IR 05000321/1988007
| ML20151M313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1988 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151M300 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-07, 50-321-88-7, 50-366-88-07, 50-366-88-7, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8804250024 | |
| Download: ML20151M313 (13) | |
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km arc UZlTED STATES
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oq'o RUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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[Y REGION 11 -
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j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
t ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 3o323
'+9.....,d Report Nos:
50-321/88-07 and 50-366/88-07 Licensee: Georgia Powei Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos:
50-321 and 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates:
February 20 - March 25, 1988
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Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors:
M A G.
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p Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
@aJL c f AL _
+l.. !n h John E. Menning, Resident Inspector Date Signed l
Accompanying Personnel:
Randall Musser
/66 Approved by
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Marvin V. Sinkule, Chief,' Project Section 38 Date' Signed l
Division of Reactor Projects i
i SUMMARY t
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Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of i
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verifica-i tion, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Testing Observation, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage, Part 21 Report Followup, and l
NRC Bulletin Followup.
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- Results:
Three violations were identified involving a failure to perform an adequate Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) surveillance, two examples of failure to follow surveillance procedures, and a failure to have an adequate turbine control valve test procedure.
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8804250024 880412
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PDR ADOCK 05000321
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted.
Licensee Employees T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Davis, Manager General Support
- J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager H. Nix, Plant Manager
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- T. Powers, Engineering Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. Sumner, Operations Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager l
R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
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mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P.
Holmes-Ray
- J. Menning R. Musser Senior NRC personnel on site during inspection period:
V. Brownlee, Chief, Project Branch 3, Region II K. Carr, Commissioner T. Elsasser, Technical Assistant to Commissioner Carr J. Nelson Grace, Administrator, Region II M. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B, Region II
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 25, 1988, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
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Item Number Status
. Description / Reference Paragraph 321,366/88-07-03 Opened VIOLATION Inadequate APRM Surveillance (paragraph 7);
321,366/88-07-04 Opened VIOLATION - Failure.to Follow Surveillance Procedures (paragraph.7)-
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366/88-07-05 Opened VIOLATION - Inadequate Turbine
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Control-Valve Test Procedure (paragraph 13)
366/87-26-01 Closed VIOLATION - Failure to Perform Monthly Caution T:9 Reviews (paragraph 3.a)
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366/88-07-01 Opened UNRESOLVED ITEM * (URI) - Design
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and Installation of Vacuum Breaker Air Test Lines (paragraph
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5)
366/88-07-02 Opened URI - Post Maintenance Leak Rate Testing (paragraph 5)
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321,366/88-05-02 Remained URI - Leak. Testing of Test Open Solenoid Valves (paragraphs 3.b
and 5).
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321/88-05-03 Closed URI - Inadequate APRM Surveillance (paragraphs 3.c and 7)
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321,366/80-BU-06 Closed IE BULLETIN - Engineering Safety Feature Reset Controls (paragraph i
15)
3.
Licensee Action on Previou> Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 366/87-26-01, Failure to Perform Monthly Caution Tag Reviews.
This violation related to failure to conduct reviews of the Unit 2 Caution Tag Index/ Audit Sheets during the months of May, June, and
September of 1987. The requirement for monthly reviews is contained-r in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-0S, "Control of Equipment j
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- An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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Clearances and Tags". The inspector reviewed the licensee's letter of response dated December 28, 1987.
Corrective action involved counselling appropriate personnel and modifying the surveillance printout to more clearly indicate the requirement for caution tag reviews. The inspector determined that the surveillance printout has been modified as discussed in the licensee's response. Additionally, the inspector reviewed Unit 2 Caution Tag Index/ Audit Sheets and determined that monthly reviews have been performed subsequent to this violation. This matter is closed.
b.
(0 pen) URI 321,366/88-05-02, Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valves.
This item concerns the local. leak rate testing of torus to drywell vacuum breaker test solenoid valves T48-F342A-L in both units. As discussed in paragraph 5, this item remains open pending completion of the licensee's review of the matter.
c.
(Closed) URI 321/88-05-03, Inadequate APRM Surveillance.
As discussed in paragraph 7, this matter will now be tracked as violation 321,366/88-07-03.
4.
Unresolved Items a.
(0 pen) URI 366/88-07-01, Design and Installation of Vacuum Breaker Air Test Lines.
