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_ amm Charl Barry gg p,,,.L,,,y g,y py, y,,gy, December 22, 1986 g Dr. Thomas Murley Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
Dear Dr. Murley:
I have enclosed for your consideration a copy of my report on the state of emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, which I presented to the Governor on December.16, 19E6. The report des:s comprehensively with the various facters that contribute to emergency preparedness including, l
plant management, reactor safety and emergency plans.
In his remarks to the Joint Committee on Energy on December 19, 1986 (copy enclosed), the governor accepted my finding that
, the current off-site radiological emergency response plans for l
the Pilgrim Nuclea- f aci.lity are inadequate and insisted that
! measures must be taken to address the deficiencies set forth in .
my report before any consideration is given to the restart of the plant.
1 I request that you review the enclosed report and advise me of your findings and the steps you intend to take in response, i i
Sincerely, i V.
Charles V. Barr Secretary of Public Safety CVB/cas 8712220237 871210 '
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REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS F v. .., .
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9 CHA?'_ES V. B A ?.F Y Secretary of Pet.:: S+.fsty
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l Date: December 16, 1966 1
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REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR AN ACCIDENT AT THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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.P_a g e I. INTRODUCTION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. B ACY.CRO U::D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. The Pilgrin Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 B. The Development of the Regulatory Frc.r.ework for Emergency Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 C. A History of Er.ergency Planning and Related Ir-. .*ior a- ? ! '. c r i - . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:
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i A. P;a .: Mana? rer.: Concernr. . . . . . . . . . . . 2; B. Siren, Alert an d !:oti f i est ion Systems. . . . . . 31 e.
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B. f;ature of E e gency Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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D. The Maf:: We s snc s. cf the Pilgri. P' ant. . . . . 47
- r. Pilgri : The Bescr. PcPulstion. . . . . . . . . . 45 T. Pilgr:r.: The ~ranrPort Dependent Pop;1ation. . . 5:
G. Corpleting the Procert of Formal Approval. . . . 54 y
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s k 2. INTRODUCT'OM l
The following report contains a history of the i
radiolog; cal er + r ge .c-; resper.ce plans for the Pilgrir. McC;es: i Power Plant, an analysis of the planning process, a critical i
assessnent of the strengths and weaknesses of the current l l
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plans, an identification of the areas where ir.proverer.ts are in l order, and recommendations f or : eacure: that can and should be l taken by federsi authorities, by the nuclent utility, and by ,
I state governnent to produce the best poscible plans.
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There are severs'. points conteined in this report that !
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irpart on erergency preps edr.e r. S e c t r.d , even in the case of 6 ... . .
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rega:re e-te, t'-e r e a r e c c r : e . ; :r.'rert ::sks in the' operation c .c :.......=.,.,
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that ':"os will not ce 1 ort in the event of a tagor accident.
I ma;or conrern :s that ee sre ur.sb'.e to Es; with certeinty or cven ressnnet'.e u ra r v :e t .n we wi:' 5;va sefficient tire i-whie. te evacaate or the reens to othe: wise protect pe op '. e bef ore radiation released d; ring an extrecely severe accident reaches populated aress.2 Third, and most troubling, the r:rk: we are s ,a r e cf ere n :t underst W we!' enoegt for st ne .
1 officials to cone:Jfe that they are acceptable or to:ctsr.;e. -
An eYpianation cf r:s. ara; iris and its uncertainties ir set 6"..
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For exanple, later in this report there is a discussion of a
( specific risk that exists dJo to the design features of the
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reactor containment at the Pilgrim Plant (so-called Mark I l Design). The MFC has deterr.:ned that in certain extre e'.y severe accident scenarios, this design could result in the rapid I
l overpressurization of the reactor's containment and a release of radiation. The NRC staff has proposed some modifications and l
l procedures to " mitigate" this risk, but the Commission has not yet decided whether to mandate these improvements. The ]
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industry has also acknowledged that the problem exists, but there it no uniforr ani firm position on receiring new systems 7.. -: ; - :. . y . - - ,
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T *. e T : an" the ind;ctry appear content to rest er the 1
belief that the probability of a severe accident is so low that
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( it is not necessary tc mandate new hardware or new procedures. l i
i:. :: re r ._ :---e-Je q n. :'iratior. of t .s r:r.ari. if l
l re'. w tt ec.nfiden:c on t he ':PC 's vi 4w .
see" that we c5-T. r s ; ,0 : i o r.: sto;; t's Icw pr:bability of a rumber of differer.:
risks underlie the M C's appresch to resetor safety. Yet, p. 3 long as there cor.t.nues to be vigorous debate abo;t the validity of the. 2 a .e ; r t . : . r , .: ts not poscib'.e for the state te assert 1
i unqus! fici25 that emergency response plans can be tots 11y effective in protectir.g the health and safety of our residents.
As you, Governor, pointed out in your remarks before the Sur : r-i t tee On T r.o r ;y Cons e r vat ion ar.i Power of the United 1 S c a t es Ccr.g r ess on 'Jover.be r 15, 1926, " Emergency plans do not
- rake a nac: ear p; ant. safe. A safe nuclear r] ant is a plant s - _ J
where accidents do not happen because of superior design, g
c on st r uction, management and maintenance."
We have learned from direct experience that given enough tine, r a cy c e t.p '. e car be safa:y evacuated out o' an area of real or potential danger. Yet the lessons we have learned fror these experiences do not provide assurance that in the event of a nuclea r poser plar.t accident recuiring evacuation, there car. be a saf e evacuation of all the people in the Pilgrim EPZ ares, or in areas outside the EPZ that may be affected.
Bef ore we can offer reasonable assurances about the e f f ect i ver.e s of ary Off-site energer.cy p:ar.s, we nust have (1) l
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6 conditions , and (2) reator.atly accorate estimates of the i a .ou .: of time bef ore there woa:d be an off site release of '
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The f1!ct ite~ ; E O ~ 9 0 ' i ". 9 th9 C U ! ! e r.t p '. i r.s p r e .e e r.t l y l a r '< . :Ic <:e ve r , Bocton ~di or 'ac centracted with M*D Acsocistes tc rroiuce a r.ew ETE arf Traffic Mins;erent P:an. The secor.5 2 . a. . ,
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Cer :ssicr. er Borter E?.s.. have oeen willing to provide. Tire and tir.e again, re.rresentatives of the Nuclear Regulatory j Com-ission ari the ut: lit *, have reported that (1) the 1:ke'. hoc? cf ; ceri^;- 5 :: i 'e r.: w . t 'r c f ' -i te release :: verj low a r.3 (2) in a;] prebar:lity, there wo;16 be days or weeks -
r.o: ice befere an at idert c.J16 presure a substantial of' site
C releace of radiation.~ Neither the industry nor federal regulations, however, will provide these assurances in terme that would enable the scientific community to put them to the test. !:e ve r t he l e s s , the c".ief eserc.ene .clanning guide .icin 1v .
developed by the NRC and FEMA (a document known as NUREG 0654) states that a major off-site release of radiation can occur within 30-60 ninutes of an accident. See NUREG/0654 at 13 (1950). Without a site specific off-site release time for a nuclear power plant, state planners can do no better than to l assure the public that we have deveJoped the best possible l
1 e ergencA> p3.=ns.
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- a d a lea?.erc.-!p :t;e i- the effert tc es;: atter. tier at t r. e national level to the safety and health problem: facing the j concercial nuclear p .>e- i r. d u s t r y , obs=rved during his
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chou 26 ca "a regelaticr ibv *:? - or FI"Ai defining t he' r.i r. i ma l l y 1
a ccep t a ble cor.di t ior.s necersary to justify the operatior cf ;
l l nuclear plar.t wit" resrect to energency preparedness. Ir. other words, no one can say under what condittor.s NRC would shat dcwn a p:=-t Idue :: "sf;cienrie.e in the e ergency p'.ancl."9 Che 1
l absence of such a regulat;0n also means that no one can say what 6egree of protection from the health effects of radiation exposure are afforded by the energency plans.10 The reco- erdat: -
0.ts nei ;- t ' t .- rep--t, enor te .,
will incare that our erercency plans are the best possible 1 r:are. However, ir vie. Of the risk.- that federal officisin i
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and industry repr ese r.t st ives concede currently exist -- namely, s
i that at leas *. in some re'.'ere accidant reensrior there asy be a significant off-site release of radiation from the plant wi t hi e.
10-60 rinu*er of an .' n c : i e *. , t i.e re ir no e ergency r a rp e r.c e plan that can guarantee that lives will not be lost or persons will not suffer severe adverse health effects.
II. BACKGPOUND The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant is located 35 miles southeast of Boston in Plymouth, Massachusetts. It is a sing 2e-ur.it, 1990 Mw (total) or 655 MWe (net) General Electric boilir.; water reactor p:ar.t owr.ed and operated by the o cston r_. ... . - . . . . .
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te a failed valve. As a result of a Confirc.ation of Action
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. :2 reactor in which the water fed to the reactor core bcilt right there in the r eact o r vecc:-1 and then passes as steam directly out to the turbine-generator where its energy is converted to
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returned to the reactor as f eed ' ate r . Figure I shows a sic.p'.e -
rehe.atic of a c '. ? p l a r. * . '. , e reccior is enclosed in a special
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containment structure. The feedwater enters and the steam
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leaves this containment structure through multiple, large diameter pipes equipped with redundant valves which can be el ,se 3 in an ecerger.:y. I .; the precsure cueprescion containment, which is used in all large U.S. BWRs, a very large ;
quantity of water, up to one million gallons, is stored in a sp'ecial compartment of the containment called the suppression pool. P.any auxiliary and erergency cooling systems are provided to pump cooling water i nto th_ reactor and to cool the containment atnosphere and its suppression pool. If a pipe )
breaks by accident, the cor.tair. ment closer to isolate the
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.; sy: cre are es.:+i 1 . : o ; '. 3 - tc c s1 :e : :- a : . c r e r. d the suporessicr. po:1, reroving the stored er.ergy and heat generated by radioactive decay."
"! .;: .+ E '. ' ;r ar .: - siste- r e rc . r ., Isrge q;s titier of er.ergy to nearty equiprer.: which, in emergencies, converts )
to a c '. c r e i syster, rarical_ , relying or, ex.er.a: cooling of the cer.tainrent to rerote the bottled-up energy. The rost cor cr. type of pressure s ppreccion containment in the U.S. is the M.s"% ! t y p e s 'r :*.:- .r FigJre 2, which is used in the 24 'J . S .
D'. R s listed in Tatle 3. r.e reactor is contained in the drywell portion of the cor.tainment, shaped like an electric light bulb standing upcide down. The suppression poc!
pirt. ally f:lis a terc;it: sh?] aroJr.d the b3Se Of the 'bulo' and a series of ducts is ir.ctalled to guide stear. and other -
releases into the r;;rreesi>n peo: which quer.ches the steam and m .e
I also abcozos mucn of the radioa:tive material (except gases)."
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P. The Mvelopment of the Reculatory Freework for Emeroency P l a n :i n e, In 1F2, at the tine Pi.lgr:m went "on-line", the utility w a. . .
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- d. r of f-site radiation releases and for notifying federal, state and loca! governments designated in its energency plan in the event an er.ergenef was declared. i;hile federal, state and locs age.cies we re retror. sib 1c for off-site response to radiation release, there was no requirement of an off-Site emergency or evacuation plan.
Prior to the : 979 accident at Three Mi!e I s l a r.d , the I;RC
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r a d i u s c or.t a i n i n g " resider.ts, the total nurber and density of w ". ." c " a . e. .e . '.. * ".. . . = . *
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occurred. A P.C n g t h e P .$ J; fi.iings of the V.ereny Co".iirsiCn,
- .c5 .:n appoi.ted b y P re r d er.t Carter to stu?y the accident, .
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local of ficials in deve2oping, reviewing anc drilling emergency plans "was insuf ficient to enrure an adecuste leve] of preparedness for a
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- 2. The Cc: n i s -i a", fou.! that it ton ove- two isyn for of ficials to determine and understand the true -
r.sture of tha occiient even though !;FC cfficials v+re e r. site w;thi n hours cf the declaration of a *
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- 3. Communications between on site URC persennel and
, the agency's. senior management were so poor for 2 I
1/2 days that senior NRC personnel were-unable to obtain a clear understanding of what.was taking place at the site. This led to a recommendation by senior fRC personnel for evacuation that was bored on inecr z dato and invalid information. Id. --
The Kemeny Commission also made a number of specific l recommendations concerning erergency planning and response.
Chief anong these was that federa] coordination of energency ,
planning should be carried out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency-(FEMA) and that FEMA should review and approve an emergency resper.se plan for any state with a nuc3 ear power plant before the utility is granted an operating
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the state must effectively coordinate.its planning with the utility and with local officials in the ares where the plant is to be located;
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g TE:.A. S t r : c t. iead;in+s m;rt be es:ac sshed to s '.1 local corrunities should have fur.ds and technical sJppert adacaste for preparing the kinds of p;ar.s des: rice 3 chove.
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- r. resp:nse to the FO eny Conniscion r e comr.e n da t ic r.s I
regarding off-site p:arr.irg, Presider.t Carter israed ar executive order late in 1979 charging FEMA with responsibility )i fer represen-i-, t'.c P r e t t ie r. t in worki.9 with stete ar.i locs; gcVernrents on er.ergency preparedness programs. Exe:ative Or?er Mo. I2343 (1979). A l'eroranium of Understanding between i
FEMA and the NFC scan fo: lowed under which FEMA would prcvide i
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the NRC with an evaluation of off-site plans anC make expert 3
witnesses available to t'.e URO. For its part, without delegating its "respor.sibility for protecting the radio'ogical health and cafcty cf the pchlic," the UFC agreed to review FEMA's findings and determinations in order to certify the "overall state of emergency preparedr.ess" prior to issuance of an operating license. See 45 Fed. Register 82713 (1980).
There developmen'.s ?ed to a fundamental change in the regulatory framework for the licensing of nuclear power plants. Prior to Three !';1e Island, it was assured that p l a r. :
hariware alor.e was adec;ste to protect the public. In Israing
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not adecuate. Ersrger.cy response plar.s developed by state ar.d l 32 k local officials were deered " e s p e r. t i a l " . - ~ Under 10 CFR l S ' ; r ' i r. - :s nice . : <c ':C tr3 t '.e r e ir r e a:c r.n:le' a sc ; r ar.ce l
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event of a radiolo ; cal e r .: r g e r.c y . " ~
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- the NRC is to be based on FEMA's I u t .: ,2
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emergency p]ar.s are afeguate and whether there is reasonable ascurance that thcy can ce irplenented...." 10 CFR Section I i
50.47(a)(2). Tris f i n d i r.g by FEMA "will primarily be based on I 3 review of the I'. ara" ar- "!a]ry o:Fer ir.formtion s'. ready available to FEMA." 15 The FEMA finding is entitled to a ~
" rebuttable presu~rticr" of vslidity tefore the NRC. Ii.
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The FEMA review process is set forth in 44 CFR Section
'T' 350.7. The process begins when the governtr, or his designated representative, sends a letter to FEMA accompanied by the state plan and p'.ans for "a:1 appropriate loca: governr.ents." 44 CFR Section 350.7(a). The application letter must contain a statement that they are " adequate to protect the health and safety of its citizens living within the emergency planning zones...." 44 CFR Section 350.7(d)(1985). Following this i
j submission, a review by FEMA's Regional Director and Regional Assistance Cor.mittee tak.es place (RAC - a tean composed of representat;ves of nir.e different federal agencies). This must
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7: 3-- 3n: ,,5::- :ne pur;;c cf ehat r a ,. ce exte.::ed cf .t as we:2 as jcir.: exercise with " fall participation of appropriate local government entities, the S:ste ar.d the appro,criate 3icensee." 44 CFR Sect.c- 3E .L: s .: - .
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a "detai2ei review" of the p:ans. 44 CFR Sectica i
350.S(d)(19EE). T.e State ray arend its plan basei en these conter.ts before prc eciir; f ;r t he r . 44 CFR Section 350.8Iet(1055). T -/ St ;e av arend its p22n at any ti-e. 44 l
CFR Section 350.24'a)(1935). The plans, along with a written record consisting of the Regional Director's report and any comments by the state are then forwarded to FEMA's I;ational Associ3 e Direc:sr for 5;c "ny;ew. 44 CFR Sectior.
350.11(c)(19E5). I' tne Arsociate Director approves the plans
- they are forwarded t o t he ::RC. If approval is withheld, the l
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1 Associate Director may call for revisions. The Associate
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Director is erpowered to withdraw a plan at any time if he finds it is "no longer adequate." 44 CFR Section yu n, . . . ( a ) ( :.. r. :. ). .
The standards employed by the NRC in making the ultimate determination that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken are set forth in 10 ,
l l
CFR Section 50.47(b)(1) through (16) ar.d 10 CFR Part 50 I i
Appendix E. These standards are reproduced in Appendix One to j this Report.
These standa rds are explained in a 1950 gui?.ar.ce document
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Preparati;r A r. d Ivs:.at;cr Oi Radio: 07ical E.erger.cy Resp;rre Plar.s Ar.d Preparedness In Support Of Nuclear Power Plants,"
!:JEEG 0654/TE"A-REP-1 (19E0). This is the basic document usef
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p ; a r. licensee ererger. y p15ns and preparedr.ers.
C. A u i s t o r v_ of E - c r e e r. V Plan *:inc_ at P i l c_ r i r .
On Noverccr 25, 19'9, shortly after the report of the Kemen, C orr. i s s i e r. , ererger.cy legis'.3 tion was er. acted j i
establishing a 10 cile Erergency P!ar.ning tone (EP2) under i
Massachusetts law a r. d imposing on the Director of Massachusetts Civil Defence the responsibility to annually publish and review RE?P elans in cor.lunctier. with lors o'f: cia'.s and the public.
St. 1979, c. 796, Section 24. The first full set of such plans was delivered to FE.".A i n De :er.be t , 2979.
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On June 16, 1961, the King Administration certified and I submitted the pilgr:r Plans to FEMA for formal approval under 44 CFR Section 350.7. On October 8, 1981, FEMA's Regional Assistance Concittee ( R F. 0 ) publ.rhed its review of the p: ant.
The Committee reported twenty four pages of comments. Most of the conments were prorptly addressed by Massachusetts Civil !
Defense. In several instances, however, concerne identified daring the 1981 RI.0 review renain as problems today and, as we recommend in Part V of this report, should be addressed immediately. These include the following:
- The need to include written agrecrents in the plans with 5
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ider.tified 6 6 r t 2 ; ~ ". (- rer Jice (9.g., redicil services, la' c orator:es, bus companies, reception, l
relCeation and dectrtsrination Centers, etc.)
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trantror; d e c e r.d e n ,r.:F;.stions including school children, the har.di:Srpe: and nursing homes re.Tidents.
- The need to specif- n re clearly resources and new procedures reg;;re' fr iecontar.ination.
- The need to dererr;r.c and provide for the trainir.g needs of emergency respcnse personnel.
- The need to engage in a quarterly updating of all t e l e p ho r.e r.unc e r s , e er;<ncy personnel ani ;ocations in the plans. -
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These are all basic objectives that should have been s
achieved by now. Historically, the Civil Defense Agency has 1acked the resources required to accomplish the objectives. On a nurber of oceesici.s over the years, Civil Defense has requested support from FEMA and from BECo in accordance with federal regulations. These efforts led to a consultant being made available to the Department of Public Health and one planner teing made available to Massachusetts Civil Defense supported by utility company grants to the Massachusetts Health Pesearch Institute, Inc. However, in view of the fact that P.aseschutetts Civil Defense has to coordinate planr.ir.g ftr
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Plyrc;;h, ". : . a r. 0 Ve r r. c r. , Vt.) ar' u r. t : 1 2.,t r i l , 1936 war involved in plar.ning ac::vities for the Seabrook Power Plant, the rescurces r.ide available to the agency have been totally
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ti e to ti c to r e r .:e s support fro. ut:lity comparies on terms i
that have prover u r.s a t i c f a c t o r y . For exanple, cons;1tants who were assisting C;v;l Dafense on the Seabrook pro:ect had to !e notifiad that the;r service; were no '.onger requ: red because their conruiting firm whs found to be coing other work for 1 PJblic Service Company of I;ew Hampshire. For these reasons, we strongly recom end an upgrading of the planning resources ava;1acle to C2vil Defense a r. 3 the Depart.ent of Puclic Hea*.th by establish;ng a Technological Hazards Division supported ti -
assecsing nuclear ut:litiec on an a.nual baris. We are 3-
1 1
prepared to initiate this recommendation immediately by an i j administrative order, but believe legiciation is appropriate to .
~
insure continued funding. This proposal is explained further i n 1.ppe:ii x Two. In vie of the preesir.g need for such a unit, it would be appropriate for BECo to help inaugurate this program by making a voluntary contribution in accordance with 6
federal guidelines. Sae Part V of this Report.
Following the 1981 PAC review, there were a number of
" interim findings" made by FEMA as a result of periodic exercisen that were conducted in which state and local emergency plans were tested and evaluated by a team of federal
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. re p .se e> e r cise . Or Septe-ber 29, 1952, it was reported that "[A}1though deficiencies are noted below, the Interic F i n d i r. ; of rEMA is that the state p'an and .
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that renain c:ncerns t ci a '; are inadequate plar.s for relocating "special r.eeds" p e rip ' e and too infrequent revision of t e l e p h o r.e nuncers.
T'.e r. ext fed +rs'.ly supervised exercise of the plans took I place on Jur.e 29, 1982. Again, Lore deficiencies were r.o:ed.
1 However, in its fir.a1 report, FEMA found that the plans satisfied all applicable federal requ:rerents and that i Prev ously identified def c;anc es ha d been 'co r rec t ed . )
On July 20, 1963, ti.e ':stsachuce:ts Public Interest - A Fesearch Group (MASE ?O) p; 51 : s h c i a report entitled i.
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, " Blueprint For Chaos II" and filed a petition with the NRC challenging the adegusey of the Pilgrim Plans, callir.g for a lj
- i shutdown of the plant by the NRC, and proposing the
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establishment of a p;bli: emergency planning commission at the state level. The MASSPIRG report made five basic claims: (1) that advance public information and education was lacking, (2) notification procedures for use during an accident were faulty, (3) the crergency plans were faulty because the evacuation time i estimates calculated by the utility were unreliable, the mobility impaired population was not properly provided for and recaired letters of agreement were lacking, (4) nedical s '"
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10 mile EP: :s too s a'.1.
A response to the MASSPIRG report was published by FEMA on
':ovember 3, 1962. Th s rerponse noted that " w)5ile MASSP:RG rsi:es a n rer of g :5 r:;-.s, after 3 detailed ans'y:is, we .
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C o r .o n .;e s l t h of Mss. esc',; etts has demonstrated that there ;z reasencnle escarance that the pub:ic would be adecuately protected if there were an a c c i de r.t at the Pilgrim Power statier." 11. at 1-2. ~he FEMA report added that, of the 73 deficiencies centioned in FEMA's 1952 Interir Findings, 13 were considered significant. Of I tnese 13, only I rensins outstanding today and is ine i the process of being corrected. The significant de f ici(:ncy is in the area of evacuation transportation c' t *e r er: .. r.e e d s r : ,r . '. s t i o n . However, we were able to cenc1Jfe that the pub 1:c would be protected because of overs 11 state sbility including being able to organize resources on an ad hoc basis.
- _I_d. at 12.
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Frankly, this issue regarding the evacuation of'the mobility l
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g impsired remains a serious concern that has not teen. resolved. It is our recommendation that Civil Defense, after conculting with local efficials and state agencien suc% as the Office of Handicapped Affairs and the Commission for the Blind, as well as .
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l local advocacy groups, produce a work plan for the development of I
special implementing procedures for the evacuation of the mobility impaired. Civil Defense has already initiated this. process.
The next significant event took place on August'15, 1984 when FEMA conducted an off-site drill at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. .By letter dated September 24, 1924,' FEMA informed Martir .:rst*z . . :<.fc r- t .a - 't .a d .r - yet reco;ved t.e correct;ve acticr.r in respense to the 2923 exercise and that these responses were required in order to further process the 1981 application for formal approval of the plans under 44.CFR Section
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has fir. ally ecap;eted the cenetruction an3 outfitting of a new EOF effective June, 1956. An evaluation of this facility, as part of an MRC sponsorei exer:ise, took place on December 10, 1986. A l finsi report is not expected for 6-8 weeks. Our Civil Defense Agency w:11 also issue an evaluation of this exercise. However,-
the exercise does not provide a basis for assessing the. adequacy _
of the energency response plans. 1 1
By letter an$ repcrt dated June 20, 195~, massachusetts Civil 4
Defense responded to FEMA questions arising out of the 1982, 1963'
- I and 29E4 exercises. Civ;; Defense noted, however, that a shortage t
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of rescerces did not permit it to complete its response to the 1951 RAC review cor.ments and that it would endeavor to do so by
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means of 1985 r e vi s i o r.s to the state, area and local plans. In Mey an; Jui.e of 1925, reviaed state and local plans were.
published by Civil Def ense and distributed to federal, state and local of ficials.1 These plans represent the current RERP plans in force for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant.
1 On September 5, 19E5, FEMA and the NRC observed the third and most recent full scale exercise of the pilgrim plar.s. On October 29, 1925, a r e r.edi al exercise was conducted by FEMA to co r r ect def i c i er.c i es regariir.g the er.erger.cy operations cer.ter
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a;r.tcr Recepticr. C e r.: e r . F E :' A ' s c c r.c '. u s i e r. , wh;ch reprcser.ts its most recent official assessment of the plans was as follows:
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..e Correct;ve Actior ar" the or.e Area Recorrerded for I r.p r o v e r e r.t .r. Carver were also addressed and corrected. j In cor.clusion, there is reasonable assurance that appropriate ress;res car be taken off-site in the e v e r. t of a ra- 'c:ical emer ency to adequately protect the putlic hesith and safety.
Or. Oct obe r 30, 1955, FEMA wrote to Massachusetts C;v;l
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Defense once again concerning formal approval of the plans and
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l raterial callei for i r. the 1951 ar.d 1932 ?A reviews. FEMA 1
also recuented copies of 19:- revised plar.s. These pler.2 were t
ade avsilable te Fr"' d;ri-a *"e .
