone advised of the status in a timely manner. The County advised of a possible evacuation.. When further word had not been received within what the Superintendent believed to be a reasonable time, she initiated a call to the County to see if they had tried to get through and could not because the lines were busy. This was the case, but the prompt action of the Superintendent allowed the evacuation to proceed on time. Communications between all facilities is by telephone only; hortever, the Superintendent stated tha.t it is pre-arranged with the County to provide a RACES operator. She also indicated that should the situation warrant, she 19
would dispatch people from her office to contact critical locations and/or find local CB support. Bus service is provided through contract. The system is in place for the contractor to notify dirvers and haye enough buses pre-positioned at schools to evacuate the entire student body in one trip. All buses have a copy of the plan on board; this includes loading procedures and route maps. For this exercise, one bus was used to demonstrate and ran the route to the host school.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. When the initial call was made from the County, the caller did not identify herself nor ask for the Superintendent. The secretary receiving the-call and the Superintendent took quick action to initiate notification of other key staff, school principals and transportation people, but did not immediately verify the call from the County. The Superintendent recognized'this later and corrected the situation on subsequent calls from the County. She stated that in the future all calls would be verified.
- 2. Each participant was annotating the margin of his or her plan with message notes and actions taken. It would be best if one person was designated to keep a central log.
DRUMORE TOWNSHIP EOC OVERVIEW M -
The initial notification of Ee Emergency Management Coordinator and her subsequent activation of the 40CI and staff were accomplished in accordance with the plan. The EMC managed the E0C operations effectively and was clearly the person in charge!according to the plan. The EOC and facilities were adequate to support operations. The primary communications system used between the Lancaster County E0C and Drumore Township was the County Radio with commercial telephone and RACES as back-up. The communications system worked well and accurate records were maintained on all transmissions.
Public alert and notification actions were taken according to the plan.
Alert teams were dispatched with proper equipment after the sounding of sirens and the total route alert required 37 minutes. Protective actions were implemented according to the plan. Special evacuation problems were discussed and proper arrangements were made for special transportation of a few local residents. Ingestion pathway protective actions were followed according to the plan with the sheltering of all livestock at 2006. All dosimetry equipment was available and the Radiological officer briefed each '
staff member on proper use. XI was available and distributed (simulated) to emergency workers at 2009 on order from the State Health Department. The E0C was relocated to East Lampeter High School due to possible exposure.
After which proper communications with the Lancaster County E0C were established. No problems were noted at this location.
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EAST DRUM 0RE TOWNSHIP EOC- a OVERVIEW The Township Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) took immediate control
- upon arriving at the E0C, approximately 20 minutes after receiving a call from the Lancaster County E0C. Prior to her arrival she called one of the j Township Commissioners who placed calls to other staff, initiating
! activation of the E0C. Staffing was complete at 1645, with round-the-clock
- staffing demonstrated by presentation of a coster.
3 The EMC was very much in control at all times; demonstrating strong leadership capabilities which carried over to the rest of the staff in the way they performed their duties. Access to the E0C was exceptionally well controlled to authorized individuals only and with visitors needing the.
. written permission of the EMC to enter. The E0C facilities were excellent. ,
A backup generator is not available but is scheduled to be the next purchase
! when money is received. Although the telephone has been the primary method
' of communications in the past, a newly installed county radio was the
- primary communications method used for this exercise. One difficulty with the radio; however, was that background noise from a speaker in the county 1 E0C made the messages being transmitted from the county difficult to j understand.
i Route alerting was initiated at 1855 and took approximately 40 minutes to complete. Sirens were heard at the EOC location at 1855; however, the EBS
- announcement was not heard. Evacuation was ordered at 1929. All staff knew
! their assignments and simulated their actions. - Adequate supplies of dosimeters were on hand. KI and TLDs were distributed by the county I
(simulated). Media relations was demonstrated during the exercise by the
, ' actual arrival of a reporter from the quarryville newspaper. A township commissioner represented the EOC and briefed the reporter.
PROBLEM AREAS l
! 1. Although the E0C personnel were monitoring the EBS station, no EBS j message was heard in this E00. Radio coverage should be checked in i this area to ensure that the public would be able to receive the EBS l announcements.
- FULTON TOWNSHIP EOC .
OVERVIEW I
! Staff notification and activation was fragmented, slow and never completed i
due to absences of individuals noted in the plan. The Emergency Management i Coordinator was not available for the second exercise in a row. 24-hour i staffing capability was not demonstrated.
I i Command and control is considered poor. The Radiological Officer was in
- overall command; however, no formal transfer of authority was initiated l .
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between the Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator and the Radiological Officer. The Acting Coordinator (radiological officer) was operating in a vacuum. Staff members present who were shifted to fill positions listed in the plan did not have the appropriate training and knowledge to complete their newly assigned. Staff members did not consult plans and checklists .to ascertain what their roles and responsibilities were.
The E0C is located in the township maintenance garage. Additional emergency responders were located in the firehouse. There was no coordination of actions taken at the firehouse with either the Acting Coordinator or staff members in the E0C. -
Comunications were primarily handled through the County radio net. Message traffic was not recorded or logged nor were administrative actions noted.
The RACES operator's equipment was not compatible with the antenna system in the E0C. However, this problem was solved during the exercise when an additional RACES operator arrived. The RACES team effectively handled messages providing backup communications capability after the antenna problem was solved.
There are 231 residents within Fulton Township requiring transportation assistance. The Township has an unmet need of five buses. The Township reported this unmet need to the County 35 minutes after the County requested the information. The pickup point for evacuees needing transportation is located at the E0C. However, the holding area is not large enough for five buses and the evacuees. Staff were not aware of who would need transportation, only the total number.
The Acting EMC (Radiological Officer) had dosimeters available and did demonstrate his ability to read and zero them. However, no briefing or instructions were provided to the staff in the E0C or at the firehouse. In as much as this E0C lies entirely within the 10-mile EPZ, in close proximity to the plant, all personnel should be briefed on the use of dosimetry and record-keeping forms. The Distribution of KI was simulated and procedures for the proper use of KI were known.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. A lack of enthusiasm and interest in the overall responsiveness of the Township EOC staff was evident by the following:
Initial notification of staff members was slow and never completed as all personnel could not be reached.
Staffing of first and second shift positions was never completed as noted in the plan.
Additional personnel in the E0C who were shifted to fill key staff positions did not ha.ve sufficient training and knowledge to perform assigned tasks. No attempt was made to review the plan and checklists to ascertain what functions were required.
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The Emergency Management Coordinator was not available for the exercise. This is the second exercise in a row in which the appointed
- EMC has not participated. The deputy EMC did not assume the role and responsibilities of the EMC. The Radiological Officer was in command; however, no formal transfer of authority was initiated between the deputy EMC and the Radiological Officer.
The Radiological Officer, as acting EMC, attempted to respond to all areas, he was operating in h vacuum. The EOC staff provided no input, status of actions taken or assistance in fulfilling the township responsibilities. There was no communication or coordination between the acting EMC, the E0C staff and the emergency workers located at the firehouse.
The E0C staff was not aware of who the residents were who would need transportation assistance. There was no list only a total number.
The pickup point does not have enough space to hold buses and evacuees waiting for evacuation without causing congestion problems.
Although several dosimeters were available and zerced, no briefing or instructions were provided for E0C staff or emergency workers at the firehouse. Even though actual distribution of the dosimetry was simulated, the briefings to staff must be accomplished.
Based on the above problems observed in this E0C, Fulton Township did not demonstrate an adequate' capability to protect the health and safety of its residents. Each area must be addressed and resolved and then adequately demonstrated within 90 days of receipt of this report.
LITTLE BRITAIN TOWNSHIP OVERVIEW The township activated its E0C and performed its initial notifications in accordance with the plan. Staffing of three key positions was not complete. The radiological officer, the transportation officer and the Emergency Management Coordinator positions wer a not filled as listed in the plan. However, the responsibilities of these positions were adequately demonstrated by other staff members and clearly indicate a depth of capability in the township's emergency response capabilities. Second shift capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Communications ;
capability was established to include RACES (backup radio)and commercial !
telephones.
According to the Little Britain Township Plan, the Quarryville Fire Department and the Robert Fulton Fire Company are responsible to commit resources to provide route alerting for Litte Britain Township. Neither the Quarryville E0C nor the fire. companies are aware of this responsibilities.
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The township officials feel strongly that route alerting is ~ critical to insure public warning based in part on the limited outdoor warning signal strength and based in part on the fact that being in doors or performing noisy activities lessens the chance of hearing the siren.
PROBLEM AREAS 1 Staffing was not complete as outlined in the plan. Since personnel were available to fill the roles and carry out the responsibilities of the three key positions that were-not manned in accordance with the plan, the emergency coordinator should consider placing these personnel permenantly in the positions and changing the plan accordingly.
- 2. If other jurisdictions or agencies are to provide resources and have responsibilities within another jurisdiction these agencies must be aware of the specific resources and responsibilities for which they are needed. There should also be agreements between these jurisdictions that state that the resources are available to perform the additional responsibilities. (Fire Departments equipment and personnel).
