IR 05000321/1988021: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20153F235
| number = ML20205H053
| issue date = 07/22/1988
| issue date = 10/18/1988
| title = Insp Repts 50-321/88-21 & 50-366/88-21 on 880620-24. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection/ Prevention & Followup on Previously Identified Insp Findings
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-321/88-21 & 50-366/88-21
| author name = Conlon T, Ward D, Wiseman G
| author name = Ernst M
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Hairston W
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = GEORGIA POWER CO.
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-321-88-21, 50-366-88-21, NUDOCS 8809070159
| document report number = NUDOCS 8810280380
| package number = ML20153F215
| title reference date = 09-20-1988
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 13
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
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flVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
["~ n  REGION ll g*
* , j  101 MARIETTA STREET, ' t  ATLANTA. GEOROf A 30323
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Peport Nos.: 50-321/88-21 and 50-366/88-21 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.-0. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366  License Nos.: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 20-24, 1988 Inspectors: k- ,(htettw  /3/8cf G. R. Wiseman    Date Sfgned Ok    Y/$88 F. C. Ward    Date Signed Approved by: (1/D/A rE&A    //I2/Fv T. E.Agn,lsfi,' Chief  Odt'e Sig~ned Plan ( Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of fire protection / prevention and followup on previously identified inspection finding Results: Within the areas inspected, the following violation was identified:  4
  - Failure to Conduct and Document Required Surveillance of the Remote Shutdown Panel Halon Suppression System.
 
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
*J. Bennett, Superintendent, Plant Training R. Bunt, Project Manager, Appendix R
*G. Creighton, Senior Regulatory Specialist
*D. Davis, General Support
*R. Davis, Audit Supervisor
*T. Elton, Administrative Support Supervisor
*P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance
*G. Goode, Superintendent, General Engineering Support
*J. Lewis, Superintendent, Operations
*D. McAfee, Fire Protection, Engineering Supervisor
*H. Nix, Plant Manager
*T. Portrs, Engineering Manager
*D. Read Plant Support Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craf tsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administra-tive personne NRC Resident Inspector
*R. Musser
* Attended exit interview    r Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)
L Fire Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative l Procedure procedure N Title
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20AC-ADM-002-05 Rev. 3  Plant Records Management 40AC-ENG-008-05 Rev. O  Fire Protection Program  ,
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42 FP-FPX-005-OS Ret 0 Drill Planning, Critiques, and Drill Documentation t
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the '
NRC guidelines of the document entitled "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and <
Quality Assurance" dated June 197 !
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  '      t 00T 181988 Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. OPR-57, hPF-5 A eorgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III Senior Vice President -
 
Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:
The inspectors verified that procedure 40AC-ENG-008-0S included specific criteria for the establishment of fire watches during repair and maintenance activities whenever combustible materials are stored or moved through the non-sprinklered area of the Intake Structur This was a special conditional commitment identified in the Hatch Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report dated January 2, 1987, in support of an exemption request approval by the NR Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveillance procedures:
SUBJECT: NRC I 13PECTION REPORT i!05. 50-321/88-21 AND 50-366/88-21 .
Procedure N Ti tle 42SV-FPX-006-OS (Rev. 0) Fire Damper Surveillance 42SV-FPX-009-25 (Rev. 1) Inspection and Testing of the Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing System, Remote Shutdown Panel 42SV-FPX-013-0S (Rev. 1) Automatic Fire Door Surveillance 42SV-FPX-023-05 (Rev. 1) Fire Hose, Hydrostatic Test Based on this review, it appears that various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement the surveillance requirements of Appendix B of the plant's Fire Hazards Analysi In addition, it appears that the inspection and test instructions in the procedures follow general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire protection program guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Code Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test records for the dates indicated:
Thank you for your response of September 20, 1988, to our Notice of Violation issued on August 23, 1988, concerning activities conducted at your Hatch facilit We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte
Procedure N Dates 42-FPX-009-25  03/28/87 - 02/10/88 42-SV-L43-001-IS (Fire Doors)  07/19/85, 08/16/85, 08/26/85, 09/14/85, 09/23/85, 12/16/85, 02/26/86 The surveillance test record data associated with the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of Appendix B of
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the plant's Fire Hazards Analysis. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the surveillance results associated with procedure
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F2SV-FPX-009-25 to ensure the 62 day surveillance of the Unit 2 l remote shutdown panel halon suppression system was conducted within !
the required interva This onsite review identified that the
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required documentation was not available in Document Control, to t indicate the performance of the required surveillance between 03/28/77 and 07/17/87 tests and between 08/19/87 and 11/20/87 test This interval exceeds the maximum interval of 62 days plus 25% of the !
interval or 77.5 day !
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During a subsequent telephone conversation on June 28, 1988, the !
licensee stated that the documentation package for the surveillance !
performed on May 13, 1987, had not been transmitted to Document i
      '
Control but was found in the possession of the Engineering Fire The licensee also stated that their review
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Protection Grou indicated no evidence that the required surveillance was performed f
;  between 08/19/87 and 11/20/87. Failure to perform this surveillance 1  and failure to transmit the May 13, 1987 surveillance package to f Document Control is identified as Violation Item 50-366/88-21-01, l
Failure to Conduct and Document Required Surveillance of the Remote
!  Shutdown Panel Halon System, i Fire Brigade (1) The total station fire brigade is composed of approximately 73 members from the operations staff. The on duty shift fire brigade leader is normally one of the shift supervisors and the remaining four fire brigade members are composed of plant a  equipment operators. The inspectors reviewed the on duty shif ts for the following dates and verified that sufficient qualified
;  fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet the provisions of l  the plant's Technical Specifications:
 
l    06/18/88 i    06/19/88
;    06/20/88
;    06/21/88 06/22/88 l
In addition, the inspectors verified that sufficient personnel J
were assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and i  fire brigede staff requirements of the Technical Specifications, i
!  The licensee has recently initiated an informal shift roster i  which is used to designate the-personnel assigned to the fire
:  brigade and to the minimum shutdown cre In reviewing these 4  rosters for the day shif ts on 06/18/88, 06/19/88, and 06/20/88, j  the inspectors found that two individuals who were not fire i  brigade qualified had signed in on the roster as fire brigade member These two individuals are Auxiliary Plant l
 
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Operators (AP0s). AP0s are not presently trained for fire brigade duty. Further review of the rosters for the dates above, identified that additional fire brigade qualified personnel had also signed in on the roster and that a five man brigade was available exclusive of the unqualified AP0s. In addition, the inspectors found that there is no method of verifying that only trained individuals sign in as fire brigade '
members. At the beginning of each shift, the fire brigade and minimum shutdown crew members sign in on the roster maintained by the shift supervisor; however, the shif t supervisor does not have a list of qualified brigade members to compare with the roster to ensure only qualified personnel are assigned to the brigad For the dates reviewed by the inspectors, the assignment of unqualified personnel to the brigade is not considered a violation of plant Technical Specifications since additional qualified personnel were assigned brigade duty to meet the five man minimu However, the lack of a method of positive verification that only qualified personnel are assigned brigade duty is considered a weakness in the implementation of the Fire Protection Progra This weakness had been previously identified as part of Unresolved Item 50-321,366/88-15-02 in Inspection Report No. 88-15. Based on the inspectors' review of this unresolved item, it was determined that the licensee was taking adequate corrective action to eliminate all weaknesses identified in the item except in the area of controlling fire brigade assignments. Since none of the weaknesses identified in the Unresolved item constitute a violation of the licensee's Technical Specifications or Fire Protection License Condition, the Unresolved Item 88-15-02 will be closed in this report and a new Inspector Followup Item, 50-321,366/88-21-02, Failure to Provide Control of Assignment of Fire Brigade Members, is identified here to track the weakness in assigning personnel to the fire brigad Based on the review of the duty rosters associated with the above dates, there was sufficient manpower on duty to meet both the operational and the fire brigade requirements of the plant's Technical Specification (2) Training The inspectors attended a one hour session of the initial 40 hour fire brigade training dealing with the use of firefighting foams on flammable / combustible liquids fires and a two hour session for fire brigade leaders in which fire ground command and management were discusse The session on the uses of fire fighting foams included a video tape and a classroom discussion of plant specific foam use. The
 
