ML20205A299
| ML20205A299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Sumner H SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903300354 | |
| Download: ML20205A299 (21) | |
Text
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March 19, 1999 l
l Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President - Hatch P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - HATCH
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Hatch.
The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current l summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management j meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee l performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the - !
assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Hatch involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period February 1997 to January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of April 4,1997, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on April 22,1997.~
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPRs provide an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
During the last six months, Unit 1 operated near or at 100 percent power. Power was reduced ;
three times to implement corrective maintenance for equipment problems. Unit 2 entered the 1 assessment period at 100 percent power. Power was decreased six times to complete ' ,
corrective maintenance activities for equipment problems. Unit 2 completed a scheduled refueling outage which commenced in September and tied to the grid on November 10.
Following the outage, the unit operated well until January 28, when the unit was manually shutdown to repair an electrical ground on safety related equipment.
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... i SNC 2 Performance at Hatch was acceptable. No plant scrams or unplanned transients occurred during this period. Operator communications and peer checks have continued to improve. in the Maintenance area, plant material condition has been maintained at an acceptable level.
Housekeeping has been recognized by the licensee as an area which needs improvement although no equipment issues directly related to housekeeping have been identified.
Engineering continued to be effective. Root cause analyses for equipment problems have been thorough. Although engineering support to operations was good, some engineering analyses have relied heavily on " engineering judgement" without thorough supporting documentation.
Security, Emergency Preparedness, and Fire Protection have continued to be acceptable.
Late in the assessment period, more emphasis was observed being placed on the As Low As Reasonably Achievable program and personnel contaminations. However, additional improvement is warranted. First line supervisors do not always clearly communicate or enforce management expectations.
In the operations area, performance was consistent. The operators continued to perform with a high level of competency during both normal and abnormal operations. Operations management w' 'ctively involved in the daily operation of the plant, provided a strong safety focus and exhibited conservative decision making. Improvement was observed in operations communications. Although procedure usage errors were not observed to be problematic during this period, deficiencies were identified in several existing procedures. The licensee has implemented actions to identify and resolve procedure deficiencies. Early during this assessment period Operations personnel exhibited a high threshold for documenting discrepant I conditions such that deficiencies of minor significance were not being corrected. An example of this was an alarm on service water radiation monitor which was not pursued as a discrepant condition. Toward the end of the assessment period this had improved, however, more improvement is warranted. The licensed operator requalification program continued to be effectively implemented. Operations performance during this assessment period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the NRC core program, although some increased emphasis will be placed on the areas identified above.
1 in the maintenance area, performance was consistent. Corrective maintenance activities were generally performed well. Inservice inspection activities were generally well planned and conducted in accordance with the required codes, standards, and documented commitments I exhibiting an improving trend. In addition to the normal NRC core inspections, a regional initiative inspection is planned to review generic issues associated with jet pump cracking and flow-assisted corrosion. Regional initiative inspections will be associated with the construction and testing of the independent spent fuel storage facility installation, e
in the engineering area, performance was consistent. Design control, implementation of major modifications, and the modification readiness review program were identified as program strengths. Field engineering support for implementation of design changes was effective.
Audits in the area of the 10 CFR 50.59 program were thorough and detailed. A regional initiative inspection will be conducted to close open issues associated with circuit breaker maintenance.
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1 m i
SNC 3 i
4 in the plant support area, performance was consistent. The Emergency Prepcedness program was maintained in a state of operational readiness. Security equipment remained operable and
- in good condition with management support dedicated to providing a quality physical security
! . program. Intemal and extensal personnel radiation exposures continued to be below regulatory i limits. The number of personnel contamination events declined and radiological housekeeping l improved compared to the previous assessment period. Quality Assurance audits in the i radiological controls area appropriately identified deficiencies for corrective actions.
1 Performance in the Plant Support area during this assessment period does not warrant any
! additional inspection effort above the NRC core inspection program.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee i performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other j docketed correspondence between the NRC and Southem Nuclear Company. The NRC does t not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be
! functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes
- warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
l j This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Hatch PPR review. It i is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts j; and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 l details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection j' outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for
- emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and j continuous nature.
i i l . We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 562-4520.
, Sincerely, i
(Original signed by
- Pierce H. Skinner) t
! Pierce H. Skinner, Chief j Reactor Projects Branch 2 l Division of Reactor Projects r
Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan cc w/encis: (See Page 4)
. SNC '4 ;
cc w/encls:
J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. .
P. O. Box 1295 i Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 P. H. Wells General Manager, Plant Hatch !
Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. ;
U. S. Highway 1 North P. O. Box 2010 -
Baxley, GA 31515 D. M. Crowe Manager Licensing - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
. Emest L. Blake, Esq.
- Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20037 Office of Planning and Budget Room 610 270 Washington Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30334
- Director Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 4
-Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources 4244 Intemational Parkway
, . Suite 114 Atlanta, GA 30354 1
cc w/encis cont'd: (See Page 5)
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. . _ - -. - - . --.-,. .-- . .. - . ..- . . - . - . ~ - - - _ _ _ _ . . -
4 -
SNC 5 cc'w/encls: Continued Chairman .
Appling County Commissioners -
- County Courthouse Baxley, GA 31513 Program Manager
- Fossil & Nuclear Operations :
Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place -
Tucker, GA 30085-1349 .
- Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 10th Floor _
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. 20004-9500 Senior Engineer- Power Supply -
Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia 1470 Riveredge Parkway PW Atlanta, GA 30328-4684
^
. Distribution w/encis. _
L. Plisco, Ril ;
P.' H. Skinner, Ril l S. Collins, NRR j J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR T. Boyce, NRR H. Berkow, NRR L. Olshan, NRR
- G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieberman, OE
- PUBLIC NRC Senior Resident inspector
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11030 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513'
-
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE 4
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! vrrNt R11;unr- RII:DR5:M5 Ril:prm;E5 Ril;DR5:OLMPB Ril:DR5:P55 l 0 510 NATURE
] NAME BLHolbrook:dlut* GBelisle' KLandis' HChristensen* KBarr*
- DA1E wm wm a m u m u m mm u m COPY 7 YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME
- G:\ HATCH \PPRLTR.WPD 4
SNC 5 cc w/encls: Continued Chairman
' Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse Baxley, GA 31513 ,
Program Manager .
Fossil & Nuclear Operations i Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place Tucker, GA 30085-1349 Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
- 10th Floor ,
, 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. 20004-9500 )
Senior Engineer- Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority ,
of Georgia !
1470 Riveredge Parkway NW Atlanta, GA 30328-4684 Distribution w/encis:
L. Plisco, Ril P. H. Skinner, Rll ;
L. Olshan, NRR l T. Boyce, fair I W. Dean, NRR G. Tracy, EDO PUBLIC NRC Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11030 Hatch Parkway North
- Baxley, GA 31513 l
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE j n
UFFNt Ril unr- iyip:NB Ril:DR5:lpkg/ Ril;uno:OL,MPB Ril:DR5:P55 NMIdM 4k ! M NAME. BLHolbrook:dka* ligelislV KLandig i, HChristensen 4(KBerr DATE 31 /99 - g 199 ggb/99 gp /99 3/ O /99 31 /99 3/ 199
- COPY 7 YE5 NO (YE5) NO ( YES J ' NO 7EV NO Y{p NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD coPr DOCU(E)lt NAME
- G:\ HATCH \PPRLTR.WPD
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1 SNC 6 Distribution w/encls: Continued PUBLIC NRC Senior Resident inspector l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
11030 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513 o
j l
OFFICE l Ril:DRP Rll:DR5;MB Ril:DR5:EB Ril:DR5;OLHPB Ril:DR5:P5B SIGNATURE gp NAME BLHol wook:dka GBelisle KLandis HChristensen KBarr DATE i /99 2/ . 199 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ 199 2/ /99 21 199 i
- COPY? YE5] NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YES NO YES NJ YE5 NO I OFlHlTAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME
- G:\ HATCH \PPRLTR.WPD I
Page: 1 of 12 Date: 02/17/1999 '
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission nme: is:27m negion ti PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functioool Area Functional Template Dofe Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 12/29/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri- 1B Operations preplannre the prompt direction provkjed by operations supervision to decrease power, and g ~, 3, the immediate re'ponse d the operating crew effectively mitigated a decreasing condenser vocuum transient that had the poter.tial to cause o Unit 2 scram from o low condenser vacuum turbine trip. (01.3).
Tec 12/29/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3A Personnel response to Residual Heat Removal and Plant Service Water system flow pertubrotions due to
- * * " " P "*
- Sec: ENG Sec: 5B the results of the root cause investigation were logico!. The problem was believed to be leaves and ottser Tec debris in the pump suction pit. Monogement provided a focused otter tion to the issue for resolution (O2.3).
12/29/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IC Operators responded appropriately to plant transients and equipment failures os port of the emergency prep redeness exercise. Event classification. plant status. and follow-up activities were correctly Sec: PLTSUP Sec:3A communicated and coordinated with the Technical Support Center. Initial notifications were prompt and Ten operators responded using oppropriate procedures. All exercise objectives were met (P4.1).
10/31/1998 1998006 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A Operations monogement demonstrated conservative decision making to reduce reactor power and remove the turbine / generator from service to troubleshoot and implement corrective maintenece for o Sec: MAiNT Sec: 5A plugged Stator Cooling Water system "Y " strainer. Maintenance identified the specific component cousing Tec 3A the problem, lhe stroiner was bect ming clogged with copper oxide.
Operations demonstrcted conservative decision making to reduct Unit 2 power during maintenance troubleshooting octrvities for o turbine combined intermediate volve test circuit problem. Troubleshooting identified the cause of the problem os o blown fuse in the test ekcuit. (IR 9842. 5/2/98)
Operations monogement took immediate and appropriate corrective actions to troubleshoot. repair. und recolibrate on erroneous desel generator fuel oil tank level indication. Monogement displayed conservative and cautious opproaches for verifying level by having each shift log tonk level indications. (IR 9845. 9/10/98)
Operoi~ management demonstrated conservative decision making by reducing unit power to trouth - ' and repair the 2B circulation water pump shaft bearing sleeve that worked loose. The plant operator's questioning attitude about the location and appearance of the sleeve resulted in prompt identification of the probleni. The cause was o set screw that was not countersunk. (!R 9844. 6/21/98) 09/19/1998 1998005 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3A Control room operators demonstrated correct procedure usoge, proper annunciator response three-port Sec- c mmunications, the phonetic olphobet, and peer checks during power chor.ges on Unit 2 Pre-job briefs Sec: 1B were detailed and attended by oppropriate personnel. (irs 9841. O2.4. 9842. 04.1. 9843. O3.1. 98-04 Tec 58 O1.2.9845. 04.1)
Operators demonstrated systerr. oworeness and correct procedure usoge when they immedotely identified and restored a loss of shutdown cooling on Unit 2. A volve unexpectedly went closed during a surveillance due to a procedure lineup deficiency for o switch located on the remote shutdown panel. (IR 9846. O2.4).