- 3. Based on the township officials concern that siren signals are not of sufficient strength to be heard in all areas out doors and that being in doors lessens the chance of hearing the sirens, it is r'ecommended that siren signal strengths be evaluated to insure adequate coverage.
MARTIC TOWNSHIP EOC OVERVIEW The E0C was opened and staffing call-up began in accordance with the RERP.
However verification of the Alert was delayed due to an incorrect phone number at the Lancaster County E0C. After several attempts, verification was obtained from another source. The balance of the actions to be taken during Alert were implemented smoothly. An action worthy of comment was that the President of the Township Board was the second person to arrive at the E0C. He immediately took part of the call list and began to call people to notify them of the situation, or to call them for duty at the E0C. This active involvement of the political structure with the actual operation of the EOC is somewhat unusual but welcome. Following his arrival from his full-time job, the EMC reviewed actions taken so far and directed continued activation of the E0C. Space was limited but adequate for this E0C; however due to the location of the radio equipment, the area was rather noisy. This aside, the operation of the E0C was conducted in an efficient and professional manner and indicated that considerable -training and practice had taken place prior to this exercise.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The incorrect verification number at the Lancaster County E0C should be corrected and appropriate changes made in all subordinate plans.
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2.- The present location of the Communications Section of this E0C is just inside the entrance, exposing communicators to those entering or leaving the E0C; thereby causing distractions to the workers and poss,1bly creating security problems. The activities of those using the equipment also creates considerable noise for other staff members using the operations area of the E0C. It is recommended that the communications equipment be relocated to a less exposed and more secure area, which should also reduce the noise levels in the operations area.
PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP EOC OVERVIEW The Providence Township E0C demonstrated an effective emergency management operation. The facility was promptly staffed and housed in adequate surroundings. Ample space, lighting and communications equipment enhanced the operation. Whereas communications problems were encountered in prior exercises, due to limitations placed on the RACES operator, efficient channels were maintained and message flow was excellent. Although a problem was present because of the absence of the Radiological Officer, who was called away on business, the Emergency Management Coordinator adequately filled the role. She provided appropriate direction and instruction regarding dosimetry and KI to emergency workers. Briefings were provided as necessary and utilization of a recently completed set of implementing procedures (Sept. 86) aided in maintaining the continuity of operations. '
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. All staff members should be trained in the area of closer adherence to plan requirements and better familiarization with the. implementing procedures. Further training will insure complete understanding by all participants. Thought should be given to train another Radiological Officer in view of the limited availability of the individual currently designated.
QUARRYVILLE BOROUGH EOC OVERVIEW The initial notification was received by the EMC, who proceeded to '
efficiently and promptly notify staff and set up the E0C. A full staff complement arrived within an hour, all of whom were very competent in their assigned positions. Communications included two telephones, police radio, emergency frequency radio and RACES. An extension to the fire department telephone was a backup line. EBS and a police / fire scanner were monitored.
The plan was followed during all portions of the exercise. The EMC and all section hr. ads did an excellent job. ,
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. l During the drill, Little Britain Township called to see if Quarryville was going to do route alerting for the Township. This was not a part of the Quarryville plan or the County plan at the E0C. Staff in Quarryville proceeded logically and rapidly to resolve the problem.
Adequate supplies of dosimeters (CDV-742,CDV730) were available. Complete instructions for use and maintenance were given. Staff displayed knowledge of KI dosage information and use and decontamination procedures. -
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The RERP for the Quarryville E0C does not state that they are to provide equipment and personnel to perform route alerting in Little Britain Township. Agreements with Quarryville Emergency Management Agency and the fire departments involved should be obtained so the '
response organizations can adequately plan for this additional responsibility.
YORK COUNTY EOC OVERVIEW York County and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency requested and received an exemption from full participation in the Peach Bottom Exercise for 1986. The communications procedures from the State E0C to the county and local E0Cs was the only operation observed. The communications procedures functioned according to the County Plan. There were changes in the communications staff, namely, communications and races officers and ,
their deputies. This change has been submitted to the State. The staff were competent and well informed. Message reception, recording,-actions and follow-up were excellent. Equipment and facilities were more than adequate. The Emergency Management Coordinator and communications officer effectively managed the communications function. The county received messages from the utility for Site Emergency and General Emergency. The state instructed the County to ignore the General Emergency notification from the utility. The County did not have the opportunity to verify or implement procedures for General Emergency, p,rior to the State's message to ignore the message from the utility.
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l RECEPTION AND RELOCATION CENTER, YORK COUNTY OVERVIEW The Reception and Relocation Centers were co-located at the Red Lion High School. Of a total staff of 50 persons,12 staff members and 20 decontamination personnel participated in this exercise. Key staff reported 10 minutes after notification of Site Area Emergency. American Red Cross personnel predominated in most activities. Their capabilities are impressive. Nevertheless, too much reliance is placed on informal arrangements to procure needed supplies and equipment. For example, only two cots were on hand and no blankets. They advised that additional cots and blankets can be obtained from military and American Red Cross supplies.
However, no evidence was presented to indicate how these suppl.ies will be provided. In addition to the apparent competence of the staff, the enthusiasm and effective exercising of the decontanination procedures were especially noteworthy. Outstanding motivation of this staff was demonstrated.
PROBLEM AREA
- 1. Much reliance is placed upon informal arrangements such as in procuring needed supplies and equipment (e.g., cots and blankets). Formal agreements should be made with those agencies who have verbally agreed to supply equipment to this facility.
- 2. Written plans and procedures were not available at this facility.
DECONTAMINATION CENTER YORK COUNTY OVERVIEW The Brogue Ambulance Association (now known as Red Lion Ambulance Association) did an excellent job in displaying decontamination procedures.
They had two teams of six persons each participating in the exercise.
Normally, one team would participate and the other team would rest so they could provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> round the clock service. Personnel were well trained and knew what they were doing. Instructions were posted in large writing on sheets of paper taped to the walls. Records were kept, forms were completed. A decontamination shower enclosed in a 10'x 10' area had been installed so that it was possible for both males and femaler to shower, but not concurrently. The staff took precautions to prevent the center from becoming contaminated and the staff wore hats, protective clothing and latex gloves. Floors from the entry way to the shower were covered with large sheets of throwaway plastic. Newspapers for victims to stand on while being i nonitored were also present. Radiation equipment was protected with plastic )
sheets. All in all this was an excellent demonstration and they should be l commended for their enthusiasm, skill and performance.
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- 1. A problem area could arise since no planning has been done to isolate the potentially contaminated water runoff from decontamination of personnel and equipment. Water from the shower is fed through a hose to the outside in a grassy area. Water from equipment decontamination is run off into a corn field.
50tJTH EASTERN SCHOOL DISTRICT, YORK COUNTY OVERVIEW Activation of the School District RERP was carried out rapidly and effectively by the superintendent and staff upon receipt of Alert from the County E0C. No confirmation of alert was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Education or the municipality. The superintendent did not verify the notification since he had personal voice recognition of the County EMC. School facilities are adequate to support the plan.
Communications are adequate but not robust, being almost totally dependent on commerical telephone. The School District is generally well prepared to protect students in a radiological emergency. There was a lack of available law enforcement personnel to control parental access and traffic at Fawn Elementary School during an evacuation. Superintendent opted to delay mobilization of buses until General Emergency.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. Thbre is essentially no arrangement to deal with possible traffic jams of parents at Fawn Elementary School. Teachers are needed to care for young children (Kindergarten-4th grade). Pennsylvania State Police are reported to be the only law enforcement agency available to this school and all troopers are expected to be assigned to major traffic control points. York County and Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Township EMCs and South Eastern Schoo.1 District Superintendent should meet to review .
problem and seek a solution.
- 2. School Superintendent opted to delay deployment of buses to schools until General Emergency. This might delay prompt execution of an evacuation order in a rapidly developing emergency. Recommend buses be deployed to schools at Site Emergency as directed in the RERP.
FAWN GR0VE BOROUGH / FAWN TOWNSHIP, E0C OVERVIEW The combined Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Township Emergency Management Organization, under the leadership of the Fawn Grove Borough President, as-
- EMC, mobilized rapidly and effectively on receipt at 1640 of the Alert from York County E0C. Staffing included, in addition to the EMC, Service 28
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Chiefs / Deputies per RERP, four additional elected officials, two RACES operators, and support personnel. Emergency operations were conducted primarily in accordance with the RERP and supporting SOPS; with staff
< members calling conferences as'needed to coordinate their actions.
Facilities in the Fire House improvised E0C are austere but adequate.
Status Boards and Emergency Classification Levels were displayed and kept up to date. Other necessary information was available in data sheets and SOPS at each staff position, an appropriate technique for this size and type of -
E0C. Communications are adequate to support functions of this E0C.
Previous problems in route alerting have been corrected. Municipality's responsibilities for protective actions were demonstrated. Radiological Exposure Control was effective. Knowledge of dosimetry and use/ control of KI was effectively exercised, correcting a previous problem.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The Emergency Management Coordinator is unaware of back-up means of alerting municipality if he is unavailable. County and. municipal EMCs should confer and include back-up alerting methods in the plan.