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session was well organized and provided adequate information on the use of fire fighting foams at Plant Hatc The training session for fire brigade leaders is the licensee's        i initial implementation of a new fire brigade leadership training progra The program was developed in response to an internal QA audit finding which identified a weakness in the area of fire        <
brigade training program. The training program is set up to be conducted quarterly and will include the following      erial  -
covered over a two year period:
      *  Critical Factor Analysis        .
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Fire Fighting Systems Model        :
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Time Constraints
      *  Fire IP,cident Comand
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Tactics for Fire Control
      *  General Tactical Principles
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Special Hazards Tactics        ;
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The training in the two hour session, in which fire ground command and management were discussed, provided a good background in the subject areas; however, the training lacked plant specific information necessary for an effective leadership training program for Plant Hatch. The fire brigade leader perfomance during the fire drill witnessed during this inspection and during a previous inspection indicated that adequate training was not being conducted for brigade leader Therefore, an Inspector Followup Item, 50-321,366/88-21-03, Followup on the Implementation of Fire Brigade Leadership        .
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Training, is identified to ensure the implementation of this training is reviewed in future inspection (3)  Fire Brigade Firefighting Strategies          ,
The inspectors reviewed the following plant firefighting        ,
strategies:
Pre-Plan N Description
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SR-2407  Diesel Generator Room 2C SR-2404  Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 2E SR-2402  Diesel Generator Battery Room 2A SR-2401  Diesel Generator Oil Storage Room 2A SR-2203F  Unit 2 Reactor Building North CRD Area SR-2205F  Unit 2 Reactor Building South CRD Area    F SR-0501-IS  River Intake Structure      ,
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Based on this review, the inspectors detemined that the above        ,
firefighting strategies adequately addressed the fire hazards in        !
the area, the type of fire extinguishants to be utilized, the        ;
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direction of attack, systems in the room / area to be managed in order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke control and salvag (4) Fire Brigade Drill During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced fire brigade dril The drill fire scenario was a fire in a temporary tent setup on the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Buildin Ten fire brigade members responded to the pending fire emergency in full protective clothing and self contained breathing apparatus. The fire brigade advanced two 1-1/2 inch fire attack hose lines into the area. The hose lines were placed in service on the fire and the tent fire was placed under control in approximately 40 minute Fire brigade performance was identified as steadily deteriora-ting in Inspection Report No. 87-30, Inspector Followup Item 50-321,366/87-30-0 This trend appeared to have improved only minimally in the drill witnessed. The following weaknesses identified in Inspection Report No. 87-30 still exist:
Sincerely, NbAv. 0A h S>< Malcolm L. Ernst Acting Regional Administrator cc: d . P. Mcdonald. Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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  /J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch A4. C. Nix, General Manager, Plant Hatch A. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager vi.. T. Gucwa, Manager Licensing and Engineering, Plant Hatch
The brigade leader failed to establish a command post with adequate comunicatio * The brigade leader did not perform a proper sizeup of the fire situation prior to initiating firefighting activitie *
  /S. B. Tipps, Manager of Nuc1 car Safety and Compliance State of Georgia bec: (See page 2)
Health Physics personnel did not promptly respond to assist the fire brigade.
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l  The primary problem identified was the lack of leadeaship provided by the fire brigade leader in the drill. The licensee has recently initiated a leadership training program for all fire brigade leader The inspectors feel the successful implementation of such a training program will eliminate the deficiencies identified during the two drills previously witnesse The Inspector Followup Item 50-321,366/87-30-04 will remain open pending the NRC witnessing a satisfactory fire brigade dril Review of Appendix R Nonconformances Through discussions with plant personnel, the inspectors found that the licensee had recently identified a number of nonconformances from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R for the protection of l
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Georgia Power Company 2 00T .181988 be . P. Crocker, NRR M. V. Sinkule, R11 NRC Resident Inspector DRS, Technical Assi; tant Document Control Dc A
 
