ML20196J285

Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from 981102 Insp Planning Meeting.Details of Insp Plan for Next 4 Months & Historial Listing of Plant Issues Called Plant Issues Matrix, Encl

ML20196J285
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/01/1998
From:	Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Sumner H SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9812100015
Download: ML20196J285 (21)

Text

1 l

December 1, 1998 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.

Vice President, Hatch Plant Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, At 35201

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION PLAN - HATCH PLANT

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On November 2,1998, the NRC staff completed an inspection resource planning meeting.

The staff conducted this review for all operating nuclear power plants in Region 11 to develop an integrated inspection plan. We conducted this meeting in lieu of the semiannual Plant Performance Review, which the staff has moved to February 1999 because of the agency's shift to an annual Senior Management Meeting cycle.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the inspection planning meeting. We have provided it to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved befor~e the inspector's arrival onsite. Enclosure 1 details our inspection plan for the next 4 months. We have provided the rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

During this scheduling cycle, we will continue to focus some of our discretionary inspection effort on the resolution of open inspection items. Therefore, we may conduct additional inspections, which are not listed on Enclosure 1, to close open inspection items that are ready to be resolved. We will notify you at least 3 weeks before the start of these inspections.

The NRC's general policy for reactor inspections is that we will announce each inspection, unless announcing the inspection could compromise the objectives of the inspectors.

Therefore, we may not have included some specific inspections on Enclosure 1, such as in the security and radiological protection areas, and these inspections may not be announced.

fl contains a historical listing of plant issues, called the Plant issues Matrix (PIM).

//

The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. This material will be placed in the public document room.

9812100015 981201 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G

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l We will inform you of any changes to the enclosed inspection plan. If you have any questions,

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please contact me at 404-562-4520.

Sincerely, (Original signed by Pierce H. Skinner) l Pierce H. Skinner, Chief i

Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects i

i Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 l

Enclosures:

1. Inspection Plan

2. Plant issues Matrix cc w/encls:

i J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 i

P. H. Wells General Manager, Plant Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

j U. S. Highway 1 North l

l P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, GA 31515 i

D. M. Crowe Manager Licensing - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 1295

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Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Ernest L. Blake, Esq.

Shaw, Prttman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW

?#ashington, D. C. 20037 cc w/encls cont'd: (See Page 3) i l

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SNC 3

cc w/encls: Continued Office of Planning and Budget f

Room 610 1

270 Washington Street, SW I

Atlanta, GA 30334 i

. Director Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources 4244 International Parkway Suite 114 Atlanta, GA 30354 f

Chairman i

Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse j

Baxley, GA 31513 Program Manager Fossil & Nuclear Operations Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place i

Tucker, GA 30085-1349 i

Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker i

10th Floor 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. 20004-9500 i

Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority -

of Georgia 1470 Riveredge Parkway NW Atlanta, GA 30328-4684 Distribution w/encts:

L. Plisco, Ril P. H. Skinner, Rll W. P. Kleinsorge, Ril L. Olshan, NRR PUBLIC Distribution w/encis cont'd: (See Page 4) 1

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Distribution w/encis: Continued NRC Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regu;atory Commission 11030 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513 i

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HATCH INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED INSPECTION PROCEDURE /

TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 73756 Inservice Testing of 1

January,1999 Regional Initiative - Generic inspection Pumps and Valves 84750/86750 Rad. Protection. Waste 1

January,1999 Core Program Treatment, Effluent and Transportation 62700 Maintenance Program 1

January,1999 Regional Initiative implementation 92904 Fire Protection Penetration 1

February,1999 Regional Initiative - Generic inspection Seals 60853 On-site Fabrication of 1

March,1999 Regional Initiative - Construction of ISFSI Components and Construction of an ISFSI i

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HATCH 25-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 8/1/9998 Positive 98-04, 01.2,98-03.03.1, NRC Control room operators demonstrated correct procedura! usage, proper annunciator 1 234 5 04.1,98-02,04.1 response, three-part communication, the phonetic alphabet, and peer checks during power reductions on Unit 2. Pre-job briefings were detailed and attended by A OOOOO approp'iate personne. (Also see IR 98-06, O2.2). Operators demonstrated system awareness and correct procedure usage when they immedately identfied and B COOOO restored a loss of shutdown cooling on Unit 2. A valve unexpectedly went closed O

OOO dunng a survedlance (IR 98-06 O2.4). (Also see IR 98-01, O2.1) Actions for a Notice Of Unusual Event were timely and correct. The appropriate procedures were correctly implemented (IR 98-05,04.1).