09/19/1998 1998005 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 3A Operator inattention to detail using the Unit 2 outoge safety assessment procedure resulted in the failure to Sec N M. '
promply identify a cond; tion of increased risk. The operators failed to recognize that a Core Spray system was not available for core cooling as identified in the outoge assessment due to sofety relief volves being Tec removed for maintenance. Operators fc" led to complete o detailed re view of ovailable systems. plant conditions, and ongoing maintenance activities inct offected system ovoilulity for core cooling.
Item s ype (Compliance. Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999 Enclosure 1
Page: 2 of 12 Date: 02/17/1999 ~
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission nme: is:27-o2 negion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functiond Areo
- Functional Templote Dole Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 08/01/1998 1998004 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 38 The overall performance grade for some licensed operators was o combination of observations of the Shift Technical Advisor and the licensed operator position into one grade.
Sec.
Tec 08/01/1998 1998004 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt 3B For the licensed operator requalification process, the sample plan and the reviewed licensed operator g* g ,* written examinations were satisfactory. The development of the Probabilistic Sofety Asses:; ment motrix was noted as a program strength. The licensee had performed on ondysis of the training /tedoble items versus Tec the Probobilistic Sofety Assessment dato and identified which important events, equipment operability and operator actions were significont core domoge frequency contributors. The licensee then ensured thc! oil significont contnbutors were included in operator requalification troining.
05/02/1998 1998002 Prt OPS NRC NEG PrtSA Operations personnel demonstrated a lock of sensitivity for changing unclear steps in the Reactor Core Sec--
Isolation Cooling surveillance procedure. The procedure required operators to make independent Sec: 48 verifications that could not be mode and required operators to take actions that were not specificolly Ter. identified in the procedure.
The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) procedure precuotuions contained ombiguity related to running the EDG unfooded or of low lood. This contributed to o smoll fire on EDG insulation. (IR 97-12, 2/7/98) 05/02/1998 1998002 Prt OPS NRC POS Pri: The Plant Review Board (PRB) met the requirements specified in Section 1 of the Hatch Quality Assurance Sec-
" *
- U * "O * """ **
- See: ENG '
deportments represented. timeliness and scope of review. The PRB members conducted a detailed and Tec thorough review of the 10 CFR 50.59 evoluotions completed for procedure revision. (Also see IR 97-12, 2/7/98) 05/02/1998 1998002 P.h OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A Operations supervision was actively involved in the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolont injection maintene and tes acms W mm cmms o%M Mkech Operous sem M m et Sec: MA!NT Sec: 2B displayed on oMentiveness to detail. ond effectivley monitored system criticd porometers. Technico Ter IC Specifications and surveillance testng occeptance criteria were met. Maintenance and enoineering support to operations was evident for the planning and work octivities.
03/10/1998 1997012-02 Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Prt 3A The Nitrogen Supply system for the Containment Atmospheric Dilution System (CAD) was not well 3,c. I M 2B maintained. Although the system remained operable, pressure control volves were leaking, insulatian was not in place per drawings, ice had formed on piping and vdves, and some volves were not in the required Ter: testing program. Procedures were not followed to change setpoints bosed upon operating history. (Also VIO 97-12-06).
07" W1998 1997012 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 3A Operators quickly detected and immediately extinguished a small fire on Emerg ancy Diesel Generator (EDG)
Sec M T Sec,' insulation. Mointenance provided support to operations to evoluote the cause of the fire and provided recommendations to change the surveillance testing procedure. The prot %m was caused by running the Ter: EDG unloaded or at low loads for on extended time during surveillance and post maintenance testing which allowed tube oil to occumulate in the exhaust.
02/07/1998 1997012 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt SB Site equipment reliobility and corrective action meetings were effectively focused. Management Se
- T MK demonstorated effective priortization and focus for risk and safety significant equipment.
Tec item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Pogo: 3 of 12 Date:02/17/1999 .
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Tim.: iS 27.c2 nesion il PMNT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Area ~
Functional Temploie Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 01/23/1998 1997011-03 Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Prt 1 A Operectors foiled to make the required 4-hour report the Drywell pneumatic system had isolated. I
- ** * * #
- I Sec: OTHER Sec: 3A corrective actions failed to prevent four late 10 CFR 4-hour reports that occurred within the post two years.
Ter* (Also VIO 97-11-02. LER 321/97-07) 12/27/1997 1997011 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt 18 Operator response to o transient and mmuol scram resulting from the Unit 2 condensate booster pump
- g.
- p check vs Ve problems was good in that power was reduced, o monud scrom was initiated, and plant procedures were correctty and prompfty used. A condensate booster pump check volve failed to seat and .
Tec resulted in a overpressure and foilm of a metal suction bellows. (LER 366/97-10) '
12/27/1997 1997011 '
Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A Monogement was actively involv .1 and provided oversight and direction for system walkdowns onJ ge sess e . re re suW pesonneMeWW o Sec: MAINT Sec: 2B domoged Unit 2 condensate check volve and ruptured suction bellows. The check volve stuck open Ter: 4B cousing overpressure and domoge of the suction bellows.
12/27/1997 1997011 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt IB Operator octions to immediately identify and verify by instrumentation that the Unit 2 Recirculation pump t See: MAINT Sec: 3A speed had increased were oppropriate and in occordonce with procedures and expectations. Operator actions were timely with reactor power reduced to rated offer about 2 minutes. Engineering and Ter: maintenance provided support to investigate and repair the stuck controller pushbutton that caused the problem.
i 11/15/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt 3A Operator performance nrevented a potential Scrom on Unit I due to a loss of condenser vocuum.
- g. Sec: 3B
- ~# * *"' ** "O equipment clearance activities to' 'the original position. The problem was a volve on the standby Ter: 1 A cir ejector that had seat leckoge.
Operator performance dunng refuleing and fuel movement was identified as a strength. This was the fourth ,
refueling outoge completed without operator or fue! movement error.