As discussed in paragraph 5, a URI has been opened as a result of the licensee's finding that torus to drywell vacuum breaker air test lines in Unit 2 were not designed and installed as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
b.
(0 pen) URI 366/88-07-02, Post Maintenance Leak Rate Testing.
As discussed in paragraph 5, a URI has been opened as a result of the licensee's finding that certain equipment had not been local leak rate tested as required following recent outage maintenance.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant opera-tions.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access
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corit rol s. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions
with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited, Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolation.
During this reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functions.
The inspector reviewed a Health Physics and Chemistry Department Overtime Report for the month of January 1988.
It was determined that applicable requirements of the technical specifications and licensee Procedure 30AC-0PS-003-0S had been satisfied.
Technical specification overtime guidelines were exceeded for two individuals during the month of January, and these deviations from the guidelines had been approved in advance by the Plant Manager.
As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos.. 50-321/88-05 and 50-366/88-05, the licensee discovered on February 12, 1988, that torus to drywell vacuum breaker test solenoid valves T48-F342A-L would not hold pressure during local leak rate testing (LLRT) when pressurized on the accident side.
Past LLRT's had been performed with pressure applied on the side of the F342 valves away from accident pressure.
These test solenoid valves are considered outboard containment isolation valves.
At the time of this discovery, Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent of rated power and Unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Air test lines in Unit 1 were disconnected and capped at vacuum breaker test solenoid valves 1T48-F343A-L to support continued operation.
In Unit 2, the licensee elected to correct the problem by physically reversing the F342 valves in the air test lines.
Since the past LLRT's had been successful, the licensee concluded that reversal of the valves would provide a suitable solution.
Physical reversal of the F342 valves was performed under Design Change Request (DCR) 88-31.
The inspectors reviewed the work package for DCR 88-31, noting that welding was performed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Section III Class 2 requirements. This DCR specified three types of post modification testing.
Pressure testing was initially performed per
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Procedure 42IT-TET-001-05, "Pressure Testing of Piping and Components."
The inspectors reviewed the results of this initial testing.
The F342 valves were then LLRTed per Procedure 42SV-TET-001-25, "Primary Contain-ment Periodic Type B-and C Leakage Tests." The inspectors reviewed the results of these LLRTs.
Finally, the Unit 2 torus to drywell vacuum breakers (2T48-F323A-L) were operability tested per Procedure 34SV-T48-002-2S, "Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breaker System Oper-ability." The inspectors witnessed this operability testing on March 3, 1988.
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The Unit I vacuum breaker air test lines remain capped at test solenoid
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valves 1T48-F343A-L at the conclusion of this reporting period. Monthly operability testing of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers cannot be performed with these lines capped.
The licensee has developed special procedures to support the monthly operability testing requirements of Technical Specification 4.7.A.4.a.
Procedure 42SP-030288-00-1-15, Rev. O,
"Installation and Removal of T48 Test Solenoid Valves," provides instruc-tions for individually uncapping and reconnecting the air lines.
The vacuum breakers are tested per the normal surveillance procedure (345V-T48-002-1S) with the restriction that only one air test line can be uncapped at one time.
The inspectors observed monthly vacuum breaker operability testing accomplished in accordance with these procedures on March 9, 1988, and noted that all vacuum breakers tested satisfactorily.
The licensee is continuing to review the circumstances surrounding the apparently inadequate past LLRTs of vacuum breaker test solenoid valves T48-F342A-L.
Pending completion of the licensee's review, previously identified URI 321,366/88-05-02, Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valves, will remain open.
On February 25, 1988, the licensee notified the NRC that Unit 2 torus to drywell vacuum breaker air test lines had not been designed and installed as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The air test lines in question are the individual, stainless steel lines between test solenoid valves 2T48-F342A-L and the air operators for vacuum breakers 2T48-323A-L.
The FSAR describes these lines as being Seismic Category.1 and Class 2 per Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
The licensee discovered that these lines had in actuality been designed and installed to comply with American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
B31.1, "Standard Code for Pressure Piping, Power Piping." Bechtel was subsequently asked to identify the necessary modifications to make the test lines Seismic Category 1.
These modifications have been implemented by the licensee under DCR 88-43.