LOWER CHANCEFORD TOWNSHIP E0C OVERVIEW The Emergency Management Coordinator and staff reported to the E0C promptly as called for in the municipal plan. They were familiar with their plan and capable of carying out their responsibilities. They maintained contact with the County E0C. Municipal Supervisors, the EMC and staff had a good working relationship. They were familiar with all aspects of their municipality.
Facilities and equipment were adequate for a municipality of this size. The Radiological Officer appeared sufficiently knowledgeable and capable of performing his duties. Dosimetry and KI were not issued for this exercise.
The dosimetry and associated record keeping materials were explained by the Radiological Officer. Full staffing was accomplished and the EMC said he had the capability for twenty-four hour staffing; however, no roster of second shift personnel was available. Relocation of the E0C was simulated for this exercise.
, l
! I PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The municipal officials expressed a concern over the lack of information about dangerous radioactive releases, even though they were asked to relocate.
29
+,
1 DELTA BOROUGH / PEACH BOTTOM TOWMSHIP EOC OVERVIEW The initial notification of the EMCs (one from each municipality) and their subsequent activation of the E0C and staff were accomplished in accordance with the plan. Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated via presentation of a roster. The Public Works position was not staffed since the Chief was not available and the backups were involved in ambulance duty. The EMCs indicated that in the event of a real emergency a cover would be available. The EMCs managed the E0C operations effectively and the staff were well versed on their roles and displayed esprit de corps. The E0C and facilities were sufficient to support operations.
PROBLEM AREAS
- 1. The Public Works position was not staffed. All positions listed in the plan should be filled.
- 2. The EMCs were not aware that KI was to be simulated. Once they realized that simulation was to be utilized, distribution and instruction proceeded smoothly.
- 3. The radio and RACES antenna were wired together. Consequently the radio and RACES were directly adjacent to one another creating some intermingling of transmissions and distractions. In the future the Radio and RACES will be spaced apart.
- 4. A real concern was expressed, one which was not the fault of the local E0C, relating to the lag time between the occurence of General Emergency at 1826 and the notification to the E0C at 1900.
CHESTER COUNTY EOC OVERVIEW Chester County and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency requested and were granted an exemption from full participation in this exercise due to having participated on a full scale basis in another exercise this year.
The evaluator present at the Chester County E0C focused his efforts on the communications capabilities with State and Local Municipality. The County ably demonstrated this capability throughout the exercise.
6 30
WEST NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP EOC OVERVIEW Notification of officials and activation of the E0C occurred promptly at West Nottingham Township E0C. The ENC managed the E0C operations effectively. Communications capability with the appropriate organizations and locations'were adequately demonstrated throughout the exercise. The primary means of communicating with the County EOC was commercial telephone. Backup communications systems were available. The municipality confirmed the siren and EBS activation. In addition, the capability to i conduct route alerting when there is a siren failure was demonstrated. The responsibility for manning traffic and access control posts is shared by the l Pennsylvania State Police and the municipality with the county having the i
responsibility of coordinating the allocations of available transportation resources to risk municipality. The County is responsible for distributing Dosimetry /KI kits to municipalities. For the exercise, the kits were distributed (simulated) as required and the township staff explained the procedures for the issuance of dosimetry and KI and associated record-keeping.
PROBLEM AREAS
, 1. The West Nottinghan municipal elected and appointed public officials d
were not present at the EOC; therefore, their abilities to demonstrate knowledge of the plan familiarity, operations process at the EOC, and decisionmaking capabilities were not tested or met.
1
- 2. Prior inadequacies included incorrect names and phone numbers on the
- Township's call lists. The lists are still incorrect and should be regularly checked and changes made accordingly.
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. _ __ __ _ _ _ _ - ~ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ - _ _ . _ - _ . _ _ __, - .
DEFICIENCIES -
Reference i NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiengy , ,,,,,, ,,,,,, ,, ,,
, , ,, ,. Part,II_, Corregtion _ ,,,
Date Date Maryland
- 1. Sirens were sounded and the EBS was activated E.5,E.6 i prior to the exercise. FEMA was not aware that this process would occur out-of-sequence as this was not included in the scenario; ,
therefore, it was not observed. It is .
understood that the entire statewide EBS >
network was involved and that the Governor
- j' l participated, as well. However, since the i-process was not observed prior to the ,
ex rcise and it was not simulated as part of the regular exercise play, the State and risk Counties did not demonstrate the capability -
~to comply with the 15-minute alert and notification requirement established in FEMA-REP-10 This procedure needs to be ,
demonstrated at every REP exercise. ,
l
'DEPARTENT OF EALTH Als ENTAL HYGIEE -
l
- 2. When questioned about twenty-four staffing cap- A.2.a,A.4 tbility, the federal observer was informed that DHMH does not have the necessary in-house resources but instead would rely on federal assistance. This issue was originally ,
considered a deficiency that held up "350" '
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DEFICIENCIES
- Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency.. . , ___, ,_,_ __,,,, _ _ _ _ Part II __ _ Correction , _
Date Date cpproval of the Calvert Cliffs REP Plans. The problem was considered resolved but it is now evident that it has resurfaced. DHMH must work to address this issue as quickly as possible.
Harfcrd County I D. Since many tasks required to be accomplished were not observed because many functions were carried out prior to exercise start er out of sequence, FEMA Region III cannot stcte that there is adequate assurance i that the public health and safety will be ;
pr::tected.
Fniton Township E0C
- 4. A lack of enthusiasm and interest in the overall responsiveness of the Township E0C staff was j cvidenced by the following:
Initial notification of staff members was E.2. ,
slow and-never completed as all personnel g ,_, g;77' g--~g .
could not be reached.
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33 f
e
DEFICIENCIES
- Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual D.e. f. i. ci. enc.y...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P. a. r. t. . I. I . . . . . . . C. o. r. r. e. c. t. i. o. n. . . . . . . . . . .. D. at. e. . . . .. Date 5taffing of first and second shift positions E .'2.
tes never completed as noted in the plan.
l ~
Additional personnel in the EOC who were l A.2.a.
shifted to fill key staff positions did not i I have sufficient training and knowledge to perform assigned tasks. No attempt -
was made to review the plan and h.,
checklists to ascertain what functions were required.
t Th2 Emergency Management Coordinator was A.1.d. ,
not available for the exercise. This is the second exercise in a row in which .
the appointed EMC ha: not participated. The deputy EMC did not ;,
assume the role and responsibilities .
cf ttbe EMC. The Radiological Officer '
was in consnand; however, no formal transfer of authority was initiated between the deputy EMC and the .
Radiological Officer.
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DEFICIENCIES .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual i Deficiency , , ,, ,,,,,,,,, ,,, ,,,,,,,, ,,,,
Part II Correction Date Date i Tha Radiological Officer, as acting EMC, A.2.a attempted to respond to all areas, he was operating in a vacuum. The E0C staff j' pr:vided no input, status of actions taken or assistance in fulfilling the ,.
township responsibilities. There was ,
na connunication or coordination ;
i-between the acting EMC, the EOC staff and the emergency workers located at . ;,
the firehouse.
i The EOC staff was not aware of who the J.10.d.
i rcsidents were who would need transpor-tation assistance. There was no list !
only a total number. -
l The pickup point does not-have enough space to hold buses and evacuees waiting for evacuation without c.rusing congestion prcblems, t
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DEFICIENCIES .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual.
Dg((cjgncy,,, ,,,_,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Part,II , ,_,,, Correction, ,, ,, ,,,, ,,, Date , ,
Date Although several dosimeters were available K.3.a.
and zeroed, no briefing or instructions were provided for EOC staff or emergency workers at the firehouse. Even though actual distribution of the dosimetry was simulated, the briefings to staff must be accomplished.
Based on the above problems observed in this ,
EOC, Fulton Township did not demonstrate an adequ te capability to protect the health and -
s3ftty of its residents. Each area must be addr:ssed and resolved and then adequately demonstrated within 90 days of receipt of this report.
e 36 J
AREAS REQUIRING' CORRECTIVE ACTION -
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual InadtquacyPart II ,,,, , ,, ,,, , ,, ,,
Correction ,
Date , ,
Date
~
Emergsney Operating Facility.
~ ~
?. , The Utility declared General Emergency at J.7. ,
1626. However, at that time no protective s '-
action recommendations were given and no actual release was occurring. When
- protective action recommendations were given, almost an hour later, an actual
- release was occurring; thereby failing -
to minimize dose to evacuees. -
Rr.d Cross' Field Activitie's
' 2. Basic communications problems were caused F.3. ,
when two counties in Pennsylvania played mass care demonstrations out of .
sequence.' The problems were compounded when support elements were not in place '
to effectively support Red Cross cperations. ~
.2
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4 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Inadequacy,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,, ,,,,,,,, ,
Part II ,,,,,_ Correction ,,,, ,,, ,, , Date ,,, Date Maryland' State E0C
- 3. The utility's notification to the State EDC of E.1.
the Site and General Emergency classifications .
was not timely, taking in both instances, approximately twenty minutes. At the Site Emergency declaration the Department of '
Health and Mental Hygiene liaison at the
~
State EOC* reported that his department had i' received the change of classification information from the utility almost '
immediately after it had been declared. .