11/15/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A Decoy heat removo! systems were in good operational condition prior to and during the refueling outoge.
Sec: MAINT Sec: 2B gemt, m W as safeWM M wM oms M could offect core cooling and the removal of systems from service that would decrease emergency system Ten availability. Operators prevented work octivities in and around control room panels where emergency core cooling system switches were locoted.
11/15/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A for the Unit 1 Drywen closeout following the refueling outoge. the materid conditions and general Sec: MAINT Sec: 3A housekeeping were good. The licensee correctly installed the new reactor vesselinsulation os port of the new insulation upgrade program. No system or component teokoge was observed. The Unit 2 Tcrus was Ter- closed out in occordance with procedure requirements. The licensee demonstrated a safety focus toward equipment and system operability prior to closeout activities. (Also IR 98-06) 11/15/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC POS Pri: 2B Operations and maintenance interfaced effectively during on infrequent main transformer backfeed See: MAINT Sec: 3A ctivity. Good overall planning was observed. Operations provided good oversight and direction for equipment clearances to remove the ID stortup transformer from service. Overon work octivities were we5 !
Ter: planned. detailed, and precise.
1 Item Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1993
Poge: 4 of 12 Dole: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. ,ission Time: iS:27 02 negion u PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Areo Functional Templofe ,
Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description '
11/15/1997 1997010 Prt OPS 'NRC POS Prt 5A All significant occurrence reports reviewed were correctly classified and were being actively trocked for Sec: OTHER Sec: SC resoh oppropriate hcommem for the NMmreports situation. The occurrence h%were W receiving cmsesenior W and suWt medwh departret level we Ter: monogement attention and review. ;
11/15/1997 1997010 42 Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Pri: Unit I was in cold shutdown when operators withdrew a control rod with occumulator pressure less than that M ', specified by Technical Specificotons. Several occumulo' ors had been discharged in preporation for T
maintenance activities and operators were attempting to time the control rods of the some time the Ter occumulators were discharged. (LER 321/97-05) 11/03/1997 1997009 41 Pri' OPS S' VIO IV Prt 3A Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of a bottery charger transfer activity. A plant M WT k 3C equipment operator failed to follow (use) procedures governing continuous activities that offected the operobility of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and their bottery chargers. The battery chargers for EDG Ter 2A and 2C were rendered incperable due to on incorrect breaker alignment. (LER 366/97-U9)
Operations supervision failed to follow procedures to correctly generate o Mointenance Work Order package for o Reactor Manual Control system relay replacement. Operations supervision authorized work and maintenance personnel performed working using a work package that did not contain work instructions or post maintenance testing information.
A required VT-1 inspection was not completed following work on the 28 feedwater check volve hinge pin.
(VIO 97-0941) 10/04/1997 1997009 Prt OPS NRC WK Prt 1B The operating crew's performance on Unit 2 resulted in additional challenges during a normal manual scrom.
Sw' ms w spmse to mM WheseN bom dW Whel %mosa Ws reW Sec: 3A in manuol closing of the Main Steam isolation Valves to prevent flooding the lines and using Reactor Core Ter Isolation Cooling for pressure control 12/29/1998 1998007 44 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt 1 A A lock of administrative controls resulted in on inoppropriate surveillance frequency and o missed Technical pe nce teh h M 2 Wm Bmn@msNN NW se h Sec: OPS Sec:2B licensee's immediate corrective actions were timely and comprehensive (M3.2).
Tor.
0?/19/1998 1998005 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt Unit 2 Inservice inspection activities were conducted in occordance with procedures, licensec g *, ,
commitments, and regulatory reovirements. Underwater welding related to emergency core cooling 1 equipment suction strainers was accomplished by qualified and certified welders using certified fill material.
Ter 06/20/1998 1998003 Prt MAINT NRC POS Pri: 58 Actions to identify and correct total in-leokoge was satisfactory. Ucensee monogement was kept informed 3, ,'
of the total amount of rodwoste in-leckoge which was indicative of component and system leaks. Leakoge [
was routinely assessed and leakoge reduction was often identified as a priority. Although monogement Ter goals for total site rodwoste irHeokoge were generofly not met, the amount of in-leckago for 1998 to date, was improved from the values recorded in 1997.
Itern Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 5 of 12 Date:02/17/1999 .
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: iS 27:02 hoion il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Arw -
Functional Temp:ote Dole Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 06/20/1998 1998003 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri' 5A Maintenance and engineering personnel foiled to recognize and expeditiously correct mechanical system Sec: ENG See:48 ced hbh 6 % mm Wee W WmW psonM N@ mc@e the root cause of problems ossocK2ted with the Unit 1 Core Spray Jockey pump. The significance of the Tec 4C tolerances for the impeller clearances and flotruss of the cosing wear plate was not identiifed.
06/20/1998 1998003 Pri' MAINT NRC POS Prt SA Maintenance and engineering personnel took prompt and prudent oction in conducting on ossessment and inspection of the bearing condition for the 1 A Emergoncy Diesel Generator offer on onofysis indicated a ENG MM wear porticle concentration increase. The inspection revealed that the wear increase was due to normal Tec 4B weor-in for a new bearing and a replacement bearing was not necessary.
06/20/1998 1998003 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 1 A Operator performance for the Unit 1 Control Rod Drive system testing and corrective maintenance for Bolonce of Plant leaks was excellent as evidenced by correct procedure usage, clear and concise communications, peer checks. and careful switch monipulation. Supervisors were present to provide Tec support and direction and to mcke on-the-spot decisions.
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05/02/1998 19980CM8 Prk MAINT NRC NCV Prt3A The Technical Specifications (TS) requirements for a Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation monitor Se~ Sec: 2B
" * " * " * ^ *"Y review of the completed procedure failed to identify the error.
