IR 05000321/1988014
| ML20195E382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1988 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Ross W, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195E374 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-14, 50-366-88-14, NUDOCS 8806240034 | |
| Download: ML20195E382 (14) | |
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EQ Clo UNITED STATES uq'o
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO,4 j-
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA,Gr.ORGe A 30323
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Report Numbers:
50-321/88-14 and 50-366/88-14 Licensee:
Georgia Power Company
'P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and'2 Inspection Dates: -Ar il 18-20 and April 23 - May 20, 1988 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors:
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Peter Molmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed d-/d -W
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'ngt Resident Inspector Date Signed
& -war Fl J. Ross, Chemistry Iffspector Date Signed Accompanying Pers nel:
Randall Musser j'
Approved by:
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s MarVin V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B Date' Signed DivisionofReactorProjects SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine in:pection was conducted at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verifi-cation, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events,ives. Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts, and Recent Chemistr Initiat Results:
lwo violations were identified.
One violation was for backfilling an instrument reference leg without specific work instructions or procedures.
The other violation was for violating primary containment integrity during hydrogen recombiner. system testing.
One unresolved item was also identified involving improper drywell pneumatic system valve lineup.
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8806240034 890610 PDR ADOCK 05000321 Q
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Davis, Manager General Support
- J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Froser, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- H. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager-H. Nix, Plant Manager
- T. Powers, Engineering Manager.
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager H. Sumner, Operations Manager S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Comp!iance Manager
- R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Other licensee employees contac+.ed included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and cffice personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors P. Holmes-Ray
- J.
Menning
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Musser NRC management on site during inspection period:
M. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II G. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors, Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation(NRR)
C. Julian, Chief, Operations Branch, Region II W. Regan, Chief, Human Factors Assessment Branch, NRR X. Brockman, Chief, Operator Licensing Section 2, Region II C. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Pro M. Shymlock, Chief, Operational Programs Section,jects, Region II Region II M. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Project Section 3B, Region II D. Lange, Chief, Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Section, Region I
- Attended exit interview
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Exit' Interview (30703)
The inspection scope arid findings were summarized on May 23, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 321/88-14-01 Opened VIOLATION - Backfilling of Instru-ment Reference Leg Without Specific Work Instructions or Procedures (paragraph 11)
366/88-14-02 Opened VIOLATION - Violation of Primary Containment Integrity During Hydrogen Recombiner System Testing (paragraph 11)
321/88-05-04 Closed VIOLATION - Inadequate Mainter.1nce Work Order for Vacuum Breaker Maintenance (paragraph 3)
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321/88-14-03.
Opened UNRESOLVED ITEM * (URI) - Improper Drywell Pneumatic System Valve Lineup (paragraphs 4 and 12)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 321/88-05-04, Inadequate Maintenance Work Order for vacuum breaker maintenance which resulted in the failure of several Unit 1 torus to drywell vacuum breakers to test properly during monthly oper-ability testing.
Corrective action involved correcting wiring discrepancies,as reviewed.
The licensee's letter of response dated March 29, 1988 w functionally testing the vacuum breakers, and generating As-Built Notice (ABN) 88-23 to reflect the proper wiring configuration.
The inspector observed functional testing and reviewed ABN 88-23.
Since the actions to correct the specifics of this violation have been completed, this item is closed.
"An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio _ _ _ _, _
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Unresolved Items-(0 pen) URI 321/88-14-03, Improper Drywell Pneumatic System Valve Lineup.
As discussed. in paragraph 12, a URI has been opened as a result of an improper drywell pneumatic system valve lineup in Unit 1.
This improper valve lineup resulted in the unexpected closing of the inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) and subsequent reactor scram on May 20, 1988.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kapt themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were imlo with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journais and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions
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Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.
Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited.
Observations included general plant / equipment condi-tions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions fire protection i
equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection
controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in.the control room, and containment
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isolation.
In the area of housekeeping, the following discrepancies were observed by l
the inspector and brought to the attention of licensee personnel:
On April 28, 1988, an obstructed floor drain was observed in the l
Unit 2 reactor building in the vicinity of the Standby Licuid Control l
system pumps.
Spilled chemicals were also observed in tie Unit 2
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reactor building on the floor adjacent to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water system Chemical Addition Tank.
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On April 29, 1988, wood scaffolding was found in the Unit 2 reactor
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The material was found on elevation 96 in the southeast
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On May 7,1988, an accutalation of oil and fuel was observed in tha fire pump house under the diesel for diesel driven fire pump No. 3.