This situation is clearly not the fault of ,
I p:rsonnel at the State EOC; however, the -
Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency should pursue this problem with the utility. .
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual ;
(gad;guagy,,,,,,_, ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,, , ,,,,,,
,,,,,,_,,Patt,!!,,, ,,,Cg((ectjgn,,,,,,,, ,,
,Date ,
, , ,, Date j t
- 4. The public information function was somewhat G.4.a of a weak point. It was evident that the PIO '
is certainly a qualified individual. It' is equally apparent that he is not as well-vsrsed as he should be about the specific procedures for responding to a nuclear j power plant incident. The PIO was not ,
aware of the S0P written for his position and thus his knowledge of the* resources ,
available to him was limited, especially '
from a communications standpoint. j.
'Dipirim46f'6f'H551th'shd'M56fil'Higishi ;
5 Dose assessment calculations were conducted I.8 l' under the direction of an outside consultant . ;
using computer equipment brought in for
~
th2 occasion. In future exercises, the DHMH staff should conduct their own calculations.
, Field M:nitoring Team, MD ;
- 6. The expiration date on the bottles of KI J.10.f. !
i carried by the monitoring team was 1982. It '
is well past the date for this important radioprotective drug to be replaced; this should be done as soon as possible. .
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Inad;quacy,, , , , , , , ,, ,,,, ,Part,Il , , ,,, Correct 1,on,,, , , _,,,
Date Date Cecil County E0C
- 7. The blue phone direct line to the PBNPS did F.1.
n:t operate at the EOC during the exercise, but it did operate at the Cecil County communications center. The system should -
be checked out and repaired.
8 The E0C received notification of the Site E.2.
Emergency at 1853. Part of the problem '
was a 10-minute delay between the communications center and the E0C, but there is another 38 minute delay b: tween the declaration of the Site Area Emergency and when it was received by the communications center which is unaccounted for.
- 9. The USDA Extention Agent was not present for A.4.
the exercise. All positions listed in the plan must be staffed for exercises.
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1-AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
{gadequacy,,,_,, , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,
,,,,,,_,,,Pa[t,((,,,,,,,,Co((ectigg,,,,,,,,, ,,, , Date ,, , , ,
Date
the exercise.
P nnsylvania Stat 6'E0C -
- 11. EOC activation and staff mobilization were per- E.1,E.2.
formed at the Alert stage, rather than at Site ,
Area Emergency, as the plan specifies. If state officials decide to adopt this policy, ;.
the plan should be modified accordingly. j t' .
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION -
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
'Inad;quccy . ,, ,,, ,,,,,,, ,,,, ,,
, ,,,,_,, Part II, , ,, Correction,,,,,,,,,, Date , , Date -
12 Th2 Analysis Group at the State EOC 1mproperly D.3,D.4 and incorrectly challenged the utility's de-claration of General Emergency, resulting in a 20-minute delay in implementing ;
offsite General Emergen:y response ,'
actions. Analysis Group members should -
rcview their role, relative to the responsibilities and authorities of BRP !
and the utility, regarding emergency i classification. The Analysis Group should rafrain from second-guessing the state's ,
d signated technical experts regarding onsite matters in the future. ,-
B6fi56'6f'Ridiitib6 Pf6t66tib6,'PA.
- 13. Twa primary communications system components, F.1.d. ,
the dedicated telephone line linking BRP Head-quarters with the State E0C, and the '
dedicated line linking the utility with BRP and Maryland's accident assessors, did not function properly. Both lines should be rcpaired and tested periodically to assure th:y remain in operating condition.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION .
Reference NUREG-0654 Prnj'd Actual Inad;guacy , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,, , ,,, ,, ,,
,,,,,,Part,II,,, ,, Correction ,,, ,, , ,
, Date,, _ _ , ,
Date 14 5:veral new BRP staff members were not A.2.a.
adequately familiar with the dose calcul-ation procedures. Additional training ,
should be provided.
East Drdmor5' Township'E0C ,
- 15. No EBS message was heard in this E0C. E.5.
Radio coverage should be checked in this area to ensure that the public would receive the EBS announcements. .
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Inad;guacy,, ,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,_, ,,,,,,,, ,,,
,,,,, Part II,, , ,_, Correction,,, ,, ,
Date ,
Date Little Britain Township EOC 16 Full staffing, as designated in the plan was A.2.a.
not demonstrated. Township officials should .
censider assigning personnel that were available during the exercise to the three positions that were not manned in accordance with the plan; staffing lists in the plan should be changed accordingly, i
- 17. Little Britain Township is depending A.2.a,A.3. L' upon Quarryville Borough to provide re :-
sources for route alerting, but this .
responsibility is not indicated in the Quarryville Borough plan. '
Agreements should be developed between these municipalities. ,
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Inadpquagy,,,,,, .. ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,, ,,,,_,,_,,,,,,, ,,,Part,II, , ,,,Corrggtion, ,, ,, ,
Dat9,, ,Date "18 Based on the township officials concern that E.6 siren signals are not of sufficient strength to be heard in all areas out doors and that being in doors lessens the chance of hearing the sirens, it is' recommended that -
siren signal strengths be evaluated to ;
. insure adequate coverage.
i Martic Township E0C 4
- 19. The incorrect verification number at the E.1. '
Lancaster County E0C should be corrected and appropriate changes made in all plans.
Prdvidi6c T6s6 shive 0C 20 All staff members should demonstrate closer A . 2. a .,
adherence to plan requirements and better fami-liarization with the implementing procedures. Further training will insure understanding by all participants. Thought should be given to train another Radiological Officer in view of the limited availability ; i of the individual currently designated.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
{Inad;quagy . ,Part II,, Corregtion,_ , , ,,,, ,,_,,Date ,, , ,
Date
-Quarryville Borough EOC ,
- 21. The RERP for the Quarryville E0C does not state A.3.
that they are to provide equipment and personnel ,
to perform route alerting in Little Britain i Township. Agreements with Quarryville ,
Emergency Management Agency and the fire '
departments involved should be obtained so the _
response' organizations can adequately plan for (1=t gtg;g;~~g - ; j ;-.
this additional responsibility. : ,
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual ,
-Inadgquagy,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Part,II, ,,,,,Cgrregtign, ,,,,,,,_,,, ,,,Date,,, ,,
.Date i
Rtctption and Relecation Center, York County
- 22. Much reliance is placed upon informal arrange- A.3.
ments such as in procuring needed supplies and equipment (e.g., cots and blankets). Formal ,
agreements should be made with those '
ag:ncies who have verbally agreed to supply equipment to this facility.
23 Written plans and procedures were not available P.S.
at this facility.
Siuth Editsin'$ch661 DistFict
'24 Th:re is essentially no arrangement to deal J.10.1,j ,
with possible traffic jams of parents at Fawn !
Elementary School. School District ,
Officals should coordinate this unmet need i with the EMCs for Fawn Grove Borough / Fawn Township and York County.
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. _ - . . . . . ... -. . . . - - ___- . = _ __.-- _ -_ .- - .. -.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual {
- Inadpquacy,,,, ,_,, ,,,,,;,,,,,, ,,,,, ,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Part II ,,
, Correct 1,on ,,, , ,,,
,,Date _ , ,
Date ,
i 25 The School Superintendent opted to delay de- J.10.g.
ployment of buses to schools until General Emergency. This might delay prompt execution of an evacuation order in a
- rapidly developing emergency. Buses should be deployed to schools at Site . !'
p Emergency as directed in the RERP.
~ -
Fawn Grove'B6r6 ugh / Fawn ~ Township'E0C
'26. The Emergency Management Coordinator is unaware E.1.
of back-up means of alerting municipality if
he is unavailable. County and municipal EMCs should confer and include back-up
. alerting methods in the plan.
I' .
Delta Borough / Peach Bottom Township EOC
- 27 The Public Works position was A.4.
, not staffed. All Positions included -
i in the plan should be staffed.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
,Part II , , Corregtion _,_,,, ,,,,,,, Date Date
'Inad;guagy_,,,,,, ,,,, ,,,,, ,, , , ,
' WEST NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP E0C t 28 Prior inadequacies included incorrect names E.2.
and phone numbers on the Township's call .
lists. The lists are still incorrect j.
and should be regularly checked and ,
changes made accordingly.-
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AREAS RECOMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual ;.
- R ec ommen d a t i o n , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , _ , , , , , , , , , Pa rt , I I , , , , , , , , C g r rec t i o n , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , D at e , , , , _ , , , , , , , D a t e ,
l'
-Rcd Cross Field Office
- 11. The American Red Cross and the State of
- Ptnnsylvania should contince to i establish dialogue concerning mutual l
- support in mass care per Pennsylvania ;-
Directive 69. 1 i
22.- In future exercises the Red Cross
- lk ~
i Chapters and Field Headquarters ,
sh:uld.be included in scenario l'
d:velopment sessions and be listed as an action point in tha final scenario, f-
- 3 Physical arrangements established for the PIO !
l were somewhat awkward. The PIO liaison'in 'i '
l the operations room is poorly positioned to ;
be able to read important information on t tha status boards. In addition, if the PIO function was located immediately adjacent to the operations area iin a room with direct visual access, it woul'd preclude the need for an individual moving back and forth with information.