By letter dated March 4, 1988, as supplemented by letter dated March 15, 1988, the licensee proposed to the NRC that the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) be applied to these Unit 2 air test lines.
This section of the regulation allows the NRC to accept
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alternatives to the requirements specified elsewhere in 10 CFR 50.55a for
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meeting the provisions of the ASME Code. The licensee proposed that the l
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subject lines be treated as ANSI B31.1 upgraded to Class 2 for ASME Section 3, with Section XI inspection and testing requirements. By letter dated March 17, 1988, the NRC notified the licensee that the proposed alternative was acceptable.
Pending completion of the licensee's review of this matter, this item will be identified as URI 366/88-07-01, Design and Installation of Vacuum Breaker Air Test Lines.
At 1535 on March 21, 1988, the licensee declared a loss of primary containment integrity in Unit 2 and entered _ the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1.
The loss of primary containment integrity was declared due to discrepancies with High Pressure Coolant Injection system turbine exhaust isolation valves 2E41-F021 and 2E41-F049.
Bonnet leakage was observed on 2E41-F049 (a check valve), and the licensee therefore conservatively questioned the ability of this valve to perform an isolation function.
The licensee also discovered that 2E41-F021 (a manually operated valve) had not been LLRTed following recent outage maintenance.
These two valves are identified as required containment isolation valves in Technical Specification, Table 3.6.3-1.
Since the licensee could not restore primary containment integrity within the one-hour period provided by Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, a 12-hour hot-shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered. As discussed in paragraph 13, Unit 2 was manually scrammed at 1647, in effect placing the reactor in hot shutdown. Valve 2E41-F021 was subsequently LLRTed with acceptable results, and the associated LCO was terminated at 2105.
The licensee also checked maintenance records to determine if other equipment had not been LLRTed as required following outage maintenance. This check revealed that electrical penetration 2T52-X105C had not been LLRTed as
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required.
This penetration was promptly LLRTed with acceptable results.
pending completion of the licensee's review of this matter and review by the resident inspectors, this matter will be identified as URI 366/88-07-02, Post Maintenance Leak Rate Testing.
Two URIs were identified.
6.
Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2 During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
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actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary mainte-nance observations during this month are summarized below:
Vaintenance Activity Date 1.
Repair of scram discharge volume thermal 03/01/88 sensor 2C11-N660C per Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 2-88-1123
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Maintenance Activity Date j
(cont'd)
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Maintenance on operator of Reactor Core 03/06/88 Isolation Cooling system valve 2E51-F007 per MWO 2-88-1260 3.
Installation and removal of T48 test 03/09/88 solenoid valves per proc 2 dure 42SP-030288-00-1-1S
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Installation of operator on Hydrogen 03/16/88 Recombiner system valve 2T49-F008B
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per MWO 2-88-1494 No violations or deviations were identified.
I 7.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the oerformance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the _ actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components ffected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the a
acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing-observations during this month are summarized below:
Survaillance Testing Activity Date 1.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 03/01/88 valve operability testing per Procedure 345V-E11-002-1S (Unit 1)
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Torus to drywell vacuum breaker 03/03/88 operability testing per Procedure 345V-T48-002-2S (Unit 2)
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RHR system Low Pressure Coolant Injection 03/06/88 Logic System functional test and auto actuation per Procedure 42SV-E11-001-2S (Unit 2)
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Torus to drywell vacuum breaker 03/09/88 operability testing per Procedure 345V-T48-002-1S (Unit 1)
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Control rod scram testing per Procedure 03/25/88 42SV-C11-001-0S (Unit 2)
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As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-05 and 50-366/88-05, URI 321/88-05-03 was opened to track inadequate Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) surveillance.
Table 4.1-1, Scram 8, of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications requires the APRM flow referenced thermal. power and APRM downscale trips to be tested weekly. Unit 2 Technical Specifica-tion Table 4.3.1-1, Item 2, also requires weekly testing of these trips.
On February 15, 1988, the licensee discovered that APRM functional test procedures did not test these trips.
The involved procedures are 34SV-C51-002-15 (Unit 1) and 34SV-C51-002-25 (Unit 2). Further review of this matter has confirmed that these APRM trips have not been tested as required.
Failure to perform this functional testing is a violation of the previously cited technical specification tables.