Err'.=~ber 19E! exercise, but 4 f
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i' evidently were not formally delivered until June,'1986. On g June 6, 1986 Civil Deferre responded to FEMA and it.dicated that .
t work remained to be done to prepare the plans for the formal review, end that a lac <. of r2 oarces was ir.peding progress.
i The above historical note establishes the need, beyond any doubt, for additional resources in the area of planning development and maintenance within our civil defense and_public health agenciec if we are to cceply_with the requirements of federal regula~tions as well as state law. In order to complete the case for the planning initiative we recommend.in Part V of this report, I have ine;uied a badget narrative ar.alyzing the
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In addition, it is oc: recom endation that a work plan be i
prc p+.:y develcred cy Cf.';; Defense detailing a:tira tatie for correr. --
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revie.: and c;r evs:ua:. r prior to the plant's scheduled da:e.
for restart. :: shou:6 he noted, however, that FEMA officials have stated en r re than one occasion that although completion of the ferr.a; review process is desirable, it produces .o 1
l ressursble gsir in ter s cf public safety fror'that-which would 1 l
be achieved by carrying out the current emergency response I plans.18 It is our rece- endation, however, that we should .
1 strive to r;%e avery i.pr;/erent that car. he ievised in the )
emergency response plan. ,
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On July 15, 1966, a number of the Massachusetts stste legis:atort and MASSP:F3 filed a petition wirt the NRC
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recue: ting that EECo's operating license be suspended until it c a n der.an st r a t c- t h s : it hs. t/crec.e a vsriety of a:1eged safety concerns. In particular, the petition cites license management problems, problers with the design of the G.E.
reactor containment at Pilgrim, and problems with the emergency plar.s, all of which are discussed in later secticas of this P.eport. These problems are essentially a repetition of concerns voiced by MASSP:PG in 1983. We have covered the i .e s u e s raised by the show-cause petition in this report.
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On August 27, 19E6, Dr. Thomas E. MJrley, Regional A4-inistrator fcr M F. : Fegio. I, wrote to Boston Edison Cor. pan, a . . ". " .- ^. v. d a. .'. .' u r *.'..c.
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ev.pectc5 to be ret before the plant would be perritted to restart. Dr. Murley advised Boston Edison Company in part as followc: j r
": . :::P* of t'.e r.; ner and sco-c of the ou+.stanii-~
irecee, ! En -^t r.r e .r a r e " to sr rov.e_rastart of the . .
P 29r: P faci.'ty u r. t : 1 vou prev 3e a wr:tten reecrt
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readiness for rertart operat on. Inis assessment
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l resolved and that p '. a n t systens have been restored and prepare'd for'creration. A formal restart progrec and
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schedule should also be submitted for NRC review and approval. This program should include hold points at.
appropriate stages such as criticality, completion'of code switch testing, and at sper:f ic milestones during ancencion to fu'l power. Aut".orization to proceed beyond-each ho"d point will be contingent upon my approval and will be based on my staff's evaluation of a the operational performance of the plant. . We will l have substantially augnented URC inspection coverage durina this restart period. q l;
Planre plan to submit vour readiness acsessrent and 1 rectsrt progran and schadale at least fortv-five days 1 before your p'anned ster:co fror the currer.t outace. !
My decision on restart will be based in part.on our 1 review of these documents."
On September 9, 1986 and Nover.ber 18, 1956, Boston Edison n._.....
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Mar:ey an6 the deveicpmer.: ci :ts readi ness assessment and restart program. My staff attended these hearings'and will
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December, ry staff alcr.; with the C;vil Defence Agency has had 1
narero;3 neetings w.ti :.e ererger.cv c '. a . . n n i n c.
staff at BECo. to I ravie. the isscen that are the cubject of this report. The
- ecults of these meeting are d;scussed in later sections of :
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D . . r_ S S Erergnr.") prer5refnest f or a nue: ear power plant accident is a complex phenomen:n that is a function of plant dec:gn, rsi a nt management, techne ogy, resources and preparation.
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Federal law piaces the states in a difficult position because i 'e are responsible for protectinc public health and insuring public safety, but have virtually no control over the ta r.a g e c e n t or technc:ogy facter; involved in the operation of commerciel nuclear power plants, and are forced to depend on federal regu]ators to establish and enforce adequate safety standards.
There is arp: 0 evidence that the Pilgrim utility, Boston Edisen Cocpany, has repeatedly failed to demonstrate that it is capa::e of properly managing the plant. There is also some basis for questio.ing t'-e com~itment by the !;uclear Re:u:atory t....
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Therefore, although this report is concerned principally wl.th cuestiens cor.cerri.? rascurces and preparation, i.e. energency
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" ?. : or :be Jr.; eu 5:n e Congres; may w:sh to exp'. ore further.
A. ?: a .t Merage-ont cc-ce--e.
In ter~s of p: art m a r. a g e r e r. t , we are grave'.y concerned arou: r e ve '. a t i o n: cor.ce r ni r.; poor r.a na gement practices by Poston Editor. Corpsny (hereafter 9ECo). On t'.ay 22, 195?,
fluelear Regulatory Commission of ficials testified bef ore Congre.es that Pilgri~ is one of the worst run nuclear power p1;nts in the Jni ei St ner. ~h s statenent was e.ade in responte to a cuestion by Pepresent at ive Edwa rd !!a rkey, chsirran of t'.e t Fabconnittee on Energy Conservation and Power.
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i This revelation was supported by the February 18, 1986 NRC t Report on Pilg rim known as a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Pe r f o rma r.ce (SALP No. 50-293/55-99), that eva]uated on-site activities at Pilgrim Poser Station from October 1, 1984 to-October E,.1985. Although overall performance was rated
" acceptable," the utility was cited f or " marginal performance" 4 i
in the areas of operations, maintenance, radiological controls and emergency preparedness. In f act, in the areas of Plant Operations, Radiological Cor.t rols and Energency Preparedness, BECo was given a Category 3 rating, the lowest of three possible ratings (under the NPC's definition, Category 3 means
" v e a < .e.~ ce s a r e +; ic-.; '. . o r. s c e r: :;rce arpetr to be strained or not eiiert.ce:/ used se that r.inima'ly sat; factory .
pe r f ormar.ce wi t h respect to operational safety is being achieved.")
A :c ri. .g t. ':F : Fe;.-.. ::reet:- Dr. Chc t2 ' ; r '. s y , vnt e-- - ; *e.-r .: ar -
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t .- J Report, l "Du r i n g its review, the S A* P Boa r 5 f our.d a rec a r r e r.t there of :nsdegaate personnel staffing and inadequate supervisory oversight at the plant. A specia'. cor.cern we have is with regard to the chronic shortage of licensed reactor operators and the routine exceeding of NRC overtime guide'.ines.
Tne enclosed review of SALP history for Pilgrim shows a pattern of perforr.ance that raises other questions. For instance, the areas of operations a r.i :sii+'.c:: s1 ee-trt'.s have shswn ester. tis:;y no improvement o v.n the years. In other areas, sach as maintenance, surveillance and energencv Prepa r ed ne s s , there have been improvements f o!! owed ty a r::rr.ge back to the l o w e.r level of performance :n later fesr=" (erpnasis addedJ. .
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Following the SALP Report, eight members of the NRC Region I team conducted a special safety inspection of operational and other activities at Pilgrim between February 18 and March 7, 1936. lheir i r.cp e c t i on report ("o. 50-293/S6-06), which was released on April 2, 1986, found "no evidence that the plant i
i was being operated unsafely", but identified four weaknesses "that are inhibiting progress": "(1) incomplete staffing, in particular operators and key mid-level supervisory personnel, 1
(2) a prevailing view in the organization that the improvements made to date have corrected the problems, (3) reluctance, by r a n a g er.ent , to acknow'. edge sor.e problems ider.tified by the ::P.C ar $ '4' derend?nce -
t :" p3--ier t- .do-t.'; rror:e s r =. - h + r t h a r. ir.plerenting ar effect:ve progrs- for s e '. f - : d e n t i f i c a t i o r of weaknesses."
l ( In addition, t'-are .ere repcrts in June, 1986 that BEcc ha d c.,...=.=. .--=..:....-
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s l Sacsequent tests have s 'r : w r t ..a t scre of the previcasly 1
i untested valves have excessive leakage beyond regulatcry j j star.iards. Or June 24, 1956, it was reported that "!a]n ala -
l l that warns crerstors when voltage levels are too low to run emerger.cy syster.s war due to be tested in January or rebreaty, but plant operators forget...." These findings constitute or.ly a few exarpler of syster.atic failings by BEco's nanagerent which have persisted for the past seven years.
It was against this backdrop of chronic management and 1
safety problers e P. c ir the operation of its nuclear l I
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facility that we received the 300 page, June 26, 1986, report i
e by the Department of Public Utilities that charged that "in short [BEco) management has ceased to manage in defiance of its publ;c serv;ee obligstion."
Further support for the view that BECo has suffered from a management crisis of najor proportions comes from an independent industry source. The Institute of Nuclear Power Opera *. ions (:NPO), an industry based professional organization, conducted an onsite evaluation of Boston Edison Company's Pi2 grim Nuclear Power Station during the weeks of October 21 l
and 2S, 19E5. The II:PO repcrt and two previous IMPO
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evaluation took place while the plant was operating at full
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Aren; c:her things, the 1955 IMPO report contains the follo ing " findings" that are relevant to BECo's r.anagement of l
Pilgrim:
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- Station go;1s and cc:ect;vez are not always ured to effectively focus efftrts on areas needing improvements.
l - Managers and supervir rs do not always provide I
a f.e T2 s t e 3 ;i ? a r. : e and ?;rection to ensure
- Sp r ove. .cn t s ;n rt; tion perforx.ance.
- :ncreased effort i .- r.eeded to ensure correctior of r e e ng r. i z e d 2cng-:*and; g probler.s.
t, l
- Ge neral . pl ant housekeeping needs upgrading.
- Additional ef f ort is needed to improve' industrial safety practices and conditions.
- Sore probleme occerved by nuclear operators and quality program personnel that are not related'to spwific regulatory compliance requirements. are of ten not reported to appropriate levels of management.
- Maintenance seper risors need to be more involved in directing and monitoring shop and work site activities.
- Many significant plant material problems.have not been identified and documented on maintenance requests.
- Maintenance activities frequently are not conducted
-in accordance with. good maintenance practices.
- A f:r 1 trs; .i .g pr::r:- i:r chor : s t r y p e r c ent.s '. n a .-
r.:: teer ir.cler+n:+;.
- Sigr.ifican; prcb'. ems continue to exist in the. ,
radiological protection in areas such as radiation exposure reductior., radioactive waste minimization and contamination contrci.
- TA ?.a 2 ; : ; ; r a '. :::;rrer. e ?cror: (?"?) S/ete- : .=
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7 .
- ~,e sist.:r. na: . .= : ::nc.t:er, .j ;;r an .; i:
Colle: ;Ve r a d ; 1 *. ; c r expo 3Jre.
- The vo'_ur.e cf solid radioactive waste is not being minimized. Additiena'.ly, not,all radioae::ve waste is being checked for liquids prior to off site disposal.
i
- Additional attention to decontamination efforts' is needed to achieve control of centaminaticn at its sources.
- Station and construction workers frequently do not adhere to radiological procedures.
a The chemistry q;;1ity control prograr. does not enc;re j the accurac- ; of analytics1 results. !
1 A periodic effectiveness review of the operating I experience prograr is not performed.
t l
-;i-l
i t
The IMPO report contains the following qualification. "Tne recommendations in each area are based on best practices, rather than mininum acceptanie standards or requirements.
Accordingly, creas where inpr';vements are recor. mended scc not necessarily indicative of unsatisfactory performance."
Nevertheless, the INPO report identified a series of what can j l '
only be described as serious concerns in the area of plant managerent and operation that could precipitate or coeplicate a severe accident. BECo has reported that it is in the process of addressing each one of INPO's concerns. See Appendix eight.
l T '- i s 3itan, cf ranacement failings by DECO has a di rect l
l
-==~. - i e-~ cr ~be m :-
c' c~cr-<~L 7 - r 7 : r e 5 .e - . ': c ratte r 5. r ar- i ;r: ce e . s sy be ~2de :- t '- a off-site emergency plans, outlic safety is at risk as 1cnc as BECo O
perfc -e at su bs t s r.d a r i er a ;i.s: 2 c v e l .e in tar s of its l
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P'.ync :b a r. d D .:tu ry ::;ssa:h _ s et ts and elsewhere earlier tais year. Boston Edison Compsr. has appeared on these occasions to answer questior.: fro the pJctic. The corpar**'s response to
, )1 l
the hnst of msnagemer.t prob'.e s referred to above was basically 1
l the sare as the resss?e de../:> red to Congressman liarkev.'s Committee on July 16, 1986 b'; Mr. Stephen J. Sweeney, President and Chief Executive Officer of BECo. fi r . Sweeney's statement l
cou3ht to answer the central cuestion in this controversy - why should Bos:on Edison be te:ie/ed tajay g;ven the problems over )
the years at P- 3 9 tin St at :cr ?
s
-1i-I
Mr. Sweeney's answer was as follows:
"It is perhaps the mest difficult question and.can
~
on]y be answered fu1]y by performance over time. But l in closing I weald underscoreLtwo-najor differences I today from the past. The first is our forceful I acceptsoce of the need far us'to meaccre our performance against an ever increasing set of1 standards set by those plants. judged by the industry and the NRC to be among the best.
The secon3 is the fact thtt we have adopted the basic principles and criteria for good nanagement that are-applied to the nuclear Navy. They are the same principles and criteria that are in evidence at all of
~
the top rated plants."
In particular, Mr. Sweeney identified four specific initiatives that BEco.had undertaken to correct the most recent p n:e r ;iertifie: t; t'- '3 . "hese werc riated r*; Mr.
S .:e e r. e - as iD.:cus:
- 1. "Staffi. - A comprehensive staffing review has been completed by the Company. All but one of the key positions identified in the SALP report have been filed. He h3ve identifiei other needs and the ccmpany
- s exre?itt.; t>e '- - -
cf these petple. :t ' w3:
c:c ar to _s t'.e .- :4 cases, w h i '. c r.ee p..:. tion?
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outside inc:cd;.; cre .:::b nuclear Navy experience.
He believe this w.~ 1 he:p sustain the improvements we are making."
- 2. "Prevaili.c d as - B:ston Edison ur.derstands that meaningful co rective actior. reqcires adoption of excellence itself as a goal - not nerely the achievement of an objective list of changes. The Company has undertaken a progran of critical self analysis at the midd'.e r.aragement. level to examine current practices and performance. The focus of this effort is not to compose a new definitive list.of' achievements needed, but rather to introduce an atmosphere where exce:2ence as a goal is both ur.ferstcci ar,d p;rsuc3."
- 3. "Peluctan.?e to sekr.culad e oroblems - Boston Edison ~
acknowledges a past reluctance to accept proelems raised by th 1:EC. As discussed in the introduction, 1
our new commitrent to achieving excellence requires l
l i
d e
-l ,M l
that we acknowledge not only those problems brought to our attention hy the NPC, but all problems of which we become aware regardlers of source."
- 4. "Decondence on third-rsrty problem identifiestion -
P;1cric Stat;on management pract:ces during the part several weei.s. Nunerous pctential improver.ents have been identified, communicated to NRC Pegion I, and individually scoped. An integrated plan is currently unde r develo,, ment . Self-assessment will become a part of Station oterations."
During the past several months, Boston Edison Company has described in considerable detail a major reorganization of its l nuclear management operation and revealed a comprehensive 1
system f or detecting problems at the earliest porrible opportunity. For exa.ple, a: a meeting with DPC Region I riaff cr ' .; /e-te r E. , : 9 E ;. , ? ?. C o . reror:e" : . p '. ?. . s to e p".ete t r. e
. r; .? cf 109 a d 5. :;cral ar.igers and te:P.ical r;ppert rtsff for its nuclear operation. Alto they r- 'stted that they have
, ider.t:fied al: the hac;. og r.aintenance and pis.t improvements I :n nc-+" tc :s -
- . r - r-r t, ; r.
- " . i; .; s '. t 'r s 1
.a . e i
g;.de:ines and r e g u i s t i cr.s c:r.rer.ing f;re prctert;:r.
l
- e ve rt he le s s , t.e burien is on BECo to demonstrate :tr corr e t ence i n r.u : '. e a r operat".onc and to win back puclic confidence. As Ccngressnar C-erry Studds observed at the July IE Cc n ; r es s i o r.a : hearing:
l "One burden of proof with respect to the Pilgrim Power P" ant has shifted from those who would question to those who would defend the safety of operating this plant. The b:-der :r er. 9::t:r. Edicen to prove by perf ormsnee - not jas. ,ctcc;se - that it har the acility, the discipline and the sense of public rerpontitility necessa ry to operate a nucien t po'.:e r plant the way cuch a plant can and chould be run.
S;np y reet ing ricimur standardt is not enough; and it t hould r. eve r have bcen considered enough by plant za a;cr.~-~ --
t *.c '; ? : . "
The NRC has acknowledged that there is a direct relationship betweer. Plant management and public safety. At a May 22, 1986 Congressional hearing on the Safety of United States Nuclear Resetors, cc:. ducted by the
- douse Subcor.mittee on Energy Conservation and Power, NRC Commissioner Asselstine stated, "I am coming more to the view that management is the fundamental aspect in terms of the safety of the plant and the manner in which it is operated, ar.d I think that the operating experiences at the p2 ant last year demonstrate that. Management is the one factor that can have the biggest benefit, either for good or for ill and in the way the plant is run, and many of the other pretlems and difficulties or successes flow fror the capsbility of the manager of the utility."
A- : -M :~r p r e r -i r r -: .es*: ; c r. P;;;r:r's ranagorert prs;1ers he:S cn C../ 16, 1956, newly aggc;nted NCP. Cr.airrar.
Lando Zech descriced the current NRC program for monitoring management ar.d ackn wledged :ne .eed for change.
'A'.: :_;- : : - : r. : .'. e .;-rc c.r c;rre-. SA:.?
r
- 7 ..-
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. . 5 .- ,e q.snti at./e perf:rian:e ir.d;cs ors .?;ch ei '
c:;ert;ve y and re!.at. capture the trends of safety performance on a more frequent basis. The Commission is considering develer ent and testing of performance ind:cators as a me;ns of monit:rinE p'. ant safety performance. I regard this regu:atory initist:ve ac a top priority for the NFC."
With particular referer.ce to the Pilgrim plant, NPC Chairman Zech tcid Ccr.gressman Markey's Subcommittee on Culy 16, 1986, that he will consider a formal review of the Pilgrim !
piar.t'r pret:cr ty the fa:: co ristion of the "PC ari an cpan i
l 2
meeting to discess tl.a icsces prie- to any decision by the regienal office of the NPC to cpprove the rastart of the
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ s
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plant. Cormi ssione r Arsel.e t ine went even further and suggested that the Commrission should cor. duct a specia2 evaluaticr. of 1
' ~
Pilgrim's new ranagenent team and a joint NRC/ FEMA review of l
]
all the issaes concerning energency planning.
1 l We agree with NRC Region I Director Tom Murley's directive l l that the utility, prior to makinc any reauest to restart operations, should publish a detailed self-assessment and restart procedure p:an, subnit it to the NRC for review and subject it to the scrutiny of a public hearing. This review should take account of the next SALP report which is scheduled to be prepared i- April o* May, 1987
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inspections and reviews. For exarple, the NRC has added additier.a: i r.r p e c t e r t tt sffc-i 2' heur-a-day, on-site coverage
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fact, ir v;ew cf the ex!racrd.nsry histcry of mar.agerent fa:: .cr b BECn o ce r the yearr that has been docuner.ted by the NRCr *Ve or.ly wsy tr inr;re that the utility nakes good or its recer.t pre"ises is for t hc F: to estab'..sh a specia'.
"vatendeg" prograr (perhaps invciving an independent tn rd petty) during the first two years of Pilgrim's operation. This j fe ir heeFing with the ..ex recently expressed by Janne '
i 3trosnidar, NRC Section C"ief, who stated that it will take two o
yearc tefore NPC off:c:als know whether BEco has made ~
1 frprevements i r. their nu c'.e s t op e r r. t i o n s . The state.should j
\
-3;-
.s u_________.______. _ _ . . _ _ . - - - . - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - -
w have a role in such a post-rest art monitoring program.. In some jurisdictions, state er.ployees accorpany NEC inspectors durin) on-site inspections. It would be useful to have the services of a nuclear engineer on the staff of our Technological Hazards Division. We believe, however, that cooperation between state, local and federal officials on an ongoing basis is more sensible than a parallel state inspection program. The installation of an off-site monitoring systen as we discuss later in this report would give the state a najor new tool with which to nonitor the quality of on-site activities at Pilgrim.
Mr. Sweeney has acknowledged the need for time for BECo. to
-: r e- : ! :- 1 ..:*=: . "c : . : ? r r~ s- F- 'n. :r c, of :nc icn; h: story cf ranagerer: f ii . . .; r. BE c, sce foctr.ote 20, we believe the shareholders, and not the rate payers, should be req;i red to thca'. der the bul< of the finar.cial burden that wn ; e.;:: ' r- :.+ .; e e- st.c- si . . + re::.- er ds: : .: r:-
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- 9. Sire , A' art A r. d Motifics-ior Svrte . I A se rious '.a riws re co .ce rn we have relates to the Siren ari A:ert Mctification Sycter, wh:c5 unier feder7.1 law the utility rest int:311 throJghoe the E erger.cy Protectior. Zor.e (EP2) (10 i
I rile radier frc p'. ant) to alert residente in the ever.t of an i l
l accident. See 10 CFR Section 50.47(b) (5), (6) and (7). This is a critical corrone. of emergency preparedness because local off cials and the gener;1 pubite may not be asare of an
~
emergency reg-:::ng pro:cetive action unless there is a working warn:ng syrte . On Jur.e IE, 1986, Mr. Edward Thoras, Division
- 3:- ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ ~
Chiet of the Natural and Technological Hazards Division of FEMA
( Fede r a l Fme r.?ency Mar.s ?c ter.t Agency), reported that he had been waiting for BECo tc submit its final design report for the Si r er. Syct em sir.ce 19E3. Tnere is correspondence from FEMA dated August 9, 1984, indicating that tests of the alert and notification system that were scheduled to take place in 1983 had to be postponed several times because of BEco's failure to submit " technical inforr.stion specified in FEMA-43, ' Standard l
Guide for the Evacuation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Pcwer Plants.'"
T.e Massachusetts Civil Defense Ager.cy repeatedly advised r- :: :- ; ' := t'- rez;;rce feei?r rer -. ari a t t e r t e ': t resched;;e a tert of the ryster ir. 02:y, 1955. FEMA rerpor.ie.'
to these efforts by advising that in order for such a test to occur the ut:lity w 2;d have to file its design report on or l talcrc J-- =- 3., .?:-I. D- 2. '
, . '5, ?Ei, FF ' A rep;rted th5:
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l planned to test the syster :n Noverter or Dece~.her, 1965 after l corpleting a technics'. review of the report.
1 On Januar.. 29, 1956, FEMA sivised the Civil Defer.se Ac. enc.,
that its technica' revicw of BECo's design report lei to the l
disc >very of ic;r deficiencies including BEco's failare to l
certify that the siren syster would emit a signal at the 1
i i rinir.a1 decibel level throughout all parts of the EP2. FEMA advised further that tett of the systen could not be schedu'.e5 until the utility corrected the orcolems found with its decian t
r repert.
(
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Or. Septenber 29, 1966, FEMA conducted a test of the Siren
( 1
. and Alert Notifiestion System. The test covered the operation of each of the 94 sirens. While FEMA's written evaluation of the test has not yet been p:epared, it reported that BEco. has scored 884 and described these'results as very good.
The Siren system is such a critical component of the' alert and notification system that a thorough evaluation of the FEMA
> report shculd be conducted.by Civil Defense as.soon as it is 1
i available. Any deficiencies with this system that may be noted I
in the FEMA report must be corrected before.the plant is allcwed to restart.
e.,
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I
. ~'.e c;a:it;. and rc :nr:2ity of p'. ant technc'.cgy is obviously another factor'that has a direct bearing on. emergency preparedness and p;blic saf et; . For many years there hsve ."eer c:a:~r, r. r ir :t. : '. e crient: ts, ths: desig- f aes ir sce.9:S:
7.g;.-27,, ,
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one at P:';rir., c ald lead to an ear:y breach of the cor.tainment vesse: a .5 a releace of harmful radiation due to overpresserization d; ring certain types of portulatei accident r.
. (1) Stateaen: ef t'.e Prop *.e . The containment structure at i
i' Pilgrin is known as a G.E. Mark I design. In this system a pool of water (suppression pool) below the reactor core is used J
~
to cendense stear t h r. t wo;1d be released into the steel and i
I concrete containment structure during some types of accider.ts.
The ccr.densation of steanredecespressbrethat'couldotherwise' lead to a bresch of the centain.ent and a release.of rai:stio..
l.
n It has been generally known since at least 1975, that in certain extremely severe accident sequences involving serious damage to the reactor core, prolonged loss of core cooling and fuel disintegration f.e., a core relt sequence, the Mark I containment may rapidly overpressurize and fail. This type of accident was' evaluated in a 1975 Reactor Safety Study known as WASH-1400 (:WREG-75/014). This study applied certain assumptions about the cor. sequences of severe core accidents to seversi types of reactors including the Peach Bottom Reactor, a BWR Mark I type that is siiilar to Pilgrim. An updated version of that study is expected to be releared soon in draft form
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Denton, there is a 901 char.re that the Mark I containnant will
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centair er.: fsi.;re ir. a : ;.'ing water reactor such a:
Pilgri . Further cre, arrer3:ng to docar.ents submitted to j 1
tre 5;bcor.mittee er E r.e r g ; conservation and Power on Jul"J 16, l 1
1 1950 cy the !:~~, it is r. c t pt ible to messure the safety of tre M a r <. I contairre.t. ~ 5. r. ::P C's wri t t en subr.iscion t o Congressi.an Markey stater,
"?ecause cf the certir.Ji.g work and the incorplete
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(2) Induet v : e r t - '. . The inder ty rarponte to th n
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Response Tc Severe Accident Study (IDC0R Uov. 1984), which i
concluded that " additional major design or'crerational changes ]
i l
- p in existing nuclear power plant designs are not warranted."
l This conclus'.on wac reached despite acknowledging that there was at least one accident scenario involving a BWR Reactor like that in use at Pilgrim in which there could be an early failure of the containment. 1 More recently, there has been extensive study of the Mark I containment issue in the context of the Vernon, Vermont nuclear reactor, which is a BWR type similar to Pilgrim. Earlier this year the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pcwer Corporation produced a ci te .n ^r.f; : - s:. +:: Tc: ' t...a1 FSil;re Trotst :t y (CCFF) rept:t ir an effcrt to test the validity of the 901 containment failure prediction made by Mr. Harold Denton. The study purported to uce the sare ana]ysis as that erployed'by t he ':E: in :9"E f- t '.e .;15 9 - 12 ', r : u -:; , oiifie" :: ref;ect
- 3:- .