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50 I" . j {- r _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ .
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT .
Reference Proj'd Actual NUREG-0654 Date
,, Correction, Date R commendation ,,,,,
, Part II D:;partment of Health and Mental Hygiene
- 4. Conference call capability on the Peach Bottom Gr en phone should be effected among DHMH, the E0C at Pikesville, and the EOF at the plant in order that all critical f, d:cisionmakers can talk to each other. ,
Traffic and'Accsss'C6ntrol l.
- 5. On3 of the access control locations in Cecil Ccunty (No. 3) was not updated with regard to a route designation change from a state '
r ute (Rte 269) to a County Road (Liberty i
GrcveRoad). There should be a scheduled rtview of access control points on a I ccntinuing basis to update nomenclature.
l R716 cation Csnier,'Cscil'Cosnty
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- 6. It is recommended that the Cecil County E0C provide the Relocation Center periodic updates on the status of the emergency. :
51
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AREAS REC 0fGEENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
,Corrggtion,,,,,,_,,,, ,,,,,Date,,,_,,,,,,,, _Date ,
. Regommendation, ,,, ,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,,,,, ,,,, ,,
, , Part II,
,Decintamination Station, Harford County .
- 7. Monitoring personnel should consider a demon-stration of monitoring and decontamination of equipment and vehicles at the next exercise. ,
Reception Center,'Lancaster ' County i.
' 8. The repeating tape announcement system is an
excellent approach to inform evacuees of needed information. This concept should b2 explored and utilized at other i receptions centers throughout the state, FEMA should share this concept with other t States in Region III and with FEMA ,
National Headquarters.
- 9. The excellent First Aid Station and ,
monitoring capabilities; although a redundancy to existing programs, should be
- included in the county plan.
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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
, Recommend.a.ti onPart . I. I . . . . .. . . . . . . . Co r. re. ct. i on . . D a t. e. .. ... ..... . Da t. e. . . . . . . .. ... ....
SOLANCO
,Quarryville Prssbytsfia6'Ndisi6g'Homs 10 There is a need for more detailed procedures A.1.b,A.2.a.
for the home to obtain sufficient ambulances to transport non-ambulatory patients in the event an evacuation is required.
SOLANC0' School District .,
- 11. Each participant was annotating the margin of .
his or her plan with message notes and actions '
taken. It would be best if one person was d signated to keep a central log.
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j AREAS RECOMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENf .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual i' R.ec.o.m. mend. ati.o. n. P, a rt I. I. . . . . . . . . . . ... . ...... C.orrec. t. i.on Date -. . .~~
Date
, SOLANCO 12 When the initial call was made from the County, ..
thm caller did not identify herself nor ask .
for the Superintendent. The secretary l,'
- receiving the call and the Superintendent j to
- k quick action to initiate notification of !-
other key staff, school principals and i.
transportation people, but did not i' '
immediately verify the call from the County. -
Tha Superintendent recognized this later and a corrected the situation on subsequent calls -
from the County. She stated that in the j.'
future all calls would be verified. , .
Martic' Township'EOC
.13 Th2 present location of the Communications ,.
i Ssction of this EOC is just inside the l cntrance, exposing communicators to , ,
those entering or leaving the E0C; t th:reby causing distractions to the workers and possibly creating security problems. The activities of thoseusing th2 equipment also creates considerable noise for other staff members using the
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i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT ,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual ,
R9comm;ndationPart,II,,,,,,,,, ,, , ,,,,,,,,,,,,_ ,,,,,Corrgction,,,,,Date ,, ,, ,,, ,
,Date , ,
i.
cptrations area of the E0C. It is -
recommended that the communications eqeipment be relocated to a less exposed and j
more secure area, which should also reduce the noise levels in *
! the operations area.
- ?
' D:centamination Station,' York County
- 14. A problem area could arise since no planning has been done to isolate the potentially
- contaminated water runoff from ,
decontamination of personnel and i,
equipment. Water from the shower is fed through a hose to the outside in a grassy i area. Water from equipment decontamination is run off into a corn 7 field.
I
- 15. Two persons in Fawn Grove Boroughdid not have their pagerswith them when the '
Ccunty tried to notify the municipalities, they were contacted by I phone. This could cause an undue dalay and negate the purpose of pagers and EMA radio innterface.
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9 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT .
Reference Actual Proj'd NUREG-0654 Date Date
- R: commendation, _ ,, ,, , ,,_ .,,, , ,, Part II. ,,,,,Correcti,on, , , ,, ,,
- Low r Chanceford Township EUC
i
! 16. Tha municipal officials expressed a concern f i cver the lack of information about dangerous radioactive releases, even i though they were asked to relocate. !
Dalta Borough /P6ach'B6ttom'T6wnship'E0C .~
- 17. The EMCs were not aware that K1 was to be -
simulated. ~Once they realized that '
simulation was to be utilized, distribution and instruction proceeded smoothly.
~
18 The radio and RACES antenna were wired together. Consequently the radio and '
RACES were directly adjacent to one ,
another creating some intermingling of '
transmissions and distractions. In the -
future the Radio and RACES will be t spaced apart, j I
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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT- .
Reference Proj'd Actual NUREG-0654 Date Date, , ,,
- R1 commendation,,,, ,, ,,,,,,,,, ,, ,,,,,,, ,
,,Part,II ,, , ,, Correct 19n ,, ,,
WEST NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP EOC
!19. Tha West Nottingham municipal elected and appointed public officials were not present atthe E0C, therefore, their j.
abilities to demonstrate knowledge of e the plan familiarity, operations process at the EOC, and decisionmaking ;-
capabilities were not tested or met. .,
9 i
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rwggy m -; _
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STATE OF M ACVLAND 5 } DEPARTMENet& REG UN III
'A, es ., PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES MARRY HuoMEs MARY N AN I5 A B : 00 CAL, VIN A. LIG,HT,F_OOT sove==ca EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND ,w.6,e . .,,,, a no FR ANK A. H ALL CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY ***"'***'"*"*
secesvaev EDWARD MURR AY pueLec Sartiv a=0
' suD8 ROCK LANE & REISTER$ TOWN ROAD oinacion or guanosucy uawsoturut comescreonat samvices plK E8vtLLE. M A RYLAND 21208 awo civik OEFENet notwcr AREA CODE 301 486 4422 January 9, 1987 Mr. Paul P. Giordano Ibgional Director Ebderal Dnergency Management Agency Ibgion III 105 South Seventh Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 A'ITENTICN: Mr. Ja:Tes Asher
Dear Mr. Giordano:
3 This correspondence represents the State of Maryland's response to the draft Federal Dnergency Management Agency /Pegional Assistance Comittee evaluation report for the radiological emergency exercise held in conjunction 5 with the Peach Bottczn Atcmic Power Station on Octobe'r 9, 1986. 'Ihis response provides a schedule of proposed co'rrective actions for cited deficiencies and areas requiring improvement (Inadequacies). Areas recormended for inprove-ment have been noted for consideration in future endeavors but will not be included in the corrective action schedule.
Our corrective actions are organized in four categories; equipnent, plans / procedures, training, and exercise participation / conduct.
DQUIPMENT 4 The expired KI carried by the Maryland field mcnitoring team has been replaced with new KI (Inadequacy #6).
The Cecil County blue phone direct line to PBAPS was ro. paired on October 10,1986 (Inadequacy #7) .
1 PIANS/ PROCEDURES '
l The Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's Division of Radiation Control (DBC) possesses the capability to operate two 12-hour shifts for a period of about 7-10 days. After that period, DRC staff would request assistance frcrn the Federal Radiological Itnitoring and Assessment Program (FBMAP). At no time will the DPC relinquish its responsibility to 1
TTY FOR DEAF - 484 4083 AfdI \
.r .
f operate the Accident Assessment Center. Rather, FBMAP staff will be used in' ocxnbinaticn with DBC staff' to insure continuous coverage over a long term (Deficiency #2).- (NorE: If the federal observer was told that DBC did not.
have 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability, then he (she) was incorrectly informed.)
'Ihe utility's notifications to the State EOC of the Site and General o Dnergeng and to Cecil County for Site Drergency were not timely as a result
. of a PBAPS ccxtnunicator problem. MEM&CDA has discussed the problem with the utility and gained sufficient assurance that the problem will not recur (Inadequacies #3 and #8).
TRAINING MEM&CDA is actively pursuing the. inprovement of the public information functions through training and revised standard operating procedures.
Maryland intends to demonstrate inprovement in the Calvert Cliffs emrcise ,
j schedule in November 1987 (Inadequacy $4). '
EXEBCISE PARTICIPATICN/CCNDUCT l 1
Maryland intends to demonstrate the' Alert and Notification System (sirens and EBS) during a limited scale exercise to be conducted during the 3rd quarter f*
1 FEY 87 (Deficiency #1). A specific date will be coordinated with EEMA
. Iugion III to amwnnefate federal observation. i M -
i Harford Cbunty will conduct an EOC staff notification and mobilization I drill and tabletop exercise in conjunction with the above' mentioned 3rd quarter
,k FEY 87 siren /EBS demonstration. h intent is to demonstrate those functions i b whicit were not observed during the October 9,1986 exercise (Deficiency #3) . I
, e E
G 'Ihe Departnent of Health and Mental Hygiene DBC was assisted by a-consultant in dose. assessment calculaticns as part of the " user support" provided with the acquisition of an IBM PC based dose assessment conputer program. In future exercises, DBC will be able to make dose assessment cal & 1ations on its own (Inadequacy #5).