The diesel was not operating at the time of this observation and no leaks were observed.
- On May 11, 1988, a significant accumulation of water was observed on the floor in front. of-Liquid Sample system Panel 2P33-P102 on elevation 185 in the Unit 2 reactor building.
The water appeared to be draining from this panel which displayed a sign indicating that the panel was contaminated inside.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functions.
Section 6.2.2.g of the Technical Specifications establishes requirements for the contro'
of such overtime and Section 8.4 of licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05, "Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to support the technical specification requirements.
The inspector reviewed a Maintenance Department Overtime Report for the month of March and determined that the requirements of 30AC-0PS-003-0S and the technical specifications had been met.
Particular emphasis was
) laced on conformance with the requirement that overtime deviations se apyroved in advance by the Plant Manager.
At the start of this reporting period,s operational upgrade program.
both Hatch units remained shut down to implement portions of the licensee This program is discussed in paragraph 13.
At 1825 on May 14,1988, startup commenced in Unit 2 following the completion of certain upgrade activities that the licensee had decided to complete prior to startup.
Criticality was achieved in Unit 2 at 0634 on May 15, 1988.
However, startup progress was subsequently (delayed due to equipment problems with the Unit 2 reactor feedwater pumps RFP) and feedwater injection valve 2N21-F0068.
The "2A" RFP turbine would not roll when started.
Investigation revealed that the motor speed changer was ourned.
The "2B" RFP started but was trip)ed by the operator when a 1cw lube oli pressure condition was indicatec and alarmed.
Investigation revealed that a heater strip in the bottom of a circuit breaker compartment had come in contact with and shorted 5 power cables to the
"A" lube oil pump.
The shorting resulted in a false indication of low lube oil pressure.
Lube oil pressure did not actually drop during the event.
Valve 2N21-F006B would not open by positioning of its control switch.
Initial indications were that the valve's disc was separated from the stem.
The valve was subsequently disassembled, revealing that all four lebes on top of the disc had broken off.
At the close of this inspection period, Unit 2 remained critical with the reactor pressure at 350 psig pending completion of repairs on valve 2N21-F0068.
Startup of Unit I commenced at 1545 on May 18,1988.
Criticality was achieved at 1705 on that day.
At 0216 on May 20, 1988, Unit 1 automatic-The scram resulted from the unexpected clos:ng of the 'g " and 'p ' perations ally scrammed from approxirr.ately 20 percent 30 war durin startu o B
C inboard MSIVs.
This event is discussed in paragraph 12.
Just prior to this scram,
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plant personnel discovered a leak in a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system line.
The leak was found to be coming from a 2-inch crack in weld metal at a "T" which joins the two 3-inch discharge lines from the "A" and
"B":RWCU pumps.
At the close of this inspection period Unit 1 remained in hot shutdown pending the completion of repairs to the RWCU system weld.
On' May 11, 1988, the inspector was advised that a leak had apparently developed in the liner of the Unit 1 spent fuel pool.
Although the leak rate had been variable and difficult to precisely determine, the licensee estimates that it was no greater than 8 gallons per minute.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's plan for locating and repairing the source of the leak.
The liner will be inspected with a video camera after areas of the fuel pool are vacuumed.
A repair strategy will be developed deaending upon the nature of the flaw causing the leak.
The licensee has 'nitiated several Design Change Requests to enhance monitoring of fuel pool level and of the liner leakage flow rate.
A dip stick will be installed to provide a more positive pool level indication.
Additionally, a flow meter indicator will be installed in the leakage detection system.
The inspector will monitor the licensee's progress in locating and repairing the source of the fuel pool liner leakage.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2 During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities.
The deervations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
~ actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:
Maintenance Activities Date a.
Balancing of Refueling Floor Exhaust 04/27/88 Fan IT41-C005A per Maintenance Work Order (MW0) 1-88-00087 (Unit 1)
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Filtration and Demineralization of 04/27/88 Torus Water per Special Procedure 63SP-042588-X0-1-0N, "Torus Water Cleanup" (Unit 2)
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Repair of Standby Liquid Control 04/28/88 system Pump 2C41-C001B per MWO 2-88-2168 (Unit 2)
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Maintencnce Activities Date (cont'd)
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Installation of Circuit Boards in 05/19/88 Panel 1Z43-P400 per MWO 1-87-0177 and Work Process Sheets 84-019-E007 (Unit 1)
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances.
The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration,. observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and. review of the data for acceptability based upon the accept-ance criteria.