5/2/1998 Positive MAINT 1R 98-02, M3.5 NRC Operations supervision was actively involved in the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant 1 234 5 Injection maintenance and testing activities and provided continuous oversight and direction. Operators correctly used procedures, displayed an attentiveness to detail, A OOOOO and effectively monitored system critical parameters. Technical Specification and surveillance testing acceptance enteria were met. Maintenance and engineering B OOOOO support to operations was evident for the planning and work activities.

O OOO 512/1998 Negabve IR 98-02,04.1, IR 97-12.

NRC Operations personnel demonstrated a lack of sensitivity for changing unclear steps 1 234 5 O2.1 in the Reactor Core isolation Cooling surveillance procedure. The procedure required operators to make independent verifications that could not be made and AOOOOO required operators to take actions that were not specifica!!y identified in the procedure. The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) procedural precautions B OOOOO contained ambiguity related to running the EDGs unloaded, or at low load. This CO OOO contributed to small fire on EDG insulation.

2/7/1998 Positive MAINT IR 97-12,07.1 NRC Equipment reliability and corrective action meetings were effectively focused.

1 234 5 A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 2/7/1998 Positive MAINT IR97-12. 07.1 NRC Review of Plant Review Board (PRB) organization and function. The Plant Review 1 234 5 Board (PR8) organization and function met the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements for review and assessment of safety related issues. The A OOOOO equipment rehability meetings focused on equipment problems. Problems were being corrected and management and PRB members demonstrated a strong safety B OOOOO focus to ensure safety equipment was availabihty and reliable for plant operation.

O OOO 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-09, O2.2,98-NRC Operations failed to submit a timely deficiency card for a frozen safety related 1 234 5 04.01.2 nitrogen pressure control valve. Discrepant conditions of minor significance were not consistently documented as deficiencies.

A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 2 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

HATCH 25-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-02. O2.2 NRC The Nitrogen Supply System for the Containment Atmospheric Diluton System 1 234 5 (CAD) was not well-maintained. Pressure control valves were leaking, insulation was not in place as per drawings. ice had formed on piping and valves, and some A OOOOO valves were not in the required testing program. Procedures were not followed to change setpoints based upon operating history.

B OOOOO c0 000 2f7/1998 Posttive MAINT IR 97-12.02.1 NRC Operators quickty detected and immediately extinguished a small fire on the EDG 1 234 5 insulation. Maintenance provided support to operations to evaluate the cause of the fire and provided recommendations to change the surveillance testing. The problem A OOOOO was caused by running EDG unloaded or at low load for an extended time dunng surveillance and post maintenance testing which al towed fuel oil to accumulate in B OOOOO the exhaust.

O OOO 12/27/1997 Strength ENG IR 97-11. O4.2 NRC Operator actons to immediately identfy and venfy by instrumentation, that the Unit 1 234 5 2 Recirculation Pump speed had increased were appropriate and in accordance with procedures and expectatons. Operator actions were tmely with power reduced to AOOOOO rated after about 2 minutes. Engineenng and maintenance provided support to investigate and repair the stuck speed bias pushbutton that caused the problem.

B OOOOO cO 000 12/27/1997 VIO SAOV VIO 97-11-02. VIO 97 NRC Operators failed to make the required 4-hour report that the drywell pneumatic 1 234 5

03. 04.1. LER 321/97-07 system had isolated. Operators failed to identfy that the closing of the valves was a safety system actuation. The previous corrective actions failed to prevent four late A OOOOO 10 CFR 4-hour required reports that occurred within the past two years.