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r the Vernon plant. The Yankee Atomic study concluded that-for all accidents where containment nay fail within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the i
probability of failure was no rcre than 71. Nevertheless, Yankee Atomic did recornend further study of certain enhancements that NRC staff recon 5end should be made to the containment.
On October 24, 1956, Mr. Pobert Bernero, chief of the !
Boiling Water Reactor Divicion of tne 1:RC, reported that a review of the Verr.cr containment report revealed the abcence-of
- an analysis of uncertainties in nothodolo?y and engineering -
l a 3
i
i I
judgements. He observed that " based on the (NRC) staff's j t .
i 5 experience with other Bh*R Probabilistic Risk Assessmen's )
i (FRA's), we believe that the CCFP of 7% may be fairly I
representative but is clite uncertain." Mr. Bernero added that although URC staff believed that the CCFP was "probably less than 50% and may be fairly estimated to be about 10%,"
enhancements to inprove containment performance in the face of core melt type accidents were " desirable and achievable."
The Vermont Yankee containment study was also reviewed by an expert consultant hired by Governor Kunin's Department of ,
1 P;blic Service. On Octeter 30, 1986, PRD consultants of Idaho e .e ;- , ..
r, .. x... 79, 0-. efe,g., ;- e . ., i .. ; g .; a; 9.e v i e a cf ;5e ~/eracr: iar.<ee Cor.tainnent Stady." Tne */e r mo n t ,
third party, study ccr.cluded that the Verront Yankee CCTP was i
" reasonably accurate." "This is concluded from this corparison l
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high as abca: 201, bet tt:s is considered an upper limit."
(3) RerrenFm P. Porte" F"ison Co.rany. On July 25, 1986, l
l BECo annoance; p ar.s to rerain shutdown until "early 1967" -
1 "the corpsry w:'.: procend with a Pilgrim Station-specific evaluation to iden:ify ar.d irpierer.t bene f i ci al improvemer.ts to its Mark I c o n t a i nc.e r. t during this outage." It is certainly encouraging that after rany years of denial, BECo has acknowledged that a .rror:er exists with the Mark I containment l bJilding. Deta: Is cf a "esfety ennancer.ent prograr" to update
. ,\
I t he s3iety of Pilgri 's Mark I containment were explained by
(
i l
1 1
BECo. to NRC officials on November 13, 1986. BECo. officials i announced that their goa2 was to respond to and implement all the recommendations contained in the draft NRC policy (see infra) prior to restart.
(4) NRC Resconse. The NRC staff has developed hardware modifications and new emergency procedures to help to prevent an'd to " mitigate" the consequences of' severe core damage at a BWR plant with a Mark I containment. See Appendix Six.
According to Mr. Robert Bernero, chief of the BWR Division of the NRC who has met with my staff on several occasions and been very helpful to us, a " generic letter" is under review by the -
- R : th=t w:.;id r e g ; ; r e 9'<;5 Pesetor c a r.e r s to do the fs :".e..::
(a) e::sti;sh stricter ecn:rois on hydrogen, (b) irprove the-drywell spray system, (c) establish reliable pressure control or venting capability, (d) insure decris control and (e)
- nstitute r.e p::. ies an" .rrc:edares ftr operators, mar. agers a
e r.
y -.3 -;c - .,e .7_ . .. .r..;, ge 49,i ;..- 3,, 3 2, )
in the event of ar accident involving severe core damage. l These recorr.endaticos have been discussed by the ::RO staf f with an industry group known as the BWR Owner's Group. One of the issues under study by the ::RC is the cost effectiveness of mandating certain safety improvements. This is an issue of such grave concern and so critical to the health and safety of.-
.i the public that any cost / benefit anaylsis should not rely on I
the questionab'.e reliability of probabilistic risk analysis, i The NRC should take the lead in mandating every availacle
- safety improvement when faceci with a problem as serious as this. .
(.
I
Unfortunately, according to Commissioner James K.
Acselstine, in remarks he made before the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners on June 9, 1986 at Chathan, MA, See Appendix Seven, there has been a slackening-off by the NRC in recent years in its enforcement of safety standards. Commissioner Asselstine stressed that it is not enough to say that a severe accident is unlikely cr a remo*e probability, but thst we must "make every effort to reduce or eliminate the chance of such an accident in this coentry." _I_d. at 6. In reviewing recent !;RC performance, he concicded that,
";- t- .e de7;I r ISr: yest, the Cc--iss;tr. p;- sr er" to f;rther ef: arts ::th to reJace the pccriril.ty of a ccre reiticer a :: i d e r. : in the Ur.ited States i r. the fcture, a r. i to mir.;Tize the consequences of such ar. accident sh00ld one occur. In those decisions, the Commission effectively rejected the vigilant and forward-looking approach to safety t*st had beer advocated by the President's
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darl.; the .?53 Overs;gh- "e s r : r.g s . See Footncte 9 .=;r a.
Commissioner Asse'.stine went on tc make specific reference ::
";mprc.ter" reliance by t he SRC on the bottom line res;1ts of prots' r ; :stic risk assessments and the unwise adoption of a "backfit rele" that restricts the co mission's ability to msndste new safety requ;rements. Sea 10 CFR Section 50.109.
These are the reasons why more decisive action has not been take- to des wi t h the f: ark : c o n t a i nr.e r.: flee. The written respo ses and testimony by f:FC of ficials at the May 22 and July .
16, 19^6 Cc r.g r e r s d o r.a 2 hastingr cor.6 acted by Cor.grensnan
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-2E-
Commissioners intend to rest on the bottom line of questionable probabilistic risk assessments instead of mandating improveme.ts in hardware and procedures.
1 (5iLepropriate Pr-cronse ty C o r r o r. w a s '. t ' . In view of the potentilly catastrophic consequences of an early containment f ailure daring a severe core accident at Pilgrim and the large j 1
ur. certainty associated with risk assessment, a containment ]
study s7teifically based on the design features at Pilgrim and the operating record of DECO. should be conducted. This study should be submitted to the NRC and reviewed prior to a de te rminstion of whet he r to authorize a restart. Furthermore, t2 ::.. r.t_.] :- 8 - Svif:s-;e te tr.e sts:e far re..ee eri p0cs c'y 3r :r.deper.5er.t th;r
. . party st;i 1.<.e the or.e donc for Governor Kunin.
" . ..)er e..e v .f. r. e.~ ~, r. .. . v. . ...r.. p r..
. o. .r.w ~.
. r .e ac T,
.e . . w.
?. ?:rr :9 ct E ~ = r za .:: P'.s-- .
- s .;;- :~. -
- . .- : 4 : .. :-:; .- .
i .t e r.d e d to p r e v e r.t or cor. trol an accident at a nJelear facility. NU?E3 OEE4/ FEMA-PEP-1 at 6. Accident prever. tion and control are the respor.sibility of the plant operator and f eder al regulators. The REFP is meant to lirit exporare of the public t: radiatior should an accident occur. Protective actions are designed to reduce doses to the lowest possible level if exposure is unavoidab'.e. As the NRC observed in its i
hi g h ' y cor.t r ove r s i a l decision in the Shorehan case, "lo}ur
. i 1
~
eme r gency p'.a nni ng recairerents do not recaire that an adequate p'.sn achieve a preset ranimum. radiation dose savings...." Ir
(
l 4
the matter of Long Island Lighting Comoanv, CLI-86-13 at 11
, (7/24/56). For reasons discussed earlier, the absence of any mandatory mininum standards by means of which plans can be tected for effectiveness represents a major flaw in t!.e j i
regulatory framework.
i Although we are concerned about management deficiencies, i reactor design problems and planning deficiencies at Pilgrim, the public should understand that there is no emergency response plan that can assure that lives will not be lost, l persons will not te injcred, property will not be damaged and l our 1:ves will r. o t otherwice be disrupted in the event of a 1
a t ; r '. . i.es't- or a ~; -
- 2: " 0"ogier: arcile t, W a . *.e :
frr a ng: lear poaer p:;-t, a producer or shipper of hirardcas material or a fossil fuel storage facility.
- 9. NitJTe of PEEE P '. a - E .
- re are t ree f .. . .r+-ce5 .;;. ear p;eer stat.:nr ei.-
,-..- .- . .., g . ._
- a - - . . .
c.
l Massachusetts: Pilgrir r . a t . c r. i n P '. y e c u t ' . , Yankee Powe in P. wa, Massachusetts, and Vermont Yankee in Vernor., Vermont.
The following is an outline of the Radiological E".erc.ene" 1
i Rorpense Plan struct;re for t'-eze plants, i State P:an - Tnere is one generalized state plan to direct 1
I overa,.2 cooro: nation o, state agency response to an accident at a nuclear power station. This plan is found in A.n.n e r.i : x ::: of the State'. Con.:rehen:ive Emergency .
l Rerper.re P;an (CER?).
- Area Pier.s - The Erdt ar.i Vernan station EP2s are within 1
M23I 1:-i [.,
". { f ' $ i r [ ** 2 E2 *E Ei- *I
. - b b
- O '- 5$'
-AC-
1 i
1 l
Each area has an Area plan which'is principally designed to 1 assure that the state supplements resource needs for local response to a power station accident. The Area plan prov: des for coordination ar.;ong local jurisdictions and coordination between state and local authorities. The Area i
Plan also . specifies communications to and among local authorities.
EP: Cermunity P:ans - Each community within a power i
station emergency planning zone has a plan to guide local j i
response to a power station accident. There are five co munities in the Pilgrim EP2 (P:ymouth, Carver, Duxbury, )
" rr*';+15
. a" .pr.- , s e v e r. i- t *.e V e r . : - ??: ar #
elever in the P : <t e EF:.
Reception Community Plan 1 - Certain communities outside an 4
EPZ have beer. derignated to host evacuees requiring a r i . r : a r. c_
~
ir : e eve.: c' a pceer s:st . n accider.. _Es:b 4 ; - - 3- :- -
g - c .- - , ; , , - - - ;;(
monitoring and decontamination, and sheltering. Rowe and ;
Vernon each have two reception communities and Pilgrim had three ( H a r.o v e r , Bridgewater and Taunton).22 j i
1 1
C. At.e c u t c y of Pilgrir P'.an.:. I J
As noted in Part II of this report, an operating license cannot be issued "unless a finding is made by the !;RC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures l J
can and will be tak.en in the event of a radiological emergency."
10 CFR Section 50.47 (a)(1). " Adequacy," in one sense, is largely a functier. of having certain hardwsre, sufficient l
1 1
l
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
1 doc u men tati on , correct procedures, and available personnel and i re sou rces.
Under this definition of " adequacy", if we were writing.on a clean s! ate in the sense that an operating license had not yet been issued for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, I would not reems:end that . we submit the existing RERP plans for Pilgrim and certif y them under 44 CFR Section 350.7. This l
position is based on (1) BEco's failure to meet its j responsibilities to emergency preparedness under federal law including the f ailure to adequately support our planning effort, (2) deficiencies in the plans, sore of which have been referred s and c * .e r s ar+ d+ rrir+d ';rther ir the rection:
i that fo'Mw, and (3) prcb.e:s with the erergency com.ranication system.
Howeve r , "adegaacy" when used in the above sense does not cro.ide a ; 32- . r s r. c .. :: .:. ~ e r 7 e . c y p . a r. r w::. be effect;ve ;.
.-::er:
. : e.- - - - -
-;r .r.- -
t;t e-,. -
ee take the tern adeq :3:;. to sig.ify a minimum level of ef f ectiveness , then ; ws;1d cite the following additional and more serious reasons for not certifying the plans:
(1) Inadequacies in the 1953 Evacuation Time Estinate (ETE) prepared by BECo, such that we can't be sure how long it would take us to evacuate certain populations f rom.the EPz; (2) unanswered questions about reactor safety; and (3) the absence of a ccrprehensive Shelter Survey.
There also are concerne about the risk.s faced by the Pilg rim ru T.e r c(ach pepu:ation that if not overcore wr-uld lead I
l l
i i.
me to recommend the same position we have taken in that regard
\
, at S e a b r o ok'. This issue is discussed further in a subsequent section of this report There are obvious concerns that we and public health officio."- : ave a'out c the possible implications of the Chernobyl accident, particularly in terms of the need for planning beyond the traditional limits of the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone. This too is discussed in a subsequent section of this Report. Fins 11y, flaws have been identified in the planning process that became evident during an evaluation of the draft Seabrook plans.
These " process" concerns were discussed in the
- r- -5;r. . .3sr fci+rs is , the t*.;.e *'- ; - ^ 3 - ; .- f role to play ir deve:c p' .? and approving off-site e erge.cy response plans. Yet, the state is required to exercise its i
resper.sibility without the ber.efit of certain authoritative, si:e cree.f.: -f:r a:.:- a:c n :A - ser ;.a . T.:
7 . ..
t , . . - -
l l i eff:cacy cf a p;ar. For exa pie, federsi law recaires an l ana!ysis of ETE's, but does not specify that plans rart demonstrate a capacity to evacuate the EP2 or some portion of it pr.or to the p:Jne reach.ng it or within a specific peried of t : r e . 2 '- P ar.s most be made for an accident in which there is off-site release from the plant within thirty minutes of an incident.24 Even assuming that in such a case it will take additional time for the Plune to reach populated areas, the question arises whether any plans could ce " adequate".
The existing ETE for Pil? tin, which was prepared in 1979,
(
_ _____ _ ____ _ _ _ _ l
i
- gives us a clesrance time for the entire EPZ of more than five -
l , hours,-under certain. conditions. It is based upon outdated information. Furthermore, it rests on a series of highly controversial assu.ptions. For example, the Pilgrim ETE assumes that " people not in the planned evacuation boundaries for each case would not choose to evacuate anyway". This ignores consideration of the so-called " shadow phenomenon" which is a theory thst holds that during a radiological-energency there will be widespread spontaneous evacuation. The.
Pilgrim ETE also assumes that emergency personnel will remain in place and not evacuate with their f amilies. This assumption
+..c" s- --
.- :' : 8 :. i "::.. ecr.E .r " i nis sc.e supptrt in socic:cg;ca'. literature. See Appendix en.
An Evacuation Time Estinate is an essential aid to emergency p'.a--ing. A ger$ ETE establishes current pop;:ation chsracter.r..cs, n ;- r. e r cf tranc;ent visitors oy sesst., and e-- :.'-n c..=-.- --
sr i n . . af . . a. r?:. ;- s '. c . b r , ~ . = -
use of recreation and other special facilities, including besches. With this information, the ETE evaluates the range of times required to evac;ste the population based upon existing transportation capabilities and various westher, tire of day and time of yes.r facters. An ETE can also evaluate the benefit of various policy options such as early school dismissal and early beach closing. Finally, the ETE can evaluate traffic management procedJre , both inside and outside the EP;, and reconmencoc actions wnic..
.. s will improve evacuation t:mes. . . .
It is thcs c !tical to obt'ain a new ETE analysis specific 1
for each significant geographic subsector.of the EPZ communities (including in particular, the beaches) under varying conditions (weather, traffic, time of day, week and year) a nd o r.e t h s t is scnsitive to a greater number of external variables. Boston Edison Company has contracted with KLD Associates to do such a study. Preliminary results are expected to be available in February 1987.
In order t<> correct this maior flaw in the plannin process, the tRC should adjudicate a site specific off-site release time for each nuclear power plant based on a wi de rance of accident scenarior, and recuire assurances that evacuatior.
...- . c. , . ,..,; . u. , , ~;. 8.. .... -
7 4 ~ ,. . ..a.. .. . . . n.
reles.s ti es. Due to the ahser.ce of such site specific information, there is also doubt about whether the current plans for Pilgrim enatie us to satisfy the state law reg;.rerent that p l a r. ;st previie w6r%able means for th*
re-:iie ts -'
.'. EP. --
- r. - - = -
t i .: s 0: ' .
- nr:ted.. -
a:tior.s during a nuclear accident. See G.L. c. 33-Appen'ix, Section 13-29.
The federal response to the dile na of state planners :h 1sek eathoritative site-specific data and minimun ETE standar5s is to point out that sheltering, and not evacuation, is the solution in the case of the extremely severe, fast-breaking accident. Indeed, in such a case sheltering may be the only I
visole option. Unfortunately, that alternative provides no '
~
greater assurance that public health can be protected. At the 1983 Congressier.a1 Oversight F. earings, Congressman Patterser,-
l I
from California had the following exchange with Mr. Richard W.
i
.)
Krimm, Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural and Technological Hacards, FEMA.
"Mr. Patterson: Without a ctandard or requirement that )
specifies the longest acceptable amount of time for a l successful evacuation, how can NRC or FEMA really guarantee j the public safety will be protected in a radiological emergency?
Mr. Krimm: When we look at evacuation timing, we look at what would happen in several different types of accidents.
In the extrene case, the worst type of accident, which I think is a class 9 accident, you would really have to go to shelter rather than evacuation and you are talking about the plume area; you are not talking really so much about a 10-mile radius, but that area where the plume exposure goes, where the release of radioiodines would be harmful to the public.
. - 1: y?; w '. _ '. i <,
- d. .- tr.- r.- >. t r + - s ct. e ;; :: i;: r
- ,:e a r. ; 10. c;- a.er: them. "his .: s:neth.r.7 we 6:
I c : <. at, how fast we car. alert and not;fy people and tne a ;lity of the local and the State governments to do this.
In that extreme case, you would have'no alternative but to offer sheltering until you could safely evacuate the people.
Mr. Patterer-- She teri.g ir this case mear.s stayir.g in tne ":;se :: wha:?
5-i ; , <, , 7 p r . .
.- -- r* - r ---
-5, . --
Mr. Patterscr: How r.ach does that reduce the radiologic effect, about a half, 50 percent? I mean, I don't know.
Mr. M-ir~: I am not sure."
As the previous section points out, however, we are not writing on a clean s1*.te. " Adequacy" is a federal law concept, e.c., 10 C F .:. Section 50.47 (a)(1), which for purposes of plant licensure is determined by the NRC with reference to federal stariardt a r. d tared u;;- a finding by FFMA which enjoys a rebuttatic precucption of validity. 10 CFR Section 50.47 (a)(2). FEMA has rade suc' a finding in writing or four different occarinns w i t b i r. **c past five years and has repeated
-AE-
the same at each public forum on this subject during the past three months. Nevertheless, state law imposes on us a fundamental duty to take all reasonsble measures to protect public health and safety. See Footnote 18. Accordingly, the 3 appropriate action in these circumstances is for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to transmit a copy of this recort to FEMA and recuest that each of the deficiencies noted in this I I
reoort be addressed in the upcoring recort that FEMA is preparing on the Pilgrim plans.
D. The Major Weakness in the Pilcrim Plans The refer .es> ness ir the Pi gri 7: ant is the lack of documentation. There are r.o detailed procedures in the Pilgrim plans for implementation, for care of the school age population or other transport-dependent populations.
In the Pilgrim plans there are no separate plans or separate procedures for each school district and for 6,ay care centers. Such plans or procedures should detail sheltering and evacuation responsibilities and functions. The Plymouth school l
plan is only four pages and lacks detailed procedures. l l
Pilgrim EPZ plans give basic response functions and leave much of the detail to the judgement and experience of local officials. The Pilgrim plans lack adequate documentation of resource needs and available resources. For instance, the Pilgrim plans do not analyze the numbers of buses needed and the sources for them. The Pilgrim plans do not contain !
detailed procedures regarding early beach closing at the ;
" Alert" level. This may be sufficient for many kinds of !
accidents where there is reasonably adequate advance notice of l _ - '
an off-site release. However, ad hoc planning is clearly inadegoate when a fast-breaking incident occurs.
Another problam is that there is no cross referencing for Pilgrim area plans between each town plan and its implementing procedares. Furthermore, in the past several years, Pilgrin local plans and the state and area plans have all been revised, but a review for consistency has not been undertaken.
The Area II plan for Pi39 tim Station is in need of considerable redrafting. All response precedures will have to l
l be documentec where, in sore caser, no documentation presently ex.ste i. . ;, .. . -
-m ; ;;:- ef' r-
- c c r * = r '. . -
reccarce needs, s ; c '- cs t;cac, a-bu;ances, traffic cener.,
etc.for Areas !! and IV, and to determine the resources to fulfill unret needs.
E. ; . '. : - i - - 'c
- tr2-- n- .'.=- -- ;
i
,- n e ' ,-- 5 , .- :. : . < , r. . . p*;.....- ~.. *;- ,
1 p2ans ruct be rade for the protection of varioce special i pop;;aticr.s. In the F;;;r;~ EP:, it is erpeciall'/ import ant to carefully p'.an for the protection of beach usert. The erec !
l contains coarta: res *:r w : th large nonbers of residents, vacationers, and day viritors using the beaches. People at I beaches might be particu arly vulnerable during a fast-breaking accident at a nue: ear power station because they may not have she'.ter nearoy and :nd:vides:s may be a good distance f rom i
1 1
(
- 'E-
their automobiles. The variability and changeability of I
coactal weather is another major consideration.
~
The Pilgrim ETE is nearly seven years old, is based on 1970 cencus data, ani, in addition to the probleme noted enr:ier, did not . address detailed questions regarding beach evacuation.
It is also difficult to analyze the Pilgri: beach situations because we do not have an adequate survey of shelter i available to protect beach users in case shelter is the recommended protective action following an accident at Pilgrim station.
In the 1979 Pilgrim ETE, HMM, the consu: tant, identified 9
- -a- >-: ur .. a- a:. -
r e :, ' . ; .-
.* = .- 2, P11 grin bearhe." are at ?everal poir.ts a ; o r.g the coast and r a r. g e in peak use from about 100 to over 7,500. It is important to remember that the critica; factor in analyzing evacuation time .
j l
.c r. : tna ._-er cf .re r'.e, ta t 'r e n ;.- t e r of vehic;+s. ; .c l a.: i e : r + ~. r; ..~- - -
- ,n3' t: c ,r? , ~ -
- :\r' '
into about 9,000 cars at t he Pilg rin. beaches . In erergency planning, we are interested in knowing the maximun nanber on the beach at any or.e mo er.t, not necessarily the nunber of visitors thrc;g'.o;t a ia; .
Tne Pilgrim ETE does not ar.31yre separately the evacuat2on j times for beach areas. However, it gives " clear times" for the entire 30 nile EP" which range up to and in excess of five 1
i hours with peak population. Tne ETE evaluates evacuation times l f or Saouish !!eck, south of Duxbury beach at about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, '
regardless of population and climate. However, this estimste I
har ret tecr a2+q;ste: . der;-cr.trd.
~ '9-
Four of the nine beaches in the Pilgrim EPZ_ pose dif ficulties in emergency planning. A brief discussion of each
~
follows:
White Horse Beact - 1 to 1.5 miles' southeast of Pilgrim Station. White Horse is a popular beach with a capacity.in excess of 2,000. It presents a significant problem because-it'is close to the power station, has very limited nearby.
shelter, and escape from a plume driven by winds out of the-NW to NNW would be extremely dif ficult.
Plymouth Beach - 3 to 4 miles. West of Pilgrim. Plymouth Besch is a neck of land extending 2.5 miles into the Bay.
~-
- r. : - - ' ?- :: :*. st-L. .
.: : : 1 - -
s : c e s. Of ale:;ste shelter is more than a -ile awny,.in 1
t town. A special problem is clearing population off.of the 2.5 -ile neck. There is, hcwever, sced access.to P.oute 3 T.C!th or s Jth.
9 , ;- E .- - ', -it'ges.s.'- t,93 - . A ,3y,,97 , . ' . p ; ,- . ,
actually ine'.edes Sagaish Neck, about five miles NMW of 1
pcwer station, running up to almost nine miles from the i staticn. Access is only across a two lane (one land d:rectional) bridge or via one rudimentary. street fro-Marshfield. Tt.are is virtually no shelter in the ares for an estimated capacity of up to 10,000. There is significant disagreement about thic capacity, some estimates are as low as 6,600. From the beach parking to the tip of Suquish Neck, about five miles, the only access
- is by four whec1 drive or boat, t
-LD-
1 1
Three characteristics of the' Pilgrim area enhance ceach j 2
protection. First, a high percentage of beach users lwould appear to be permanent or temporary residents with access to sone type of cnelter. Howeve'., beach shelters generally afford less favorable air exchange ratios than permanent or winter buildings. Second, there is generally a good evacuation rodte network. Third,,the beaches are spread along the coast in cifferent directions from the plant. Thus, under any prevailing wind conditions, the entire beach population in the Pilgrim EP' would not face immediate risk as is the case in the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EP2. However, this sane r . ; +. . : - :- r = t';; +re .s a ;:is:e: c h a r. r: t.=t s: e Portion of the Ceich area w..I r>e threat 5r.ed.
Only an updated ETE and a thorough shelter survey will give us a reliable basis for reassessing the risk to the beach area r:r;.st;ons ;n tne ?!1;rir EF . will te ne essary f:: the
- i ? .::.- == ti c-- .
M- -a s : - e q : e . : n .~ ,i .
5: &r-t' spontar.eoas evacuatier c;tside the EP2, including residents of Cape Cod. Under present cirecettences, the risks faced by the Pil rir beech poou'_stion e?.nnot be assessed. The burden thus is on BECo to de onstrata that they should be allowed to operate durinc the c:-rer months without the construction of beach area shelters.
F. Pilcrim: The Transport Dependent Population Transport deper. dent populations include people without access to a private automobile, school children and children in I
day care while schoc is in session, horpital and nursing home l!
- sti dents, a:.5 c t ' 4: r.c r . . i t y-i r,r s i r e d p e r :c n n .
I
_n_ i
?
4
_ _ - _ _ _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ = _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - . _ - _ _ _ - _ _ . .a
.)
In general, all emergency plans call for' local resources - ,
i buses, ambulances, chair vans - to be used to provide for transporting these special populations. When local resources j
^
are exhaasted, the state is pledged to arrange for additional vehicles to meet all needs. These resources are procured-1 through the MCDA Area Office and include other community re' sources, mutual aid assistance or assistance from Executive i Order 144 agencies.