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circuits required for plant shutdown. These nonconformances were identified through the licensee's review of a number of backlogged Unit 1 As-Built Notices (ABNs) associated with    the Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) design change which was completed in the Spring of 1986. The nonconformances are identified in a letter dated June 10,1988 (Log No. REA-8-6-809) from William F. Garner of Southern Company Services to D. R. Madison of Georgia Power Compan Included in this letter are recommended actions for eliminating the nonconformances which include the revision of plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to include additional operator actions or the installation of fire rated barriers to protect electrical cabl The inspectors reviewed each of the nonconformances with the site Fire Protection Engineering Supervisor and the Appendix R Project Manager from Southern Company Services. This review established that the licensee had evaluated each of the nonconformances for its effect on the ability to reach and maintain Unit 1 plant shutdown. The licensee's representatives stated that in all cases the consequences of a fire damaging the unprotected circuits could have L'een mitigated by:
RII RII RII RI R OWard:*.. GWiseman Tdn17n AHerdt AG'ik son 10//l /88 10/0 /88 10/l('/88 10/i v/88 10/$/88 I
* Corrective actions which would have been implemented through the plant symptom based E0Ps; or
RII RII RII<
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AV '/
Availability of redundant system For example, a loss of High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) could have been supplemented by the use of safety relief valves, which are protected, to depressurize to the point where Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI)couldinitiat Therefore, the existence of these nonconfermances would not have prevented Unit 1 from achieving plant shutdow The licensee is required by Appendix B of their Fire Hazards Analysis to submit a special report within 30 days to document the failure to provide protection for these circuits. This special report will include the licensee's evaluation of why failing to protect these circuits would not have prevented them for achieving safe plant shutdow Upon discovery of the nonconformances the licensee implemented roving fire watches in the affected fire areas which will remain in effect until corrective actions have been implemented, Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment (1) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features The inspectors conducted a tour of the Diesel Generator Building and Cable Spreading Roo The fire / smoke detection systems, manual fire fighting equipment (i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire area boundary walls, floors
MSii1kul e enkins JStqhr 10/pt/83 10//f/88
 
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and ceiling were inspected and found to be in service or functiona The CO2 system installed in each of the Diesel Generator Rooms and the Pre-Action sprinkler system protection in the Cable i Spreading Room were inspected and found to be in servic The tours of these areas also verified the licensee's implementation of the fire prevention administrative procedures. .
The control of combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and !
gases, and the general housekeeping were found to be sa tisfactory,    i (2) Appendix R Fire protection Features  i The inspectors visually inspected the fire rated raceway barrier !
on conduit 2E21601 in Fire Area 0014. This fire barrier was !
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found intact and it appeared that the one hour fire barrier .
integrity has been maintained. In addition, the inspectors !
visually inspected the three-hour rated raceway fire barriers applied to the conduit / raceway bank located in Fire Area 1412
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    (Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 1E) which contained the i following safe shutdown circuits:  l i
ESA-4  ESA-26 ESA-6  ESA-28
 
ESA-8  ESA-84 ESA-10  ESA-86  i
 
ESA-12  ESA-90 ESA-14  ESA-91  j This fire barrier was found intact and it appeared that the '
three hour barrier integrity was maintained.
 
