IR 05000321/1988003
| ML20148M496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1988 |
| From: | Blake R, Robert Carrion, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148M474 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-07, REF-GTECI-CO, TASK-A-07, TASK-A-7, TASK-OR 50-321-88-03, 50-321-88-3, 50-366-88-03, 50-366-88-3, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8804050385 | |
| Download: ML20148M496 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES
'o MUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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/n REGION 11 g
, j 101 MAPIETTA STRE ET, N.W.
r ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 i
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Report No.:
50-321, 366/88-03 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-321, 366 License Nos.:
Hatch Inspection Conducted:
February 1-5, 1988
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Inspectors:
$26k C
C LW 3'/7'80 R.
Chop Date Signed
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Date igned Approved by:
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J. J. Bla_ke, Section Chief Ofte S'igned Mt ials and Processes Section iv sion of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of the previous open items, seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14), and Mark I Containment Long Term Program Modification (USI A-7).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8804050385 890331 PDR ADOCK 05000321
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REP 09T DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- S. J. Bethay, NSAC Supervisor
- J. K. Branum, Senior Nuclear Engineer
- E. M. Burkett, Engineering Supervisor
- G. M. Creighton, Regulatory Specialist /NSC
- J. D. Davis, General Support Manager
- H. C. Nix, Plant Manager, Hatch
- J. Payne, Senior Plant Engineer /NSC
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
- D. S. Read, Plant Support Manager
- C. L. Tully, Senior Nuclear Engineer T. Wilkes, Maintenance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, l
engineers, technicians, mechanics, and office personnel.
Other Organizations S. Deminco, Civil Engineering Supervisor, Bechtel Power Corp.
K. Desai, Senior Stress Engineer, Southern Company Service
- J. P. Reynolds, Senior Civil Engineer, Southern Company Services
- C, F. Toegel, ANI/ANII, Hartford Steam Boiler C. Weaver, Civil Engineering Supervisor, Bechtel Power Corp.
S. A. White, Consultant, Southern Company Services NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
"J. E. Menning, Resident Inspector
- R. A. Musser, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 5,1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection:
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I Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-321/88-03-01, Discrepancies on As-Built Drawings for Torus Attached External Piping Systems UNR 50-321/88-03-02, Rock Bolt Bent at Torus Mid-Bay Column Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-321/88-03-03, Torus Area Maintenances j
The lic6nsee did identify all calculations or analyses reviewed or
provided as proprietary during this inspection, but this material is not included in this inspection report.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.
(Closed) Violation 321, 366/87-15-01, As-Built Drawing Discrepancies in Weld Symbols ' and Baseplate Thickness for Pipe Supports.
The Georgia Power Company letter of response dated September 2,1987 has
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been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II except that the severity level of the violations would remain as originally cited. The inspectors held discussions with the licensee responsible engineer and examined the corrective actions stated in the letter of response.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of-l response have been implemented.
The inspectors did not agree with the statement in the response concerning a drafting error in that the bill of materials shown on FCR 81-058-75 listed baseplate number one as 1" thick rather than
3/4" thick as had been authorized and installed in 1979.
The FCR
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i 81-058-75 was issued on February 14, 1986 as indicated in the drawing l
submitted for inspection. The 1" plate also appeared in the original j
drawing Rev. A tesued on December 12, 1983. The 1" plate was used in
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the calculations for the support qualification although 1" plate was
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not required by the calculated stress.
The NRC Region II agreed to drop the violation cited for Unit 2 since
all the field walkdown reinspections were on Unit 1.
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b.
(Closed) UNR 50-321, 366/87-15-02, Pipe Support Component Maintenance.
This matter concerned spring load setting indication and spring type marking plate being painted over.
The in.pectors held discussions with the licensee's responsible engineers and maintenance personnel and reviewed the information provided.
Licensee provided training to the maintenance personnel and contractor to not paint over the plates.