The absence of WDA extension agents in Harford and Cecil Cbunty EOCs was the result of their involvement in a real-life emergency situaticn (Irwbquacies #9 and #10). Real emergencies shall always take precedence over exercise participation. h WDA extensicn agents will participate in the next exercise for Harford and Cecil Counties (3rd quarter FEY 87 EOC exercise for Harford County and the 1988 Peadt Bottcnn exercise for Cecil-l
, County). -
,- Should there be any questions regarding the corrective actions or the schedule, please contact either Chuck Rayburn or myself at (301) 486-4422.
Sincerely,
' O. ":g_
EDRIN O. TREMPER Assistant Director for Operations eor:CLR:sdc 9
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PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY P.O. BOX 3321 HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17105 December 10, 1986 Mr. Paul P. Giordano Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III 105 South 7th Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Dear Mr. Giordano:
Enclosed is a copy of your draft exercise report for the October 9,1986 Peach Bottom Power Station. The report was received December 4, 1986.
The comments have been noted.
Sincerely,
- s ohn L. Patten Director JLP:tjl (Tel: 717-783-8150)
Enclosure j l
l 90 :21a ii330 98 n 1!;c 9 .! G i !
- _ - _ y-DEFICIENCIES '
Reference NUREG-0654 Deficiency Proj'd Actual Part II Correction Date Date Maryland
- 1. Sirens were sounded and the EBS was activated E.5,E.6 NA prior to the exercise. FEMA was not aware that this process would occur cut-of-sequence as this was not included in the scenario; therefore, it was not observed. It is *
"s understood that the entire statewide EBS
' network was involved and that the Governor participated, as well. However, since the process was not observed prior to the ,
exercise and it was not simulated as pa'rt of
~
l the 'egular r exercise play, the State and risk Ccunties did not demonstrate the capability to coinply with the 15-minute alert and notification requirement established in FEMA-REP-10. This procedure n'eeds to be', '
demonstrated at every REP exercise. .
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE '
gG& '
- 2. When questioned about twenty-fouFstaffing cap- A.2.a,A.4 NA ability, the federal observer was informed that DHHH does not have the necessary in-house resources but instead would rely on federal assistance. This issue was originally considered a deficiency that held up "350"
. .\
32 1 .
DEFICIENCIES o '
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Ds(icjency,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,',,,,,,,,,,,Part,II ,,,,,,, Correction, ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,Date,,,,, ,,,,, ,,Date ,
approval of the Calvert Cliffs REP Plans. The problem was considered resolved but it is now evident that it has resurfaced. DHMH .
must work to address this issue as quickly as possible. ;
! Harford County
- 3. Since many tasks required to be accomplished NA '
were not observed because many functions were carried out prior to exercise start -
or o'ut of sequence, FEMA Region III cannot state that there is adequate assurance that the public health and safety will be protected. /
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.Fulton Township E0C ; ' , '
- 4.
A lack of enthusiasm and interest in the overall responsiveness of the Township EOC staff was cvidenced by the following: '
Initial notification of staff members was E.2. Deficiency noted. Plnns slow and never completed as all personnel and procedures will be could not be reached. devel0 Ped to resolve discrepancy listed.
33 i
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6 0 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l DEFICIENCIES ~
l .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual De(jcjtncy
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , P a [t , I I , , , , , , , , C 9 ( rect i on , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Da t e , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Da t e , ,
Deficiency noted. Plans and Staffing of first and second shift positions E.2. procedures will be developed to was never completed as noted in the plan. resolve discrepancy listed.
Additional personnel in the EOC who were A.2.a. Deficiency noted. Plans shifted to fill key staff positions did not and procedures will be have sufficient training and knowledge developed to resolve '
to perform assigned tasks. No attempt discrepancy listed.
was made to revi.ew the plan and checklists to ascertain what functions
, were' required. '
The Emergency Management Coordinator was A.I.d. , Deficiency noted. Plans-nst available for the exercise. This is and procedures will be tha second exercise in a row in which developed to resolve the appointed EMC has not discrepancy listed. '
, participated. ThedeputyEMCdidbdE, assume the role and responsibilities
~
! cf tthe EMC. The Radiological Officer -
was in command; however, no formal transfer of authority was initiated bztween the deputy EMC and the - - -
Radiological Officer.
1
- y 34 m - - - ---- - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
f~ ,,
DEFICIENCIES .,
Reference -
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficigncy,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Pa tt , ! ! , , , , , , , , Co((ec t i on , , , , _ , , , , , , , , ,, , , Da t e , , , , , , , , , , , ,, , Da t e , , .
The Radiological Officer, as actin A.2.a Deficiency noted. Plans attempted to respond to all areas,g EMC, he was and procedures will be cparating in a vacuum. The EOC staff developed to resolve
- prcvided no input, status of actions discrepancy listed.
taken or assistance in fulfilling the township responsibilities. There was na communication or coordination between the. acting EMC, the E0C s'taff 7
. and the emergency workers located at 1 tha firehouse.
Th2'E0C staff was not aware of who the J.10.d. Deficiency noted. Plans residents were who would need transpor- and procedures.will be f*
tation assistance. There was no 11.st developed to resolve cnly a total number. , discrepancy listed.
Es {
The pickup point does not have enough l'
space to hold buses and evacuees - '
waiting for evacuation witihout ' ;
F causing congestion problems.:- ,
l
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4 1
_ _____ ._ ___ _ ___ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
4 ?
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DEFICIENCIES .-
Reference
~~
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual U'fiCl1DCY................................... . . . . . . Pa rt, { { , , , , , , , , Correct j gn , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Date , , , , , , , , , , , , , pat 9, ,
a Although several dosimeters were available K.3.a. Deficiency noted. Plans and zeroed, no briefing or instructions were and procedures will be
, - provided for E0C staff or emergency developed to resolve workers at the firehouse. Even though discrepancy listed.
actual distribution of the dosimetry was .
simulated, the briefings to staff must be -
accomplished.
c Bas:d en the above. problems observed in this -
EOC, Fulton Township did not comonstrate an .,
ad:quate. capability to protect the health and safety of its residents. Each area must be '
addressed and resolved and then adequately + c/
dem:nstrated within 90, days of receipt of this , '
rep:rt. j , .j-j_
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1s.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION *'
Reference . ,
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual I nad 4qu a cyPa rt , I I , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Co r rec t i o n , , , , ,Da t e , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Da t e , , , , , , , , ,,
Emerg:ncy Operating Facility s
- 1. The Utility declared General Emergency at J.7. Noted.
1826. However, at that time no protective ,
action recommendations were given and no :
actual release was occurring. .When .I protective action recommendations were '
given, almost an hour later, an actual ,
release was occurring; thereby nzedlessly exposing evacuees to radiation.
red'Crdis'Fi61d'Adfiviffii !-
t-
- 2. Basic communications problems were caused F.3. Noted. '
when two counties in Pennsylvania played * '
mass care demonstrations out of ni.,
sequence. The problems were compounded -
when support elements were not in place to effectively support Red, Cross ~
operatior.s. ' ;-
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference - '
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
' Inad;quacy i
,,,,,,, ,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Part,II,,,,,,,, Correction,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,pate,,,,, ,,.
,,,,Date, [;
\',
- 1
- 3. Tha utility's notification to the State EOC of E.1. NA i the Site and General Emergency classifications was not timely, taking in both instances, approximately twenty minutes. At the Site "
Emergency declaration the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene liaison at the ,
State EOC reported that his department had -
rcceived the change of classification 3 information from the utility almost immediately after'it had been declared. ;
This situation is clearly not the fault of >-
j parsonnel at the State E0C; however, the Maryland Emergency Management and Civil !
Dsfense Agency should pursue this/ problem with the utility. -
S 4
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$ 9
s .
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- AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
( n ad3 gg a cy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , P a [t , ! ! , , , , , , , ,C ((ec 9 tion,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Date,,,,,,,,,,,,Date,,
- 4. The public information function was somewhat G.4.a NA of a weak point. It was evident that the PIO is certainly a qualified individual. It is !
equally apparent that he is not as well- i versed as he should be about the specific procedures for responding to a nuclear [
power plant incident. The PIO was not aware of the S0P written for his position and thus his knowledge of the resources
- available to him was limited, especially ,
from a communications standpoint.
Dipirim46f'6f'Hsilth'i6d'H56fil'Higli6i -
5 Dose assessment calculations were conducted I.8 33 l under the direction of an outside consultant using computer equipment brought,in.for j the occasion. In future exercises,.the C DHMH staff should conduct their own calculations. .
W Fiald Monitoring Team, MD , , .