1 Plans should contain a good estimate of transportation-I needs and lists of locally available vehicles of each type. !
Having identified needs which cannot be met, the plans should 1
.ua.f. _r:, :-- . er, s r. - :..- ca c re c ; 7.r i c 'r e_ . :' t ,e i l
EP- w.tich can be .::;;; zed. Where nececsary, letters of i l 1 agreement should be concluded with private companies which will su ply vehicles in ar emergency.
Tne Pi;;r.r ?; art s'.t__c deta;' :::51 tran.tr rtation 1.?r=.--; .
- ~.;?::-:, cr . ~ 2 ~~ 1-9 :-- '=- .- -
connunity, assigned a route or pickup point, and given a destination. Maps of i n t e r r. a '. bus roates should be contained
\ \
l
- in each plan. Other matters attending transportation for l 1 ,
i dependent populations cheu'.i be extensively documented in Ices! ;
plans and the Area II p l a r. .
i The current plans for transportation dependent populations 1 in the Pilgrim EPZ connunities are far too rudimentary. They
.epecify thet dependent individuals make prior arrangement with their local civil defense director who, in turn, wil) see to
- their needs. The plar.c specify only that the local directer r t
-L2-
will contact MCDA Area II for assistance in' fulfilling needs.
The Area II plan, however, does not contain-detailed information on how to procure additional transportation and prir.cipally ref e rs to local plans and civil def enso directors for these arrangements.
While some progress has been made in identifying mobility impaired individuals, much work on this matter remains to be done. Clearly, better plans to provide for the needs of all transportation dependent populations in the Pilgrim EPZ can and must be prepared.
One other special needs population for which better.
- '.+ e
~
- = r : r a t . -- r -r _ . .s- .- :r y::f :n11; dead. .c e q u i pi.e n : s'/ailar:e :: 6:er: profound *.y deaf individea:s to an emergency situation and the Boston Edison Company has pledged ;
i to buy these units for all who need them. State and local '
off. cia:s chc;;d assis- .- . dent.fying ar.i contactir.g the !
,r r - : . ; - . :,f .- -
- .- r?: v h7:: c'.'4 :' ;: -
major effort to reach c;t and identify this popu'.ation and-1 offer them the equipment needed to receive emergency !
notification.
We also believe that the utility shoJ1d give serious consideration to installing in each school bus within the EPZ the so-called NOAA tone alert radio system.or some equivalent system to contact these bases when they are on the road or a communications system to ensble emergency personnel to contact the schools. This system would enable civil defense -
authorities t0 give Energency Broadcast System (EBS) 1
Information to each bus driver in order to avoid situations whereby children are transported to inappropriate locations or
{
valuable time is lost due to drivers following predetermined, but possib:y unJer changing conditions invalid, transportation routes.
G. Essential Items to Complete Submission for FEMA 350 Review. j As noted earlier, the Federal Emergency Management. Agency (FEMA) has made an interim finding on four separate occasions since 1981 that plans f or response to an accident at Pilgrim Station provide " reasonable assurance" that the public can be a
adequately protected. This finding covers the State F 7. n c ' 7 : C. E e r p r. : . r: - -.re P; v ( F E :..: . , Cc Ares 11 E r. : . ,
Local REF?'s for Plymo;;h, 05:ver, Duxbury, Mirshfield and i i
Kingston, and reception community plans for Hanover, Bridgewater and Taunten. 40 CFR Section 350 requires that FEMA i 4
l ra%e a f i n t '. deter-inat.:- cf adeq;acy. FEMA suspended this 4
7.-. .:. ;e8 4-i.- g re-
- .- - .c
. :.., . . 9 ; .- ,
On October 30, 1955. F E P. I. wrote to MCDA explaining the 1 j
mininun items that need resciution before the review process resunes. The status of these items is discussed below, Before addressing what are considered to be plan deficiencies, it is important to explain each item fron FEMA's October 30, 1985 I letter and give the present status of each item. The references to " planning standards" refer to I,he standards set !
forth in :PJREG 0654/FE"A-REP-1 (1990, as revisc3).
(1) General
- All EP2 and host ec- ;nity plans were revised in May a
ani Uune CI 195.. AE.d i t i o T.11 : Visions U37 De
-F4-
necessary and state approval of a new RERP~ plan may be
')
appropriate.
Emergency Public Information brochures were revised and distribute.! to the EP2 population just. prior to the October 1985 exercise. A revised brochure was distributed by BECo. this past summer. Among the issues that need further study is the' controversy about whether people should be advised, as current material-provides, not to attempt to pick up their children.
This is a subject where local' review is critically important.
(:, v. e ,
- :.uir= :.
- 1. - - v -:--
- e. ! p c. : r - - r . ' <
Letterc of agreezer.: are reqJired tc demonstrate the availability of certain essential resources. Signed letters of agreemen.t have been completed between Civil.
Defer.re ar d 5 :rt on E d i z e r. , *.e
.' A..cri:an ?.ed Crose, the
..c. ~n-. 3.> "
, v.' -
' n .. a r. i. ;.,r .+r 5+?'.:n.
Lette:s cher.d be exe:Jted With private bus.and ambulance co panies, medical facilities, the National Guard and with reception centerr.
Local plans need better charts exp'.aining lines of authority in the total response effort.
Local plans need complete staffing lists. This must be documented in conjunction with each local Civil Defense Director.
Plans direct that local officials secure supplementary resources through the MCDA Ares II office in I
B r : .!;s ,w t e r . ~here r e r r.; r r e : cle 15 be identif;e?.
(3) Plannine Standard C. Emercency Resconse Succort and Resources The Department of Public He31th supports the state's Nuclear Incident Advisory. Team (NIAT) which exists to respcM to. any inc2 dents it.volving radiation. The Handbook contains their response procedures.- The Radiation Control Program of the Department of Pablic-Health is. responsible'for maintaining in the NIAT handbook a list of available laboratories to analyze environmental .sa.ple for radioisotopes. This list is a
in the updated N AT handbook and should be approved by p> i r -
FEMA. <
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All proced;rst for not.fication of an accident at ,f <
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c Pilgrim Station m.:st be reviewed. The present systeri , ,
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.: s-for notifying local officials is unreliable and, as suc.h t
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Troep D dispat:her Heirrerdinger. The sys tem di d.-i.ot' /
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l be used. We have been inforced thc Ureviocs tests #
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have consisten.ly produced less ttsn,10% success. l
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This hardware needs to be replace:2 or. repaired and 41L , ,*
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f procedures amended as appropriate prior to any rer[ art
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f of the Pilgrim Plant. BECo hat advised us the t they /
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have contracted for a totally 'new communica): ion rpj6m ,
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which will enable us to rapidly and reliabIy notify >
i 1, 1 local officials in the evant'of an accident. o r . 1 y
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(5) Planning Standard F. Emergency Communication The P3ymouth County Radio Net has proven unreliable for communications with and among local officials. It needs a thorough overhaul or complete replacement with a dedicated radio system.
(6) Plann,bg Standard G. Public Information i .
g - ~ FEMt.-
hen !,been' given the 1986 EPI update referred to o e o a' ')
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f(7) --Planning Standard I . # c711 d.e. n t Arsessment g, -
Radlation Cor.'t! o1 Prbgram personnel for the Department
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I f of Public He'abth at the EOF (an off-site location
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e
' '[ t County Ho.:se of Correction) are responsible for
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j ,. / , /- y x accident a, t;ie s s me nt . Hosever, this inf,ormation is sent p ,
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,tc,-ene pt,aingham st E00 (Emergency Operations Center -
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)u'.y II,1y 'd.! . Ci:01 Defense and DPH discaned new 7 . >
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3 procedy,res to inst te accurate e, c' .timelp (e. formation >
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-3 A}1 Itui.. EOC's nos have the 'sa.e ETZ map and st,atus ,
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,. e V The radioactive protective bbeking agent, potassium o t'- i , i.
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, l t is&id tv, ' ( K I ) nay be provided to emergency workers and
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,U M ersf"Districation s,.
t of KI wil'I be.'mafe caly at the -
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! Upec.f r d'irenf on' of the to: r.issioner of Public Hesit k.,
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KI is to be held in stock in dosimetry kits at each local EOC. Boston Edison has taken responsibility for
, purchasing and distrib* ting KI and should promptly certify that it has been distributed. It has been suggested, particularly in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, that KI should be avialable for distribution to the public. DPH has an policy to the contrary. It j would be advisable, we think, for DPH to reexanine this i 1
se iFSue. j
\
l i (9) Planninc Standard K. Radiological Exoorure Control l i
1 P r'oc ed u r e r stating the frecuency for reading dosimeters 0:e ;; , en t :c : .- :-i s. ; ._ c st esch F1 Er 2
3-l l State Police ~: cop 3, M;ddleboro.
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(10) Planrine Standard L. Medical Services Procedures for local officials to request ambulances to l 2;r: ( ent l o c a '. rect;r:es t hr s;g! MCDA Ares :: ;s. ce i
. ;. r',. *
(11) Planning Standard M. Re:cvery and Reentry Procedures regarding reentry into an evacuated area were included in each local plan in the 1965 revision.
(12) Pla-.ing Star.dard 1: . ~xerciss r.nd Driils An exercise war ccheduled for December 10, 1986. The utility has proposed a full scale exercise for August, 1967
', (13) Planning Standar$ D. Radi31egical Emer ency Recconne Trainir.c Traditionally, and because of lirited resources,. -
t r a i r.i n g h a s rior. previded only in the two months 1
I !
L preceding a full-scale exercise. However, each plan
.on.g should have a schedule of courses to be provided by MCDA and DPH throughout the two years interval between exercises. Training of local and state personnel is necessary. However, additional support must be provided to assure the training.
(14) Planning Standard P. Responsibility for Planning Effort The appendix listing procedures for plan' implementation have yet to be completed.
There is no cross reference prepared for the State, l area and local plans.
t T.e tsbie of contents for a revised draft of'the State plan has been erhancei. A new table of contents should be prepared for the current State plan.
Procedure for quarterly updsting are lacking at present.
Tr.is review covers all of the items covered in FEMA's Or*-her 31, .?i 's.:er r V : 7 2. . M u ,:e v e r , severs: y ' Je r actions shocid be undertaksn to assure a superior rating by the RAC. These matters are discussed in the next section.
l H. Propored Pilgrim P2an Enhancements l
l The following is a discussion of enhancements which should be made to the Pi33 rim Plans, even.if they are not deemed essential to complete the 350 review process.
Shelter Survey - A survey of available shelter within the Pilgrin EP2 should be prepared. At present, we cannot say for certain if there is adequate space to " shelter in -
place" the peak sunner population and we are unable to 1
w____.___m.______.__ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ m m.__._._.___._____.____..__.m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
assess the degree of protection that may be afforded by T
t existing shelter.
Plymouth County Radio flet and "Minitsur Radio" Syster.s These systems are lasdecuate and unreliable and shou;d be replaced completely. Boston Edison has agreed to install the same system for initial notification installed as presently is in use for Rowe and Vernon. Local governments should be given an enhanced, dedicated communications network.
Perconse to All Previoer Exercise Reoorts and RAC Reviews Since at least 1953, MCDA has lacked adequate staff to f_:: , tv.~.5 :: i c --^ := and aren: - nt ei fc correction in t r.e 1962 and :954 exercise reports.
Similarly, FEMA shoJ1d be provided with responses to all minor EA: review co- ents.
S ; e r i a '. ': sis otr.'st: -s - P;ar.s to serve and assist tre- s: :: - -r -
- ire rer. ..t-;; wa-<
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levels of Pi;;rie ,r:ans a r. d represer. a chronic deficiency
\
that has existed si. e 1951. This nest be a majo.
l planning priority and should be addressei by Civil Defense :
in the work ;1an we propose they file. See Section V of i this report.
E va cua t i e r. Time Estimate - This issue was discussed in the previous section.
Of f-Sit e Monit or i .9 -
Presently the Department of Puc. ic Health does conduct of f-site monit oring at the Pilgrim ~
1:Jelear Power P3ar.t by mE3nS of fixed loc 6 tion dosimeters t
~6."-
( TLD 's ) and the testing of air, water and fish samples.
i In at least one other plant, LaSalle'in Illinois, there exists a more advanced system for monitoring radioactive gases emitted. f rom the plant.. See Appendix Eleven. The Illinois system has a number of attractive features. The i system calls for the placement of.a computer at each of
~
the four operating nuclear power plants 1ocated in Illinois. There computers are to be connected by dedicated, high speed data. transmission lines to a Radiological Emergency Assessment Center in Springfield.
Each computer will continuously receive the following
- r f er stisr
.v.e t e o r o l e g i c a l d a t a , efficent release rates, and in-plant radiation measurements.
Ambient radiation measurements fron up to 16 remote monitoring devices.(pressurized in cha-bcre) o;tside a.i IJrrcanding the p: ant's per:r:ter.
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continao;s gross garma i.easJre-ants fro. an on-line stack monitor installed in the plant.
Once received in Springfield the meteorological and stack data are checked for signs of emergency conditions on indica icns that plant releases are exceeding design
'i specifications. In addition, the system employs a Radiation Exposure and Dose Assessment Model and Graphics Display System which can realistically depict the effect l of varying meteorological conditions on the dispersed material. The modelling system features the ability to
- 1 compute the exposure to radiation that would be suffered i t
j l
by people at varying distances from the plant with updates
( every fifteen minutes.
The system employs an isotopic stack monitor that "ut:lizes high purity gernaaium detectors and gamma spectroscopy to identify and quantify the isotopic components of gaseous effluents whether particulate, iodines or noble gases.... The advantages of isotopic nonitoring over simple gross monitoring include real-time knowledge of nuclitide release rates, continuous calibration, and automation for versatility and flexibility." Bu:letin of the Illinois Department of
'::'=:- F=!et'.
Tne ra.;f: cations of sach a system must be carefully studied. For example, such a system might enable state authorities to order anticipatory protective responses, in :;5:n; e'acustion, sr a precautionary .easure ref:re
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The Governor's Advisory Counci: On Radiation Prctection should do a thcrough study of this issue and if a system
)
of off-site monitoring is determined to be advantageous, then such a system should be installed and maintained at Pilgrim at the expense of BECo. >
1 Improved Public Education Methods - BEco should give consideration to using means other than the annual EP:
brochure to educate the public. These might include use of cable TV programs, preparation of video cassettes, -
including information packets in people's gas and electric
(
-C2-
1 bills, etc. It is also appropriate for a study to be h conducted by the Governor's Advisory Council' On Rafiation l
protection of the effectiveness of the various EPI devices j 1
1 used by Br00 and for a survey to be undertaken to j l
determine who receives the material and the level of knowledge about EPI by persons within the EPZ. ;
)
- Exoansion of the EPZ - As we noted in Part Two of this
)1 report, following the accident at Three Mile Island, the federal and state government established a Plume Exposure Pathway (EP;) of about 10 miles and an Ingestion Exposure 1
l Pathway (IEP) of 50 riles for nuclear power facilities.
S-e :: OTR sert.c- 5 . ' . : .e iefers: reg f.3 tic- :=
s:1ewhat flexic'e. . "The exact size and configuration of the EP:s surrounding a particular nuclear power facility shall be deternined by state and local governments in c o r.z ; : : s t : O r w.t- rE*'.A ar" NRC tak;ng ir.to ac ount s;ch
- .. ::.- -- ;; is~ ; 37 , :;r y-vc , 's -
characteristics, access routes anf locs'. jurisdiction boundaries." See 44 CF3 Section 350.7 (b). According to Civil Defense and TEMA officia'.s, there is no written definition by the NRC of the precise boundaries of the 1 EPZ. Rather, the definition results from a consultation between state, local and federal officials. This is ) 1 1
precisely what tock place at some point in the past for I l
the Pilgrim Nuclear Poder Plant. Thus under federsi regulations, we retain some measure of discretion to -
define the sice of the EPZ even after a plant has been l i c i r C "J .
-E3- 1
.E
Since at least 1983, the're have been those, including organizations like MASSPIR.G, who have advocated an expanded EP2. Most recently Senator William Golden and Energy Committee Chairman Larry Alexander he /e advocate?
I an expansion of the EPZ to 40 miles. See Senate Bills 1
Nos. 2066 & 2183 (1986). Tne Nuclear Regulatory j i
Commission has repeatedly affirmed the decision to limit the Plume Exposure Pathway to 10 miles. Recently, ;
published reports indicate that the nuclear industry may I
have plans to request the NRC to reduce the size of the !
l EP2 based upon research allegedly indicating that the f
\
l c : . .: ~. . .~ .: : oi ss:;rn :r a : C i d E . ~. v r. : t be 1.- .= . : e : a as thoJght i .- 1975 w h e r, the Reactor Safety Stady l
(WASH-1400) was prepared. According to a May, 1966 report I
(
prepared for the NJclear Safety An-lysis Center of the E; ectr:: Pr cc r Fecear " :r.it.t;te er. titled "E :rger.rj
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"the sa e tazic ::- riderations which led to the recommendation for a 10 mile plume exposure emergency planning zone (EP ) support a reduction in the EPZ to three miles or les.c with the IDCOP. spectrum of source terms."
Availatie evidc nce from Chernobyl indicates that evacuation extended to a portion of an area with a radius of approximately 2 5.5 railes f rom the p: ant. Reports suggest that, based on the wide dispersal of the radiation (due to its shooting high into the atmosphere above the to
~ l i
plant) there was more exposure to radiation in some cases suffered by persons who were farther away from the plant 1 than the exposure suffered by nearby residents. This saggests that there mJAt be flexibility to. Lake protectiVA ,
i actions including possibly evacuation outside of a 10 mile.
EPZ. According to Dr. Christoph Hohenemser, Professor of J
Physics at Clark University who was in. Germany at the time of the Chernobyl accident, "If anything is clear from the European experience, it is that protective action planning at:Iarge distances from a reactor accident is an issue whose time has come. .The need for such planning is not only driven by public fear and confusion, but also l by e$rly ec!!ect: te dore ertireter. Wherear rec
- of there estics.t+: 3;rce that Cherr,cbyl will impere i
at incre ental cancer ris< for individuals that ic ]
of order of 0.011 or less, and henca epidemiological 1y undetectable, the same estinates I show that the total social burden of. cancer will increase by thousands or even tens of thousands of cases. In light of'this there can be.little cuestier that the public will de ar.d appropriate pr;t?rt;c.."
T- .
r,4e-- ,t- ;.-- , ,. A r7-; *
,* p.,
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- ocal Het Sp : :n Ger.any (paper delivered to the Annual
- l i
l Meeting of the Society For Risk Analysis, Boston November 10-13, 1986).
Ironically, plannin; for widespread evaccation has never :
been stressed by the NRC or FEMA. As we noted earlier, the a i
Kemeny Commission found that the NRC scrambled to put together' li a 20 mile evacuation plan during the Three Mile Island !
accident. Mcre recently, during the 1953 Congressional i
i Hearings, Mr. Blond, Senior Risk Analyst, Office of Naclear
- I Regulatory Research, made the following remark:
\
l i
"Mr. Blond: Well, I would like to state from the I beginr.ing the 10-mile zone is not for evacuation.
It is for emergency planning and we had no pretention when we started that it would require evacuation in that zone but we would have planning performed. In f,ct, the document which proposes this distance is very clear in its specification and indicates shelter as the preferred method of emergency response." Id. Part I, at 102.
Certainly, Chernobyl is compelJing proof that serious exposure to radiation does not necessarily stop at a 10 1
j mile boundary and plans must exist for large scale' relocation. However, the additional costs associated with simply expanding the current EPZ'would be significant. For ex3 p:e a 40-mile EP: w:uldLinclude a area 16 times the s re cf tne presen: E:: and ccr.:sining :":-ty ti es the population of the prece. EP2. See Appendix Twelve for further details. To simoly expand the EPZ would mean that scarce resources would be spread out over a nuch larger ares .ith the res.': that the e - ;ritier with a - n <. ' for 1 -
l tr.e r.cs; intence plan ..; and training .ignc no oc.a.n what they need or might not obtain support as promptly as we would like to provide it. Also, to sirely enlarge the EP: would pessibi;. i. crease the spontaneous evacJation that occurs when an accident takes place. To the extent that greater nunbers of motorists are on the move in the event of an accident, our ability to evacuate those who face an immediate threat of exp:.?ure may be adversely affected.
It also should te ur.3erstood that ex,canding the Ep; will 1
not serve to wide- - " a +hree, add additional ~ egress fren Cape Cod, or inprove traffic flow over the Bourne and 1
\
t Sagamore Bridges. The population of Cape Cod is, by virtue
)
g of unique geographic factors, vulnerable in the event of a severe accident at Pilgrim. Nevertheless, to date, there has not been sufficient planning on behalf of residents of Cape Cod to prepare for a possible accident at Pilgrim.
This point was stressed by Congressman Gerry Studds at the ;
July 16, 1986 hearings on Pilgrim. The current state Emergency P.erponse Plan (CERP) and the local Comprehensive Emergency P.anagement Plans (CEMs), which to date exist for 166 of our cities and towns with the others in the process of being developed, provide a planning basis for evacuatica ,
1 c u *. ! - i C t.e EP: .i r.erct ary. C r. bt';r e, however, we j suppcrt the iritiat;Ve b'_ Ser.stor Golden ar.d Perreser.tative Alexander of the Joint Er.er:y Comnittee and others to l
excar.d e erger.cy plarring beyond the cJrrent 10 mile EPZ to; :a 3 To de r: : r. a- efiective a .i net 12s: =y rol;r
. . . , .. ., ;. . :. - ., ., - ..s...,-
.c.
r ero;r re s availarie to our C: Vil Defer.re and Puclic Healt'-
l acencies. 1 It would be usefal, we believe, at least initially, to develop a radiological ar.nex for the local CEMs as a further preparation for a serious accident at Pilgrim, or i
any other nuclear power plant or facility. Beyond this, it j l
might be prudent to establish a graduated EPZ with more l detailed p'.anr.ing and emphasis on prompt evacuation in the interior zcne and more flexible planning as one moves -
beycr.d the EP2. We recommer.d that this issue be referred
.c -
I to. the Gove'rnor's Advisory -Council on Radiation Protection
- for further analysis and. recommendations. See Part V.
- - Letters of Acreement - Letters of agreement are usef ul f or i a plannin- basis. A'though no substitute for crisis management, they' represent an important step in insuring l
that all necessary resources are in place. Civil. Defense l should secure letters of agreement with all private j companies supplying buses f or evacuations and produce a transportation plan f or each community andL the Area ' plan.
Moreover, there should be.a review of the adequacy.of existing nedical facilities for the treatment of those who P sva r;fi-:-r e 3 reve re r h i s ien exper ;r t. r ,cs tir; ar, there sh:;:S be implementing procedJres to provide fc the transportation of the injured and treatment at f acilities outside the EP2. This is particularly important with respect to ,tr v;siens for med;cs1-care. The fact ths:
- -- - 3,-- 3- -: :- :- e r - 97,s,, .. r'-;n.'
B;rns Institate and ~he Jordan Hospital'have agreed :o assist with the care and treatment of persons who may be contaminated or exposed to radiation is not saf ficient.
There shecid be details about the capacity of these facilities and tne type of care they are capable of providing.
State Plan -
The proposed revision' to the state's- RERP plan should be considered for adoption by Civil Defense. If-this new version of the state's plan is submitted for the -
j 350 process, it will req; ire substantia 1 ' revisions to the. l
(
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1
.. j
Area II plan. Since the Area II plan is the weakest document, its revision should preceed with all deliberste speed.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1. ACTION BY FEMA. It is our recommendation that a copy of this report be forwarded to FEMA with a recommendation that.
it be reviewed and that each of the deficiencies we have identified be addressed in the upcoming report that FEMA is preparir.g on t'.e'Pilgri? plans.
- 2. ESTABLISE f:EW STATE PLAN!!!!G RESOUFCE. Creation of Technological Hazards Division (THD) within Civil. Defense Agency to add planning resources we de not presently have.
This will be accomplished by an Administrative Order by the I
Secretary (See Appendix Two). Initial funding for upgrade 1 and maintenance of Pilgrim RERP plans to come from Technological Hazards Fund maintained by Secretary under G.L. c. 6A section 6. Future funding based on legislation authorizing state assessment of nuclear utilities and certain other commercial operations. The THD should publish a work plan for the creation of a Statewi$e 1
Automated Radiological Emergency Response Data Base to be i
7 l
i 4
l
administered and controlled by the Massachusetts Civil q
Defenre Agency and to include a comprehensive and current list of emergency personnel, and telephone numbers, persons 4
within the ro: with specia; transportation needs who choose l
1 to be identified and the location and availability of !
j material and personnel resources along with ETA's for each
{
i category.
- 3. WO R Y. PLAN FOR UP3R ADI!m PILGRIM PLANS. Within ten days of the execution of the Secretary's Administrative Order, the Civil Defense Agency should file a work plan detailing the steps to be taken to upgrade the Pilgrim RERP plans to i
- : .: s r e :; -
f- f - '
a r r : *. : .~; F D N. under 44 CTF Sectior 250.7, inc;Ld.n], in particular, the executien of appropriate written memoranda of understanding with federal, state and local agencies whose assistance is et.:e ;'.5:e: - t ..e care cf a .a.: ofi-site r e;e :c . :f 4; , . .
fcr the schocls snd the robility irpaired. Such a p;an nust provide fcr !cca: review and evaluation of any revisions to the emergency plans.
- 4. ?!"DY POSS:B!LITY OF E XPA*:D:NG THE EP2. The Governor's I Advisory Council on Rad ation Protection, see G.L. c. 111, Section 4F, should undertake a study (a) to determine j whether the definition " nuclear power plant area" under G.L. c. 33-A;;eniix, Sc:t;on 13-29, inserted by St. 1979, 1 I
i
- c. 796, Section 24, should be modified to inc1cde - I co nunities located within a radius greater than 10 riles
-7;- l I
l l
l J
and whether consultation with FEMA and'the NRC to modify I
the existing agreement should occur, (,b) to determine the-
~
type.of emergency planning that should take place within an expanded EP: and (c) a study of the effectiveness of the i
present material used.to convey EPI information to the public.
l
- 5. ANNUAL REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PLANS. Within thirty days of l the execution of the Secretary's administrative Order, the l
Director of the Civil Defense Agency shall publish procedures for annual review by' state and local officials of the preparedness and response plans for Pilgrim Power S stion,'F;.+ iir.>.s e P xe r S t a t ion a n d Ve r..o r Powe r S t 3 t i n in accordance with G.L. c. 33-Appendix, Section 13-23, inserted by St. 1979, c. 796, Section 24, and for the annual letter of certification required Section C of G;; dance Me :randar ??- to UCREG'0654/FF.MA-REP-1.