A walkdown by the licensee for Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings was conducted to identify spring cans that have been painted over or the markings are not legible.
A total of 131 cans were inspected.
There were 19 cans in Unit 1 and 19 cans in Unit 2 which had been cleaned.
Spring load setting indication plate for Support No.1E11-RHR-H37 will be provided per Deficiency Card (DR)
No. 1-87-1234 and Maintenance Work Order (MWO) No. 1-87-7026 due to
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the plate missing. Spring load setting indication plate for Support No. IP41-ISH-75 will be replaced per Deficiency Card No. 1-88-463 and Maintenance Work Order No. 1-88-0488.
To verify the licensee performance on cleanirg the plates, the inspectors walkec' down Unit 1 for Support No. CSH-21, E11-H41, E11-RHR-110, E11-RHR-109, E11-RHR-H37 (with DR to add missing plate), E11-RHR-H30, E21-CS-H27, and P41-ISH-75 (the deficiency report was initiated to replace plate due to overcleaning). All the above plates were in the licensee walkdown lists, and cleaned in good condition and legible except the two supports noted above.
Based on the above actions taken by the licensee, UNR 50-321, 366/87-15-02 is considered closed.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
Two unresolved item identified during this inspection discussed in Paragraph 6.
5.
Inspector Follow-up Items a.
(0 pen) IFI 50-321, 366/87-15-03, Documentation Availability for Inspection Review at Site Within Inspection Time Period.
The calculations which were originally requested for review and which eventually led to this IFI in June 1987 were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
The system operability analysis for the recirculation and main steam systems and snubber calculation SB-1 will be reviewed
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during the next inspection.
However, the central issue of the IFI remains unresolved; that is, the availability of documents for timely review by NRC inspectors during the course of routine inspections.
The fact that certain documents are not maintained on site is the preference of management but does not relieve the responsibility of timely turnaround.
The "certification" process implemented by various vendors, suppliers, A/Es, and contractors results in turnaround times of several weeks.
While it is understood that proprietary information must be protected from public dissemination, the legitimate needs of the NRC must be honored. A more expediticus system must be devised.
Pending the licensee further action, this item stays open.
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(Closed)
IFI 50-321, 366/87-15-04, Process and Control of Installation and QC Inspection Records for Pipe Supports.
This matter concerned the installation and QC inspection records for Support No. P41-SDGH-800, P41-SDG-H702, P41-SDGH-49, and P41-SDG-H703 that could not be located ar.d were not available for review.
The licensee was requested to review procedures on the control and process of QC documents.
The inspectors held discussions with the licensee's responsible engineers and reviewed the information provided, AIT No.87-882.
A complete review of the Planning and
Controls (P and C) records file was conducted by the licensee. The
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Maintenance Work Order ( WO) No. 1-85-7646 which included the above four supports and the associated documentation were found in the
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field where it had been returned for additional information.
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review was expanded to include all twelve additional W0s issued against DCR #81-058.
The review verified each MWO's proper status
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and documentation retrievability. The twelve W0s issued against DCR No.81-058 were accounted for and the documentation was retrievable.
The licensee determined the following three factors as the root cause of the documentation availability problem:
(1) P and C failed to change the status code 'of MWO #1-85-7646 to
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show that it was returned to the field for additional
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informations.
(2) MW0s were transmitted to other departments without an adequate tracking system.
(3) The Kd0 package was incomplete, requiring the MWO to be returned to the field.
'f The actions taken to prevent recurrence are as follows:
(1) WO status codes have been revised to be more specific.
(2) All MW0s issued and received by P and C are transmitted on a Records Transfer Form which provides a positive tracking of the Kd0.
(3) Kdos are reviewed prior to issue, after work performance, and finally, prior to close out.
Additionally, an internal auditing program has been implemented to review Kd0 statuses and processing functions to assure system reliability and functionability.