8 00000 cO 000 12/27/1997 Positive MAINT IR 97-11. 012 NRC Maintenance and Engineering provided excellent support to operationo for the 1 234 5 system and component damage assessment and repair activities for a Unit 2 condensate booster pump check valve failure. Management was actively involved A OOOOO and provided excefient oversight and direction for system walkdowns ard damage assessment; shutting the unit down for repairs; and ensuring personnel safety.

8 OOOOO cO 000 12/27/1997 Strength IR97-11. O1.2. LER 366-NRC Operator response to a transient and manual scram resulting from the Unit 2 1 2 34 5 97-10 Condensate Doster pump check valve problems was good in that power was reduced. a manual scram was initiated, and procedures were used. Operator A OOOOO performance was observed during unit startup on November 26-27 and assessed as excellent. A condensate booster pump check valve failed to seat and resulted in a B OOOOO failure of a metal bellows in the suction piping.

O OOO 12/15/1997 Positive SAOV IR 97-10. 07.1 NRC All Significant Occurrence Reports (SORS) reviewed were correctly classified and 1 234 5 were being actively tracked. The recommended schedule for determining root cause and subsequent corrective actions were appropriate. SORS were receiving senior A OOOOO management and department management level attention.

OOO cO 000 FROM 10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 3 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

9 HATCH 25-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 12/15/1997 V!O MAINT VIO 97-10-02,04.2 LER LICENSEE Poor operator performance resulted in failure to meet Technical Specification (TS) 1 234 5 321/97-05 actions pnor to withdrawing a Unit 1 control rod. Unit 1 was in cold shutdown when operators withdrew a control rod with accumulator pressure less than the TS A OOOOO required pressure. Other administrative controls failed to prevent the problem, cO 000 12/15/1997 Positive MA!NT IR 97-10, O2.3, IR 98-06, NRC For the Unit 1 drywell closeout observations, mate ial conditions and general 1 234 5 01.3 housekeeping were good. The licensee correctly installed new reactor vessel insulation as part of the new insulation upgrade program. No system or component A OOOOO leakage was observed. The Unit 2 Torus was closed out in accordance with procedure requirements. No system or component leakage was identfied.

B OOOOO Personnel accountability was emphasized for the closecut activity.

O OOO 12/1S/1997 Positive MAINT IR 97-10 O2.2 NRC Review of Unit 1 decay heat removal systems and regulatory requirements during 1 234 5 the refueling outage. Systems were in good operational condition and controlled decay heat. Final Safety Anatysis Report Technical Specification and outage safety A OOOOO assessment requirements for decay heat removal system availability were met.

Management, supervisors, and operators demonstrated a good safety attitued about B OOOOO work activities that could affect core cooling and the removal of systems from O

OOO service that would decrease emergency system availability.

12/15/1997 Strength SAOV IR 97-10,01.2, O1.3 NRC Operators continued excellent performance dunng fuel movement and in-vessel 1 234 5 work. This was the fourth refueling outage that no fuel movement or personnel errors occurred. Excellent operator performance dunng unit 1 scheduled shutdown A OOOOO for refueling outage as demonstrated by crew briefings where specific assignments were made, past personnel and unit performance, and contingency plans were B OOOOO discusssed. Supervisory and management personnel provided oversight and O

OOO direction when required. Procedures were used appropriately and communications were clear, concise and three-part.

12/15/1997 Strength IR 97-10, O1.1 NRC Operator performance prevented a potential Unit 1 Scram due to a loss of 1 234 5 condenser vacuum. Operators ident:fied the problem, reduced power, and restored a valve being manipulated during equipment clearance activities to the original A OOOOO P ** "'

sO00OO CO 000 10/4/1997 VIO VIO 97-09-01,04 4, LER NRC Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of a battery charger 1 234 5 366-97-09 transfer activity. A plant equipment operator failed to 'ollow procedure goveming continuous activities that affected the operability ut Emergency Diesel Genereators A OOOOO (EDG) and their battery chargers. The battery chargers for EDG 2A and 2C were rendered inoperable due to an incorrect breaker kneup.

B OOOOO cO 000 FROM.10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 4 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

r HATCH 25-Nov-98

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DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 10/4/1997 Weakness IR 97-09,04.3 NRC The operatng crew's performance on Unit 2 resutted in additonal challenges during 1 234 5 a normal reactor manual scram. Operator poor response to controllevet and slow Scram reset allowed reactor level to increase. This resulted in manual closing of A OOOOO the Main Steam isolaton Valves to prevent flooding the main steam lines and using Reactor Core isolation CocJeng for pressure control.