- 6. The expiration date on the bottles of KI J.10.f. NA carried by the monitoring team was 1982. It is well past the date for this important ,
radioprotective drug to be replaced; this should be done as soon as possible. p
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
. NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Inadpquagy,,, ,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Part,II ,,,,,,,Corregtion,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,Date
- Date_,
' Cscil' County EOC
- 7. The blue phone direct line to the PBNPS did F.1. NA , l, nnt operate at the E0C during the exercise, !.
but it did operate at the Cecil County l communications center. The system should !?
ba checked out and repaired. 1,
- 8. The E0C received notification of the Site E.2. NA .
Emergency at 1853. Part of the problem was.a 10-minute delay between the .
communications center and the E0C, i but there is another 38 minute delay !
between the declaration of the Site Area Emergency and when it was , i received by the communications center i.
which is unaccounted for. '
- 9. The USDA Extention Agent was not present for A.4. NA I the exercise. All positions.'7 listed in the i, plan must be staffed for exercises. ,
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual I n ad equ a cy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , P a r t , I I , , , , , , , , C o r r ec t i o n , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , D a t g , , , , , , , , , , , , , , D a t e Harferd County, MD, EOC -
- 10. The USDA Extention Agent was not present for A.4. *NA the exercise.
Pinhiylva61s^$tif4'E00 9
- 11. E0C activation and staff mobilization were per- {.1,Q2y g .Not,ed. -
, formed at the Alert stage, rather than at Site
- Area Emergency, as the plan specifies. If state officials decide to adopt this policy, the, plan should be modified accordingly.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd . Actual- ,
Inad;quccy ,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , ,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,Part,II,,,,,,,, Correction,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,Date ,,,,,,,,, ,,,Date,, '
12 The Analysis Group at the State EOC 1mproperly D.3,D.4. Noted. !"
and incorrectly challenged the utility's de-claration of General Emergency, resulting '
in a 20-minute delay in implementing '
offsite General Emergency response actions. Analysis Group members should -
review their role, relative to the rcsponsibilities and authorities of BRP .
and the utility, regarding emergency '
classification. The Analysis Group should .
refrain from second-guessing the state's d:signated technical experts regarding onsite matters in the future. ,
BUFiiU'6f Ridiiti66 PF6fidi166','PA.' -
13 Two primary communications systen'homponents, F.1.d. Noted, the dedicated telephone line linking BRP Head-quarters with the State E0C, and the "
d:dicated line linking the. utility with BRP and Maryland's accident asse'ssors, did not function properly. Both lines,should be ,
repaired and tested periodically to assure they remain in operating condition.
i 4 I I'
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference . :
NUREG-0654 . Proj'd Actual I n a dequa cy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ', , , , P a r t , I I , , , , , , , ,Co rrec t i o n , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , D a t e , , , , , , , , ,
, Date,,
14 5:veral new BRP staff members were not A.2.a. Noted. ; ,
adequately familiar with the dose calcul- 's ation procedures. Additional training 1, should be provided. .,
East'Dr6mord'T6wnship'E0C !
1
- 15. No EBS message was heard in this EDC. E.5. Noted. .
Radio coverage should be checked in this area to ensure that the public would receive the EBS announcements. j. .
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1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference -
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual ,
90$9909Y.............................................fa[$,I},,,,,,,,gg((99pjgn,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Qa$e,,,,,,,,,,,Date,,
1 Little Britain Township EOC ;
i 16 Full staffing, as designated in the plan was ,
A.2.a. Noted. -
1 not demonstrated. Township officials should consider assigning personnel that were i.
available during the exercise to the three :'
positions that were not manned in ,
accordance with the plan; staffing lists -
- , in the plan should be changed according4y. ,
- 17. Little Britain Township is depending A.2.a,A.3 Noted.
- upon Quarryville Borough to provide re scurces for route alerting, but this -
responsibility is not indicated in .
- the Quarryville Borough ' plan. "
j Agreements should be developed ,
i between these municipalities. y?-, ,
, 9 4
4
- 3 0
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i . . , ,
i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i Reference - +
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual I n adequ acy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , P a rt , { { , , , , , , , , Q o r rect i o n , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Da te , , , ,,,,
,,,Date,, ,
1 18 Based on the township officials concern that E.6 notea.
i siren signals are not of sufficient strength to be heard in all areas out doors and that being in doors lessens the chance of -
hearing the sirens, it is recommended that -
, siren signal strengths be evaluated to ;.
1 insure adequate coverage. l tl 2 .
Martic Tow 6 ship EOC i.
l 19 The incorrect verification number at the E.1. Noted.
- Lancaster County EOC should be corrected and appropriate changes made in all plans.
4 Prividi6ci T6w6 ship'E00 -
20 All staff members should demonstraIe c' loser A.2.a. Noted.
i adherence to plan requirements an'd bett,er_fami- ,
- liarization with the implementing' ,
j procedures. Further training will insure
! understanding by all participants. Thought should be given to train.another Radiological -
Officer in view of the limited availability
- 1 of the individual currently designated. .
i i
. 45 H
4 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual r.
Inadequacy, , , , ,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Part,II ,,,,,,, Correction,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Date ,, , , ,, ,,Date,, !;
Quarryville' Borough 'E0C ),
21 The RERP for the Quarryville EOC does not state A.3. Noted. !
that they are tn provide equipment and personnel
- to perform roate alerting in Little Britain Township. Agreements with Quarryville Emergency Management Agency and the fire ,
t.
. departments involved should be obtained so the response organizations can adequately plan for this additional responsibility.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference -
HUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual -
Inidequacy ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Part II Correction Date Date Rcception and Relocation Center, York County b
Much reliance is placed upon informal arrange- A.3. Noted. !
22 ments such as in procuring needed supplies and equipment (e.g., cots and blankets). Formal agreements should be made with those agencies who have verbally agreed to supply ,
cquipment to this facility. l.
Written plans and procedures were not available P.S. Noted. .
' 23 at this facility. ;
So6tn~fiiidrd'$26661'01stridi 24 There is essentially no arrangement to deal J.10.1.j Noted.
with possible traffic jams of parents at Fawn ,
1 Elementary School. School District ~ -
Officals should coordinate this u'nmet need with the EHCs for Fawn Grove Boro' gh/Fa'wn u ,
Township and York County. ,,
O l.
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference -
NUREG-0654 Pro.j'd Actual ;:
Inadequacy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Part II Correction Date Date ,:
s ,
l 25 The School Superintendent opted to delay de- J.10.g. Noted. ,-
ployment of buses to schools until General ,i Emergency. This might delay prompt '.
execution of an evacuatioa order in a
, rapidly developing emergency. Buses !
j should be deployed to schools at Site - l
]
Emergency as directed in tt'e RERP. ,
i Fawn Grove'86i66gh/Fawd'T6wnship't0C f 26 The . Emergency Management Coordinator is unaware E.1. Noted.
t of back-up means of alerting municipality if ha is unavailable. County and municipal l EMCs should confer and include back-up
- alerting methods in the plan. ,,
1 . .:. .;..
'. Delta Borough / Peach Bottom Township E00 '- ,
- 27. The Public Works position was A . 4 .' Noted..
i n3t staffed. All Positions. Included .
i in the plan should be staffed., , .
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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual I gad equ a gy , , , , , , , , , , , , ', , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Pa rt I I , , , , , , ,C o r rec ti o n , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,, , , D a t e , .,_ ,
Date ,
(.
b,
! EST NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP EOC J 28 Prior inadequacies included incorrect names E.2. Noted. I and phone numbers on the Township's call :.
I lists. The lists are still incorrect '
and should be regularly checked and changes made accordingly.
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- AREAS REColMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference '
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Reggamendati on , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Pa rt , I I , , , , , , , ,C 9 rregti on , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Date , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Date , ,
Red Crass Field Office s -
- 1. The American Red Cross and the State of Noted. .
Pennsylvania should continue to ,
cstablish dialogue concerning mutual support in mass care per Pennsylvania Directive 69.
I
- 2. In future exercises the Red Cross Noted. l
. Chapters and Field Headquarters j should be included in scenario ' t.
development sessions and be i listed as an action point in the final scenario. !
^
Mihilind'$ tits'E0C
- lI ...
3 Physical arrangements established for the PIO were somewhat awkward. The PIO liaison in the operations room is poorly positioned to -
b2 able to read important information on the status boards. In addition, if the PIO ;
-function was located immediately adjacent - i to the operations area iin a room with direct visual access, it would preclude the i .-
need for an individual moving back and 1 farth with information. t i
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- e AREAS REC 0ft e SED FOR IMPROVEE NT Reference P ro'j 'd ' Actual ;
NUREG-0654 Date,, !
Reconnendati on , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,Pa rt ,II , , , , , , , ,Correcti on , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , Date , , , ,
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene , . i-4 Conference call capability on the Peach Bottom I Green phone should be effected among DHMH, !
the EOC at Pikesville, and the EOF at the i
~
plant in order that all critical decisionmakers can talk to each other. .
Traffic ~a6d Acc655'C6ntrol !
- 5. One of the access control locations in Cecil County (No. 3) was not updated with regard
, to a route designation change from a state route (Rte 269) to a County Road (Liberty Grove Road). There should be a scheduled review of access control points on a continuing basis to upda,te nomenclature. .