The internal auditing program is called P and C Md0 File System, Document Number DI-0AP-05-1087N, which was issued on November 30, 1987. The program includes systems, instructions responsibilities, and maintenance.
The maintenance includes the discipline team leader responsibility, monthly internal audit, the internal audit record, and corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed Rd0 No. 1-85-7646 and 1-87-1780 which included Quality Control inspection hold point, work process sheet, completed quality control inspection, inspection plan, inspection checklist for seismic supports, concrete expansion anchor installation record, weld process sheet, material request, etc.
Based on the above findings and corrective rctions taken by the licensee, IFI 50-321, 366/87-15-04 is considered close.'
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6.
Mark I Containment Long Term Program (LTP) Modification for Units 1 and 2 (0 pen) TI 2515/85, Unresolved Safety Issue A-7.
This is the third inspection on Mark I Containment Long Term Program Modification.
The previous inspectors did inspections at construction stage on welding and Nondestructive Examination (NDE) for torus modification.
The inspection report 50-321, 366/81-08 inspected welding (Units 1 and 2) and NDE (Units 1 and 2). The inspection report 50-321, 366/82-08 inspected welding (Unit 2) and NDE (Units 1 and 2).
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Backgrcund The Hatch Units 1 and 2 Containment Systems are one of the first generation General Electric (GE) Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) nuclear steam supply systems housed in a containment structure designated as the Mark I Containment System.
The original design of the Mark I Containment System included pressure and temperature loads associated with a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), seismic loads, dead loads, jet-impingement loads, hydrostatic loads due to water in the suppression chamber, overload pressure test loads, and construction loads. Due to additional, hydrodynamic loads, which were discovered later resulting from the dynamic effects of drywell air and steam being rapidly forced into the suppression pool (torus) during a postulated LOCA and from suppression pool response to safety relief valve (SRV) operation generally associated with plant transient operating conditions.
The NRC required licensees to have a detailed reevaluation of the Mark I Containment System.
The resolution of this issue was divided into a short-term program and a long-term program.
The Short-Term Program (STP) provided a rapid assessment of the adequacy of the containment to maintain its integrity and functional capability when subjected to the loads induced by a design-basis LOCA, and used NUREG-0408 as a guideline. The NRC had approved the Hatch's STP, The long-term program was to maintain a margin of safety when the Mark I containment structures and piping i
systems are subjected to additional hydrodynamic loads and was j
identified by NRC as Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-7, Mark I Long Term Program (LTP) which would use NUREG-0661 as design criteria.
The licensee, based on detailed testing, analytical work and
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modifications completed by 1983, summarized and submitted the result to NRC as a Plant Unique Analysis Report (PUAR) in Letter No.
NED-83-029 dated January 26, 1983.
The NRC reviewed the licensee's PUAR for the pool dynamic and structural load aspects against the design criteria, NUREG-0661 and approved the PUAR on January 25, 1984.
This inspection and the subsequent inspections to come later are to
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verify that the li;ensee had modified the plant with appropriate procedures, design, analysis, calculations and in accordance with the licensee commitments stated in the PVAR.
The inspectors held discussions with the licensee's responsible engineers and engineers
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from Architecture / Engineer firms, Bechtel Power Corporation and
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The walkdown reinspection areas
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included torus structure modifications on stiffener, mid-bay column,
saddle, and attached external piping systems.
The structural
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modifications inside torus such as vent-header deflector, downcomer bracing and safety relief-valve quenchers (T-Quecher) were also
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discussed.
Unit 2 was in a refueling outage and because of high
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contamination no walkdown was done on Unit 2.
The walkdown reinspection was performed outside the torus in Unit 1.
To verify the licensee commitment and performance, the inspectors' randomly
selected the following restraints and structural components that had j
been QC final inspected to see if they complied with commitments and
as built drawings.
The restraints and structures were reinspected with the assistance of the licensee's QC inspector, engineers and
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craftsmen.