The primary surveillance testing observations during this month are summarized below:
Surveillance Testing Activity Date a.
Calibration of Differential Pressure 05/11/88 Transmitter 1E21-N0038 per Procedure 57CP-CAL-103-15 (Unit 1)
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Standby Gas Treatment System Filter 05/13/88 Train 2T46-D0018 Testing per Procedure MW0 2-88-2411 (Unit 2)
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Monthly Operability Testing of the 05/19/88
"2C" Diesel Generator per Procedure 345V-R43-003-2S (Unit 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
ESF System Walkdown (71710) Unit 2 The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems.
Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
The Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system was walked down in detail.
.Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
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The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The perfor-mance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various shifts to include:
involvement v s-1th physics supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of persor m! inonitoring equipment, control of high.
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radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10.
Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2 In ti.e course of the monthly activities, the re',ident inspectors included
a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
availability.of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.
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Unit 1:
88-02 Personnel Error During Backfilling of Instrument Reference Leg Causes Low Level Scram The events of this LER occurred in Unit 1 on April 10, 1988, when Instrumentation and Control personnel were backfilling an instrument reference leg to correct the output of Feedwater Control System reactor water level transmitter IC32-N0048.
Reactor water level transmitters 1821-N080C and 1821-N0800 share the same reference leg as transmitter 1C32-N0048.
The two 1821 level transmitters provide low reactor water level input to Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels A2 and 82.
They also provide low reactor water level input for the isolation logic for the outboard isola-tion valves of Primary Containment Isolation System
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(PCIS) valve Group 2.
During the backfilling of the common reference leg, transmitters - 1821-N080C and 1821-N0000 sensed a false low reactor water level signal.
A full RPS actuation occurred, and the PCIS Group 2 outboard valves closed.
Since Unit 1 was in cold shutdown at the time of this event, an actual scram did not occur.
The backfilling of the common reference leg was performed under MWO 1-88-1531 which provided no specific instructions or guidance for this o)eration.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires t1at written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.~
Section 9.a of Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33 states that maintenance that can effect the perform-ance of safety-related equipment should be performed in - accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circum-stances.
This event is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a in that the common reference leg was backfilled without the use of specific work instructions or procedures.
This matter will be tracked as violation 321/88-14-01, Backfilling of Instrument Reference Leg Without Specific Work Instruction or Procedures.
Review of this LER is closed.
88-04 Drain Line Fails Due to Fatigue Causing High Tempera-ture Condition and Valve Isolation This event was caused by a fatigue-induced crack in-a 3/4-inch diameter 3-inch long section of drain piaing h
connecting the "A RWCU pump and a drain to the c ean radioactive waste system.
The drain line was replaced.
Review of this LER is closed.
Unit 2:
88-13 Personnel Error Allows Valve to be Opened Resulting in Primary Containment Violation The events of this LER occurred on April 15, 1988, and involved the opening of primary containment isolation valves in the
"A" Hydrogen Recombiner System for testing purposes prior to demonstrating the integrity of system piping.
A portion of the system's piping had previously been cut and welded to remove an obstruction.
The licensee elected to operability test the system prior to performing radiographic examina-tiont, local leak rate testing, and hydrostatic
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testing on the weld and piping.
Consequently, at 1030, isolation valves 2T49-F002A and 2T49-F004A were opened as required by plant test procedure 345V-T49-001-25.
It. was subsequently discovered that these actions had resulted in a violation of primary containment integrity.
The operability test was then terminated and a 1215 isolation valves 2T49-F002A and 2T49-F004A were closed.
At the time of the event Unit 2 was in Operational Condition 1 at approximately 100 percent of rated power.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires that primary containment integrity be maintained while in Operational Condition 1.
This event is considered a violation of the technical specification requirement in that the primary contain-ment isolation valves were opened prior to demonstrating the integrity of the system piping.
Review of this LER is closed and this matter will be tracked as violation 366/88-14-02, Violation of Primary Containment Integrity During Hydrogen Recombiner System Testing.
88-11 Equipment Failure in conjunction with Surveillance Causes Scram The events of this LER concern the Unit 2 automatic scram on April 17, 1988.
This scram was discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/38-11 and 50-366/88-11.
Review of the LER is-closed.
Two violations were identified.
12.
Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 1 The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor event.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.
On May 20, 1988, Unit 1 automatically scrammed from approximately 20 percent power during startup operations.
At the time of this scram, the turbine steam chest was being warmed and plant personnel were preparing to operability test the High Pressure Coolant Injection sf' stem.