Tec 04/21/1998 1998001-02 Prt MAINT NRC VIOlV Prt 3A Maintenance personnel failed to follow procedures and work was performed on *he Unit 2 Standby Liquid Sec' ' W. '
C ntr i system that was not specified on the maintenance work order and was outside the approved clearonce boundary. This rendered both trains of the system inoperable when a pipe was cut to remove o Tec volve.
03/21/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B For maintenance rule (c)(2) systems, structures and components (SSCs), performance criterio had been M- ' Sec- '
established. suitable trending had been performed. and corrective actions were taken when SSCs foiled to meet performance criterio or experienced failures. Industry wide operating experience had been Tec considered.
03/21/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC WK M 2A wveral weaknesses were identified in the periodic assessment procedure for the Maintenance Rule. For Sec- '
See: 2B
. e es wo nce. @ des d cceective actions. and optimizing ovoi! ability and reliability.
Tec 03/21/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Personnel performance during routine surveillance activities between 10/97 and 3/98 was satisfactory.
Procedures were consistently used. communications were generally three-part. clear. concise and met the requirements of the communications procedure. Supervisors observed some work activities and provided Tec direction and assistance when needed. (Also IR 97-09. 97-10. 97-11) 03/20/1998 1996008 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri 28 Some manufacturer recommended steps and good industry practices were not incorporated into circuit 3 . ~ g. '
breaker maintenance procedures. Examples included the following: reduced voltage functional test. check of the anti-pump circuit, breaker operating time check and clearance check between tripping trigger, trip Tec latch roller, and closing trigger.
Item Type (Compliance. Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 6 of 12 Date:02/17/1999 .
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: iS:27.e2 Region 11 PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Areo
- Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 02/07/1998 1997012 G Prt MA!NT NRC NCV Prt 3A Due to o lock of attention to detail, surveillance schedulers foiled to submit a surveillance procedure g, '
frequency change form and the required weekly test frequency was not met for the Reactor Protection System chonnel switches.
Tec 02/07/1998 1997012 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Maintenance and engineering personnel provided support for the troubleshooting and repair of the 2C Sec: ENG See: 48
. superv'som were present to provide oversight and direction during troubleshooting. The activities identified Ten that the governor shutdown solenoid was the problem.
02/07/1998 1997012 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Maintenance personnel and plant equipment coe ators exhibited procedural familiarity for the isolation of o e o was Wg h to anoen md was W See: OPS ' Sec-*
replaced. Performance was demonstrated by octions to close proper volves to correctty isolote the air Tec headers, placing temporary air hoses to maintain component operation, and estabhshing a correct clearance boundary. Appropriate firs actions were token for a blocked open fire door.
12/27/1997 1997011 Prt MAINT Self NEG Prt 3A Poor maintenance work practices resulted in a leak from the nitrogen supply line to the Unit 1 *B" inboard h *- Sec-*
Main Steam isolation Volve 'O' rings were not insto!!ed property and nitrogen leaks occurred that required o unit shutdown for rework activities. (LER 321/97-07)
Tec 12/27/1997 1997011 Prt MAINT NC STR Prt 3A Routine mcintenance activities between 12/15/97 and 10/04/97 were generally completed in a thorough Sw' Sec: 28
"* " # * #8 U'
- pockoges. Documentation of work performed and os-found conditions of equipment was detoiled and Tec occurate. Supervisors observed work octivities and provided direction and oversight duriry the work. (irs 97-09,97-10,97-11) 12/27/1997 1997011 Prt MAINT NRC WK Prt 3B Poor supervisory oversight of loaned personnel during the Unit I refueling outoge was identified. Looned !
Sec: MAINT P *" * "* * * " "* ' '""
See: 3C removed insulation was not documented. trocked or replaced.
Tec 11/15/1997 1997010 @ Prt MA:NT Self NCV Prt 3A Operators lack of attention to detoil during testing on Unit I resulted in on Engineered Sofety Feature See: OPS Sec.'
octuation. During local leak rate testing. two operators placed jumpers in ca incorrect ponel cousing the actuation. Operator peer checks and independent verifications foiled to r,revent the error.
Tec 10/04/1997 1997009 Pri: M AINT NRC POS Prt 2A Maintenance and engineering support to operations following the 1 A Emergency Diesel Gerrsator (EDG)
Sec: ENG Sec: 4B failure to stort on September 4 was excellent os evidenced by troubleshooting and history reviews. The review identified that a fuel oil check volve foilure caused the problem. The review of post performance Tec and repair history of the failed fuel oil check volve repiocemer.ts for all EDGs demonstrated conservat a ,
decision making. The licensee altered the preventative maintenance schedule for the volves.
10/04/1997 1997009 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Maintenance personnel's attention to detail during a system wolkdown led to the discovery of broken pieces Sec: ENG Sec: 4B f the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection pump flonge bushing. The bushing was replaced and the bearing was repaired. The pump vendor suspected that slight shaft movement occurred cousing the Tec bushing to be domoged (LER 366/9708) ttem Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 7 of 12 Dole: 02/17/1999 .
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ano: iS 27 o2 Region si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX t HATCH By Primary Functional Areo
- Functional Template i Dole Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 10/31/1998 1998006 Pri ENG NRC POS Prt 3A Field engineering support for implementation of design changes on Unit 2 was effectrve and thorough. The Sec: MAINT Sec:48 implementation engineers coordinated activities directly with craft foremen and provided direct oversight in ;
resolving installation problems !