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Torus Attached External Piping Systems
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j Eight supports were reinspected.
Seven discrepancies were found.
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TABLE 1 J
SUPPORT NO.
REV. NO.
WALKDOWN COMMENTS
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E51-RC1CH-17
None l
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E51-RCICH-17A
Extra fillet weld on far side l
between web of bracing and flange
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on drawing.
E71-RCICH-700
PSA-1 snubber and clamp j
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were installed instead of
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Bergen/Patterson Part No. 2410-1.5
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d snubber and clamp shown on i
drawing.
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E71-RC1CH-701
Same as above i
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G51-TOP-H704
U-bolt extended to top flange of j
W6X25 was not shown on drawing.
I Bolt edge distance at north side of top north corner existed in
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i field 2" instead of 1-1/2" shown j
on drawing.
4-5/8" bolt edge distance at bottom side of bottom
1 and south corner existed in field instead of 5" shown on drawing.
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G51-TDP-H705
None G51-TOP-H706
U-bolt extended to top flange of W6X25 was not shown on drawing.
G51-TDP-H707
The outer face of attachment TS4X4 was 5-1/2" from the outer edge of base plate instead of 3" shown on drawing.
The above restraints were partially reinspected against their detail drawings for configuration, identification, fastener / anchor instal-lation, member size, welds, rust, maintenance, and damage / protection.
c.
Torus Modificati:n - External (1)
Shell T - Stiffeners and WT4X33.5 Stiffeners The torus was constructed of 16 similar bays.
Two types of stiffeners, 14-inch T-stif feners and WT4X33.5, were added to the external of torus shell during the long term program modification.
Per PVAR P.6.1-1, the 14-inch T-stiffeners were spaced longitudinally at approximately 40 inches and the WT4X33.5 stiffeners were spaced approximately midway between the 14-inch T-stif feners, resulting in a longitudinal spacing of approximately 20 inches.
Circumferentially, the stiffeners extended just above the torus equator. The inspectors inspected both types of stiffeners at outer faces of the torus for Bays 4 and 13. Drawing sheet No. 4-40043, Rey, o, Location 10-502 for Bay 4 and 13 was reviewed to check the stiffeners spacings.
Section T-T for typical stiffener WT4X33.5 and Section U-U for typical 14-inch T-stif fener both shown on Drawing Sheet No.
4-40044, Rev. O, Location 10-502 were checked against the field installed stiffeners for Bays 4 and 13.
The approximately 40 inches of spacing for T-stiffeners, 20 inches of spacing for WT4X33.5 stiffeners, and stiffener sectional dimensions for both
types of stiffeners which all existed in field and were showed in the detail drawings were consistent with P.6.1-1 of PUAR. No discrepancies were found in this area.
(2) The Saddle Column The saddle columns are modified from the original torus support columns (mitre columns) at mitre joints. There were 16 original ring girders welded continuously to the inner surf ace of the shell at 16 locations which were at mitre joints for mitre columns. The torus was supported by 32 columns (two each per ring girder).
The columns, which rest on lubrite plates, carry the deadweight of the steel structures.
The original bracings for columns were removed and replaced with a big 1-1/2" saddle plate.
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-The saddle plate enclosed the two columns and the lower portion
of the torus outside surface.
The ring girders at inside of l
torus for support columns were also modified to add cone plates t
j and ring girder / lip plate stiffening. The above modifications l
are to reduce the torus membrane stresses and distribute the'
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i torus loads more equally through the entire length of the j
support columns. The saddle plates for Mark Nos. 93-1 and 93-2
j were showr on Material List, Drawing 93, Rev. O, Saddle and (
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Gusset Plate Details and Section A-A (Typical), Orawing 90,
Rev. 5, Saddle and Gusset Plate Insta11rtion, Chicago Bridge and Iron Company.