The automatic scram resulted from the unexpected closing of the "B and
"C" inboard MSIVs.
Reactor vessel level decreased from plus 37 to plus 12 inches indicated during the transient.
Reactor pressure decreased from 920 to 630 psig.
Plant systems responded properly during the transient.
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Prior to this event, plant personnel had switched the supply to drywell pneumatic loads from instrument air to backup nitrogen.
The switch was accomplished by removing an equipment clearance that involved the closing of valves IP70-F029 and F053 and the opening of valves 1P70-F027A and F0278. Plant personnel were unaware that 2 valves in the backup nitrogen supply. lines (1P70-F025A and F0258) remained closed.
Consequently, neither instrument air nor backup nitrogen were available for drywell pneumatic icads after the clearance was removed.
Pressure in the inboard
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MSIV accurrulators gradually dropped, resulting the closure of all inboard MSIVs.
Although the scram resulted from the closing of the "B" and "C" inboard MSIVs, the
"A" and
"0" inboard MSIVs closed approximately 6 minutes later.
It appears that this event was caused by personnel error.
Plant personnel relied on the equipment clearance to accomplish to switch of drywell pneumatic su) plies rather than using the appropriate procedure.
The switchfrominstrumentairtobackupnitrogeniscoveredbyDataPackage5 in procedure 3450-P70-001-15, "Drywell Pneumatic System.'
A review of this Data Package by the inspector showed that it is technically correct and specifies the proper valve manipulations for this operation.
Pending more detailed review by the inspector, this matter will be tracked as URI 321/88-14-03, Improper Drywell Pneumatic System Valve Lineup.
One URI was identified.
13.
Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts - Units 1 and 2 On April 19, 1988, the licensee voluntarily initiated shutdown of both Hatch units to upgrade certain aspects of operational performance.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's operational upgrade efforts in several areas.
Reviews of upgrade efforts in other areas are discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-12 and 15 and 50-366/88-12 and 15.
The resident inspectors will review longer term operational upgrade efforts as related c::tivities are completed.
Clearance Tagging Program:
The licensee has taken steps to reduce dependence on equipment clearances for configuration control and reduce the number of long-standing equipment clearances.
Periodic clearance review requirements have been modified to provide for review of equipment clearances that are active for six months or more to confirm the need for the clearances to remain active. The Manager of Operations is now respon-sible for appropriate followup action on clearances that are active for six months or more.
These revised clearance review requirements are contained in Section 8.13 of licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-05, Rev. 4,
"Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags." The licensee also formed a team to identify active, long-standing clearances and initiate clearance
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removal actions where poss'ible.
On May 6,1988, the inspector reviewed
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the team's progress and held discussions with the team leader.
The inspector determined that 97 clearances had been identified for review.
This included essentially all outstanding clearances that had been l
initiated prior to 1988.
As of May 6, 1988, 39 of the 97 clearances had l
been eliminated.
The inspector subsequently reviewed clearance documen-
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tation in the control room and confirmed that the 39 clearances had been removed.
The inspector confirmed that outstanding long-term equipment clearances were reviewed and approved by the Executive Vice President on May 11, 1988, prior to Unit 2 startup.
At the time of this review, 20 long-term clearances remained active in Unit 1 and 17 long-term clearances remained active in Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed ecuipment clearance records in the control room on May 13, 1988. and notec the significantly reduced number of long-term active clearaaces.
Event Review Program:
The licensee is taking ste)s to enhance the Hatch event review and resolution program.
A new procecure is being prepared that will provide for 4 classirications of events.
Specific team leaders and members will be identified for scrams and events identified as complex.
This new procedure will be identified as 10AC-MGR-012-02, "Plant Event Analysis and Resolution Program." Program training is also planned for involved individuals.
The licensee anticipates issuing this procedure and completing related training by the end of June 1988.
Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) Review:
The licensee has completed a review of NPRDS failure reports that had been coded as cause unknown.
The review included reports generated since 1984.
Of the 251 re) orts reviewed for Unit 1,138 had cause codes changed from unknown to otler more appropriate codes.
Of the 247 reports reviewed for Unit 2, 130 had cause codes changed from unknown to other codes.
The licensee has resubmitted the affected reports.
Emergency Diesel Generator Testing:
The licensee has taken action to reduce the number of emergency diesel generator fast starts in an effort to prolong engine life and improve reliability.
More specifically, the methodology for conducting monthly operability testing is being changed.
t In the past, the diesel generators were fast started; i.e., synchronous speed was achieved in a maximum of 12 seconds.