B OOOOO cO 000 10/4/1997 VIO MAINT VIO 97-09-01, O4.2 NRC Operations supervision failed to follow procedures to correctly generate a 1 234 5 Maintenance Work Order package for a Reactor Manual Control system relay replacement. Operations supervision authorized work and maintenance personel A OOOOO performed work using a work package that did not contain work instructons or post maintenance testng information.

B OOOOO cO 800 MAINTENANCE l

10/31/1998 NCV SAQV NOV 98-06-01, M1.4 SELF A failure of maintenance personnel to follow procedure to remove an electrical 1 234 5 jumper associated with the contnrol rod drive system was identified. Procedure steps were signed that the jumper was removed and independent!y verified by a A OOOOO second individual, however, the jumper was not removed The independent venf. cation for the jumper removal failed to identfy the error.

B OOOOO cO 000 9/19/1998 Positive ENG IR 98-05, M1.2,1.3 NRC Unit 2 Inservice inspecten activities were conducted in accordance with 1 23 4 5 procedures, licensee commitments, and regulatory requirements. Underwater welding related to ECCS suction strainers was accomplished by quahfied and A OOOOO certfied welders using certified weldrng fill matenals.

B 00000 c0 000 8/1/1998 Posrtive OPS IR 98 04, M t.1 NRC Performance in the identfication of equipment problems. Licensee management 1 23 4 5 demonstratad conservative decision making by reducing power to troubleshoot and repair the 2B circulahng water pump shaft bearing sleeve that had moved out of A OOOOO positon. The plant equipment operator's questioning atttude about the appearance and location of the bearing sleevere resulted in a prompt diagnosis of the pump B OOOOO problem. Maintenance personnel's attenton to detail during the repair activity was O

OOO instrumentalin determining that the root cause of the problem was a set screw that was not counter-sunk.

6/20/1998 Posit ve OPS IR 98-03. M3.1, M3.2, NRC Operator performance for the tesbng of the Unit 1 Contori Rod Drive testing and 1 234 5 M3.3, M3.4, M3 5 corrective maintenance for Balance of Plant leaks was excellent as eviderx:ed by correct procedure usage, clear and concise communications, peer checks, and A OOOOO careful switch manipulation. Supervisors were prersent to provide support and direction and make on-the-spot decisions.

B OOOOO cO 000 l

FROM.10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 5 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

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SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 3/21/1998 VIO Vio 98-01-02, M4.1 NRC Maintenance personnel failed to follow procedure and work was performed on the 1 234 5 Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control System that was not specified on the maintenance work order and was outside the approved clearance boundary. This rendered both A OOOOO trains of the system inoperable when a piping was cut to remove a valve.

8 00000 cO 000 3/21/1998 Positive IR 97-9,10,11,98-01.M3.1 NRC Personnel performance during routine surveillance activities between 10/97 and 3/98 1 234 5 was excellent. Procedures ws a consistently used; communications were generally three-part, clear, concise and met the requirements of the communications A OOOOO procedure. Supervisors observed some work activities and provided direction and assistance when needed.

B OOOOO cO 000 371/1998 Positive IR 98-01,M1.4 NRC For Maintenance Rule (a)(2) systems, structures and components (SSCs),

1 234 5 performance entena had been established, suitable trending had been perfomied, and corrective actions were taken when SSCs failed to meet performance criteria or A OOOOO experienced failures. Industry wide operating experience had been considered.

OOOOO cO 000 3/21/1998 Weakness IR 98-01.M1.3 NRC Several weaknesses were identJied in the periodic assessment procedure for the 1 234 5 Maintenance Rule. For example, the procedure did not adequately address review of goals, review of performance, review of effectiveness of corrective actions, and A OOOOO optimizing availability and reliability.

s00000 cO 000 2/7/1998 NCV NCV 97-12-03, M3.3 LICENSEE Failure to perform weekly Reactor Protection System channel test switch functional 1 234 5 tests was identified. Due to a lack of attention to detail, surveillance schedulers failed to submitt a surveillance procedure frequency change form and the required A OOOOO weekly test frequency was not met.