Ter-l 06/20/1998 1998003 Pri ENG NRC NEG Prt 28 A iock of attention to detail by corporate engineering resulted in undersized wiring and incorrect breaker trip :
Soc--
- '" U" * * "'
Sec: 4B water system is not safety related but is important to safety. As a result the non-sofety related MCC lost Ter- power. Operations personnel were required to take corrpensatory octions to limit loods on the MCC to i minimize the impact of the design error. I 06/20/1998 1998003 Prt ENG '
NRC NEG Prt 3A The request for engineenng review (RER) process was not rigorously implemented as required by procedure, RERs were not consistently trocked by deportment. The disposition of RERs was not thoroughly controded by ,
the engineering departments, nor was the status of RERs communicated to requesting departments. The Ter: RERs did not offect safety related equipment.
05/02/1998 1998002 Pit ENG NRC POS Prt 5A Audits in the creo of the 10 CFR 50.59 Evoluotion Program were thorough and detoiled. The cuoits were I Sec: OTHER Sec: 48 chmy capm@ ete pesh W%em oN safeWem prpn. h '
response and corrective actions to audit findings were timely and oppropnote to ensure progrom Ter 38 implementation. Site and corporate personne' had received specific training to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 evoluotions. The afety evoluotion procedure included oppropriate and detailed guidance fnr the preparation and review of 10 CFR 50.59 evoluotions.
l 05/02/1998 1998002 43 Prt ENG NRC NCV Prt 3A The failure to comoore and document the closure t ne of the Unit 2 Reactor Core isolation Cooling vdve. I Sec: OPS Sec.'
EWOO3. to N Mce teshng mfamce W. was WnN h de cymme wm not Wed md l monitored following maintenance activities.
Ter:
04/21/1998 1998001-03 Prt ENG NRC VIO IV Prt 3A Personnel failed to review, opprove. and obtain sgnature ou+hority of the responsible engineer for o pressure Sec- *
- Sec: 48 opproved, and pioced in service without a review from the responsible engineer.
Ter-04/21/1998 1998001-08 Prt ENG NRC eel Prt3A A missing temperature switch on each train of the Main Control Room Environmental Control system
- g. rendered each train incopoble of performing a design safety function to protect personnel from rodiction.
Sec: 4B The licensee believed that the switches had been missing since' origind installation of the systems. NCV '
Ter: SC 98-0241 was later issued.
03/20/1998 1998008 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 4A Wecknesses were identified in the origind cdculations of circuit breaker control voltage with respect to f Sec: OTHER Sec*'
@ s emchs. h wW cme dwW dage d h cW cd fa hrgem M Generator 1B was below the published minimum operating voltoge for the coil.
Ter:
L item Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
. Page: 8 of 12 Date: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: is:27:02 Region n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Areo '
Functional Template Dole Source Area 3D Type Codes item Description 02/07/1998 1997012 Prt ENG NRC POS Pri: SA Engineering personnel demonstrated excellent observations for problem identifiecation on the Standby Sec: MAINT Sec: SC n )m m a e sys ems. ng sm e c concem) was identified by the system engineer during a system wdkdown. Maintenance replaced the ,
Ter: bolts. A small section of piping.12-15 inches, that did not have missile shielding since initial construction was identifed by a system engineer during a PSW system wdkdown. A temporary concrete barrier was immediately placed for corrective Mions. Maintonnce and engineering support to identify and correct the problems were timely.
02/07/1998 1997012 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4B The problem soMng taom convened by Nuclear Sofety and Compliance conducted a detailed M SUP MM investig tion for the root causes of the fission product monitor and commerciof grade oxygen onolyzer problems. The systems would not operate property to meet the surveillance require, nts. The team Ter determined that the problems with the systems included incorrect operation of the system, vocuum lecks, !
and degraded components. Previous design changes also contributed to the probierns for line routing that i
allowed moisture buildup to hinder operations.
11/15/1997 1997010-04 Prt ENG Ucensee DEV Pri: 3A A missed commitrnent for Unit 2 Technical Specifications amendment 132 was ossociated with the alternate g '. g. '
lookoge path equipment. The licensee identified a missed commitment to treat (test) otternate leakoge path equipment (repair /replocement) os ASME code. A code test was not completed before unit stortup as Ter required.
11/15/1997 1997010-09 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Prt 3A Engineering personnel failed to identify that a procedure change required a Final Safety Anotysis Report
- 3,,'. (FSAR) change The issue was for Residud Heat Removal system on-line testing. The FSAR specified that certain testing be conducted with the unit shutdown and the system droined. On-line testing was
- Ter: completed for the system without revising the FSAR.
09/19/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl: 3A The As Low As Recsonably Achievable (Al. ARA) planning was limited in some respects os evidenced by Sec- ' Sec.'
minimal participation by upper monogement in scheduled plant ALARA committee meetings and by inspector observations of a pre-Job briefing that contained inconclusive details.
Ter 09/19/1908 1998005 .'? PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 2A Emergency facilities and equipment were maintained in on operational status. The licensee mointoined M '- m se osmssekopoNes M wee uss MW gM mh hoWng. Menwe Sec: 1C maintoined a satisfoctory Emergency Preparedeness (EP) training prgram. The EP audits satisfied the '
Tor. 3C requirements of 10 CFR 50.543 (t). Both of the licensee's Notices of Unusual Events since August 1996 were !
properly classified and notifications were mode in a timely manner.
09/19/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 3A Actions for o Notice of Unusual Event were correct and timely when two workers fell from o scaffold and
- g.
- g,
- were transported to o hospitol. The workers were potentially contaminated. Procedures were correctly used ond contamination control techniques were correct.
Ter:
08/01/1998 1998004 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC Both possive and active barriers of the vehicle barrier system were in place and operable os required by the Se' *** " * **' * ** '
See: 2B caused by environmental conditions and the placement of the cable.