The licensee is currently revising the monthly operability test procedure to provide for slow starting of the diesels in accordance with the technical specifications and provide for burning over the engine subsequent to operation.
That is, the diesels will come up to 500 revolutions per minute (rpm) when started.
Synchronous speed (900 rpm) will then be achieved by manually increasing speed at a rate of approximately 50 rpm per minute.
Under the new testing methodology, controlled loading of the diesel generators will be performed essentially the same as before.
On May 16, 1988, the inspector reviewed
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these testing changes with the cognizant engineer.
A draft of the revised test procedure for the "2A" diesel generator was reviewed at that time.
Revised testing requirements for the "2A" diesel generator will be imple-mented by Revision 7 to procedure 345V-R43-001-25.
The inspector deter-mined that the licensee plans to issue appropriate revisions to the monthly operability test procedures for all 5 emergency diesel generators by June 1, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Recent Chemistry Initiatives - Units 1 and 2 The following items were inspected by W. J. Ross on April 18-20, 1988.
a.
Installation of Corrosion Monitors in the Reactor Building and Recombiner Building Component Cooling Water Systems As discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-13 and 50-366/88-13, recent leaks in the seals of Reactor Bulding Component Cooling Water System (RBCCW) pumps in Unit 2 had resulted in continuous loss of water from this closed cycle system.
While obtaining replacement seals, the licensee had provided demineralized water as makeup for RBCCW inventory.
However, the licensee chose not to add makeup solutions of sodium nitrate to provide corrosion protection through reduction of dissolved oxygen in the R8CCW.
This decision was based on the difficulty involved in the disposal of the increase in volume of water containing sodium nitrite that was leaking from this system and being processed to meet National Pollution Discharge Elimination System disposal regulations.
The absence of an adequate corrosion inhibitor could increase the possibility for corrosion of the carbon steel pipe.
The NRC inspector was informed that a decision to install corrosion monitors had not been made as yet, in the belief that the problem had been resolved by the installation of leakproof pumps and subsequent addition of sodium nitrite solution to achieve a typical value of 500-2000 parts per million.
Also, the Recombiner Building Component Cooling Water System (RCBCCW)
had been contaminated with raw river water through leakage of Service Water through as RCBCCW heat exchanger.
The possibility for corrosion within the carbon steel pipe of the RCBCCW may have increased by the ingress of contaminants.
Consequently, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations inspectors believed that corrosion monitors should be installed on this system also.
The NRC inspector was informed that sodium nitrite was no longer being added to the RCBCCW in an effort to reduce the amount of sodium nitrite in the radwaste.
The hole in the RCBCCW will not be repaired until the next refueling outage for Unit.
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b.
Shielding of a Light in a Fume Hood. in One of the Chemistry Labora-tories Against Possible Damage by Fumes Normally, such lichts are protected with a glass cover to reduce the possibility of be 'ng brnken by deposition of condensate, etc., or -
from being. physically struck by some object.
The NRC inspector was informed that a shield had been i.istalled around the bare light bulb.
c.
Monitoring the Flow of Air Through the Fume Hoods During his inspection, the WRC inspector observed that fume hoods windows had. stickers that identified the most recent inspection date for the' flow measurement.
These measurements have been made on a periodical schedule established and implemented by plant maintenance personnel.
The NRC inspector was informed that the licensee was attempting to acquire flow meters for each hood so that personnel using the hoods could always be assured of sufficient air flow to provide an acceptable level of safety from fumes.
d.
Chlorine Gas Monitor in the Chlorine Building Thelicenseeinjectschlorinegasintoriverwaterusedforcondenser cooling to minimize fouling and corrosion of condenser tubes by micro and macro organisms.
Since chlorine gas is toxic, the environment in the vicinity of the gas storage and injection points should be continually monitored for the presence of chlorine gas.
In March 1988, the licensee's monitor was inoperable.
Subsequently, the faulty monitor has been replaced.
Also, the NRC inspector was informed that, in the near future, the use of chlorine gas as a biocide will be discontinued in favor of using sodium hypochlorite, a less toxic and more easily handled form of chlorine.
e.
Long Term Chemistry Control During the last two years, the need for plans and procedures to protect safety and non-safety related components of nuclear power plants from degradation during long-term outages has beer. recognized l
by the industry.
Recommendations for wet layup during short, outages have been developed by the BWR Owners Group.
The licensee had
,
!
discussed this subject with other nuclear power plant licensee's and is in the process of developing the needed procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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