IR 05000321/1988008

Insp Repts 50-321/88-08 & 50-366/88-08 on 880307-11.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Areas of Complex Surveillance Testing & IE Bulletin Followup

ML20151B965
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/01/1988
From:	Jape F, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151B958	List: IR 05000321/1988008 ML20151B955
References
50-321-88-08, 50-321-88-8, 50-366-88-08, 50-366-88-8, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8804120054
Download: ML20151B965 (8)

Text

.en afou' g*

UR$1VED STATES

- b NUOLEAR REGULATORY COMMIF-~ st

1. i REGloN il f*'-.. . 101 MARIETTA STREET. ' 's ATL ANT A. G EORGI A 30323

%J g

.....

Report Nos.: 50-321/88-08 and 50-366/88-08 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 7-11, 1988 Inspector: flwL Q %" % 3hil8D S. G. Tingen Da'te Signed Approved by [ , ,Id v///P/

F. Jape /, fectivn Chief Dat6 Signed

// Division Engineering Branch of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: Thi; routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of Con. plex Surveillance Testing and IE Eulletin follow-u Results: No violations or deviations were identifie i l

l I

i l

l I

i l

l i

8804120054 880404 PDR ADOCK 05000321 l

'

O DCD

!

I

--.

~ _- . . -- .. . - - - . . . - . .. . - .

,

'

.

!

, . . , .

~

!

'

i REPORT DETAILS

,

' Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Bethay, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

• Brock, Project Engineer

'

,

• E. Burkett, Supervisor, Project Engineering

• Fornel, Manager, Maintenance

-

• 0. Fraser, Manager, Quality Assurance

• R. Glisson, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering i

• R. Goodoy, Supervisor, Maintenance Operations A. Huber, Reactor Systems Engineer T. Metzler, Maintenance Engineer

• D. Midlik, Senior Plant Engineer i

• T. Powers, Manager, Engineering Support

• D. Read, Manager, Plant Support j *C. Sorensen, Instrument and Control Engineer ,

"

• L. Sumner, Manager, Operations  ;

*S. Tipp, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance t

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, t

. operators, mechanics, and office personne ;

,

'

NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. Holmes-Ray  ;

• J. Menning .

• R. Musser

-

l

~

* Attended exit interview

, Exit Interview i

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 11, 1988, with L those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the  ;

,

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No

! dissenting comments were received from the license ;

The licensee did identify some material as proprietary during this  ;

'

inspection, but this material is not included in this inspection repor '

! Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters i

j This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

i

,

d I

- - - - - - - - ,. - - . , . . - , - , . - - ,- -

. . , . . . , , , , , _ . . , , , , , _ _ , . . - , , . , , - , , _ , , . - . , , _ , - ,,.,, - .. . ._ .- - *

.

. . , .

2 Unresolved Items '

Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 7.a.(2).  ; Follow-up on Previously Identified Items (92701) (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 321/86-13-01  ;

During the Unit 11986 refueling outage, five Type C valves were repaired prior to first determining the as-found leak rate. The licensee committed to evaluate the effects of the omitted leak rate test data and report the results in the Containment Leakage Test Repor The inspector reviewed the 1986 Unit 1 Containment Leakage Test Report and the report did not address any of these five valve Since issuance of this IFI, Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TSs) '

have been amended to delete the Type C containment leak checking ;

requirement of three of the five valves, and since the 1986 '

Containment Leakage Test as-found condition failed, the leakage rate of the remaining two valves is not significant; therefore, IFI i 321/86-13-01 is closed, (0 pen)IFI 321/86-13-03 and IFI 366/86-13-01  ;

This item identified Valve F021, High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) {

turbine exhaust to torus, that could not be pressurized in the accident direction for leak rate testing purposes due to the design :

of Units 1 and 2 open ended HPCI turbine exhaust piping to the toru The licensee had committed to reevaluate the local leak rate test program for both Units 1 and 2 in order to identify any additional non-conservative testing and resolve any identified problems. Since making this commitment, the licensee has requested Southern Services to evaluate the Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) local leak rate test ;

'

program, and on August 1,1986, Southern Services had completed the review and reported the results to the licensee. The licensee has taken some corrective action concerning the local leak rate test program but is still in the progress of evaluating the Southern Services report which includes resolving the proper direction to test Valve F02 I This item is to remain open until HNP has completed revaluation and resolution of Units 1 and 2 local leak rate test progra l l

<

'

.