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:    The following eight-hour emergency lighting units were inspected:    j i    1R42-E041  1A Diesel Generator Room .
i 1R42-E066  1A Diesel Generator Room
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1R42-E068  1A Diesel Generator Room .
1R42-E109  1A Diesel Generator Room j    2R42-E038  2A Diesel Generator Room l    2R42-E045  2A Diesel Generator Room These units were in service, lamps properly aligned and appeared
 
to be properly maintained.
 
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g. Response to NRC Information Notice 88-04 On Feburary 5, 1988, the NRC issued Information Notice 88-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seal The purpose of the notice was to make licensees aware that some installed fire barrier penetration seal designs may not be adequately qualified for the design rating of the penetrated fire barrier The licensee's proposed response to the Notice was l reviewed during this inspectio The licensee has completed a preliminary evaluation of the concerns l
outlined in the Information Notice and has proposed the following action to evaluate these concerns as they apply to Plant Hatch.
 
l - Evaluate Plant Hatch's test qualification documentation with t respect to adequacy and completeness. This evaluation will also consider the method of installation or repair used for the fire barrier penetration seals.
 
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  - Cross reference the test qualification documentation to each
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specific fire barrier penetration seal (or repairs to that specificseal).
 
- Offer resolutions to any problems encountere The licensee has a preliminary completion date of March 1989 for the cross referencing process. If the licensee implements the proposed plan of action described above, the concerns outlined in Infonnation Notice 88-04 should be adequately evaluate In addition, the inspectors attempted to verify that the following four penetration seals located in the cable spreading room could be tracked to specific test data which demonstrated the seal was a qualified three hoitr fire barrier:
H033F H034F H068F H072F However, the lack of a cross reference between the seal and test data made the task very cumbersome and the inspectors were unable to verify the seals were installed in a tested configuration. The inspectors noted during this review that at least one of the seals, H033F, had been modified from the original design detai The licensee's implementation of their action plan in response to the Information Notice will be followed up in a future inspectio _  ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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10 Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) IFI 321,366/86-27-02, Proposed Firefighting Strategies /
Preplans Lack Fire Brigade Guidance. The inspectors reviewed the plant Preplans (Revision 1)datedApril 23, 1987, for the Diesel Generator Building and Reactor Buildings. This review determined that Revision 1 preplans adequately gives the locations of portable extinguishers for brigade use, addresses management of plant systems with references to appropriate E0Ps and Abnormal Operating Procedures (ACPs) located in the control room, gives locations of telephones and communications systems, and provides guidelines for fire attack access and command post location These revised preplans appear adequate to meet NRC guidelines; therefore, this item is closed, (Closed) Violation 321,366/87-30-02, Failure to Implement Fire Protection Program Procedures for Documentation of Fire Protection Activities. This violation involved two examples of the licensee's failure to document fire protection activities in accordance with plant procedure Example 1 resulted from the failure of the licensee's staff assigned to critique plant fire drills to complete the required records to document the drill as satisfactory or unsatisfactor The licensee's corrective action included the revision of the plant procedure, 42FP-FPX-005-OS (Rev. 0), for performing plant fire drills to include the requirement that drill evaluation be completed and transmitted to Document Control within 30 day The inspectors verified that all drill critiques sent to Document Control for the fourth quarter of 1987 were complet Example 2 resulted from the licensee's failure to implement the requirements of Administrative Control Procedure 20AC-ADM-002-05 to perform a quarterly records chec The licensee's corrective action in response to this example was to revise the administrative procedure to eliminate the requirement for a quarterly records check since this requirement was impractical . The licensee is relying on the responsible organization to insure the required records are transmitted to Document Control. The inspectors verified that Revision 3 of 20AC-ADM-002-OS no longer requires Document Control to perfom a quarterly records chec (Closed) Violation 321,366/87-30-03, Failure to Repeat Unsatisfactory Fire Brigade Drills Within Required Time Period. Orill critiques for two drills in 1986 and two in 1987 indicated that drill performance however, a redrill was not conducted within 30 was days unsatisfactory; in accordance with plant procedure _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The licensee's corrective action in response to this violation was to conduct six drills in November and December. Five of these drills were conducted to meet the requirement for each shift to participate in an unannounced drill at least once per yea One of the drills was a redrill of an unsatisfactory drill. All drills were considered satisfactory by personnel assigned to critique the brigade performanc The inspectors verified that all six drill critiques had been transmitted to Document Control and the redrill had beer conducted within the 30 day time limi d. (0 pen) IFI 321,366/87-30-04, Additional Fire Brigade Training and Drills Required. During the 87-30 inspection, a fire brigade drill was witnessed which was unsatisfactory. During this inspection, another brigade drill was witnessed which showed only minimal improvement in brigade performanc The major deficiency noted during this inspection resulted from the lack of leadership by the fire brigade leaders. The licensee has recently initiated a training program for brigade leaders which should eliminate these deficiencie ,
This item will remain open pending the NRC witnessing a fire brigade j
drill which eliminates the concerns outlined in report 87-30 and this repor e. (Closed) IFI 321,366/87-30-05, Justification for CO2 Extinguisher Mountings in the Control Room. The CO2 extinguishers provided in the
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control room were mounted on shelves and not secured to prevent fallin The inspectors were concerned that if the CO2 extingui;'ur was knocked or fell from the shelf it may become a missile in the control room since they are high pressure cylinder The licensee corrected this 3roblem by removing the CO2 fire extinguishers from the controi room and replacing them w'th halon type. The halon fire extinguishers were permanently mounted with fire extinguisher brackets designed for mounting extinguishers on vehicles. These brackets will ensure the extinguishers cannot be knocked or fall from the shelve I    f. (Closed) Unresolved Item 321,366/88-15-02, Apparent Failure to Complete Required Periodic Fire Brigade Leadership Training. During
;    the Hatch Operational Team Assessment, this item wLs identified to denote weaknesses in the licensee's methods used to control the
,    coster of qualified fire brigade leaders and members and imprecise
'    administrative instructions controlling fire brigade trainin During this inspection, it was determined that ths licensee wa: taking adequate corrective action to eliminate all weaknesses identified in the item except in the area of controlling fire brigade assignment Since none of the weaknesses identified in the unresolved item constitute a violation of the licensee's Technical Specifications or Fire Protection License Condition, this Unresolved Item is closed. A
 