Ter:
item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
o . Doie:bE/IE 5999 Page: 9 of 12 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission n :iS m 2 .
Region si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Areo .
Functional Template Date Source Areo ID Type Codes tier" Description 06/20/1998 1998003 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 3B Although some recent improvements were observed in the quality of personnel contamination reports (PCRs), some were not thorough and detailed and some corrective actions were not identified to other g,* involved departments. Some PCRs did not specificolfy identify the cause of the problems or make Tec recommendations to prevent repeat problems. The personnel assigned to complete PCR determinations were not froned in root cause and corrective action analysis.
06/20/1998 1998003 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtSA The completion of a contamination control self-ossessment demonstroted site management's increased sensitivity for contamination control issues and o need for improvement. T% self-ossessment was thorough g g and detoiled.
Tec.
05/02/1998 1998002 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 1C The command and control responsibilities of the first responders for emerger cies during a medicd emergency drill were not Clearty delineated or defined. This Contributed to o lock of Command and Control g,* observed during the medicd drill conducted in April.1998. Information communicotsd tc the control room Tec during the driU did not identify that the simulated injured individual was contaminated. Subsequent information relayed to the hospitol was incorrect.
05/02/1998 1998002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 3A Plant Hectth Physics had pioced increased emphasis upon oreo decontamination and the removal of debris from contaminated creas. This was partio!Iy accomplished through better house keeping which hos g '.
- generally improved since the lost report period.
Tec 05/02/1998 1998002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prk 3A Chemistry's persistence in determining the root cause for the loss of the prrnory Reactor Coolant system flow to the continuous irvline conductivity cell resulted in a detailed and timely solution to the problem. The
- g.
- problem was determined to be a combination of design and procedurallineup deficiencies.
Tec 05/02/1998 1998002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The fire protection personnel provided on effective drin for the fire brigade. Response and coordination objectives were met. Minor deficiencies associated with a failure to initially establish a hydront operator and Sec: OPS Sec.
- sparse followup messages to the fire brigade leader were discussed with the fire drill coordinator. These Tec deficiencies were also discussed in a post drill critique for corrective actions.
The fire brigade leader demonstrated good leadership abilities by setting up a command post. using opplicable procedures, and providing oversight and direction to fire brigode members during the performance of an unannounced fire drill conducted on March 3.1998. (IR 98-01. 3/21/1998) 04/21/1998 1998001-04 Prt PLTSUP NRC VIOlV Prt 3A A failure to conduct adequate surveys to evoluote the extent of rodiction levels and potential hozords to workers conducting condensate pump vibration onofysis measurements within a High Radiction oreo in the Sec: OPS Sec: 3C Unit 1 Turbine Buildity was identified. The surveys reviewed failed to identify maximum contoct and gernrol Tec creo dose rates where specific work activities occurred. (VIO 9841-04)
A failure to follow procedure in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1 for entry into o High Radiation Area. was identified. Workers entered the creo and foiled to notify Heo!'h Physics of planned work activit'es.
No overexposures occurred. (VIO 98-01-06)
Item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 1G'01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 10 of 12 Date: 02/17/1999 -
, United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Tim.: iS 27:02 negion 1: PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Primary Functional Area -
Functional Template i Date Source Areo ID Type Cod:s item Description 33/21/1998 1998001 Pri PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 3A Numerous examples of poor facility housekeeping cleanliness and contamination contro! practices were 3,g. g. identified. Examples included use of protective clothing. cloth and paper coverolls, cloth liners, and rubber glovcs that were discorded outside of established collection receptocles. Discorded paper trosh was Tec observed. Abondoned tools and equipment that extended across established radiologicd control i boundaries were observed.
03/21/1998 1998001 Pri: PLTS8JP NRC WK Prl: 48 Brand Industrial Services Company silicone foam penetration seal designs were not supported by ovailable Sec: ENG Sec:4C guidance of NRC GL 86-10 for deviations from fire barrier configurations qualified by test results and Tec evoluotions.
03/21/1998 1998001 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 3A Poor supervisory oversight of chemistry octivities and poor chemistry interface with the operations deportment contributed to o failure to follow procedure during drywell sampling activities. Technicions Sec: OPS Sec: 3C completed on incorrect sample onolysis that was not questioned or reviewed by chemistry supervision.
Tec Procedures were not followed and operations personnel failed to question the sample results.
03/10/1998 1997012-07 Prl PLTSUP NRC V!O lV Prt: 3A A failure to follow procedure was identified for the failure to document release surveys. Also, o failure to
- g. g.~ dispose of licensed materio! in accordonce with 10 CFR 20.2001 (a) requirements, was identified. (VIO 97-12-07 and 97-1249)
Tec 03/10/1998 1997012 4 9 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri:98 Personnel who identified contominated material in the onsite landfill foHed to initiate o deficiency cord for the problem. This was not in occordance with site procedures.
See: OPS Sec: 3A Tec Operations foiled to submit a timely deficiency card for o frozen safety related nitrogen pres;ure control volve. Discrepont conditions of minor significonce were not consistently documented os deficiencies. (IR 98 44. 6/21/98) 03/10/1998 1997012-10 Pri PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri 3A The licensee failed to maintain decommissioning records in accordonce with 10 CFR 50.57 (g) requirements for contaminated material discovered in the onsite loMfill.
Sec: OTHER Sec:
Tec 02/07/1998 1997012 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 3A Licensee Health Physics technicions appropriately identified the disposal of licensed materiot in the onsite i
- g. g '. londfill as o deficient radiological condition. This concern was identified to supervisiors and !icensee monogement. however, the problem was not considered o deficiency and no deficiency card was Tec completed.