6. Inspector Follow-up on IE Bulletin 85-BV-03: Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings (50-321/85-BU-03 and 50-366/85-SV-03) (25573)

The purpose of this bulletin is for the licensee to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings for High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) subject to testing for operational readiness in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g) are properly set, selected and maintained. This program is required to review and document the design basis for the operation of each MOV, determine the correct switch settings, prepare or revise procedures to establish the correct switch settings, demonstrate MOV operability, and prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings are maintained throughout the life of the plan The inspector discussed the HNP Bulletin 85-03 program with the respon-sible engineers and reviewed MOV Maintenance Procedures 52GM-MEL-022-05, Limitorque Valve Operator Electrical Maintenance, and 53IT-TET-001-05, limitorque Valve Operator Diagnostic Testing (MAC) and Setu The inspector also reviewed the completed data packages for MOV> 2E51-F03 and 2E41-F111 that were accomplished per Procedure 53IT-TET-001-0 The following findings were identified during the inspector review of the HNP Bulletin 85-03 program: Bulletin 85-03 requires that the applicable HPCS and RCIC MOVs be demonstrated operable by testing the valve while at the maximum differential pressure expected during an accident condition or provide justification for any cases where testing at the maximum differential pressure can not practicably be achieve HNP has identified 23 valves in Unit 1 and 22 valves in Unit 2 that fall under Bulletin 85-03 jurisdiction with plans to test two valves in each unit at the maximum differential pressures achievabl The inspector informed the licensee management that justification for not testing the remaining bulletin valves at differential pressure must ;

be provided to the NRC. To further discuss this issue, the licensee l is preparing to meet with Regional and Headquarters NRC personne Bulletin 85-03 requires that a program be developed to establish the ,

methods for selecting and setting switches (i .e. , torque, torque I bypass, position limit, overload) and report the details of this !

p ogram to the NRC. The inspector reviewed the licensee's program i

'

for selecting and setting switches and verified that the licensee did have a program to accomplish this; however, with the exception of torque switches the licensee has not reported to the NRC their i program for selecting and setting the remaining switches utilized in j HNP MOV The inspector informed the license management of this i additional information that is required to be reported to the NR l l

l

.

'. '

4 Bulletin 85-03 requires that each MOV be stroke tested (not necessarily at the maximum differential pressure) in order to verify proper switch setting Procedure 53IT-TET-001-05 performs MOV stroke testing with MAC test equipment installed on the valve actuato During the review of the procedure, the inspector noted

that the only switch setting recorded in the procedure during MAC stroke testing was the torque switch and corresponding thrust. The

"

'

limit switches and torque bypass switch actuation settings were stored in the MAC data bank but not verified correct or recorded in the procedure. Since 85-03 requires that all switch settings be verified, the inspector expressed the need to licensee management to record all switch trip results in the procedure data sheets, Procedure 53IT-TET-001-0S provides instructions for setting torque, torque bypass, and position limit switches. HNP MOV logic is set up to deenergize the MOV motor when a valve is opened by actuation of the open limit switch.- If the open limit switch is set incorrectly the valve could inadvertently be backseated which could result in valve damage. After adjusting the open limit switch the valve should be tested for backseating by first electrically opening the valve, and then taking manual control and counting the handwheel turns it takes to fully open the vcive on the backsea Procedure 53IT-TET-001-05 set the open limit switches on MOVs but did not subsequently check for valve backseating. Also, this procedure was not clear on the required open limit switch setting for fast speed actuators. The inspector informed the licensee management of these finding No deviations or violations were identifie . Complex Surveillances - Units 1 and 2 (61701) Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leak Rate Testing Unit - 1 MSIV Timed Closure Testing - Unit 2 The scope of this inspection was to ensure that the required testing was being performed in order to validate the MSIVs function to limit the release of radioactive material to the environment and limit vessel inventory loss during an accident. The inspector reviewed the MSIV leak rate results obtained during Unit 1 1987 spring refueling outage and the Unit 2 MSIV timed closure test results obtained during the 1987 third and fourth quarters. The acceptance criteria for MSIV leakage rates and closure times are contained in HNP TSs and in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cod One of the purposes of HNP Procedure 42SV-TET-001-15, Primary Containment Periodic Type B and C Leakage Tests, is to perform MSIV leak rate testin The inspector reviewed the sections of this

. _ _ . - . - . - - _ _ - . -

.

,

.

,

procedure that applied to MSIV leak rate testin The inspector verified that the MSIVs were leak rate tested at a pressure of 28 psig, that the final leak rate was less than 11.5 scfh per valve, and '

that the test interval of every operating cycle as specified in HNP TS 4.7. A.2.h were being adhered to. The inspector verified that 4 Procedure 42SV-TET-001-15 complied with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements regarding test frequency, when

] to take corrective. action, methods to measure leakage, test medium and direction of test pressure application. One Section XI require-ment that was not being adhered to was the requirement to increase '

test frequency based on an increasing leak rate but still within specificatio The licensee provided to the inspector a waiver to this requirement granted by the NR The inspector reviewed the i completed procedure data packages for MSIV leak rate testing in order ,

J to verify that MSIV testing was accomplished per the applicable  :

procedure instruction The data packages for the MSIV leak rate tests document the valve line-ups utilized for accomplishing the tes The inspector found several instances where the valve line-ups utilized to accomplish the leak rate test were not correctly documented i on the data sheets. One instance involved not properly transcribing