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new inspector followJp item is identified in paragraph 2.d of this  ,
repor . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on An a 24, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary infonnation is not contained in this repor Dissenting coments were not received from the license Item Number  Description and Reference 366/88-21-01  Violation - Failure to Conduct and Document Required Surveillance of the Remote Shutdown Panel Halon Suppression System 221,366/88-21-02  Inspector Followup Item (IFI) - Failure to Provide Control of Assignment of Fire Brigade Members 321,366/88-21-03  Inspector Followup Item (IFI) - Followup on the Implementation of Fire Brigade Leadership Training f
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Latest revision as of 23:00, 6 December 2021

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-321/88-21 & 50-366/88-21
ML20205H053
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1988
From: Ernst M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Hairston W
GEORGIA POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8810280380
Download: ML20205H053 (2)
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' t 00T 181988 Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. OPR-57, hPF-5 A eorgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III Senior Vice President -

Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NRC I 13PECTION REPORT i!05. 50-321/88-21 AND 50-366/88-21 .

Thank you for your response of September 20, 1988, to our Notice of Violation issued on August 23, 1988, concerning activities conducted at your Hatch facilit We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte

Sincerely, NbAv. 0A h S>< Malcolm L. Ernst Acting Regional Administrator cc: d . P. Mcdonald. Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations

/J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch A4. C. Nix, General Manager, Plant Hatch A. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager vi.. T. Gucwa, Manager Licensing and Engineering, Plant Hatch

/S. B. Tipps, Manager of Nuc1 car Safety and Compliance State of Georgia bec: (See page 2)

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