OOOOO c0 000 2/7/1998 Positive ENG IR 97-12 M2.2 NRC Maintenance and engineering personnel provided excellent support for the trouble 1 234 5 shooting and repair of the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator following a failure to start. Procedures were correct'y used and supervisory were present to provide A OOOOO oversight and direction during trouble shooting Trouble shooting activities iden+!fied that the govemor solenoid was the problem and the governor was replaced.

D DDOOO c0 000 2/7/1998 Positive OPS IR 97-12, M1.2 NRC Maintenance personnel and Plant Equipment Operator performance exhibited 1 234 5 excellent procedural familiarity for the isolation of the instrument air supply outside the power block that was leaking due to corrosion Performance was demonstrated A OOOOO by actions to close proper valves to correctly isolated the air headers, placing temporary air hoses to maintain component operation, and establishing a correct B OOOOO clearance boundary. Appropriate fire actions vi ere taken for a blocked open fire O

OOO door.

FROM: 10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 7 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

HATCH 254 toe-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 12/27/1997 Weakness IR 97-11, M2.3 NRC Poor supervisory oversight of loaned personnel dunng the Unit I refueling outage 1 234 5 was Wentfied. Loaned personnet from another site removed insulation on safety related equipment (RHR) to remove pipe snubbers. The insulation removal was not AOOOOO documented or tracked and was not replaced.

g cO 000 12/27/1997 Negative IR 97-11, M1.2, LER 321-NRC A poor maintenance work practice resulted in a leak from the nitrogen supply line to 1 234 5 97-07 the Unit 1 *B* inboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV). 'O' rings were not property installed and nitrogen leaks occurred that required a unit shutdown for A OOOOO repair.

OOO cO 000 12*27/1997 Strength IR 97-9,10,11, M1.1 NRC Routine maintenance observations between 12/15/97 and 10/04/97. Maintenance 1 234 5 activities were generalty completed in a thorough manner. Workers consistently used procedures and followed work instructions of the work packages.

A OOOOO Documentation of work performed and as found condibons of equipment was detailed. Supervisors observed work activites and provided direction and oversight B OOOOO during work.

O OOO 12/15/1997 NCV OPS NCV 97-10-03, Md.1 SELF Operators lack of attenton to detail during testing activities on Unit 1 results in an 1 234 5 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. During local leak rate testing. two operators placed jumpers in an incorrect panel. An ESF actuation signal was A OOOOO generated. Operator peer checks and indepenuent verifications failed to prevent the error.

B OOOOO cO 000 12/15/1997 Positive ENG IR 97-10, M1.5 SELF Review of westinghouse type DHP 4160 circuit braker problems. Several breakers 1 234 5 failed to operate on demand. The licensee had taken initial steps to address the problems based upon previous industry experience. An event review team (ERT)

A OOOOO was established to investigate the recent site problems. ERT actions and recommendations, such as implementng westinghouse technical bulletin actions, B OOOOO full preventative maintenance actions on the breakers, and completing a full cycle O

OOO start-run-stop for each 4160 breaker, were sound and approprarte.

12/15/1997 Positive OPS IR 97-10, M1.4 NRC Review of Unit 1 backfeed activities during refueling. Maintenance and operations 1 234 5 interfaced effectively dunng this infrequent backfeed activity. Good overall planning and oversight was observed. Operations provided good oversight and direction for A OOOOO equipment clearances to rernove the 1D startup transformer form service. Review of work activity was well planned, detailed, and precise.

B OOOOO c0 000 10/4/1997 VIO ENG VIO 97-09-01, M3 2 NRC A failure to follow procedure occurred and a required VT.1 inspection was not 1 234 5 completed following work on the B feedwater check valve hinge pin for Unit 2.

A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 FROM.10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 8 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

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SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 5/2/1998 Positive SAQV 1R 98-02, E3.