~

the valve line-up from the clearance to the data sheet valve line-up, ,

and the other instance involved not utilizing the exact valve line-up .

specified by the procedure for accomplishing the leak rate tes '

Since these discrepancies did not adversely affect the MSIV leak rate test results the inspector did not site a violation; however, these t items were discussed with licensee managemen The inspector reviewed Unit 2 Procedures 34SV-B21-002-25, Main Steam Isolation Valve Trip Test, and 42SP-012787-0V-1-25, MSIV Supplemental  :

Closure Time Test in order to verify compliance with HNP TSs and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Requirement These procedures provide two different methods for timing MSIV full closures. HNP Unit 2 TS 3/4.4.7 e< quires two MSIVs per main steam line be operable with closing times >3 and <5 seconds.Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code specifies MSIV test ,

frequenJy, stroke time, accuracy of stroke time measurement, when i corrective action is required, test intervals, and when test i

intervals are required to be increased. During the third and fourth quarters of 1987 the inboard MSIV in A main steam line failed to -

close within three to five second time interva The inspector reviewed the Limited Continued Operation sheets required as a result  ;

'

of these failed tests and verified compliance with TS 3/4. .

conditions for continued operations with inoperable MSIV !

As previously mentioned, Procedures 345-B21-002-25 and

42SP-012787-0V-1-2S provide two different methods for timing MSIV i closures. The following findings were identified during the review i

of these procedures

l i I

i

_

_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. _ _ _ _ , . ._._. ._

.

,

!

6 i (1) Procedure 345V-B21-002-25 utilizes a strip chart recorder that measures the time interval from MSIV switch actuation to .

actuation of the "valve closed" limit switch set at the 90% stem '

travel position. The time for the valve stem to travel the additional 10% to the fully closed position is mathematically calculated by determining valve velocity obtained from the strip

hart recorder and multiplying the valve velocity by the distance of the stem travel during t' e last 10% of the valve i

'

stroke. The distance of stem travel for the last 10% of the valve stroke is obtained from preoperational test data. The inspectors concern is that since the preoperational test data ,

has been obtained, maintenance on the. MSIVs has resulted in !

limit switch adjustment, therefore the preoperational test data relating limit switch position to stem distance may no longer be accurat l (2) Procedure 42SP-012787-0V-1-2S is used in Unit 2 when the "valve open" limit switch is inoperable and measures the time interval from MSIV switch actuation to actuation of "valve closed" limit .

switch set at the 90% closed stem travel position. The last 10%

of valve stem travel is not timed. Unlike the previous test i method, this method does not measure the time interval from !

initiation of the actuating signal to the end of the actuating !

cycle as required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code In order to resolve these concerns, more information regarding ;

preoperation limit switch setpoint accuracy, method of MSIV ;

closure testing in Unit 1, and calibration of step watches is :

required. This is identified as unresolved item 366/88-08-01, Timing MSIV Closure Method l No violations or deviations were identified, b. Main Steam Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Surve111ances - Unit 2 (

During the Unit 21988 refueling outage, all SRVs were sent to Wyle !

Laboratories and tested for disk to seat bonding, steam lift set l point, and seat leakag Wyle Laboratories also disassembled, '

cleaned, repaired and retested all SRVs. The inspector reviewed the results of SRV testing performed by Wyle Laboratories and verified compliance with HNP TS 4.0.5 which requires SRVs to be set point j checked and seat leak checked in accordance with Section XI of ASME '

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Of the eleven SRVs tested, the l as-found set pressures for seven exceeded the 1% TS set point I tolerance range. None of the SRVs failed to open during the Wyle '

Laboratories testin Target Rock SRV pilot disk to seat bonding has been a problem for ,

SRVs at HNP and other Boiling Water Reactor utilities. As an attempt j to solve this problem, five of the eleven Hatch Unit 2 SRVs disks l

. __ - . _ __ _ .-. . . _ - - . . . . . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ ,

<

-

,o . , .

were replaced with disks made of a new material, PH138MO stainless steel. The remaining SRVs disk were of the old material, Stellite- These recent $RV test results indicate that disk to seat bonding is still occurring in both the PH138MO and Stellite-6 disks. Until this bonding problem is resolved, HNP is removing all SRVs each refueling outage and having Wyle Laboratories test for as-found set point and seat leakage, disassemble, clean, repair and retest the valve HNP did 'not report the SRVs results that exceeded the TS 1% lift set point tolerance range via a Licensee Event Report -(LER). In

-

General Electric Report No. NSE0-09-0283, Over Pressure Protection Analysis with Upwards Set Point Drifts for Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2, dated' February 1983 an over pressure escident where SRV set points drift upward to 200 psig is analysed. The results indicate that the design limit would not be exceeded. The set point drift data obtained during the Unit 2,1988 refueling outage did not exceed 200 psig. Since the situation has been previseusly analysed reporting via an LER is not require No violations or deviations were identified.