.,, e ;;, 77_-g . . - : ;77- ..,
, 3 , ; . , , , , g. g the execution of tne Secretary's Administrative Order, the Governor's Advisory Council On Radiation Protection should file a report on the cost and utility of installing an off-site monitoring system like the one in place at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant or any-other comparable system ar.d a proposal for how such a system would interface with our existing and any proposed' emergency response procedures..
- 7. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY SOSTDN ED: SON CO!1PANY. Within 4 thirty days of the execution of the Secretary's - i Administrative Order, in accordance with theEprovisione cf
\ :
i
NUREG 4654/ FEM A-REP-1, pg . 25, Boston Edision Company i should,
- (a) En.ancial Contribution To Planninc - make a significant co n t rit a t i c n to the Technological Hazards Fund to support the kehnological Hazards Division and the upgrading of the Pilgrba RERP plans [an appropriate credit would be given to BECo to of f set future assessments under the proposed l
legi slat ion }
(b) larrove Communication with Transoort Vehicles - publish a report on the cost and feasibility of installing NOAA tone alert radios or sone other communications system in ever; sr"7:: tur, tra ::::st.r- t e .- i ~. e a r. i c t ' . e r v e ". ; c '. e r s pe c is '. l y 1; censed to trsnspott children, the elderly, or the handicapped within the Ep2 and a special communications sy s t e: for the schools within the EP2:
(c) N+ .- Ivac;3 tic- .-: :- i.ste - proceed witr a'.1 (l
- -- I d- .- :. :: p . -
r+r.r .- ci s 3' .
J I
Time Estinate s tud3 bared on a consideration of the most 1
recent census data, traffic pattern analysis, population l density analysis [with particular attention to the sammer l t
beach and tourist pop;;stion) and the location of and moveent of people, vehicles and materials to and from public and private schools and day care f acilities, hospitals and retail, ccreercial and industrial facilities; (d) Stelter Survey - co nission a comprehensive shelter s u r vey:
-~2-
(e) kprove Delivery of Emeroency Public Information -
i repon on additional methods that could be utilized to-
]
- I convey EPI to the public including Cable TV, including i
inf omation packets in custcmer's electric or gas bills, etc., and study the extent to which EPI information' reaches the' residents of the EPZ and is understood by those people; (f) taprove Communications with State and Local Of ficials -
replace or repair the current Minitaur Radio System by whiet P. massachusetts State Police notify local of ficials l f ollowing a call f rom the Pilgrim Power Station and . install with a new system that is independent of the Plymouth C c ;:.- 1:e:w rk f;: loril erergency r.ctificatter ar.d cc plete testing of the new system; (g) Oct a i n Certification of Siren and Alert Notification System -
obtain final approval of, under the auspices of FEMA and Massarhuse: .s Ci .1 Def ents, the Siren ar.d Alert (h) Eari.:sre :~orece ents - make all required hardstare and procedure upgr ades to take full advantage of NRC strategy' to mitigate ef fects of severe' accidents; and (1) Cor r e c t i on of Manage er.t Problem - propose a mechanism f or providing the public with an accounting of its success or f ailure in addressing all the management problems to surf ace in the past year prior to any-attempt to resume of er ations.
VI. CONCLUSION This study of our preparedness for an accident at the J Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant establishes the interdependence of plant management, resctor safety, regulatory enforcement and emergency planning. A deficiency in any one of these areas may jeopardize the safety and health of not only those in the immediate. vicinity _of the plant, but others who may live many.
3 miles away. l There is cause for concern about the quality of each of these four functional areas. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth )
is limited in its ability to bring about improvements in the first : tree erett. ::e t e r : t e ' e ;. r , we have st;ght to iden-ify the problems and weaknecces that presently exist in all these !
i areas with specificity. We have proposed a plan of action that !
I includes recommendations for activity by Boston Edison Company, the ' ; c '. e a r P e g u ; e t o r:; Cr--3.ssien, the Congres: and state and
- s
- .
- '. . - . .
In .our vie.', there has been s;ch a disappointing history of performance at Pilgrir by Boston Edison Company since 1972 and there currently exists problems of such magnitude that Boston Edison Company bears a heavy burden of persuading the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that it shocid be permitted to resume nuclear operations at the Pilgrim Power Plant.
Resce tfally submitt i,
'- P .
Charles V'. Barry (
Secretary of Public Safety
(
\
-i VII.
- INDEX TO APPENDICES Appendix One NRC Emergency Planning Standards Appendix Two Order by Secretary Establishing Technological Hazards Fund Appendix Three Library of Congress Study On Funding Of Local Emergency Planning Activities Appendix Four Analysis of Mass. Civil Defense Agency Planning Study Appe r.ii x Five History of Regulatory Perfor ance 2. Pilgr: 'Ur:es:
Pcaer Stat;on 1972-ISEC Appendix Six Material Regarding Severe Accident Behavior of Boiling Water Reactors Submitted by Mr. Joseph Bernero, Chief of the Boiling Water Reacter Di/;sion cf the NRC U
^- e- Fe3r>< t. :t- .:i.- Ar --:-
e . AFse'.stine, U.S. S u c '. 9 5 :
Regulatory Commission (June 9, 1986)
Appendix Eight Boston Edison Company Response to Report by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Appendix Nine FEMA Memorandum Regarding Requirements of Emergency Planning Appendix Ten Material Submitted by Suffolk County, New York to )'
Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations Regarding Factors Affecting Emergency P1:nning at Shoreham NucleSr )
Power Plant
, I
- 5 l<
l Appendix Eleven Material Regarding Off-Site Monitoring Excerpted from 16th Annua 3 National Conference On Radiation Control Appendix Twelve Geographic and Population j Characteristics of a 40-Mile EPZ as Outlined by Mass. Civil Defense Appendix Thirteen Proposed 20-Mile EPZ Prepared by Suffolk County New York In Connection with Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant
-7c- l 4
FOOTNOTES 1
- 1 This report is submitted in accordance with the Governor's statement on June 16, 1986 to a group of legislators who convened to discuss the emergency response plans for the Pilgrim Power Station.- The report is based on an review of source documents, interviews.with federal, state, local and BECo of ficials, and attendance at each legislative and municipal hearing on the subject.
2 Indeed, FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management' Agency, conceded that this assurance-is. lacking. According to Mr.
Ri chard . W . Krinn, Assistant Associate Director, office of Natural and Technological Hazards, "In the extreme case, the worst type of accident, which I think is a class 9 accident, you would really have to go to shelter rather-than evacuation and you are talking about the plume area; you are not talking really so much about a 10-mile radius, but that area where the plume exposure goes, where.the release of radioicidner would be harmful to the puclic.
'dhat * .;; w: li tr; tc 3e in thit extreme'cace s to aler:-
l pec;1e and ic; car alect them. This is someth;r.; se do look at , hnw fast we can alert and notify pecple and the ability of the local and state governments to do this. In I
that extrere case you would have no alternative but-to of f er snelter:nc unt:2 you could safely evacuate people."
(emphas:s adced ) . Erercency Preparedness and the L:censine Procest Fer Co-.ere s! Suclear Power Reactors, Oversight E s a ri".g c e i ; r e t r.+ 5 ;ccom .;ttee on Oversight and ani :.c;1ar
- v a r '. ? s . : . ! tf :te Co-rittee on Interio
airs, M ;. e of t e ,r . , 95.- Cong., 15: secs'pn I :f r .
9E-52), P. 2 at 21 (hereafter, 1933 Oversight Hest;ngi.
3 The following excerpt from the Report of New York State Fact Finding Panel on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Facility (December, 1953) (hereafter, Marburger Commission) presents a good starting point for an understanding of the controversy. surrounding the analysis of risk and accident consequence in the case of commercial nuclear power plants.
"The risks assoctated with nuclear power plants arise prinarily from the possibility of human exposureLto l
radioactive elements in the fuel, in the spent fuel, and in l material that has beer. exposed to irradiation fromi fissioning fuel in the reactor. -Thus the entire life cycle of the fuel, from mining to ultimate disposal, presents opportunities for public risk. This Panel focused upon risks ascociated with accidents within the operating plant, because these are most r.elevant to thecoff-site'energency -
preparedness issue. But even in the absence _of catastropn:c accidents, a normally operating i
nuclear plant does release very small amounts of radioactive material. The associated health effects of this radiation are in dispute, but the majority of the Panel agreed that the National Academy of Sciences report
" Risks Associated with Duclear Power: A Critical Review of the Literoture" (NAS, 1979) is a credible one. Two views of the risks of low level radiation are described below together with an. indication of how the Panel members divide on the issue.
"The nuc2 ear reactor at Shoreham is. called a boiling
, water reactor. [ed. note: The ~ Pilgrim reactor also is a boiling water reactor). .It cannot explode as a nuclear
. weapon does (not because an explosion is unlikely, but
! becuase weapons requireivery special design features which l are not present in nuclear reactors) and therefore a l release of radioactivity to the environment must be1 driven by some other means. . Boiling water. reactors have three
.- barriers to prevent the escape of: radioactive material:
- the cladding.around.the fuel elements, the reactor vessel itse?f, which is designed to' retain fission prcducts-r+;esred fro- is ;st cf. e d d i n c , sn-; the er.tsi-.er.
st ;cture ar;;ni the res::c vecrel, wr..cr is d e r i g r.e ' ::
retain relesser frcr.s daraged reactor vessel. Since the only way the radioactive fuel materials can get out of
- their cladding is if the cladding melts, risk assessment
{ '
and safety design are focused upon accidents in which the ebility to cool the reactor core is lost. It is not easy to understand bcw the fuel once released frow. the core couli escape tne c:ntai- ert t;;15ir.; in '.srge q ; a r.t i t i e s ,
"e scci da-* r e .s -i c t'r s^e tris es- e ettrei te i.
":ne effec: tf a rs;es e cf rsiacac :1..y 5 +; e r. n.
extensi vely uper. w+at he r conditions during and sutsequent
- to the release. Health effects result both from exposure-
} to the relessed "plun " and free subsequent exposure to i substances contaminated by contact with.the plume l materials. These exposures could irradiate people in the vicinity of the plant at levels sufficiently great to i cause short-term as well as long-term health effects.
"The level of irradiation is comronly measured in unite called rems. Each year a typical' United States' citizen
,i receives about 0.18 rem of which about 0.11 rem comes from I natural sources, and the rest comes fron diagnostic
! x-rays. Short-term health effects appear at levels exceeding about 100 rer, although'some individuals show .
clinically meas;rsble changes in blood cell count at ')
" levels somewhat lesc than 50 rer. At 200 rem, most people j
- will show clinical symptoms, and these most sensitive to: . '!
rediation could die fror infection in the absence of i medical a t t e n t : c t.. A: 4'O rer., half those exposed would 1 succomb within 30 days unlers treated. Long-term effects i
-2
_._____.____.___mm__ _ _ _ U
i f
include cancer and genetic changes and may result from a short period of high level irradiation or a11onger period of lower irradiation. One way of describing the long-term
- effe:t is to give the increase in lifetime risk of death f ron cancer due to the irradiation. Becausa of the low love's involved, and the difficulty of distinguishing among the various possible causes of actual cancers, the numbers are somewhat controversial. The best available stuty estimates the increase in lif etime risk to' be f rom 0.54 to 1.4% of the naturally occurring mortality rate for each 10 reps of exposure.
"How are these numbers related to expected irradiations f ro: a serious nuclear powar plant accident? The DRC requires protective action when it appears that the general public may be exposed to radiation J evels of 5 rems or more. _I t recommends protective action at the 1 rem level . The 1-5 rem range is referred to as a Protective Action Guideline (PAG) . PAGs are related to accident scenarios in the following statement from NUREG 0396: 'Given a cere relt accident, there is about a 70%
c 3rre of exree r. g the FA7 dczer at 2 ri:es. A 4;i c .u.re a: E r.:^7 a r. i a 30i chance a: 10 r::es. ~ r. E probat:lity cf exceci:ng PAG doses at 10 miles is ... one char. e in 50,000 per reactor year. Based in part upon the above inf orration, the (joint NRC/ EPA) task force judged that a 10-mile energency planning zone would be appropriate to deal with a core melt accident'. One infers thst the ';PC erti.7.tes that within each year of r e s r;; r c r -: : 1 ; 5 , tt+= ;: c'.;r.ce :n 50,C00 that
- .sr ' :- the p; ant we .: 2 recaive i-rer. ,.; :.. .:
2 y ,- .: :
r=- . , -
-c.u , or .,, ,:. ; ~ . ,2 3 p..r-.
rernkt are rasef sra n:: specif;c to :ne snorer.a.- p ; a r. : ,
and do not reflect r:re recent analyses of the nanner i r.
which radioactive materials might escape from their confinement in the reactor core. The more recent analyses, which have not yet been accepted or rejected by URC, indicate that the actual probability of exceeding PA3 guidelines is lower than that given above by a factor of at least ten.
"F.ow are such probabilities estimated? The arount of radioactive rateria; released in a given type of accident may be estinated by applying known physical principles to the analysis of the accident scenario. The amount and type of material released is called the ' source term'.
Large source terms cone fron accident scenarios with' low probahili ty of occcrrence. The overall probability of a given radi stion hosith ef f ect may be obtained by combining the probabili:3 of an accident producing a source term and .
the prchsrility cf a weather condition that brings the plune into contact with a populated area.
t 3
3
" Accident probabilities are difficult to predict. The conventional method, called 'probabilistic risk assessment'... gives probabilities for major accidents )
o that are so low that other unpredictable events such as j sabotage may occur with greater likelihood. [There j findings were expressed in a 1975 study known as "The i Reactor Safety Study" (WASH 1400)(the Rasmussan Report)).
For emergency planning. purposes, a source term is selected corresponding to a severe accident and used to establish parameters such as the size of the zone which might.have to be evacuated. The est.imation of source terms, and selection of accident severity for emergency planning .
purposes are ordinarily conducted by the NRC and also )
involves the various utilities." Marburger Commission Report, supra at 6-7.
l PRA methodology, however, isl highly controversial. For I example, in a consultant report to.the Marburger Commission entitled "The Nature and' Manner of Risks Associated with the Operation of Nuclear Power" by Mr.
David Spr i t zen of C.M. Post College, the aut",or challengci the :st;: fer ~.e r e.5irti-.s of the "Pesctor Saie.3 S:ciy" t '.; A S H 1 4 ~. . ) en gr ;nic (1) that it relies on ar
" event tree analycis"'that reg;;res theLassignment of specific probabilities of failure to events about which there is no meaningful statistical data (i.e., it is grounded in guess-work), (2) that event tree analysis assumes single initiating events and overlooks accident sequences initiated by ~ultiple failures, (3) that the Mstical Aeren;;t r . ani Ersee '.f" r i ni s t r a t i c s has 5: cered t ". e ;rc :f ecer: tree - : . v : '. e :ces;s- t ev prr.*e te re
- , :-<= s- a - ,a. -n. ,
- -ae gr-~,-
- 5- .;v4 71,: -
. tne crder cf .3to -.. -
- ez", (4) :nat the'Anerican Physical Scciety cbserved after its review that "we do ntt now have confidence in the probability estimates generated j
by the Rasmussan Report [ WASH 14001" and (5) that in 1979 the MRC dec]ared that it does not regard the numerical estimates of overali risk found in WASH 1400 as " reliable".
On May ~2, 1956, before the Subcommittee on Energy i Conservation and Power of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Representative Edward Markey (he:eafter, 19E6 Reactor Safety Hearing ), then MRC Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino discussed the agency's 1985 Severe Accident Policy which provides that existing nuclear power plants pose "no undue risk" to public health and safety. Chairman Palladino explained 1955 and 1986 MRC staff projections and industry projections about the likelihood of an core meltdown in a U.S. nuclear power plant. He expressed the likelinood as somewhere between .12-451 that over the course of 20 years there would be a severe core melt at one of the 100 or so nuclear power plants cre r ati ng in the United States.
e
.g.
Cor.sissioner James Asselstine, who testified at the same he a r ine . went even further.
- *(Ginless f urther steps are taken to reduce s:bst antially the likelihood of a core meltdown acci de n t , we can expect to see such an accident at a U .S . plant within the next 20 years. This conclusion is supported by the PRA done f or U.S. plants to date, by the substantial uncertainties in those assessments itel u di no their limited ability to account for human perf orncnce and ext e rnal accident initiators, and 'y c recent operating experiences with the plants which shows that at least some PRA assumptions are overly on i mi s t i c " (emphasis added).
It is t rue, as Chairman Pa11adir.:. pointed out, that neither " severe core damage" (defined as insufficient core cooling to maintain f uel integrity) nor " core me]t" (defined as the release of radiation outside of the reactor pressure vessel) means that there is a release of r aii tt ic- to the outside V7rld. For that to occur, there
~;; re s brear- cf t.e co.tair..ont that -ho ;te s tr.e
, n.r;ea: resrt r . rse'. '
1 i Unfortunately, according to URO written answers to ;
questions posed by the House Subcommittee on Energy l Conservation and Power f or the July 16, 1966 Hearing on Management Problems'at U.S. Reactors - The Pilgrim Case (hersafter, 1956 Pilgrir '<anagement Hearing), there is an a: .n:-;eig e ; " 9 C '. r :e Of fall;re" cf ccr.tain er.: ir the c>cr: -f ; rrre r e ;; . <- v. P:';ri- d;e to F.he desie- cf
.-a a: .~;- ,
- l Despit e the u.rertsi.ty surrounding PRA, the study and research that is geir.g en suggests that the NRC may plan to place even more reliance on it. Soon, the NRC staff is expected to publish for conment a draft study (UUREG 1150) recalculating the risks and uncertainties predicted by the 1975 Reactor Study (WASH 1400). According to a description cont ained in the recently published Source Term Report (" Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estinating Sou rce Terms" (::UFEG 0956 (July 1986))), "NUREG 1150 will provide (:) a description of the probabilistic risk assessment methods, data bases, and assumptions and (2). sufficient information regarding the results of the analyses and exa"ples of the use of such information so that the reader can understand hcw such reliability - and risk - reisted infor ation can be used in the regulation of nuclear power p: ants."
Obviously, f r. 1:ph: of the uncertainty associated with.
j PRA metnodol ogy, o /e: reliance on the results could be .
i
(
l 5-L_____.____________________.___.___________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. _ __ _
l l
dangerous. In responses to questions by the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power for the 1986 Reactor Safety Hearing, the NRC-reaffirmed its earlier statement to the General Accounting Office that "it shouldn't use end - result numerical risk estimates as the sale or primary basis for regulatory decisions." The !!RC explained this position as follows.
"PRA's are used to' develop central or nominal, numerical estimates of risk which are considered only with fall recognition of the uncertainties of the analysis. These uncertainties usually mean that the central value of risk calculated could be low or high by seven multiples of the central value and in some cases by a factor of 10'or more."
l l
NRC Commissioner Asselstine again went further and stated at the Congressional Hearing on May 22, 1986 that PRA's "usually have uncertainty bands of over a factor of 100".
4 .e ::- : s u r ,r '. ; e d :nc fc11:w;n? wr.tten resp-.re t o : <::
c_estions frc- the House succomr.ittee or Energy Conservation and Power as part of the 1986 Pilgrin Management Hesring conducted en July 16, 1926:
"::RC 's chief safety officer has reportedly told the indastry that he is concerned about Mark I containment buildings because given a ccre relt accident'they have a 90 percent chan:e cf fa;;ure. P;ea.:e ar.swer the f;12cxin?-
l (A) "Is a 90 percent chance of failure in the event of a core meltdown an acceptable failure rate?"
A N S'.ir R
]
)
"The NRC holds the position that the likelihoed of core melt accidents in any plant should be very low and, in addition, that there should be substantial assurance that the containment will mitigate the consequences of.a core melt should one occur in rrder to ensure low risk to the public. It is not merely a question of having low risk but of having as well the defense-in-depth assurance of combined protection by prevention and mitigation ~. This concept was identified in the Cone.ission's Policy Statement as noted in response to Question 8. However, a l number of regulatory actions have been taken, as outlined below, which will reduce the probability of containment )
(
failure for Mark I containrer.t buildings 1
i i
The recent expression of concern cited in Question 9 was expressed -with the intention' of encouraging utility owners of BWR MK I plants to give priorityuto the continuing need for ensuring MK I containment integrity. The 90' percent chance estimate was a rough approxit.:ation of the results of the WASH.1400 assessment published in 1975. That assessment was based on the Peach Bottom plant'as it stood at that time, and on the operating'and emergency procedures of that time. The results, which indicated a virtual certainty of a fairly large release with every core melt, also showed many circumstances where' lesser.
accident conditions could lead to overpressure fai' lure of:
containment -- which failure in turn actually caused the core melt. .The risk dominant accident sequences were transients such as anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) in which excessive energy is released'to containment or other transients with an associated scram where containment heat removal capability'was lost. It.is important to note that the WASH 1400. analysis still found that the overall risk of the BWR was equivalent to the-risk of the PWP even though the PW3 contain.ent was citi.sted :o p r t'. . ie p r e st e r r; t ig s tion of core mel; c:nseq;ence:. r.;s ws: L(:s e e .:A2H 1400 est:rsted a lower likelihood of ccre melt in the BWR due to its diverse ani flexible ester sepply systems.
Since the TM: accident a great deal has been do.e and is still in progress to lower the risk of the BWR MK I p: ants, bcth by suppressing the likelihood cf core melt accidents and by encuring c:ns:-quence ritigation by tne c -.si, e t. :rn ove' t si.ing ani sy pto -hisei
-- . , r.- - 'a- .:1: r- . :e ce v v: , y . . : .. -s are es e ; ally eifer::ve :n BURS 'ecause c of the ;nneren; flexibility cf t .'.e p l a n t systems. One of the major risk contributors, ATWS, har been substantially reduced by NRC rule mandated improvements. Since forther studies showed that the BWR suppression pool water had a much-greater capacility to scrub releases than was recognized by WASH 1400, a filtered-vent containment strategy was adopted.
While within the design basis envelope, the BWR containment remains s2aled. If, through some beyond design basis failure, the pressure threatens to cause uncontrolled failure of containment, the strategy call's for venting the containment from the wetwell, above the pool, so that releases pass through the water where essentially all the major constituents.except the noble-gases are recoved. Containment venting procedures are being developed and ir?:emented at many BURS. Some;small design changes nay be necessary to implement or: improve the ability to avert containment failure from overpressure -
or other f ailure moder.
,; 3 j.Et f. z c y se o ,
3 i
s Doth the !:nc and the industry are active in this prohefs t hrough our independent wor? and interaction with the '
I Industry Degraded. Core (IDC09) ' group,and the owners directly. ( , f Because of the continuingiwick and t>d incomplete ,
implementation, it is not posrible tt, sdve a !i )> 4 representative MK I containment performance figure at' this i.* "..
time but, consistent with the NAC Sev'erk Accrident Pglicy '
Statement, the current'proce s for evalbatihbf indi
' V i= proving exis*ing plants is expected to/achiabre conditions where a MK'I containment'ptcyMe't substantial assurance of mitigating :he consequence 6.cfba7 core' melt v
should one occur. Further,.with adottil)n a0 o'.of the many ways. to reduce the likelihood t1/ core meic, I thi risk 'of BWR_MK I plants is low." NRC Response t0 Questi9n<Nine r >V' (A) from House Subcommittee On Energy Conservation and ,
Power. The Committee also posed t6e'following qubstionlto '
the NRC. 4 l
e e . , e , ,s , . l '
.':~ -_ >
t
,l (3) "Me c t
- e ::-: t e '. . e ; e ' : h e F;;;rir'r cenk cdent' /
b .:i l d i n g is more vu;nerchla 56 faildre'given a$;c:4 melt accident than other types 'of.ebntain.ent huid iigs in use at other plantc?" ^ i s ! ( .
t b
' i !t j
~
i A :sur? f ,
s "Stuiles of se :re s t:i de .t c b nany yea rs Nye p
'-s-: _k=- r. :: .- : ;--3:-t-.: c ;ch s ,- the p : :ri- i 1
- . - .,5- se -~' .< ; 4 - 1 1, ;v : j r. < . -y._. . , . . -
P '
.{
- nan scme other ty;cs :t conta:nrent ou;;d;ngd Jue to V n' sms11er resitive size, c er.p a c t geome:ry, etc. f
Nevertheless, the work referred to in response to)9A(abore '
indicates that substam.61 asskrance of core melfi-1 : ,
Consequence mitigation can te dchived with,the BkV NT I i l; containment. j.
,. a 1
As to Pilgrim specifically they, 'J i k e ot herg > i ant 6 o f this type, are in the process of developiny and *^ ' 6 ,
j, implementing the necess ry: i improvements.- F o'cL e x a r; % e , d ',
emergency opersting procedures up through Revisin 2 ofJ " h I; *f the BWR Emergency Procedure Guidelines have been f f/ :,
implemented; this includes containment venting.z g Tdo of 1.
the three elements of the ATW.3 ' improvements have been i'.Y ,
rea d e . But the Ini:viies: Plant Evaluatien for severe F q
3Ccidents has not */ e
- 06 r Cond C*ed So OC sDeC:fIC Isk li. , ,
estlette can be F8.d4 bt this time'for the Pilgijm Diant" :
'i'
]- "
(empnasis added). Q C.
s .
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( ,s ,g p s.
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_ ____ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .__ _ . _- _ _L _ _ _ _ _ __________.______._J _
t, , , v T y
i
- st i ' '
.. \ .
S. .
The nuclassr industry's response to concern about the -
consequences i ef severe accidents f ollowirig tie' 19.'0 f accident at'Joree Mile Island was to establish the IDCOR ,
(Industrf Degr6ded Core Rulemaking) Program. A :.Ujor ,
study releaged by IDCOP in Nover.ber 1984 and titled g
Hoclear Power Plart Response To.?e' vere Accielents! concluded ,
that "sJdit,ioi.a1 major design or operational c'ranbes in existing nuc ear power plant Mesigns are not warranted."
This conclusion was based largely on the be21ef that previous risk analysis was too pessimistic: y ,
j 4
4
' "IDCOR cane to three primary t tchnicsi conc 3usior.c and one everall policy conclus j m. s ,
First .the pcebabilities of severe nuclepr '
Accidents occurring are extremely lo,w. [
v Second, the fission, product source terms -
, e.un,t: ties and t:rpes of radioactive material
.i ' 1c ased in the event of hevere accidents - are Pe .
t: .k e : - 4 less that had been
... . . :.".e.. a ..