NRC Audits in the area of the 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Program were thorough and 1 234 5 detailed. The audits were conducted by corporate and srte personnet knowledgeable of the safety evaluabon program. The response and corrective actions to audit A OOOOO findings were timely and apprnoriate to ensure program improvement. Site and corporate personnel had received the specific trarning to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 B OOOOO evaluations. The safety evaluaton procedure included appropriate ard detailed O

OOO guidance for tha preparation and review of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations.

5/2/1998 Positive IR 98-02 E3.1 NRC The Plant Review Board met the requrrements specified in Secten 1 of the Hatch i 234 5 Quality Assurance Manual and Sechon 17 of the Updated Final Safety Anafysis Report. The Plant Review Board members conducted a detailed and thorough A OOOOO review of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations completed for proceNe revisions.

8 00000 cO 000 5/2/1998 NCV

'R 98-02, E2.2 NRC The failure to compare and document the closure time of the Unit 2 Reactor Core 1 234 5 Isolation Cooling (RCIC) vatve. 2E51-F003, to the insemce testng (IST) reference bme was identfied as a violation for Failure to Meet RCIC iST Valve Testing A OOOOO Requirements.

OOO cO 000 4/30/1998 Weakness SAQV IR 98=08, M8.2 NRC Weaknesses were identified in the original calculabon of circuit breaker control 1 234 5 voltage with respect to design inputs and conclusions. The worst case calculated voltage at the closing coil for emergency diesel generator 1B was below the A OOOOO published rrunimum operatng voltage for the coil.

OOO cO 000 3'21/1998 NCV VIO 98-01-03 E3.1 NRC Personnel failed to follow procedures for review. approval, and signature authonty 1 23 4 5 of the responsible engineer for a pressure test following safety related work on the Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control Sytem. Cut piping was rewelded and approved A OOOOO without a review from the responsible engineer.

OOO cO 000 T21/1998 eel eel 08-01-08.E2.1. IR 98-LICENSEE Apparent Violation eel 50-321,366/98-01-08. Plant Operation Outsde of the Design 1 234 5

02. E8.3.LER 321/98-01 Basis for an Engineered Safeguard System, was identified. A missing temperature switch on both trains allowed bypass flow that resutted in the Main Control Room A OOOOO Environmental Control System being unable to perform a design safety function to protect personnel from radiation. The corrective actions to replace the switches B OOOOO were effective in retuming the system to its design condition. NCV 98-02-04 was O

OOO identiifed.

2/7/1998 Positive PLT SUP IR 97-12, R2.1 NRC The problem solving team convened by Nuclear Safety and Compliance conducted 1 234 5 an excellent investigation for the root causes of the hssion product morutor and commerctal grade oxygen analyzer problems. The systems would not operate A OOOOO properly to meet the surve4itance requirements. The problem solving team determined that the problems with the systems included incorrect operatvan of the B OOOOO systems, vacuum leaks, and degraded components. Previous design changes als O

OOO contnbeded to the problems.

FROM: 10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 10 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

HATCH 25-Nov-98

~

DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-06. E2.5 NRC insulation on Nitrogen Supply Piping was not insta!!ed in accordance with 1 234 5 drawings. As a resutt, some system components were covered with ice and could not be operated.

A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-05. E2.5 NRC Failure to include Nitrogen Va'ves in a Test Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50, 1 234 5 Section XI of Appendix B. Test Control. Valves included pressure control vanes and relief valves. The valves were operable, but had not been tested.

A OOOOO a00000 cO 000 2/7/1998 Positve MAINT IR 97-12. E2.3 NRC Engineenng personnel demonstrated excellent observations for problem 1 234 5 identfication on the Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) and Plant Service Water (PSW) systems. Missing bolts on the SBLC test tank stand (seismic concem) was A OOOOO identified by the system engtneer dunng a system walkdown. Maintenance replaced the bolts. A smati section, about 12-18 inches, of PSW piping that did not B OOOOO have miss!',e shielding was identfied by a system engineer during a system O

OOO walkdown. A temporary concrete bamer was immediately placed for corrective actions. Maintenance and engineoring support to identify and correct the problems were timely.