Accordingly, URI 321/88-05-03 is closed and this matter will now be tracked as violation 321,366/88-07-03, Inadequate APRM Surveillance. In reviewing this matter, the inspectors noted that the APRM fixed high-high flux trip had been properly tested on a weekly basis in both units.
At approximately 0920 on February 27,1988, Unit 2 RHR system pump "2A" tripped due to closure of shutdown cooling suction valve 2E11-F009. Valve 2E11-F009 isolated on a high reactor vessel pressure signal from Analog
Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) trip unit 2831-N679A. The trip signal was generated during performance of Plant Procedure 57SV-SUV-007-25, "ATTS Panel 2H11-P921 Channel Functional Test and Calibration." At the time of i
this event, Unit 2 was in the REFUEL mode and core reload was in progress.
The surveillance procedure contains provisions to prevent the isolation of valve 2E11-F009 during functional testing of trip unit 2831-N679A.
The provisions involve opening links to prevent the high reactor vessel pressure signal from reaching the valve closing circuit. After injection of a simulated high pressure test signal and verification of proper relay operation, the procedure requires that the trip unit and isolation logic be reset prior to closing the links.
On February 27, 1988, plant
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personnel closed the links without resetting the isolation logic.
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valve closing circuit was actuated and valve 2E11-F009 isolated because a portion of the logic was still made-up. Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment.
This matter is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c in that Procedure 575V-SUV-007-25 was not followed by personnel performing the testing.
This matter will be tracked as part of violation 321,366/
j 88-07-04, Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedures.
On March 7,1988, at approximately 2250, Unit 1 experienced a half-scram
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and isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system. At the time
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of this event Unit I was operating in the RUN mode at 100 percent of rated power.
Investigation revealed that the event was caused by power interruption to ATTS panel 1H11P921. The power interruption, in turn, was caused by personnel error on the part of individuals performing Procedure 57SV-D11-016-1S, "G.E. NUMAC Main Steam Line Logarithn.ic Radiation Monitor Functional Test." This procedure required the opening of links 00-23 and D0-24 in panel 1H11P611.
Test personnel erroneously opened links 00-23 and 00-24 in panel 1H11P609, resulting in power interruption to panel
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1H11P921.
The half-scram reset within one minute and the RWCU system was.
returned to service in approximately 13 minutes. This failure to follow a surveillance procedure is another example of violation-321,366/88-07-04 and will be tracked as such.
Two violations were identified.
8.
ESF_ System Walkdown (71710) Unit 2 The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups sere in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment. material conditions were satisfactory.
The Unit 2 Core Spray system "A" loop was walked down in detail.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
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The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various
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shif ts to include:
involvement of health physics _ supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10.
Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2 In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security forca was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controis, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A wmber cf Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost consideraiio.
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Unit 1: 88-01, Personnel Errors Cause Procedure Errors Leading to Violations of the Technical Specifications.
The events of this LER have been cited as violations 321/88-05-01 and 321,366/88-07-03. Since this matter will be tracked with the violations, this LER is closed.
Unit 2: 88-07, Failed Valves Disclose Design Deficiencies and Te:hnical Specification Violation.
The events of this LER have been identified as URI 321, 366/88-05-02. Since this matter will be tracked as a URI, this LER is closed.
12. Operating Reactor Events (93702) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor events.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, and scram reports and also had discussions with operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as appropriate.
On February 26, 1988, at approximately 0940, the Unit 1 main turbine tripped as a result of operation of the generator field ground detection relay (1N71-K751).
Closure of the main turbine stop valves resulted in a full automatic reactor scram.
At the time of this scrar, Unit I was operating in the RUN mode at 100 percent of rated power. Closure of the turbine stop valves caused reactor pressure to increase to approximately 1091 psig.
Two safety relief valves (SRV) did not perform their low low set (LLS) functions properly during the pressure transient.
The "G" SRV closed at a reactor pressure of approximately 1062 psig. This SRV should have remained open until reactor pressure had decraased to approximately 877 psig.
The "C" SRV closed at approximately 901 psig, and it should have remained open until approximately 887 psig.
Reactor vessel level decreased to approximately plus 15 inches indicated.
The licensee's investigation of the Unit 1 scram on February 26, 1988, failed to conclusively identify the cause of the generator field ground fault detection relay actuation.
The failure of the
"G" SRV LLS logic to arm was found to be caused by the failure of pressure transmitter 1B21-N1220.