.- . . .: . ,. c. .
In:ri, t ra r.r<
c s.i consequences'to t9e puic :.
E8 ef rev?re nucleJ:r u Ndents are significar.tly below th:se predleted by previous studies and a-e >
g;h Fra'ler than the risk levtla incorporated in the NPC inteein safety goals.
r
- . . :; s t a r. i r . ; t , ' : 0 C L R c o r.c '. e d e d t h r. .
re- 3
-- tr 2=-- -- .
- .r;.;; -: -;n 4- i. re n e -,
t d.
~
at .-6.
4 "Eva:;stior T rt EF;.r.ates" (ETE) are the result of s rathe".at: Cal no5 eld .n;t seek to provide as estinate of the time requitec to evacuate pecole from areas within t%e '
10 et.e energency plann:ag zone surrounding a nuclear power plant under varyir.g coh$1*. crc of westher, time cf day, week and year. The last ETE ' cane f or Pilg rim wac corpleted b 19'9 by HM". Associa t'et o.f Waltham Mass.
Federal regulations require that- a nuclear utility submit an " analysis" of ETE's, see 10 CFR Ch. 1, Pa'rt 50 App. E (!V), but there is no app;oved standardized methodology and r.o f Sierally appr.oved r.inieu time that
\
mu. :t be ret in order to obtain'a license. I
)
o The ak:ence of a f ederally prescribed "ni .1mur" . I e'zacusticr. tine was the subject of an interestin; exchance t 2:nen Representat ve Patterson of Calif ornia' and Mr.
3 T ger Blor.d, Ser..:r Risk Analyst, Office of Nucleir
-9 i
?. -
at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
,, TT .3 i 1
c n'
d'
\
.l
. Regulatory Researc of the NRC.at the 1983 Oversight I!edrings, Pt.1 (no.98-52) at 108-09.
1 t
~
" Rep. Patterson:Ys Thank you, Mr. Chai rman. Let.me pursue
{
1 that just a little bit. In NUREG-1E56 it says an analysis l
/ of evacuation times'around plantsites, evacuation time-estimates are given for the 10-mile radius at~each-operating nuclear plant. Under.-normal conditions, the i time estimates areafrom 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at Yankee Ro in Massachusetts to 141 hours0.00163 days <br />0.0392 hours <br />2.331349e-4 weeks <br />5.36505e-5 months <br /> at' Zion in Illinois. Under
] -
. adverse condit!ons,'the evacuation time estimates range as.
high as 30 to 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />s:for a number of sites. Now let me-Y ask for either normal or adverse > weather conditions,does s the NRC have a regulation . criteria or guideline' that
< defines what an acceptable or reasonable time is?. I think.
1 '
Mr. Blond'just said something about a reasonable time if they can be evacuated. - Whoever wants to answer."
"Mr. Snierek: The URO has no specific standard which requires a minimum time for evacuation. As Mr. Blond said, there are cther actions, other than-evacuation, that we ray want pe:r'c t: :ne. A r . ; c t. t r.::.h hs shelter:r.7 N-Dependtng ;r47, the tyre of t r : i d e n t ,- t *. + ty.re of releare,
.i weather men-itions, the specific geography, the' specific road cetditions, evacuation may not be the -m0st
, approp.. ate course of action."'
" Pep. Patterson: But of course at Three Mile Island, that
[.
is, in effe:t, what-r re pecple' evacuated than'were advised to eva ;ste. 3:r't ye; think that's 1 ke'.y to te the cere? *:o u:er we u 35r;.re e.e right Sive, it .
.:i
.. .- -c - e. - ,. : , . - - . ,: ; , , -4 :- . : rger: 3- .
of a :e asonarle p*rc an's m.ni.
Let me get back to my real question though. You say you-have no guidelines for evacuation. Are you then saying one never needs to evacuate or are you saying that there-is noiset time because any site is evaccable? Which is it
, we are saying here?"
"Mr. Blond: I think I can comment on:that.1 There is a
. numrer of pieces of in'ermetion which are relevant to those questions. I believe the report that you are referring to^ar.d the times that you are indicating presume to evacuate the entire 10-mile area and give times of what it would require to evacuate the full radius or the' full i area within 10 miles. The presumption under any type of n emergency, if it is radioactive material or. whatever, you 4 '
, would hope to protect the people'at highest risk and this is something which is carried'on-if.it's phorgene in a ,
tank that happens to be traveling the road, chlorine ,any a type of material-you _ :cok at a well' defined aren,nornal:y
, tne downwind direction and try to protect'those people-in-that d.f r e c t : c r . "
.y 4
s
l
" Rep. Patterson: Well, are you saying the that there are different. times for different' distances or different zones?"
"Mr. Elond: Yes, there presumably are."
"Reo. Patterson: That's presumaole. But you don't have any standards."
"Mr. Blond: The other interesting part of the question is that. study is a study, a mathematical study, similar to the ones that we conduct on road networks and car maintenance and the like. There is in all of the work,.as' Chairman P.arkey indicated, a probabilistic risk assessment.- There are large. uncertainties and we admit-to these uncertainties and we are trying to improve them all the time. In emergency response above everything'else that we ever ' deal with, there is a tremendous body of information on how people respond in emergencies. ,In this country it seems, according to some very gross statistics that we keep or try to keep, that evacuations oCCJr once a bT *.
- 1r.t";c Car "y. ' .s .
A"tOJ6tions noW and the' l t; er req;. red itr t !. ; ; e rea ;it. n.: u r. d e r s:1 ty,res :f q conditions, stcr conditions, is.a very well defined set of tires, approxir.ately 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to evacuate people from an area no estter how many people were involved, no ,
matter what the distances are that.were-involved. !
" Pep. Patterren: You are saying that this area coeld be eve:.r.ei ;n 2 :: ( h: n: c r. d + : any weather ccr.diticr.c."
, :~- -
z- , , , . ... . . ..y
+ . at : sr.z n ;p cf e e:gency response is very clear on the subject. 1: is the way that you really-_try to do the work when yo; do it. Yoc go back and you take a'look to see how people have really responded and what the information is that would lead yce to understand that."
" Rec. Patterson: i What history can you cite for a nuclear ace 2 cent and evacuation therefrom?"
1 "Mr. Blond: I an citing the history on evacuations and there was a report done by the Enviornmental Protecticn Agency on evacuation risk which addressed specifically nuclear accidents and the relationship of nuclear accidents to other evacuations which have taken place in this Country."'
" Rec. Patterson: O r. . Now, let me try to summarize and yta tell me if I have done it. Yoc are saying that you .
don't have any star.dards at NRC that you govern what is an acceptacle tire to evacuate and yet you are also saying, I t h i r.k , that every site history will tell us if it is i
1 1
i l
1 j
i evacuable within. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Is that what you said or l not? I thought that is what you said. If you didn't- " j i
"Mr. Blond: Yes, basically."
"Ren. Patterson: So you think this site then could be .!
evacuated under any conditions, such as a snow storm, in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. I don't think you would get home from New York City out here in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />."
7 NP.C Commissioner James Asselstine, in written comments submitted to the House Subcommittee On Energy Conservation and Power on July.16, 1986, proposed a different standard' but one that nevertheless would provide the states with some assurance that there would be enough time to implement an emergency response plan in the event of a fast breaking core melt accident. Commissioner Asselstine. j stated, j
"! believe that the Comnission shoJ16 specify minimum Co*tain ent performance standards. I proposed such a stanfard--tr.a: t.:s;- en:s perf :- i, a nar. er t*.st w ;1?
er. rare with h;r cc i.icnce : .at no .cre thar 1 :n 10C ccre celtdcwr. accidents result in a large offsite release of radia: ion -- as an addition to the Commission's Safety Goal commitment to provide reasonable assurance that a severe core damage accident will never occur at a U.S.
nuclear power plant, would provide a strong regulatory concitrent to safe power plant operations, including a bs".ance cf se:ider.t pretention and citig=.: on mearures.
3::: s;7r :: i a ri-i'.sr stariard p optsed by
. 9.... ,
s... . 7,, ;3
,, .,_3, r
3, .-
to cc a;r. malo::ty suppc:t w:t..:r. tne Conmission. S ; ; r. a i standard is needed, in ny view, to help ensure that an accident having Chernobyl-type consequences does not happen in this country."
The NPC's response to the same question was as follows:
"The Commission carrently has not specified a maximun ,
acceptable probability of containment building failure J given a core melt accident. The Commission recently adopted a Policy Statement on Safety goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, which is being readied for publication in the Federal Register. Guidance concerning acceptable containment failure probabilities is being developed in light of that Policy Statement. Two provisions of the Pol:cy Statement bear directly on the '
question posed:
^
- 1. The Comnission directs the staff to develop guidelines for regulatory implementation for the-Commission's revie. and approval. As part of its l
1 1
1
Urection to the staff included.in the Policy.
natement, the Commission di rects that this guidance umid be' based on the following genental performance 52ideline which is proposed by the Commission for furthe r sta f f exar.inat ion :
' Consistent with the traditional defense-in-depth ~
approach and the accident mitigation philosophy equiring reliable performance of containment systems, the overall mean f requency of a -large release of !
radioactive materials to the enviornment from a reactor accident should be less than 1 in 1,000,000 per year of reactor operation."
- 2. The Policy Statement includes the following.
stat ement :
' Severe core damage accidents can lead to more serious accidents with the potential for life-threatening cff-site releases of radiation, for evacuation of ne-be rs of the public, and for contamination of public
.t r :; er : y . Ari ft:- the. r heal th and s sf t:y c:r. egaences, s;rr ace; dents can erode p;;;;c confidence i n t he cafe:y of nuclear power and can lesd I to f urther instability and unpredicta'ility o for ir.d u s t r y . In order to avoid these adverse consequences, the Conmission intends'to continue to persue a regulatory program that has as its objective providit: reasonsole assurar.ce, giving-appropriate cc r. i d -: r s t ; ; r :: the anrertsin:ies involved, tts: e
.m c e r e c : r e i F. a e 3. r f.ent x '. : not cec;r -s- a - '; . s .
. ._1 . _ . , . ,- . . , . . .
~r.ese two pr;v:sions between them will form a principal-part of the basis for determining containment perf ormance ot;ectives. "
The NRC recently reiterated its inability to accurately nessure cent ainnent limits. On July 10, 1986, the UR. 4 supplemented itr submission to Congress by supplying l the f ollowing answer to a question posed by Congressman }
y.a r k e y on i<:y 14 , 19F6:
QUES!!OM "What degree of confidence does NRC have in the ability ;
of different contsinrent baildings to prevent a major l releare of radiation daring a core meltiown? For each type of containment building, what is the estimated probability of containment failure given a meltdown and .-
state precisely what uncertainty bounds are assigned to this estimate and how it was calculated?"
t i
ANSWER "At present, the'NRC staff cannot specify with a high degree of preciseness, the conditional probability (and uncertainty beunds to be assigned) of containment failure with.a major release of radiation. In general, it is believed that the overall conditional probability of a major release would be in the range of 10-1 to 10-2 or better, given a-large scale core meltdown. the larger size dry containments being on the somewhat more favorable part of this spectrum. We. expect the risk rebaseliningL work now in progress will provide improved insights on-such conditional containment failure probabilities and associated uncertainties. Here it may be useful to recall that WASH-1400 (Reactor Safety Study) found that-the.
conditional probability of containment failure with a major release of radiation would depend on the particular core melt sequence involved, even though all core melt sequences were assumed to result in a' containment failure. Given tne total ensemble of core melt sequences in Mt.SH 1400, the everall conditional. probability of a a:Or r e '.e 3 :e 75: esti stni to rang + fre arc;; 1_chanre ir 3 to ! c h a r. e : n '2 0 (:t shou:d be no:ed that a negligiole suppression pool scruobing of the fission products was assuned for the BWR risk dominant core melt sequences: thus, a higher conditional probability for a major release would be predicted.) The severe' accident research results to date and the. actual-experience at
~X:-2 suggests a r; swhst higher degree of confidence cV,;;d ex;s: i;r : = . 9. c:ntain e.nts preventing a maf::.
re; esse -rm wsr e - ; a - 2M r - W:d"-lO.
Dur:ng tne 3 cen2:ng revie. for all plar:s, a large accidental fistier, pr: duct release from the core coupled with the temperature and pressure conditions associated with a large loss-of-coolant accident-(LOCA), is required to be postulated, and an applicant for a license must demonstrate that his plant design can' prevent-a major release of radiation to the environment. The. containment plus certain other engineered safety features, such as spray systems and filters are designed and relied upon to mitigate such releases. Hence, the NRC has a very high confidence that all containment buildings can prevent a major release for many degraded core events. The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) where the containment atmosphere had a high concentration of radioactivity, but little was released bears this out. Nevertheless, there-are very low probability severe accident conditions under which a containment may be unable to prevent a major release. Although containment structures are -
cnneervatively designed to withstand the substantial temperatures and precrures associated with a major pipe g rupture, and several research studies have shown that they
retain their integrity at temperatures and pressures well in ey. cess of these conditions, they are.not designed to.
withstand the additional challenges that might be associated with a complete core-melt. Such challenges include phenomena.such as increased press;res from an uncontrolled hydrogen combustion or release of.large quantities of noncondensible gases from core-contrete interactions.
The NRC began to give attention to severe accidents.even ~
before the TMI accident, and has increased its emphasis in this area since the accident. With regard to containments, one of the first requirements introduced after TMI was intended to reduce the challenge to-containment integrity from a hydrogen combustion. Thus, the smaller BWR containments such as the Mark I and Mark II, were required to be inerted with a nitrogen
- atmosphere, effectively precluding the possibility of a hydrogen combustion, while others were fitted with a hydrogen igniter system designed to burn any hydrogen in a' controlled fashion, preventing substantial containment o v'f r p r e s s J r .
In a corplete core-melt, including failure of the
. reactor pressare vessel, molten core materials may interact with the concrete within containment,. causing production of non-condensible gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2). This may represent a pressure challenge to containment integrit;, ani the important factor in this regari ;r c:ntai-ze.; C; e. S:cdies have i r ii c it a -: t5st
."> !a r y -
"ue c n t a '. .~ e r.t s , s;ch as f.r est F'G ' s a n d
- '3n- *,i, ;f : e, '
- -< r. ' M s - - , sre .3 . .c s ,,
de so only at relatively long ::r.es (of tne order of dafs, after core-melt. A key insight emerging from.recent research on accident releases or " source terms" is that the timing of containment failure is important;-early containment failure without other mitigating factors can result in large radioactivity releases, while delayed failure of even several hours reduces the releases i significantly. Hence, there is considerable confidence )
that anjor releases for the larger volume containments are un!!kely, for nany core-melt e v e r.t s . _
l The smaller containments, such as the BWR Mark I and ,
Mark II, fail more readily as a result of core-concrete interactions. However, an important potential mitigating factor for all the BWP's is that they contain large ;
suppression pools filled with water, which are capable of j' scrubbing out ani. retaining a large portion of any released activity unless bypasred by drywell failure. .
Several research studies.have been performed on containment behavior during severe accidents. These 1
l 4
I s
o include NUREG-1079, " Estimate of Early Containment Loads From Core Melt Accidents", which evaluated the potential effect of such loads on containment integrity; as well as HUREG-1037, " Containment Performance Working Group Report", which summarized the results of studies to estimate the leakage rate of containment, buildings as a function of increasing internal pressure and temperature conditions associated with severe accident sequences. As a result of such studies, the NRC, although having determined that. existing plants pose no undue risk that requires immediate action with regard to severe accidents, is nevertheless pursing examination of individual plants.
for severe accident vulnerability. This examination includes a possible venting system to preserve containment integrity under severe accident conditions while assuring scrubbing of fission products by the suppression pool, as well as improved drywell spray performance.
In summary, the overall goal of the NRC is to keep the probability of large releases extremely low. The intent is to accomplish this by reducing the frecuency of c::;rrence of severe a :: dents, as well as by mitigatier of potential releases. Red;:tions in the predicted frequency of occurrence of severe accidents are expected to result from changs such as reduction of anticipated transients without scram (A!WS rule), and the proposed rule on station blackout. In conjunction with the nucles:
industry, each individua2 plant will also be exerined for severe. accident vu:neracilities. This program will begin the ini;..d nl p;sr: exa.-i.cti:ns .e x t jes: snd is evrectaf :: rer.'t ' - the re 3;:t . ?n of seve re a:-! der t
' - : ~, -L -+ --:- 1:+
. .,v .ie.t ';a'." .
l l
Commissioner Asselstine adds the following: i "I celieve this is a rather weak response to a fundamental and irportant question regarding our current knowledge of severe accident risk. Given the conclusion in the Commission's Severe Accident Policy Statement that the severe accident risks are acceptable'for all of the types of containment, I would have expected the Commission to be much more specific in terms of its knowledge of and expectations for the containments given a core meltdown."
8 The industry and the NRC, however, acknowledge that there is at least one exception to this rule for BWR (Boiling Water) Reactors like that at Pilgrim. "One accident sequence for this type of reactor is calculated to have a short time before containment fails. However, the amount of radioactive fissior. products that would be .
released to the environment would be small because of the filtering action of the suppression pool which is part of that design." IDCOR Repo r t , tuera at 1-4. This a
assessment is controversial as we point out infra..
Moreover, it should be noted that filtered venting would require operator intervention at a time of great stress.
- 9 1983 Oversight Hearings, pt. III (No. 98-52) at 2.
Representative Markey elaborated.on this as follows.
"I would now like to focus my opening remarks on a major disturbing facet of this issue. Neither NRC.or FEMA have a regulation defining the minimally acceptable conditions necessary to justify the operation of a nuclear plant with respect to emergency preparedness. In other words, no one can say under what conditions NRC would shut down a plant."
"There have been at least five occasions over the past several years where FEMA has reported to the NRC that public health and safety at and around a nuclear reactor cannot be protected. In these instances, as well as many others in which lesser deficiencies were found, the NRC has demonstrated great reluctance in enforcing its own rules and regulations. In fact, no nuclear. reactor has ever been shut d o w r. , even'thouch emercency prepardenees h:s teen ft;nf :o te inadequate, and despite r.;rerous ind;v; dual violaticr.s, no ut.1;ty has ever bee. f;ned f:r emergency preparedness deficiencies, a:though in one case the utility was fined for misleading the NRC about the status of prepardr.ess."
"On Febuary 7, 1983, I wrote to Chairman palladino about this issue becaure I discovered in en internal NRC staff r :: tr i;r w i. . ; r .r.i.chted the *:RC staff had no i.:s.:i:n
' enf -r. c ite sec r"'r r u '. e : and wo:'i .ct
~
- i. : ' ~ ~ ~ ~. -:. ::'=.*+- 7:..- ic a- h p'y- te care :i emerger.cy preparedness deficiencies."
"That internal memo from Mr. William Dircks, executive director of operations, to the NRC Commissioners was dated April 2, 1951, one day after the post-TMI emergency plans ,
were to be implemented."
I I
"What the NRC staff argued, and the Commission agreed t o, was that limiting conditions for operation that are applied to plant equipment should not be applied to If a certain cooling pump or ]
emergency preparedness. l safety system is not working, a plant may not be allowed to operate. By not classifying emergency preparedness in a similar fashion, the Commission has implied that it is of secondary irportance." ;
"This is completely out of step with what Federal. ,
regulations say about emergency preparedness. It is an .
affront to the public who live around these plants, and it violates the spirit of DEC's own Special Inquiry Group Report. That report, otherwise known as the Rogovin Fe;tri, stated:"
.._-----_.__a
"In our view, the emergency plan as a condition of operating license should be viewed in the same fashion as a engineered safety system in the plant. The typical plant's technical specifications provide that when engineered safety systems become degraded or inoperable, the plant ma;' bave to be shut do*'n if the situation cannot be remedied within a short period of time. Whether an evacuation plan can realistically be executed in a particular time should be treated in the sane fashion."
"The practical effect of not having emergency preparedness as a limiting condition for operation is that it makes the NRC's regulations unenforceable."
"From the Subcommittee's review of this issue, I have come to the conclusion that the sense of imoortance assigned to the emergenev preparedness after the TMI accident faded awav. Th r important ' lesson learned' has become a lesson lost" (emphasis added).
20 T '- f s p e i . t war coge-::
- exrressed by attor.ey Char's: 7 Mc::;ng Jr. of ca..for.:- who re.:rere toi intert-:ncrr before the NEC Ir litigation over the San 0 ofre Nuclear Power Plant. In a testimony sube.itted to the Congress for the 1983 oversight Hearings, Pt. 2 (no. 95-52) at 150-51, Attorney McClung stated:
"Ine major overriding problem with the Emergency ;
P:arning Fe7ulatier at they are app'.ied today is that thev 1 provide ot :e c t . ce ste-iari :f adequacy. The
- ~,,-- : ,; p-- 2 .- .6 -
- Lc "
- et y,i ->9
, g {; ,d g
, - , * ...:. ,y rq- ; ;<g -. ; ' .; ;' o . . g. p '- 7 plans are adeque.te ar- capat:e of ceing :mplemente; cefore licensing a plant for fall power. (10 CFR $50.47, al sec.) But what is ' reasonable'? Interveners' took the position in the hearings that ' reasonable' reans a state l of emergency planning ir which maximum heelth and safety are achieved for the community within the range of possible prctect:ve actions, given fiscal restraints.
This is a balancing test. Using such a' test the Licensing Board would judge the social utility of any particular emergency plan hy how mJch " dose saving" will be effected by that plan and what the cost of implementing such a plan might be. This concept of developing emergency plans that may protect the health and safety of the people by affecting dose savings is not my idea. One of the key l documents which is used by all agencies to determine what !
response to take in an emergency is the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents which was written by the Enviornmental
- Protection Agency (EPA-520/1-75-001). The introduction to that docunent defines e.mergency preparedness planning in
( terns of reducin: or avoidino. prefected doses."
. . _ - - __ _ A
)
"The Interveners were not allowed to put in evidence of the doses that may have been or might have been received given the emergency plan that is in effect at SONGS. The licensing Board backed up by the NRC Staff took the position that the reasonable assurance test does not i
include any health information or dose saving information, it is simply a judgment call which the Board makes based on expert testimony."
"Instead of actually weighing the costs and benefits of a given plan to determine whether there is reasonable assurance that'the health and safety of people will be protected, the NRC simply determines whether or not the plans on paper meet the check list provided in NUREG-0654 is the NRC Regulatory Guide prepared by PEMA and the NRC l
which provides a detailed checklist for what is required
)
l and what is not required in an emergency plan."
l l
"The application of this checklist approach results in the NRC finding that whatever exists is good enough."
T:.( f ;?. ; ; .. . :. ; d + s c r . ,r : : c r cf a 93 :: .9 Water Reacter .s cased up;n mater:a'. s;;p1;ed oy Mr. Rorert E e r r.e r o , c :ef of tne Boiling Water Reactor Division of the NBC.
12 As the Kemeny Commission observed following the accident at Three Mile Is and, Erergency pierning had a low priority in the NRC ani AE r. e f o r e it. Tr,ere .s ev;ience that the rease.; f;-
t'.: 4.ri;!e' ttt.- ~ .';5e ce in iesi;- r e net :r ife: .ir;: i- : .+ : i=rire -
s.... r ; , . r. 7 c .; ; .r concern a;;;; :ne safe:y of naclear power.
Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island 35 (Oct. 1979).
13 In 1950, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published its final rules on erergency planning which now appear in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70. In explaining the rationa2e for these new rules, the NRC observed that " adequate emergency preparedneer is an essential aspect in the protection of the public healt.. and safety." 45 Fed. Register No. 162 at 55404 (6-19-50).
14 In July, 1979, there was an agreement reached between the Massachusetts Civil Defense, Public Workc, and Publie 1 Healin agencies and a group known as the Plymouth County Nuclear Information Committee which had brought suit in federal ccert in an effort to close down the Pilgrim Flan -
(federal district court civil action no. 70-933-Mc).
Ur. der the terms of tr.e agreerent, public health agreed to a program of expanded monitoring around the plant ana l
l 1 i
l
Civil Defense agreed to a number of improvements in the plans. Thereafter the plaintiffs brought suit in. state court (Plymouth Superior Court Action 80-11350)- against the Civil Defense agency alleging a. failure to carry out the terms.of the 1979 agreement. This litigation is still pending, but har never advanced beyond the discovery stage. It should be noted that this controversy centers
'around the earliest version of the Pilgrim plans and does not take account of. changes that have been made over.the years.
15 The prinicipal Federal guidance document provides that "It]he nuclear utility may have an incenti've based on its own self-interest as well as its responsibility to provide electric power, to assist in providing manpower,- items of equipment, or other resources that the state and local government may need but are themselves unable to-provide." NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1 at 25. (1980).
16 During the 1953. Congressional Oversight Hearings, Pt.
- (N0. 95-52) at 2~, NRC Commissioner Asselstine stated ste: he and at :eact one c:her Con.issicner believed ":n t tne c:st: of e ergency planning and preparedness were costs direct;y related to the operation of.the plant, and therefore those costs ought to be borne by the operators." A liorary of Congress study that'was submitted for the same hearing illustrates the lack of uniformity throughout the country in terms-of the financial contrir;.! - ry ut:lities to emergency planning l
.* s : 7. t and ;ct+; gtver- ent. See Appendix Three to th;s
- c .e
. ~es ]
Inese p'.ans were a:so d:st-ioutei to loca: agencies ani community groups which migh: be called upon to assist in responding to an energency and made available to residents. For exseple, 95 copies of the Plynouth town plan were distributed as follows:
0:STRIB"T!O'l LIST 1
AGENCIES OR DEPARTMENTS NUMBER OF COP!ES I i
Plynouth Board of Se:e: man 6 Executive Secretary 2 .)
Town Clerk 1 Plymouth Office of Emergency Preparedness 12 Police Departrent 2 Fire Departcent 8 Department Puolic Worv.s 2 Health Department 1 -
Harbor Master 2 1 Plymouth Development & Industrial Commission 1 Plynouth Area, Cnsster of Ccererce 1 Puilii.0 :nr, r--* i
s 3
Plymouth _Public Library 3 Plymouth Public Schools 15 Plymouth ~Airpott 1 Jordan Hospi'.a1 1 Commonwealth Electric & Gas Companies 2 Becron Edison Company 2 New England Telephone Company 2 American Red Cross'(Plymouth Chapter) 1 Salvation Army (Plymouth Office) >
1 Plymouth County Commission (Plymouth Office) 1 1 Plymouth County Sheriff Emergency Manageme' Agency 2 Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (Framingham) 5 Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (Area 2) 4 Massachusetts Correctional Institute (Plymouth) 1 Massachusetts Department of Public Health 2 1
' Massachusetts National Guard (Local Unit) 4 United States Coast Guard (Otis & Scituate-1 each) 2 United States Civil Air Patrol 1 Miscellaneous 6 l
7003'. Ceries: I?5)
C * * * ' n e r. t D *. Mr. E; Ward !nc as of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, befcre group of Massachusetts legislators who assembled at the State House in Boston for a discussion of emergency responst plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant on June'18, 1986.