12/15/1997 NCV SAOV IR 97-10. E3.3 NRC Engineenng personnel failed to identify that a procedure change required a Final 1 234 5 Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) change. The issue was for Residual Heat Rerreval (RHR) system on line testing. The FSAR specified that certain test.ng be conducted A OOOOO with the unit shutdown and the system drained OOO cO 000 12/15/1997 DEV SAOV DEV 97-10-04. E3.1 LICENSEE A missed commitment for Unit 2 Technical Specification amendment 132 was 1 234 5 associated with the attemate leakage path equipment. The licensee identfied a missed commitment to treat (test) altemate leakage path equipment (repair and A OOOOO replacement) as ASME code. A code test was not completed before unit startup as required.

B OOOOO cO 000 12/15/1997 Positive SAOV IR 97-10. E2.1 NRC Review of actions for Genenc Letter (GL) 96-06. Assurance of Equipment Operability 1 234 5 and Containment Integrity Dunng Design Basis Accident Conditions. Corrective actierts for both untts were completed within the committed time. New prping and A OOOOO valves were installed, tested, and verified to be com,sete prior to the startup of each unit following a refueling outage.

8 OOOOO cO 000 PLANT SUPPORT l

FROM,10'2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 11 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

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HATCH 2s-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 5/211998 Positive IR 98-02, R2.1 NRC Chemistry's persistence in determining the root cause for the loss of the pnmary 1 234 5 Reactor Coolant System flow to the contnuous in-line conduchvity cell resulted in a detailed and timel'/ soluton to the problem. The problem was determined to be a A OOOOO combination of design and procedurallineup debciencies.

OOOOO cO 000 S'2/1998 Positive IR 98-02, R1.1 NRC Plant Hea!th Physics has placed increased emphasis upon area decontamination 1 234 5 and the retreal of debris from contaminated areas. This was partially accomplished through better house-keeping which has generally improved since the A OOOOO last report penod.

OOO cO 000 3'21/1998 Posit!ve IR 98-01.F4.1 NRC The fire brigade leader demonstrated good leadership abilities by settng up a 1 234 5 comrnand post, using applicable procedures, and providing oversight and direction to fire brigade members, during the performance of the unannounced fire dnil A OOOOO conducted on March 3.

B 00000 cO 000 321/1998 Weakness IR 98-01.F1.1 NRC Brand Industrial Services Company silicone foam penetraton seal designs were not 1 234 5 supported by available vender qualification test reports. The licensee did not perform engineenng evaluations that satisfied the guidance of NRC GL 86-10 for deviabons A OOOOO from fire bamer configuratons qualified by tests. The licensee instated corrective actions to obtain and document test results and evaluations.

B OOOOO cO 000 321/1998 Negative OPS IR 98-01,R4.1 NRC Poor supervisory oversight of chernrstry activities and poor chemistry interface with 1 234 5 the operations department contributed to a failure to follow surveillance procedures during drywell sampling activities. Technicians completed an incorrect sample A OOOOO analysis that was not questioned or reviewed by chemistry supervision. Procedures were not followed and operations personnet failed to question the sample results.

B 0OOOO c0 000 3/21/1998 Negative IR 98-01,R1.2 NRC Numerous examples of poor facihty housekeeprng, clean! mess and contaminaton 1 234 5 control practices were identfied. Examples included, used protectve clothes, cloth and paper coveralls, cloth liners, and rubber gloves that were discarded outside of A OOOOO established collection receptacles. Discarded paper trash was observed.

Abandoned tools and equipment extending across estelished radiological control B OOOOO boundaries were observed-O OOO 3/21/1998 VIO VIO 98-01-04,98-01-06, NRC A Failure to Conduct Adequate surveys to Evaluate the Extent of Radiation Levels 1 23 4 5 R1.2 and Potential Hazards to Worker Conducting Condensate Pump Vibraton Analysis Measurements within a High Radiaton Area on the Unit 1 Turbine Building 112-foot A OOOOO elevaton, was identified. The surveys reviewed failed to identfy maximum contact and general area dose rates where specific work actvities occurred. A failure to B OOOOO follow procedures in accordance with TS 5.4.1 for Entry into a High Radiation Area, O

OOO was identfied. Workers entered the area and failed to noti y health physics of f

planned work activities.