Improper operation of the
"C" SRV in the LLS mode was found to be caused by the failure of pressure transmitter 1821-N1200.
These SRV LLS pressure transmitters were functionally tested as part of the licensec's investigation, were found to be inoperable, and were replaced.
Beth the reactor scram and SRV LLS operability problems were properly reported to the NRC by the licensee.
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As discussed in paragraph 13, the inspectors witnessed ard/or reviewed Unit 2 reactor scrams that occurred on March 18 and 21, 1988, during startup operations.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711) Unit 2 Prior to the Unit 2 startup, the inspectors performed a walkthrough of the control rod drive hydraulic system and the "2A" and "2C" emergency diesel i
generators to verify that this equipment had been returned to service in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspector witnessed portions i
of the startup to verify that control roo withdrawals were properly
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controlled and that operations were conducted in accordance with approved i
procedures and the technical specifications.
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The inspector witnessed the shutdown margin demonstration that was performed 1.1 accordance with Procedure 42FH-ENG-019-2S. The demonstration was performod on March 17, 1988, soon after criticality was achieved in Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed the procedure for technical adequacy, verified the licensee's calculations, and verified that data supplied by the fuel vendor was utilized.
At 1021 on March 18,1988, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approxi-mately five percent of rated power during startup operations.
The inspector observed the performance of control room personnel following this scram.
The inspector noted that appropriate plant procedures were being utilized and that plant, systems functioned as required. At the time of this event, plant personnel were performing Procedure 34SV-071-005-25, Revision 1,
"Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Instrument Functional Test."
The main turbine was in the tripped mode.
With the turbine tripped, the turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches were in the open position. Consequently, a full reactor scram occurred when the
"less than 30 percent reactor power" scram bypass feature of the logic system was removed as part of this procedure. The procedure was deficient in that it did not require the turbine to be reset prior to removing the scram bypass feature.
Technical Specifiu tion 6.S.I.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment. This matter is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c in that Revision 1 of pro:edure 345V-C71-005-25 was inadequate and resulted in the Unit 2 scram on March 18.
This matter will be tracked as violation 366/88-07-05 -
Inadequate Turbine Control Valve Test Procedure.
At 1647 on March 21, 1988, the Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed following a trip of the "2A" Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT).
At the time of this scram, Unit 2 was operating at 18 percent of rated power and operations personnel were in the process of opening the bypass (2N21-F110)
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to the feedwater startup level control valve.
Personnel initially noted
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feedwater flow oscillations when 2N21-F110 was approximately 75 percent open. The "2A" RFPT speed then increased rapidly and the RFPT subse-quently tripped on low suction pressure.
Reactor vessel water level decreased following the RFPT trip, and operations personnel manually scrammed the reactor at an indicated vessel level of plus 12.5 inches.
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The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system was manually initiated at a reactor vessel level of minus 25 inches indicated.
Reactor vessel water level decreased to a low point of minus 30 inches, and then increased.
Review of this scram indicates that the master feedwater level controller was unable to properly control reactor vessel water. level when 2N21-F110 was opened.
The licensee determined that level controller gain settings had recently been adjusted to new levels that were apparently too high.
Tne level controller gain settings were readjusted to previous levels
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prior to restart of Unit 2.
One violation was identified.
14.
Part 21 Report Followup (92716)
On April 24, 1986, Delta Controls (formerly RTE-Delta Corporation) advised the NRC of a potential defect with twenty-six (26) G.E. Type NGA15AG3 relays.
These relays had been installed in emergency diesel generator control panels supplied by Transamerica Delaval Inc. to Georgia Power Company.
Investigation has shown that the involved panels were supplied to Plant Vogtle and that the Part 21 report does not apply to Plant Hatch.
This matter, tracked by Region II as item 321/P2186-03, is closed.
15.
IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
l (Closed) IEB 80-06, Engineering Safety Feature Reset Controls.
In Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/87-26 and 50-366/87-26, the review of
action taken by the licensee in response to IEB 80-06 was documented. The
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closure of the item was delayed awaiting the results of an additional
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Architectual Engineer (AE) review to insure compliance with IEB 80-06. By
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letter dated January 22, 1988, the AE submitted the results of this review and stated that no additional discrepancies were found.
This item is closed.
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