',~~
R616diti on ~ Cinier ', ' Cedi l ' Co6nty . .
- 6. It is recommended that the Cecil County EOC provide the Relocation Center periodic .
updates on the status of the emergency. -
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AREAS REC 0pmENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT .
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
! R ec ommendati on , , , , , , , , , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Part II, ,,,,,,Corregtion,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Date,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Date,, .
Decontamination Station, Harford County -
1 f.
- 7. Monitoring personnel should consider a demon-stration of monitoring and decontamination of equipment and vehicles at the next exercise. j-Rec:ption Center,'Lancastir'Counti
~
- 8. ' The repeating tape announcement system is an Noted.
i excellent approach to inform evacuees of
' needed information. This concept should be explored and utilized at other receptions centers throughout the state.
FEMA should share this concept with other States in Region III and with FEMA National Headquarters. f].,
- Noted.
- 9. The excellent First Aid Station and -
monitoring capabilities; a,1though a redundancy to existing programs, should be included in the county plan. , , .
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a 52
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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference .
Proj'd Actual NUREG-0654
.. Date...... .... .. ...
Rec. om.menda.ti onP.a. rt 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Co r rect. i o n . . . . .Date . . . . . . . . .SOLANCO 00arryvills'Prssbytsriah'NUisi6g Homs ,
i Th re is a need for more detailed procedures A.1.b,A.2.a. Noted. i 10 fcr the home to obtain sufficient ambulances !.
to transport non-ambulatory patients in -
thS event an evacuation is required. i SOLANC0' School District _ I Noted,
- 11. Each participant was annotating the margin of _
his.or her plan with message notes and actions i taken. It would be best if one person was d:signated to keep a central 109 9
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4 53 e
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U t c'** egigg-" g . - ,. ,
i a 3 1
' AREAS REC 0pe O BED FOR IMPROVEMENT i
,' Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual i
4 i R ec. o. n. nend. at. i.o. n.P. a r. t. . I. I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. o. r r. ect. i.o n . . . . . Da. te . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .SOLANC0
......Da t
I 12. When the initial call was made from the County, Noted.
the caller did not identify herself nor ask .
fcr the Superintendent. The secretary
] receiving the call and the Superintendent s
+
i-took quick action to initiate notification of cther key staff, school principals and j transportation people, but did not .
j immediately verify the call from the County. .
.- The Superintendent recognized this later and j ccrrected the situation on subsequent calls ,
- from the County. She stated that in the future all calls would be verified. ,
1 Martic T6w6 ship'E00 -
The present location of the Communications Noted.
13 ,
Stction of this EOC is just inside the '
. cntrance, exposing communicators to '
i those entering or leaving the EOC; -
l thereby causing distractionsTto the workers and possibly creating security , .
problems. The activities of thoseusing 1
i the equipment also creates considerable noise for other staff members using the 4 .
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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Actual
. Proj'd Reference ,Date ,, ,
=
NUREG-0654 Correction,,,,,Date,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,, ,,,
RecommendationPart,II,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,
It is eperations area of the E0C. '
recommended that the communications equipment be ,
relocated to a less exposed and more secure area, which should :
also reduce the noise levels in the operations area. ~
D: contamination Station, Yo~rk County. Noted.
14.
A problem area could arise since no planning i' has'been done to isolate the potentially contaminated water runoff from
- decontamination of personnel andWater from the shower is fed equipment.through a hose to' 'the outside in ,a; grassy j Water from equipment area. -
decontamination is -run . off into a' corn Noted. -
pq field. .
?.
.I 15.
Two persons in Fawn Grove Boroughdid not have their pagerswith them when the
- f County tried to notify the municipalities, they were contacted by f phone. This could cause an undue
, , delay and negate the purpose of pagers and EMA radio innterface.
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t AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference .
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual
, ,, , ,, Date,,,,,, Date Recommendatign,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Pa rt , I I , , , , , , , ,Co rrect1,on , , , , , , ,,
Lower Chanceford Township EOC
- 16. Tha municipal officials expressed a concern Noted, ev:r the lack of information about dangerous radioactive releases, even though they were asked to relocate.
~
Delta Btro6gh/ Peach ndit6m'T6wnship'E00 Noted, 17.' Th2 EMCs were not aware that KI was to be simulated. Once they realized that simulation was to be utilized, distribution and instruction proceeded smoothly.
Noted.
- 18. The radio and RACES antenna were wired together. Consequently the radio / and -
RACES were directly adjacent to one -
arother creating some intermingling of ' '
transmissions and distractions. In the future the Radio and RACES,will be spaced apart. .
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-Y AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference ~
Proj'd Actual NUREG-0654 Date Correction Date Part 11 Recommendation f s, -
KST NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP EOC '
Noted.
- 19. Th2 West Nottingham municipal elected and
appointed public officials were not l pr;sent atthe EOC, therefore, their '
abilities to demonstrate knowledge of the plan familiarity, operations
. process at the EOC, and decisionmaking i capabilities were not tested or met. 5 1
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# 4 ; Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 MAR l 71987 MEMORANDUM EOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of EmergenOf Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regula ory Cottnission F10M: . .
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Remedial Exercise Report as a result of the October 9,1987, Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Peach Bottom Atomic Station Attached is a copy of the remedial exercise report for the remedial exercise conducted on February 18, 1987, to correct one of the de-ficiencies identified during the October 9,1987, exercise of offsite radiological emrgency preparedness plans for the Peach Bottom Atanic Station. 7he deficiency involved the Fulton Township, Pennsylvania, Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
The capabilities demnstrated by the staff at the Fulton Township EOC during the remedial exercise are adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological incident at the Peach Botton Atomic Station. The remaining deficiencies identified for the State of Maryland will be addressed at a remedial exercise scheduled for June 3, 1987. You will be notified of the results as soon as they become available.
If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attachment gqo323624@ 3 l9i
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, INTRODUCTION i
During the October 9, 1987 full participation exercise for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, the performance of Fulton Township was not adequate to protect the health and safety of Fulton Township residents. The following deficiency was assigned:
1 "A lack of enthusiasm and interest in the overall responsiveness of the Township EOC staff was evidenced by the following:
?
- a. Initial notification of staff members was slow and never j completed as all personnel could not be reached.
l b. Staffing of first and second shift was never completed as noted in the plan. .
}
1
- c. Additional personnel in the EOC who were shifted to fill key positions did not have sufficient training and knowledge to i perform assigned tasks. No attempt was made to review the 1
i plan and checklists to ascertain what functions were required.
i d. The emergency management coordinator was not available for j
i the exercise. This is the second exercise in a row in which I
the appointed EMC has not participated. The deputy EMC di.1 not assume the role and responsibilities of the EMC. The i Radiological Officer was in command; however, no formal j transfer of authority was initiated between the deputy EMC and the Radiological Officer.
$ e.
The Radiological Officer, as acting EMC, attempted to respond to all areas, he was operating in a vacuum. The E0C staff
' provided no input, status of actions taken or assistance in fulfilling the township responsibilities. There was no comunications or coordination between the acting EMC, the 4 EOC staff and the emergency workers located at the fire house.
4 f.
j The E0C staff were not aware of who the residents were who would need transportation assistance. There was no list only i
i a total number.
- g. The pickup point does not have enough space to hold buses and evacuees waiting for evacuatio'n without causing congestion j problems, t
- h. Although several dosimeters were available and zeroed, no i
i briefing or instructions were provided for EOC staff or j
emergency workers at the fire house. Even though actual i
' distribution of the dosimeters was simulated briefings to staff must be accomplished. )
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Based on the above problems observed in this EOC, Fulton Township did not demonstrate an adequate capability to protect the health and safety of the residents. Each area must be addressed and adequately resolved within 90 days of this report.
In order to correct this deficiency the Lancaster County Emergency Management Coordinator, in conjunction with Fulton Township public officials and EOC staff, scheduled training and a remedial exercise for February 18, 1987.
REMEDIAL EXERCISE REPORT FULTON TOWNSHIP EOC The objective of the remedial exercise at Fulton Township was to adequately demonstrate the ability to perform those functions found deficient during the full scale exercise, October 9, 1986. The remedial exercise was evaluated by the Regional Assistance Committee Chairman and the Peach Botton Project Officer from FEMA Region III.
The Fulton Township EOC staff demonstrated an effective emergency management operation. Initial and subsequent notifications were received from Lancaster County EOC. Staff notifications procedures were initiated and at 1909 staf fing was complete. 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing of all positions noted in the plan. A new emergency management coordinator has been appointed and was effectively in charge of E0C operations. It was quite evident that training has been provided to all staf f members. Plans and procedures were available and used by all staff members during the exercise. The telephone was the primary means of communication with the county radio net serving as backup. All communications were logged. Message flow was good. The Radiological Officer knew his job and briefed the staff on equipment usage and procedures. Staff were reninded every half hour to read dosimetry. Route alerting and manning of TCPs/ACPs was accomplished as appropriate. The AJnicipal staff took all the actions necessary to protect the health and safety of its citizens. They should be commended for the efficiency and enthusiasn displayed during the remedial exercise.
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