FROM.10.2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 13 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 10/31/1998

HATCH 254000-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

IC*d ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-10. R7.1 NRC The licensee failed to maintain decommissioning records in accordance with 10 1 234 5 CFR 50.75(g) requirements for contamination material $scovered in the onsite larcit-AOOOOO B 00000 cO 000 2/7/1S98 VIO VIO 97-12-09, R7.1 NRC Personnel that identified contaminated matenal in the onsite land fill failed to irubate 1 234 5 a deficiency card for the problem. This was not in accordance with site procedures.

A 00000 B 00000 c0 000 2/7/1998 Positive IR 97-12, R7.1 NRC Licensee heafth physics technicians appropnately identfred the disposal of heensed 1 234 5 material in the onsite landfill as a deficient radiological cond tion. This concem was identfied to supervisors and hcensee management, however, the problem was not A OOOOO considered a defciency and no deficiency card was completed.

OOOOO cO 000 2/7/1998 NCV MAINT NCV 97-12-08, R2.1 NRC Fission product monitonng (FP*A) system troubleshootng activites led by 1 234 5 chemistry with maintenance, and operations support was not well-planned or coordinated. As a resuit, personnel error led to a Breach of Drywell Integnty when a A OOOOO manual va!ve that was required to be closed, was opened.

OOO cO 000 2/7/1998 VIO VIO 97-12-07,97-12-09, i?RC A failure to follow procedure was identfied for fatture to document release 1 23 4 5 R t.2 surveys. Also, a failure to dispose of licensed matenal in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2001(a) requirements, was identfied.

A OOOOO B 00000 c0 000 2/7/1998 Weakness IR 97-12. Rt.2 NRC Technician and manag= ment interpretations of radiation control procedural 1 234 5 requirements were inconsistent with respect to the procedural methods and equipment available for use to insk material pnor to release from a radiological A OOOOO controlled area. The lim:tM use of automated gamma-sensstive equipment to conduct surveys of agg egate Unit 1 Radwaste Building concrete debns released to B OOOOO the onsite landfill was identfied as a program weakness.

O OOO 12/27/1997 Strength IR 97-9,10,11,12, S2 NRC Review of protected and vital area requirements from 12/15/97 to 03/10/98.

1 23 4 5 Protected and vital area access controls met the requirements of the Physical Secunty Plan. Personnel, vehicle, and package searches were made. Personnei A OOOOO identification and badge issuance was completed per procedure. Penmeter fences were intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair. Vehicles were searched, B 0000O escorted and secured as desenbed in applicable procedures.

O OOO FROM: 10/2/1997 TO: 11/25/1998 Page 14 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE s1 Last updated: 10/31/1998

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HATCH 85-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s)

SEC.SFA SOURCE (s)

ID'd ISSUE (s)

SMM CODES 10/4/1997 Strength IR 97-09, R1.3 NRC Management personnel had placed special emphasis for invoved Health Physics 1 234 5 and general radiation worker activities. The stop work meeting. plant tours for new contractors. and a radiation worker expectations list were identified as a strength.

A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 SMM Template Codes:

SALP Functional Areas:

ID Code:

hA ' OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations

[

, ENGINEERING

NRC NRC

[ LICENSEE ' LICENSEE 1B OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients lENG MAINT MAINTENANCE lSELF SELF-REVEALED

{ OPS 1C OPERAT;ON PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes OPERATIONS I

l l2A MATERI AL CONDITION - Equipment Conditon 2B MATERIAL CONDITION - Programs and Processes PLT SU PLANT SUPPORT 3A HUMAN PERFORMANCE - Work Performance SAOV SAFETY ASSESSMENT & OV 3B HUMAN PERFORMANCE - KSA 3C HUMAN PERFORMANCE-Work Environment f4A ENGINEERING / DESIGN - Design

48 ENGINEERING / DESIGN - Engineering Support 4C ENGINEERINGDESIGN - Programs and Processes SA PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification fSB PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis SC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Resolution Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered fer escalated enforcement action in accordance with the ' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.

URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.

However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

FROM: 10/2/1997 TO.11/25/1998 Page 16 of 16 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated. 10/31/1998

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