19 j The Preseble to the Massachusetts Constitution states in part that it is the p;rp;se of gocernmer. te guarantee the e ". ; T;'" 2 r ! of the i*i# ' d:i '? P. tur31 rights.
U"#Ar C.L.
! . 3 3-app s . i . x , 9 : -- .1-29, the Directrr cf te.
l Defense is coliged to "peblish and release-to local l offic als of each pclitical subdivision within [nuclent pow'er plant) areas preparedness and response plans which will oernit the residents of said areas to evacuate or take other pr:tective actions in the event of a nuclear accident "(emphasis aidei).
The Department of Public Health also has responsibility for protecting the public against the effects of radiation. See, e.o., G.L. c. 111, Section 4F, 5 and SB.
20 A complete h.istory of the Regulatory Performance at the.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant from-1972 to date is. contained in Appendix Five.
21 Congressman Markey posed the following question:
QUEST:o" 6 - -
l l
' "In a supplement to the record of the Subcommittee's !
i April 17, 1985 hearir.; the NRC staff wrote: 'Ana3ysis 1
i
- l. l
, shows that there are some' kinds of accident sequences that' could cause-failure of any containment. design...." For each type of containment please enumerate each mode of a potential containment failure.and the conditions that can lead to ,each mode of failure. What is the relative likelihood of different modes of containment-failure?"
ANSWER i "The potential containment failure modes for severe l accidents in all U.S. LWR decigns can be generally classified into six groups. The definition of these groups depends on the timing of the failure'(relative to core melting and anjor releasec of radioactive material into the containment) and the failure location. These-groups are:
- 1. Early failures directly to the atmosphere;
- 2. Early failures into other plant buildings;
- 3. Late failures directly to the atmosphere;
- 4. Late fsi'.urse ir.to other plant b;ildings;
- 5. Lt.:e fs11;re: ; .:: the ground; and
- 6. Uc c:ntninrer. failure.
"The exact failure modes and causes, and their relative likelihoods, vary' considerably among plant types'and even among plants of similar containment design...Brief qualitative cunmsries for each majorLdesign type >(drawn' !
from a vsriety of plant risk studies, NUREG-1079 and GUREG-;ml? see also reponse to qJestions 5) are provided in the f t: ' n i .; r i r s r s r '.s . The ::R staff sr.5 saptorting
- t t se:Orr 2rc p r? 4 .: 1; e n g e. s - ;r s n;9: r e s: :e.:s en t- 4 of the risks of carrent commercial reactors. More quantitative infermatien on the types'of containment:
failures and their relative likelihood and importance will be providad ir the staff report NUREG-1150,.to be published for public conment in September, 1986."
"BWE's w.th Mark I, II containments: BWR plants with Mark I and Mark II containment designs typically are.
surrounded by other plant buildings that are maintained at negative pressJras, se that containment failures directly to the atmosphere are less likely. Rather, containment failures with releases of radioactive material into other buildings are the more likely pathways, and these will be emphasized below."
"The failure charseteristics of these types of c ontainment b;ildirgs are quite different from those described above for PWR's. The design differences which -
cause this are the much smaller containment volume,.the presence of a water suppression _ pool, and the inerting of g
the containter,t atmosphere to prevent hydrogen 1
l . _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - -
i combustion. With these characteristics, the principal threat for early failure is expected to occur after the )
core has melted and breached the reactor vessel.- During ;
the interaction between the molten core with the contrete underneath the reactor vessel, steam and.non-condensible gases are generated. While the steam can be condensed in the suppression pool, the non-condensible gases are not, resulting in an increase in both the containment pressure and temperature, and thus could lead to containment failure. Venting of the containment atmosphere could ;
preclude this failure. Houever, should a containment failure occur, the actual location of such a failure is .
considered to be very plant-specific. Some failure l locations can result in the flow of radioactive material through the suppression pool, significantly mitigating the extent of release. Other locations may not, however, result in this suppression pool scrubbing and the radioactive materia'] would have a release path into other buildings where some further holdup and mitigation should also result."
"T..e c.c._ .: ; c cf :ne Mark : dtrig can a:so les3 .-
another failure . ode, that of direct fa:1ere by attac<. of the molten core material. At the tire of reactor vessel failare and discharge of the molten material, the potential exists for this material to flow out to the containment wall (roughly 20 feet), melting the stee; and causing a localized containment failure."
"As noted acevs, :hess fsi:ures release radioact:ye ateria: :- t m: r ;-i; .; p '. s r. : b;;15; ret. Mitig;;'t- ty eCO ';rr . - i ; *. ? . . . ;s ta' 9- .ir39 ; n 5 +' r c -/ f t s . -
c;rcunctances, b;t .:: de,:end on the location of tne containment b;11d:ng failure. The impact of a potential hydrogen born in these surrounding buildings can also influence the effect:veness of mitigation."
"Because of the 1 portance of the early containment failure modes discussed above, late failures or failures to isolate generally are identified to be of lesser impact to risk. In particular, because of system design d;fferenccc, the interfacing systems LOCA potentially of importance in the pWRs has not been identified as of such i significance for the BWRs. The issue of late containment failJre into the ground, and potential soil and water contamination, is believed to be essentially the sane for I BWRs as descrioed above the pWRs."
22 One activity that would occur at a reception center in the event of a serious accident invviving off-site releases is decenta.ination. Due to concern expressed by efficials of Hanover and owners of the Hanover Mall sLca:
, the exposure of their water supply near the Hanover Mall, 1
- - . _-__ - ___ _ __ _ __ _ A
the Civil Defense Agency has agreed.no longer to plan for Hanover as a location for reception and decontamination.
and, in conjunction with local and federal officials, to find another site to designate for-this purpose. This issue must be settled and a new site selected prior to a restart of the Pilgrim- plant.
It should be noted that decontamination is principally a state responsibility and one for which there is no consensus about costs. On July 10, 1986,'the NRC submitted the following answer to a question posed by Congressman Ed Markey:
QUESTION 7
" News reports appear to indicate that.the Chernobyl accident has caused significant ground contamination and has necessitated destroying livestock and crops. Explain what decontamination procedures NRC would implement in the event of a major U.S. accident and provide an estimate of the range of poter- C. de::nta-i.ation costs. :r.iic3t+
w'.a: *:PO stud.e. c- NP: sponscred studies exist-cr.'th.s sucjer: and W r. a *. have been thei! Conclusions."
ANSWER "In the event of a severe accident atla U.S. nuclear reactor which caused significant offsite contamination, the MRO would no have the role of implementing offsite d e cor.: a-i . s : . cr proced;res. Although tnere is no specific r '. a r '- :: # ct:.- '.3- e s: C, c ofisita deconta-i a-inn,
. e : ' .- s : , i-..c.: c.
.ie : . ie : o , a mi '.re::Fu :. -=
state and local authorities. Tne federal government woeld have an important role in supporting these.offsite authorities in making the appropriate decision and implementing those decisions. A' list of those other federal agencies with significant responsibilities in this phase of an accident is Enclosure 1. The NRC, in conjunction with these other federal agencies, would be prepared to provide technical expertise and advice to these offsite authorities on the extent of contamination, the sigr.ificance of such' contamination, methods of decontaminating, and the relative effectiveness and costs of such procedares."
"The specific methods of contamination are highly dependent on the particule.r sitaation, the extent and degree of contamination, and the amount of decontamination.
recaired by offsite authorities. A number of potential decontamination procedures are provided in the references -
listed in Enclosure 2. (These documents are vo]uminous and are not included, but specific documents will te provided if recuested.) A.s an exanple, decontamina: ion cf deve:: red pr:per:y !? 1:ks:y to ir.vo'.va firth +1ng cr
replacing the roofing or pavings, firehousing the outside waDW, and replacing the lawns. Decontamination of f andand would most likely involve deep ploughing for tits _d land and grazing land, and scraping the surface soE f or orchards. These and other procedures would reg: ire procuring the necessa ry material and equipment and penannel to do the work. Appropriate disposal of repuced material and waste water would also be necessary."
inc studies have been directed at gaining a better un&trstan$ing of the numerous decontamination procedures avadable, the effectiveness of those procedures, and the rehtive real costs of these methods. A variety of deamtamination procedures were listed and roughly quacified'in WASH-1400 for developed property, urban arms, and farmland. These procedures, their efhstiveness, and costs have been the subject of coWdnuing evaluation nationally and internationally. It shodd be pointed out that it is recognized that these j stoEes have very large uncertainties associated with the:
reru'.te. Tarle 1, which fo'. lows, rhn>s so e exa :.er of :
t'.e econceic data ased in SFC c:rp;te: ccia-f or calculating the ecor. mic impact of a severe accident. i Thirprovides some degree of perspective to'the potential l cosa that would be irvolved. In addition, as an example, we hve included Figcre 1 from the Limerick Environmental Imprt Statement which relates cost of offsite mitigation mear:re s (bulk of which is the cost of property interdiction and decontamination) to the probability of a e Vi!e accident."
"i- - : : ; ; + 1 . c..
7:sp*, c' a .; 24: cf i
URC-sponsore d st udies relating to offsite decontamir.ation and its costs. These studies provide a basis for undt: standing the varicas parameters that can affect any estisates of large scale offsite decontamination. In genual, these studies provide a basis for determining actions to take in a large offsite contamination event.
Homve r , they recognize the difficulty of coming to any defisitive conclucion on costs because any particular sitution will be so highly dependent on the actual s ceu r i o a r.d the protective action decisions that are m a ds. "
23 Sm 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,Section IV. This point isthveloped in a recently released informal counsel opizion f rom the SRC staf f which is reproduced in Appendix Nine to this Report. The point was confirmed by the HRC in de Shoreham case where a majority of the Commission obseved that "[o]ur emergency planning zone requirements
- do not recuire ... a minimum'eva6uation time for the plume expsure pathway ecergency planning in the event of a se nous accide nt . " 7- tha Matter of Lono Island Lichting Conn-", C: :-E C-12 *: _. ( - < .4.'ss).
a
l l
24- l See NUREG 0654 at 13 (1980). NRC officials such as Dr. l Thomas Murley and Mr. Richard Starastecki of the Region I office have stated at public hearings that it is possible to have an off-site release within thirty minutes. On the other hand, they'have stated that it is " probable" that it would take 48-72 hours before a core meltdown took place and 4-8 hours longer-before there was a melt-through and ,
any release of radiation to the outside world. Each of j these possibilities has radically different implications j for emergency planners. This is why the NRC should 1 adjudicate a site specific off-site release time for each plant. );
i f
l l
t 8
l
\
L__-________---______-________---_-_-____-------_---- -- - - -'
i
'4
- 10 CFR Ch. I (1-1-86 Edition)
E 50.47 Emergency plans. !
(a)(1) Except as provided in para- ..
graph (d) of this section, no operating i license for a nuclear power reactor will i be issued unless a finding is made by 1 -
NRC that there is reasonable assur- N" - "
3 ance that adequate protective meas. -
' ' , . l ures can and~will be taken in the event ,
1 of a radiological emergency. .
j (2) The NRC will base its finding on .,
a review of the Federal Emergency tlj.. -
Management Agency [ FEMA) findings %' . ., 3 and determinations as to . whether ; .
State and local emergency plans are s -
~
adequate a.nd whether there is reason- 'j .. .' ..'
able assurance that they can be imple- '
mented, and on the NRC assessment '.F.
as to whether the applicant's onsite I f, emergency plans are adequate and .
whether there is rc:_conab'e a.ssu- nce
- that they c::.n be impicmented. A ..
FEY i finding r!1.1 primarily be based ,
J.: ."""
on a review of the plans. Any other in. j formation already available to FEMA l may be considered in assessing wheth- j
. er there is rersenable assurt.nce that }
the plans can be implemented. In any 3 ;.
NP.C licensing p;cceeding, aFEMA J j
finding will constitute a rebuttable presum;; ion Cn Cuestiens of ade;uncy ane i=ple=enmeen car:. emu.
.j -
- (b) The onsite and, except as provid- . .
. ed in paragraph (d) of this section, off- .!
site e:nergency response plans for nu- -
clear power reactors must meet the ?
following standards .i l e (1) Primary responsib!!! ties for emer- ;
gency response by the nuclear fac:lity .]
licensee and by State and local organ!-
zations within the Emergency Plan- ;j .
.g ning Zor.es have been assigned, the ..g.
emergency responsibilities of the van- [j ous supporting organlaations has e been specifically established, and each ;J,j principal response organlaation has ,q ,
a staff to respond and to augment its -
initial response on a continuous b ,
(2) On shift facility licensee respon- g i sibilities for emergency response are s I defined, adequa:e -
unambiguously 3
(
staffing to provide initial facdit) ace .. ,
dent rerponse in key functional 17e2 .y a
1 is mainta.ined at all times. t ;j rnentauen of T2;;0nI?
available and the interf aces <
C2~'Q--.. ,b j
g var!aus ensite response actisitieS 3,
offsite support and response acW"4,.; f, j,q are spec!fied. g i
i l . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ - _ _ -__.--_____a
Nucirer Reguletary Cammission f 50.47
' ; (3) Arrangements for requesting and (10) A range of protective actions effectively using assistance resources have been developed for the plume ex.
have been made, arrangements to ac- posure pathway EPZ for emergency commodate State and local staff at the workers and the public. Guidelines for licensee's near site Emergency Oper- the choice of protective actions during ations Facility have been made, and an emergency, consistent with Federal other organizations capable of aug. guidance, are developed and in place, menting the planned response have and protective actions for the inges-been identified. tion exposure pathway EPZ appropri-(4) A standard emergency classifica. ate to the locale have been developed, tion and action level scheme, the bases (11) Means for controlling radiologi, of which include facility system and cal exposures, in an emergency, are es.
effluent parameters, is in use by the tablished for emergency workers. The nuclear facility licensee, and State and means for controlling radiological ex. !
local response ' plans call for reliance posures shall include exposure guide. !
on information provided by facility 11 lines consistent with EPA Emergency j eensees for determinations of mini. Worker and Lifesaving Activity Pro- !
mum initial offsite response measures. tective Action Guides.
(5) Procedures have been established (12) Arrangements are made for medi- j for notification, by the licensee, of cal services for. contaminated injured !
State and local response organizations individuals.
and fcr notinca:icn of cw rgency per. (13) General plans for reccVer) and scrnel b;. aM organizations; the con, reentry are developed.
ten: of initial and followup messages (1-1) Periodic exercises are (will be) to response organizations and the conducted to evaluate major portions public has been established; and of emergency response capabilities, means to provide early notification periodic drills are (will be) conducted
, and clear instruction to the populace to develop and maintain key skills, and within the plume exposure pathway deficiencies identified as a result of ex.
l Emergency Planning Zone have been ercises or drills are (will be) corrected.
estabhshed. (15) Radiological emergency re-sp nse training is provided to these (6! Provisions exist for prornpt com.
rnun! cations among princ!?al response 'O *"I e ca m as b an g nizations t emergency personnel ~
1 R possibilities for plan devel.
(7) Information is made available to " .
the public on a pcriodic basis on how lished, and planners are properly
' the) will be notified and what their Initial actions should be in an emer- trained (exi [ Failure to meet the applicable gency (e.g., listening to a local broad- standards set forth in paragraph (b) of cast station and remaining indoors). this section may result in the Commis-e prmelpal points of contact with sion declining to issue an operating 11 e news media for dissemination of l cense; however, the applicant w!!! have !
nformation durinc an emergency (in- an opportunity to demonstrate to the l udmg the physical location or loca. satisfaction of the Commission that !
ons) are established in advance, and deficiencies in the plans are not signif- i P.rocedures for coordinated dissemina- icant for the plant in question, that on fI ormation to the public are adequate interim compensating ac-l 1
B) Adequate emergency facilities tions have been or will be taken I promptly, or that there are other com- !
.- equipment to support the emer. pelling reasons to permit plant oper- - 4 l [, response are provided and main- ation. I s i
{eneg
- k. (2) Generally, the plume exposure
' )
' : (9) Adequate methods, sy. stems, and pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants j I ipment for assessing and monitor- shall consist of an area about 10 miles y [,W;g r etual or pctcntial offsite conse- (16 km) in radius and the ingeMion l
[. CDCes of a radiological emergency pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 1 s iUcn are in use. about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The h .
i F m !
I I
r I
exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear '
power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are af-fected by such conditions as'demogra-phy, topography,']and characteristics, '
. access routes,' . and jurisdictional boundaries. The' size of the EPZs also
~
, m'ay be determined on a esse by-case ;
b' asis ior gas-cooled nucleai re~ actors !
and for'ieactdrs with an authorized '
power le' vel less than 250 MW thermal. '
The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are ap-propriate to protect the' food ingestion pathway.
. - 8 (d) Notwithstanding the require-
- ments of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
- section, no NRC or FEMA review, l I findings, or determinations concerning '
'i the state of offsite emergency pre- ;
parednc:s cr the adequacy of and ca- -
patin .. to im;;c=cnt State and local offsite emergency plans are' required prior to issuance o(an operating li-l cense authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations (up to j - 57c of the rated power). Insofar as j 1 cmerrency planning and preparedness '
l requirements are concerned, a license '
I
- author!
- in.: fuel loading and/or low I
\ pc.ver opcration may be issued after a ' '
! finding is made by the NRC that the i i state of onsite emergency prepared ,
ness provides reasonable' assurance !
that adequate protective measures can ;
j and will be taken in the event of a ra- i diological emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of i i the emergency
- plans I
agains,t applicant's the pertinent standards in l l paragraph (b) of this section and Ap-i pendix E of this part.
(Sec.161 b.. i., and 'o., Pub. L.83-703, 68
~ .
Stat. 945 (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, as amended, P.:b. L.93-438, 88 Stat.1242, Pub.
L. 94-79, E9 Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. 5841))
[45 I?. 55409,' A'ug. 8,1930, as ame'ided r at 47 13 30235, Ju:y 13,19S2; 47 FR 40537, Sept. ,
15, 1982: 49 FR 27736, July 6,1984; 50 TR
( 19324, May E,1955) .
s I x- - .
4
- I Part 50, App. E .
events where there is substantial time avail-able for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not -
to activate the public notification system.
. Where there is a decision to activate the no-tification system, the State and local offi- ,
cials will determine whether to activate the e
entire notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The re-sponsibility for activating such a public no-tification system shall remain with the ap-propriate governmental authorities.
E. Emergency Tacilifies and Equipment Adequate provisions shall be made and de-l scribed for emergency facilities and equip-ment, including: .
- 1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring:
- 2. Equiprsent for determining the magni. ;
tude of and for continuously assessing the -
impact of the release of radioactive materi- l als to the environment;
- 3. T:.cr..nt s a:.d cut.plic: at the si:e fer de-contr. min:.:!cn of on !!e individuals;
- 4. FacD::!cs and medical supplies at the '
s!*e for apptcpriate emergency first aid l -
treatm ent,
- 5. Arra .gements for the senices of phys!- ,
clans and other medica.1 personnel qualifie d
~
to handle radiation emergencies on site; l
- 6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the sitt to sgecL':cany identified trea: ment fr.-
cE.:!es ou Jide the site bcunda y.
'i. Arr:J.;ements for treatment of Individ. .
un'.s injured in suppcrt of licensed activitics on the ltc at treatment facDities outside , ' -
l the site beundary; '
l 8. A licensee ensite techn! cal support .
center and a licensee near site emergency : .I operations facDity from which effective df. . I I rection can be given and effective control .
can be exercised during an emergency; l -
- - 9. At least one onsite and one offsite com- ; -
munications system: each system shan have !, .
a backup power source.
l AU co==unication plans shaU have ar- ,
! rangements for emergencies, including titles
- and alternates for those in charge at both }
ends of the communication links and the a
' primary and backup means of communica.
tion. Where consistent with the function of e I the gove.nmental agency, these arrange- :
l ments will include: l I
- a. Provisien for communications with con- [ [
titucus State / local governments within the ~
plume exposure pathway TJZ. Such com-
! munications shall be tested monthly.
( b. Provision for communica !or.s with Fed-l (. eral emergency response organizatic n:.
- Such ecmmunications sy itt:5 shaB be te:ted annut Uy.
- c. Prov!.s!cn for communications among
~
I De nu lear potu reactor centrol TO?rn. the onsite technical support center, and the
.' (
2 l '
. .. , : i ., '
l y
2 .
!- Porf 50, App. E
- ~
near site emergency operations facility; an!
among the nuclear facility, the principa '.
- State and local emergency operations een t t ters, and the field assessment teams. Suct 4
- communications systems shall be tested an nually.
! d. Provisions for communications by the licensee wi:h NRC Head ;uar:ers and thf appropriate NRC Regional Office O p er.
- ations Center from the nuclear power reac.
ter control room, the onsite technical sup.
3 port center, and the near site emergency op-
' '! erations facility. Such communications shall
, ; ._ . .. be tested monthly. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ . . . . _ ,
l 1
\- l l
+
. .r ..\..
I E$ bC/Il/}?C/24/0P%2' fli0 / M (ff.fg/fd, 1
2g h f XCCl(lN:C / Os h5 a >
,f,,
- Dic < ab/!tw/cm h/ ace Chaln V. Barry L i,_,,,,_ g, ,,4 ,,ys ,,,,, g.,') ,,,,,,,,
same, t
MEMORANDUM TO: ROBERT BOULAY DIRECTOR, CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY AND OFFICE OF EMERGENCY q PREPAREDNESS i FROM: CHARLES V. BARRY, SECRETARY P..... . . n. r . r. ., m e_ : $ c. , $ c : c.
RE: E S ~ Ao LI S H M E:: OF TECH::0 LOG:C AL HAZ AROS D 7:SIO::
- 1. In accordance with the recommendations of my Pilgrim Nuclear Power plant report to the Governor, you are hereby directed, subject to funis from nuclear utilities licensed to operate at f u '. '. p;ws- r.e . n g iepcsited in:o an expend!.b'.e tr.; :
-.:q E .: = : . : s - : 5 -: -
p;~ . .- S s ! g - -; ;.
n- 3,., , :; :..
ca.;.r - 6 2r. - ,
- e. : u ' -> 3 ! a .- - .c '. o 7 . : 3. b:s-i- Oi . ;e-in order carry out the recommendations of the said Pilgrir.
Report and year responsibilities under chapter 639 of the Acts of 1950 and chapter 796 of the Acts of 1979.
- 2. A work plan detailing the steps to be taken by Boston Edison Corpany, the Civil Defense Agency, and outlining a program to insure local review in accordance with G.L. c. 33 Appendix, section 13-23, should be prepared as soon as possible.
l l
l
(-
e i
= i 1
i i
i DRAFT AN ACT RELATING TO NUCLEAR SAFETY EMERGENCY l
PREPAREDNESS J 1
l 1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives:
Section 1. (a) The department of public utilities shall e s : 7. t l . s r- a ; lear r ; f +:-. c-ergency pre:sredr.+:s f a r -: wir.;ch ]
1 1
shall be fi..ar.ced through assessments of all Nuclear Regulatory l1
(
Concission licensees operating naclear power generating i 1
facilities in the state. The department shall initially assess l l
l t ' .s li:ensee.s 'or a : s: cf three -i:: Lon do:la rr a r. ' an.aall. ,
- s. car- tt- for 3 t..1. L' :-f .0- '.:. r eiefs' ,
1 i
reinburserents and grants obtained in support of the nuclear i 1
safety emergency preparedness program inc]uding contributions I 1
by Nuclear Regulatory Cor,ission licensees operating nuclear power generating facilities outside of the state shall be deposited into the fur.d. The departner.t of public utility shall develop an equitable nethod of assessing the licensees l for their reasonable pro-rata share of such assessments. All suc'. assessments shall be included as operating expenses of the
~
licensees for purposes of rate-naking. All nonies within the funi shall be invested cy tne state treasurer in accordcnce
I )
(
with established investment practices and all interest earned by such investments shall be deposited to the fund; said interest shall be expendable in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section. !
(b) Monies deposited.in the fund .shall be expended by the Director of the office of Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness (hereafter, the Director) support.the activities cf a r.;c'.+ar raf+: +rerger:, preparedness prograr and on'.; in accordante with the p:en approved by the Secretary of Public Safety under subsection (c) of this section. The program shall be designed to carry out the activities required by chapter.639 1
cf the A s of 1950 ar" chapter ??E cf the acts of !???, as !
.t e r. d i i , w;:n reprert : f;:'/ 1:rer.ced an4 ope. at : .[ . :c:a s -
power generating facilities. The program shall include, but not necessarily be lirited to: (1) Development.and maintenance ,
)
of a detailei fixed facility nuclear emergency response plan for the Commonwealth ar.d for nuclear power plant areas and any 4
away-fror-reactor sper.: feel storage facility, (2) annual l training of state and local emergency response personnel, (3) i' development of accident scenarios and exercising of fixed facility nuclear emergency response plant for licensed and operating plants, including hiring of any expert consultants,
, and (4) any other measures as may be recommended by the Nuc'. ear
(
(
Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved by the Secretary of Public Safety. Monies -i deposited in the fund shall be distributed as follows to carry' l out the purposes of the program: The Director may expend not l
more than seventy-five percent of the proceeds ofLthe annual assessment to carry out his responsibilities under this act.
The renaining monies in the fund may be allocated to other sta:e +.nenrie ar ;;r: c' t '. + n;;; ear safety e ercer.e..
preparedness p'an referred to in subsection (c) and used, subject to approval by the Secretary of Public Safety, to-reimburse state agencies and municipalities for costs incurred 4
in the pure"ase ar s;.terarre of equip en: a r.d for services rer 2+ re :- :s r y. .9 er *.e r;rc-eer of t r, - p-agra ,
including, (1) developrer.t of a computerized off-site monitoring systen to enable state officials to evaluate critical nuclear power plant parameters and integrate the sane with meteorological data in order to forecast, assess and track i
any of f-rite relea:-es of radiation and (2) provision of l l
specialized response equipment, including communication systems i necessary to fulfill the provisions of this act.