02/07/1998 1997012 Pri PLTSUP NRC WK Pri: 3A Technicions and monogement interpretations of radiation control procedural requirements were inconsistent g '. with respect to the procedural methods and equipment available for use to fdsk material prior to release Sec: 2B from o radiological controlled crea. The limited use of automated gomma-sensitive equipment to conduct Tec surveys of oggregate Unit 1 Rodwoste Building concrete debris released to the onsite landfdl was identifed as ,
o program weckness.
Itern Typs (Compliance, Followup.Other). From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
. Page: 11 of 12 Dole:02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Trn.: 15.27:o2 nemon n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX HATCH By Pnmary Functional Aroo -
Functional Template Dale Source Area ID Type Codos Hem Description 02/07/1998 1997012 4 8 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Prt 3A Fission product monitoring troubleshooting activities led by chemistry. with maintenance and operations personnel support was not wet planned or coordinated. As o result, personnel error led to a breach of I k 2B primary contoinrnent integrity when a monuoi volve that was required to be closed was opened Tec 12/27/1997 199;t)11 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR PrtIC The licensee's root cause analysis to identify causes of on increasing trend in worker contaminations and cmem ochomecommewm was opgWe. h WM MM M MWe oN m Sec: ENG Sec: SB maintenance performance teams recently implemented blurred the responsibilities for the rodlotion and Tec contamination cont ol programs, diluted worker accountability, and creott-d a fo!se sense of security among team workers. The licensee reorganized the teams.
12/27/1997 1997011 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 3A Profciency of chemistry technicions and rodwoste operators dunng the conduct of a Unit 2 liquid floor drain Sec: OPS Sec: 1C
' *'* "* " * ' 9"
- Tec 11/15/1997 1997010 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR Prt1C Review of protected and vital oreo requirements from 12/15/97 to 03/10/98 revealed that personnel, vehicle,
- g. g. and pockoge searches were correctly mode. Procedures were correctly used for these octMties. Vehicles were searched. escorted and secured os described in opplicable procedures. Perimeter fences were intact Tec and not compromised by erosion or disrepair. (TRs 9749, 97-10, 97-11. 97-12) 11/15/1997 1997010 47 Prk PLTSUP NRC NCV Prt IC Foiiure to have odequate surveillance procedures to meet Containment High Range Monitors calibration e s , w s MM Wwr oN & g &c@s ch M M' Sec: 2B Roentgens per hour were calibrated property.
Tec f
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item Type (Compliance, Followup.Other). From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: .12 of 12 -
Date: 02/17/1999 ~
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. nission Tim.: is 27m PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Prtrnary Functional Areo -
Legend Type Codes: Template Codes: Functional Areas:
BU Bulletin 1A Normat Operations OPS Operations CDR Construction IB Operations During Transients MAINT Maintenance DEV Dev.ation 1C Programs and Processes ENG Engineering eel Escolated Enforcement item 2A Equipment Condition PLTSUP Plant Support (FI inspector follow-up item 2B Programs and Processes OTHER Other LER Ucensee Event Report 3A Work Performones UC Licensing issue 3B KSA PESC Miscellaneous 3C Work Environment MV Minor Violation 4A Design NCV NonCited Violation 4B EnOineering Support NEG Negative 4C Programs orx1 Processes NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion SA identification NON Notice of Non-Conformance 5B Anofysis P21 Port 21 SC Resolution POS Positive ID Codes:
SGI Sofeguard Event Report NRC NRC STR Strength Self Self-Reveoled UR! Unresolved item Ucensee Uc m VIO Violation WK Weakness Eels are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escdoted enforcement action in accordance with the "Generd Stctement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600. However, the NRC hos not reached its find enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels ortd the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are mode.
UR!s are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is on acceptobie iterrt a deviction, o nonconformance, or o violation. A URI may also be o potentid violation that is not likely to be considered for escdoted enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its find conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the find conclusions are mode.
Itern Type (Cornpliance, Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
HATCH .;'
INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION TITLE / PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF PLANNED INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS i PROCEDURE / INSPECTORS DATES TEMPORARY i INSTRUCTION ,
73753/92902 in service inspection 1 April 1999 Core l
73743/92902 in service inspection 1 April 1999 Regional Initiative - Generic Concerns
- UT on Jet Pumps
- - FAR inspection 92903 Engineering Followup 1 April 1999 Regional Initiative to close previously opened electricalitems ,
83750 Radiation Protection 1 April 1999 Core t
81700 Security 1 May 1999 Core !
! t 84750/86750 HP & Chemistry 1 June 1999 Core !
93809 Safety System Engineering 4 June 1999 Core.
Inspection 83750 Radiation Protection 1 July 1999 Core j f
NUREG-1201 initial Examinations 3 October 1999 initial Exams for 12 candidates 84750/86750 HP & Chemistry 1 October 1999 Core 81700 Security 1 October 1999 Core t
82301/82302 EP Exercise 3 October 1999 Core ;
r 40500 Corrective Actions 3 October 1999 Core Cask Storage Facility inspection i 80853 Concrete Pour 1 April 1999 RegionalInitiative 60853 Crane Modifications 1 June 1999 Regionalinitiative !
Enclosure 2 ;
i !
INSPECTION TITLE / PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF PLANNED INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS.
PROCEDURE / INSPECTORS DATES "
TEMPORARY INSTP.UCTION 60853 Review Onsite Construction 1- July 1999 RegionalInitiative -,
81001 Review Security Upgrades 1 October 1999 Regionalinitiative 60854 Observe Dry Run Activities - Team October 1999 Regionalinitiative y f 60855 Observe Loading Activities 1 November 1999 RegionalInitiative ll ,
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Enclosure 2 ,
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