The saddle plates Mark Nos. 93-1-and 93-2
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were inspected at field for saddle columns between Bays 12 l
i and 13 and Bays 3 and 4.
The modifications on saddle columns which were inspected match the Figure 2.1.2-1, PUAR.
No
discrepancies were identified in this area.
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(3) Mid-Bay Columns
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i To reduta the torus membrane stresses which were increased by the
extra loads induced by the suppression pool swing and chugging, 32 l
mid-bay columns were added (two at each mid-bay) to share the load
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with the modified saddle columns.
The column section, column
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length, baseplate, baseplate stiffener, rock bolt, nut, thread l
j for bolt, and bolt edge distance were checked for the outer
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column at Mid-Bays 4 and 13.
The mid-bay support fabrication
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Drawing Nos.19, 21 to 27, Chicago Bridge and Iron Company and
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the mid-bay support design Drawing Nos. H-40002 and H-40029, Southern Company Services, Inc. were used to verify the field l
as-built conditions.
The plan view of torus mid-bay columns,
Drawing No. 26, Chicago Bridge and Iron Company was also reviewed
against the commitment shown on plan view of torus mid-bay column j
arrangement, Figure 2.1.2-2, Structural Modifications Torus
Mid-Bay Column Support, PUAR.
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One discrepancy was identified in this area.
The central rock t
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bolt at east side of outer column for Mid-Bay 13 was bent i
l approximately 3/4" between the bolt centers of top and bottom.
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i The licensee's responsible engineer immediately evaluated the
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condition for the system operability per the inspector request l
il and determined that the bend on one rock bolt did not have the
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significant safety impact since the total rock bolt allowable i
for six bolts is 600 kips which is more than the design loads i
j of approximately 470 kips for the uplift loads of this, column.
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Findings and Summary l
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The responsible engineer stated that there were no special procedures l
for Quality Control (QC) Engineer to do inspections for supports or l
l structural components. The QC engineer brought the detail drawing to l
l check supports or components at field. Any discrepancies from the
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detail drawings were recorded and sent to the design engineering l
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department for justification.
During the walkdown reinspection on l
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l torus modification, the inspectors discovered paint peeled off at two locations with areas of 4 sq. in. and 140 sq. in, at torus outer surface and stiffeners in Bays 12 and 7.
Based on the above findings, the inspectors summarized the results and identified the new open items as follows:
(0 pen) UNR 50-321/88-03-01, Discrepancies on As-Built Drawings
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for Torus Attached External Piping Systems. Seven discrepancies were found in pipe supports as stated at Table 1 Paragraph 6(b).
(0 pen) UNR 50-321/88-03-02, Rock Bolt Bent at Torus Mid-Bay
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Column. Rock bolt at the center and east side of mid-bay column at Bay 13 was bent as stated at Paragraph 6(c)(3). The licensee should review the manufacturer installation tolerance and determine the capacity of the bent bolt against the drawing and calculations.
(0 pen) IFI 50-321/88-03-03, Torus Area Maintenances.
Paint
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peeled off at torus shell and stiffener.
The licensee should examine the entire torus area for paint peeled off for Units 1 and 2 and develop maintenance procedures to spot paint peeled off or repaint the entire torus arda periodically.
7.
(0 pen) Seismic Analysis For As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems For Units 1 And 2 (IEB 79-14)
a.
Unit 1 l
l The inspectors held discussions with the licensee responsible engineers and licensing supervisor about the letter to be submitted to NRC, Region II for a completion schedule of the remaining support l
modifications as required by IEB 79-14. A submittal of schedule is a l
part of requirements per IEB 79-14. No conclusion was made.
During
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the exit meeting, the licensee management agreed to study the situation and submit a letter of completion schedule thru the licensee headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia.
b.
Unit 2 The licensee responsible engineer stated that the final summary report for IEB 79-14 is in draft and circulation process for comments from related departments. The final summary report will be submitted to NRC, Region II within a short time.
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