(c) Not later thar Fetruary first, annually, the Director, following consultation with the Commissioner of the Department of Public Health, shal: F;rtit to tne Secretary of Public
( Safet; a r'n. f: c a r r > i r. ? cct the pu rprzer of the nue: sir
'. ,g te i
- u p.
)' l. l
's
\'
\' \' ',
5 3
- I , a
( ( . 3'
- g- ,
d j ,f
(<
s n' _ g safety emergency preparedness program'd.uring.the next calendar r
year. The plan shall include proposed itemized expenditures '.;
I for the program. The secretary shall review the plan and, not later than March first, annually, approve the plan if it s
l conforms to the provisions of this section. A
,s.,s (d) All monies within the nnziear snfety/emgrgency' t
i preparedness fund may be expended only in accordance 7 with the
- s f
p r " . c ; r. : #:~.: r se:ti- . f-Y, (e) !:o: wi t hr t a r.d i ng ths. provisions of; subsection (a) cf this section, the Department of Public Utilities mav 2. low an i ,.
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additional assessment of the licensees tS E mlement tAs i r. i t ; a l a s z e .r e e r.: c' s;r- .rersees 1. w '*"c- '-c ':ce'es: '
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Agency disapproves or informs, in writing, the Director that additional funds are needen to conform t nuclear safety emergency preparedness plan to icceptable st anda rds.
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,- '1,(., .4 Congressional Research Service f j
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The Li'orary of Congress
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ed 5 on wasww e DC FCUD to undin$
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C JDI.JC Of LOCAL EMCROENCY PLA. WING ACTIVITIES FOR. NUCLEAR PO'*ER PLANTS
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, htrodue:fon 1
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j One require:ent t e.e : a e:ilit; s.a s: r.e e t to ob: sin an operstng 11-y cease for a nuclear power plant f rom the liaclear Regulatory Consission is the preparation of an approved e:ergency plan. The 1979 accident at Threre Mile Island signalled a neeJ to soprove emergency plannin; sad
\\
I coerdinatiot. vt:5 local and Sta:e authorities. In response, the Cc::ission r2 .. 1:e . erg.r ;. . ,ng r:, L::;ns. C f. A;; sat 1",197., 1; !ses2J q
a fi.s1 rule detailint the re; aire:en:s that r.ust be cet in order to
! k continse opera:!r.; a pl:n: tna:
[ l t.ad already received an operating license.
i er to receive as oper.:ing license f or a new plant. 1/ '
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?
Under the new rega:a: ions, li:ensees and applicanes are reqaired to sd:1. : ..- e a rg. .:
, ;.a,23 . ;; .u 5:a:e and local gov.irn;en e:ct- I 52 :/ pLns, t; . ?. " . . u.;
- 5. . :nss a landing wna:ter t he s:s:c cf ..
, ,ee casite and offsite e:erge cy preparedness provides a reasonabla assarance
- .ths l =
J that adegaata proteitive a:t2rdt:
of clan and will be taken in the event of a a <
radiological e:ergen:y.' It bases its findi:s on a revies by the Federal Emergency tianageze.t Agen;y (T;M), as well as its own reviasw of whether 2 the plans cf the utility, the Sta:e and the loca3. authorities are adeqea:e
, and ca;sbie of being a.=;is:cr.:ed. The reg.1.dior.s generally *.c!!os the .I
~
i legisis:ive Eaid(lince t '.s : were in:1;ded in the !;R: Tisen1 1^80
- Prepared by Rober:
- +- l . tiatur.11 Resources Ioli;; OivisionL. La.terger and Carl E. Behrens Environ ent and r
f
.$ 1/ 1 's CFR Par: 10. F.t;ished in J.5. Fede:41 Register, Vol. 45, t;o. ~
,.t ,.,5.Q 161,Iugust 19, 1c63, pp. 554D.1-15415.
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TEM supplies some funds, eithough oot specifically for nuclear emergency {
I pisanir.g. The extaut of FLM f unding is varied and indeterminable, l d ,
To provide an indiction of the variety and type of eciergency planning !I sid supplied, speLtu.en for utilities with reactors in several parts of j
. lad the country were asked by C:tS, in informal telephone interviews, to de-
.c Y scribe tha type and extent of assistance providsd to local authorities.
Dcopitre the variability in f unding and service, most utilities view the '
e- J t provision of e:sergency capabilitys both their own and local governments, l 1
.l ;
as part of the cost of produ:ing power. But the extent of aid varies t i ll' f e
signific.mtly.
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A sucury of twe interviews conducted by CRS follows. lo l ! ,
- f I VIROINI A EL:C*RIC P3.TR C0F. PAW (North Anna St ation) 3f ;j 2'
j VIPCO essentially bears the entire fiscal burden for e.nergen:y
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- ,n n;n;; , in:1_;i c 4 b. l.f::sn. anna:. ::.tritatien t: tha 5:a:e ..1:n l I j
overrecs pre;;;edness at:ivi:ies and plan developnen:. E:ergency planning i ,
INE i--
expenses are sca::ered thr ;; hee; the VI?CD budget, bet costs for energen;y '
t
.i planning and crills during calendar year 1983 are esti.ated at $800,000, 5
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In:19ded in this expe .se is a co-ordinating e sergen:y pisnning group at '
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.tw :::;:rav le n., and ex;enses a: tt ;1 nts. R: ;hly $7;,0;; is l #
1 t.:;c:ed f;* ener;e* ;.:nn; ; r :;enses a: 7.;;; h Ar.na , 'n.:- in:..;u h
one er tse saiaried ;:si:::ts. '
, ,P jt i Most of tne en':r;:n:y pisaning liaison would appear to be betwean <
f the coun:les and the 5:a:e Office cf I.e:Zency and Energy Services. '
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VIP 03 ::a' tea an an: ..si c:.ntribution to the State of roughly $200,000. \ L be '
- 3) Ph:ce intervie. with F.T. Econey S:ith, VIPCO, July 1983 g I I i
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ments for issuing new opera:Ing licenses.
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The new e.nergency planning require:.ents have 1:sposed a barden er. .
f local authorities to provids services that in some casos they have n
.V difficulty in supplying. One question that has not been precisely spelled j
c, .
out is whether and to what extent the utility should fund local escrgency [..
" i
. planning activities. l,(
i ,c l The NE's rule of August 19, 1980, left the question open. In a sec- !
j *
- tion on funding 2/ the notice said that if State and local pisnning are ,f
.. found to be inadequate, "a utility may have on incentive, based on its e e
k, own self interes: as well as its responsibility to provide power, to
[
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assist in providin5 Can?o='er, items of equipment.or other resources that sne 1:s:e :: 1;::.. g:.>er.nen:s ::y ne:d t; are t he:t t iv:s ur.;. tie to ;r:-
1 O v i d 2 . L;; it a;s: said t.a: "sne ques tion of b:.c;te r t'w N C snoald cr c:ald reqaire a utili:y to con:ribate to the expenses incurred by Sta:e J
and local governmen:s in u; grading and maintaining their sc.argency planning
...is bey:-d the sec;e of the present rale change." It added SM 's view s '
If tna: if Te?tr:: f. .:s s*: ."d te c:n:ribu:ed f or 5:at e and 10:a.' ;;v e r ..:c.: s ,
.D t.af s*.: 1d :: e f :: - MA , n: .u! .
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] j Tnis indetersins:e r:!c cf ene utili:y in assisting Sta:e an: local ,
l
. ;. govern en:s has led to a pa::hwork pa::ern of funding rela:icnships. ,"
).
1; Some Sta:es regwire ,aili:ies tu pay an annas 1 f ee, which is dis:ributed 4
{ to local cc::ani:ies. C:hers supply the funds out of the State tressary.
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in so=e cases tr.c utility nege:ia:es directly with the 1cesi aut'.ori:ies. i s1
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The contribution increased with? s the last few years due to a require-ment that VEPC0 conduct two full-scale drills annually at each plant.
Previously, one full-scale and one scaled-down drill had been conducted 6,
each year. Each full-scale drill costs en estimated $50,000.
Louisa, Spotsylvania, and a portion of Orange Counties fall within a
f the North Anna plant. Relations with the
" the effected radius about y
counties were described as " informal".
t
- A siren system was installed at both plants a few years ago at a cost of $1.2 million. VEPC0 installed the system and maintaine it, but '
! the sys:e,s technically belongs to the State Of fice of E.nergency and Energy M
4 Services. A back-up system to activate the sirens in located at that Of fice in Ric5r.on3 t.e c'n :is'. w;;
Vi? 0 nas aisc e;.1;;ed e=crgen:j sta: ens , but j
S not n spoke did not have cost figures 1::cdiately at hand. he no: d,
.P if the coanties express the need for a piece of equip.nent, thoash, ths:
the utility will generally parchase it f or them or c,ake a contribution towards its ;;r:hsse.
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P:': i M m :*.?: < (?;;;r n 5:stion) -4/
4 ' P.u sa: % n t u has n:: er.ac:cd le;ir,1sti: . to revire ;.s c: a:y P.
industry to sa;;ct: e ergency planning, nor has an annal levy been O
,; J 1: posed. Boston Edison has been supportin; State and local preparedness b j' 5 l dire::1y since 1975, and has encountered f ew probleins in its preparedness t'
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.: activities.
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il Phone interview with Mr. Bernard Nelsn. Emergency Preparedness '-
Co:rdinator, Ecst:n Edison. Jaly 1983. X*
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Durin;; the last three yests, the utility has spant $150,000 for
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consultants to revise and update State einergoney plans. At the local t M, level, Boston Edison has equipped emergency operating centers with com-i in i t .
I 3
municitions equipment, pading systeas, and installation of " loud hailers- '
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2
. (strens). Five towns, rather than counties, are in the Pilgrim emergency a
.s . planning zone. Boston Edison has spent an average of $40,000 in each ie town, generally discovering that the smaller the town, the less infra-(-
- h. structure in place for responding to emergency situations.
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Another co=ponent of emergency planning costs has been training. -
t
p' Soston Edison has supported training for State and local officials at a stE3 9,* *
&; cost of $20,000 annually. This includes rental of f acilities, provision
$* of meals, and other instruction expenses.
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% The utility has also been recently requested to make a voluntary e
{r centr auti:n of roaf.1/ $$h E :o sup; r: :so posi:!ons in the 5: ate T* '
Cif1:2 o f ;;i '. i l L. f e r.s e .
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!;J F.,* :G D A P T.J U. A"; D 1. ! O.C C ' Y.?.'J Y k
. (St. Lucie, Tarkey Point) 5/ g ~. ;
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- A Florida 5: ate las requires State and local coanties to develep -
k-plans to handle nuclear plan; e:ergency at utility expcase. Florio. i $
t J u Poser and Ligh: has budge:ed e:ergen:y planning expenditures of S!.9
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e E.crgen:y pre;;;edness a::!vities rest wi:h cso Sca:e ogen:les, the I y' State Bureau of Disaster Preparedness (e.g., civil defcase), and the J
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g Bureau of Health and Rensbilita:ive Services. Florida Power and Lig'.: -
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5J Phone interelev w1:n P.r. Dave 'acolverton, Florido Po.er and Ligh:,
July 1953. ji li {
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- con:ribu:ed $317,000 .
for calender year 1983, to be spent on five staff *
.a CtpCC fa.-:
position, training and some equipsent. The Bureau of Health and Reha- E bilitative Services routinely deals in the measurement and control of I_. The d'
radiation with an emphasis on hospital sources of radiation. Nuclear e.ncospa s .
'e by stat,..
emergency preparedness has fallen under the purview of the agency be- W
- 4. 3tng cause of its general exportise in radiation. That agency has received .
$157,033 fro: ,, [ggg,og-
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the utility to support four staf f positions, so=a equipient and training.
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The emergency planning zone for the Turkey Point plant enco: passes * ~-(
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Dade and Monroe Counties; for St. Lucie, St. . . ,
n,Y.
Lucie County and Lrtin County. f, yg
.e u ,.g, ,g Contributions to the counties during 1983 are: $300,000 (Dade); $90,033 ,
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ccanty are served ex:1usively by Tierida Power ar.d Ligh:. Se:e adja:ent .
s.
,$ S gg coan:!es weald serve as hosts to evacuees, but this does no: involve a:y ,' #*J '-
g preparatory expense on the part of the u:111:y. Though no: required by w' 4
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the Sta:e la., Tiorida Power and Light aise provides so.:e funding support C*
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- - +e at:a S t;itals !ct Q. .: %
- r.e tsad;ing cf rela
- e4 med::a1 e:ergen:'es. .s .
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h e ;;i..'.y has pa.: .. 1,1.3 :s a c:na;.:an: :o devel:p cenariegs *
...%, M y. A si whi:h are tes:cd annaally at each site. Sirens have been ir..talled at A .
s '!<
q Q g3;;g cost of $2.5 cillion, with an additional a.nual expense of $250,000 to W f #khera:s o
maintain a.d tes:. The utili:y ovns the sys:e=, but the counties own tha .+. .; '
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plant ecs-switch to activate the:. The siren system could be used as a warniel r :s r i
( Nrcenag-systets for other a:ergencies, and they can carry voice as well as sound. $ Q,"
h, s :
A::ording to the cos;any spokes:.an, the coanties have been coop'f88I'8'd Tne c:s: recen: dr'lls have received verbal approval fra: NRO and M
- N* rw %,y.a t h .
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NRO has approved the utility's written plan. TEM is still roleving the i,t l State and county plans. ..
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COM.M3T 'E A'.~11 EDISON COMP ANY
[ Zion) 6/
The emergency planning sons for Commonwealth Edison's Zion plant e ence: passes c: unties in two 5:stes. The S:ste of Illinois establishes by statute an assessment utilities pay to the State to support emergency planning expenses. Commonwealth Edison's contribution to Illinois is d
$250,000 annually, most of which goes to the State Department of Nuclear sing Safety. So e portion of this assessment is passed along by the State to the coun:les. \
ss ,
Additionally, C:::enwealth Edison has an agree:ent with the State of
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Visconsin to provide roughly $40,000 annually to assist the affected
{
counties in their planning. The fee is a direct pasethrough of county
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expenses. The 5:s:e of Wisconsin acts as agent for the coun:les in billing '
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"'7 La<e C:c.:f is tne s::e !!!!nois coanty in :ne c ergenc/ plannin;
, zen: Tre ati.it/ has sa;;;r:ed ces:s in full for (1) a fully-equipped e?.ergen:y :pers:ing cen:er; (2) costs of consaitants to prepare a writ:en l e:er;ency ;1:n; and (3) equi;:en: cain:enance.
I us As- s;, - '?::- S:::fi:::ict Sys:e:' was instsiled at a c:s:
- ! 530;,**:
..:- is 4.s;.;:.e :: :ne co.n:/ and 10:41 of ficiale f cr an.-
c nct e:c:gan: es :'.s : : gn: arise. Anagal pisaning exercises a: tac Ih' plan: c:s: be:see- $'.*
,000-!200,000 for caterial and services, a large per:entage of whi:h is spen: at the caua:y level.
d.
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c:an:les .ere described :s he "ex:eptionally c opera:ive" and
- I'**
all at leas: "ce:; era:ive." The cc:pany spokesman observed ens good
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- 6/ facne in:ervies wi:h Mr. Ji- Toscas, Ces. enwealth Edison, July 1933.
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$ 5.
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L l Y relations have been maintained by by recoCninf og the f airness that the j 7 t*
l ** I utility should absorb justified expense. Cooperation from both States *
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was also noted. #
ROC!CS*ER CAS t.' 0 ELEO** tlc C0tT0itA710N (Cinna) 7/ ~
' h*' x New York State law requires the utility to pay a tax of roughly ,
$250,000 annually for emergency planning, which is channeled to the '
N!
counties as appropriate. Wayne and Monroe Counties, which are in the s 1
emergency planning zone of the Cinna , plant, make application directly to
. g the State for funding assistance. V~ , j
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g Because the utility pays this assessment to the State, Rochester Cas
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i fS t and Electric does not reason that there should be much additional expense. .t
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The utility will respond to perceive needs (usually for equipment), but ,
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( the n .:e is per:eived as t5e :sinstay for emergenty planning support '., 2 vt
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3 and ex;:r.s s. In cor.trast to s::e Of tne dif ficulties experien:ef a: '
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' at Indian Point, the co .pany of ficial scg;;ested that relationships with [.
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the ccanties in the Cinna zone were cordial. u
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_r Rochester Cas and Electric did provide training to the counties in ,
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q 19E2. but this expense was funded throagh the State in calendar 1913.
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.S n.c utili has instr.ied an:' :n tsirs siren syste=s v.ich the c;.- .? ?,
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A drill condu:ted earlier this su:,:er at the Cinna site cer with
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plan has yet t o be a p p r o ve d by TE.A .
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7/ Phone interview with Mr. Ed.ard Demetrit, Re:hester Cas and j :./;.
Electric Cor; oration, July 19E3.
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457 METROPOLITAN EDISON COM.PA.NY (TMI) h l
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P' Esergency planning in Pennsylvania is under the charge of the Penn- #
. \'
sylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). Under the State organization
{
are ccunty organizations. In the case of T.11, there are flvo counties in . .
the 10-mile-radius emergency planning tone.
These organizations are funded through the State and through their own i i
funding. The utility is not required to make any monetary contributions to y
. i
,4 emergency planning. '
[..,2 t
t.w Meted takes available e:ergency planning consultants to the counties " "
~ 5 and to local borou;hs, municipalities and school districts. Each of these p f
2 units must sutsit a plan to PEMA, and the Meted consultants help in that 5
)
task. s '
He::d is required annually by NRC to provide information to the '
.l residents within the emergency pla .ning zone regarding radiation, evac s- .a
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1:::e p;; tnesc ;2:pr;<:s and tr :naras ::tc*her an: {f V t F.e :Id paid !:r :ne ;ri- in; and = ail distriba:icn. Me:Id also paid for tne
[ [
l1 print;ng and distrib;; ion of a bccile f:: far:ers prepared by the Pennsyl- Hi!
h vania Agricul:ure Depar::ent, i
Me:Id has an e:ergen:/ prepared:ess group that conducts regular f: '
F s . n.rs in :he .i
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- :cs and 1::s; :;n.:ipalities to describe tne u:..'i: 's j5) j plan and ans.cr q;e;:.. , '
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EnerE2n / plannin;, a:::rding to the utility spokes:sn, has no been $I 1h f an issue in the res:ar: cf TM1 Unit 1 proceeding. The escrgency plans k[
f or manicipslities, coan:les, and school distrie:s have been approved by k 6
-.t r PEP.A and by the Federal E:ergen:y Manage:en: Association, and are in place. $
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July 19?3.Phone int e r vie s wl:5 Mr. Sa:dy Polon, Me:ropolitan Edison Co.,
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TENNESSEE VA!.l.EY Al'THORITY (Sequoyah) 9/
.. I
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TVA has worked through the Tennessee E:sergency Manageoent Agency (TCM) k and has paid for cost of the planning process. It supplied $685.000 to TCP.A for planning. TEM :her, went :
to the local communities and identified ** 5 deficiencies which TVA has paid for. 50 .
yo, -
far it has spent aboat $300,000 for Sequoyah (in addition to the funds supplied TEM), and espects to
{ pit C
- h. g, spend about $200,000 more in correcting deficiencies in local emergency .,' DATE:
h response capabilities.
- o In addition, TVA has paid for potassiu:n todide (KI) pills that have
- ^
Y., On Ju:
been distributed to residen:s. The decision to distribute KI was asde by entit.
the Covernor at
'., NucIC' stati the reco uenda:Lon of the Tennessee Co uissioner of Public
- While 11ealth, and the Depar: ment of Public Ilealth is distributing the pills.
(
-.3 TVA is also supplying XI pills to Alabc:a; in that state, however, the <
i.' addit.
J' e x a.-i r
- ills 5:2 S... s;:: ;i.:1. !:. 2 e e r;;ent/ plar. ca.'ls 1 : :ad n3 taa i ;,
+', pt :
[ *, t::a; s:o:k;1 led pi.is :o dis:'it;;ior, cen:ers, where eva: aces voeld ;;o, ar.d ,'
s In ed; T. this :
casing the. avai;a:;e :here. Tne ::s: far pills, vni:S =as: te repla cd ,vi [,
periodically. is $30,000 fer T6:nesses and Alaba:a, p1;s ano:her $10,C00-
[ $15,000 f or dis: rib.::ing the:. .: .';: .
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- 1 r i . oer vo cr p t( t u us fdi sao ay o nP s r rp Sdil f l n1 e so mox aee Se p eu
- mf id Scned bJ s9 eo n rr Naore i r ee g o li r oy A us . h v oct ept oe tb SM csd t ri h atd P oee d pt r t eu i nn Py rnv l e ao rl ds i o Ab M
pi o ov emi cor maaen o vvo ai l r ro mt ee Hd nep t r nt p r n ei c e omm np au f o ncg e rl p
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-POSITION COMMITMENT No E TH Manager p ra.m 100g 1
Aceociate Planner CEM 100g i Principal Planner E,p. 10 01L 2 Principal Planner (Vacant) CEM 100) 1 Frincipal Planner DF: 100% 3 Senior Planner (Vacant) CIM 1001 1 i
Assistant Planner CEM 100i Assistant Planner CEM 2005 1
Junior Planner CEM 1001 1
1 Planning Assistant CEM 100% 1 1
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,( ) THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS # .
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- h. DECUTIVE DEPARTMENT A @Ny ,'
cm otrthat actact AND errect er tusmotwcv Petramtchtse s .Q eco wcactsita ncao
- P.O SCI taan y* '
m w.homaw.wassomiasif V u .
4 ACHAEL8.DUKAK10 ROBERT J. BOULAY '
covenwon cente;on MCDA FUNDING, JL'.,Y 1 - JUNE 30 FUL1.-TIME PERSC"NEL State Funds Federal Funds 50:50 State: Fed. 100% Federsl I
'S $574,430 52,130,000 109 10 1
'6 $574,430 $ 1,35 5,000 40 10
- 7 5 3: 4 , t i ". '! ???,C:: 40 10
'E $352,10E $1,CE9,000 40 10 <
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'9 $440,160 $1,165,000 40 10 i
- 0 $461,875 $1,185,000 43" 13 l
1 $435,715 $1,23',000 45* 16 i 1
. i 2 $436,700 (*,51',C::
. 43* 20 j 3 $491,460 $1,728,000 45* 20
-. $530,512 $1,820,000 45* 19 5 $652,038 $1,115,000 45* 18 l
6 $73E,235 unavaila' ele 45* 19 l
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.ly 40 positions e.re authorized and funded. 4 i
State ci Federal funds are clicested fer Radiological E=ergency Response Planning. ,
eral c:n=racts li=it pc scnnel to v :k en cct:g: ical p regrses. .
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&n Federal Emertency Management Acency -
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Regien I J.W. McCer.nack Pon Omce ar.d Coun Hcuse l Benen, MassachuseNI 02109 l
July 10,1986 1
i hod.0KAN '.N 7:R:
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/' M aceMex:ander, ra-du: cf *;* y 10th Regardir.7 Clarification cf !
l?EC f r :::. S t ;e '. V . Spe ck t.: Her.:y G. Vickers , Mc;:h 4, ;
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Izargency Preparedness as it raiatee te t?.e C: .prehensive Cocpera tive Agrea:mnt (c A),
l Yec are cerree:
tha t d:. vs :1 g re ecur:e s f := cve rall r.u' ti haz ard ce r e n:/-pe;aredness to a specif1:
hazard is 'nct Fs: .ittv. hy the terr.s cf the C A. Ycu cay net use COA l
f t.ds for the solo p.:: pes e cf u;4radir.; the 44 CFR 350 sttr.issions fer Pilgri r,, peve c- Verrent Yankse.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency ,'
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!$,.*,MP'l I Washington, D.C. 2002 1
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. t/.AR 41EEE -
!EF.ORANDUM FOR: Henry G. Vickers Regional Director 1 '
FEMA Regien 1
'TENTICN: James F. Silk . l 8
Acting Divis' n Chief. E%F0 Sar ua W. (o 3 k ;
l ICli:
I Ass....' ,! .re or
. State eA Local Programs and Su;;crt
. r/ .
i! JECT: Massachusetts Request fer E.'sA Funds f er a Technical J Fc::rd 5, Di , i s i:n 115 is in resp:nse to ycur r e : a .dur. of Jar. vary *,19M, tc Neily Eart:r
'he subject abcve.
, f"t, the recent amendments to the Civil Ce'e se Act did expand tne de'initicn
( 11 def ense tc include raturai and carmede ha:ards and did a11cw the a .f civil defense rescurces to te a;: lied :: ha:a-ds other than n'ucicar
- ack. h:-ever,19e a .e-dr.e .1 c;ualif ct ; .s Lse c f res0ur:es by sayin; that ey rust be used 10 c- .; r i b u t e ::, t e c: : d s t .t wi;*. , and rct ce:.act fr:: -
I itack p'epare ness. In cu vin , tne curren: pre,:sai fr:- t e State cf l assachuset:s f ails te satisfy tnat test by divertin; rescurces wi . . cut a .y ;
angible evidence to cuantify tre benefit t: the prirary purpcse f or which ne funds were provided, i.e., nuclear at:ack preparedness measures, 1 ne netien of cc..prehensiveness, which includes culti-hazard conditiens, is net f atisfied when resources are used to address what is primarily a specific !
azard other than nuclear attack. The principle _ expressed in the a .cnd er.t q nd the regulatiers is still that the primary use of resources is for ,
aclear attack. The _use of reseurces fer ether hazards , particularly when !
- ev are unfund*d **# PDa 'aa c S c
- i o n o f a_ s ' t 0 t e e A D e u . c h t- J . L e niw w sd 5'n 25 centr 1 outing .to the pri..ary certeses cf the acoropriater, s . .r. a . _ene road interpretat7ca you esioca t e i n v e u r e- a-^ " * ""- it c' r 'ac as not I e i n e t n e _1- t e - t c ' t h e 3-# - - - - t . < ' , +.,.n in the c ont ex t o f t he' t oTal .
ct, still naintains the primac*y of the use of the resources f ocusec or. -
n aCK P4 G (cc. ness _re6 O y,,
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1ere is little question of the fact that in the real world rescurces ied ainingfor other coursethan direct attack preparedness related purposes, e.g.,are on planning. a But, this is not the same as diverting a sbstantial amount of funds to establish a separate of fice or division to ,
al withexclusively.
.zards technological hazards wher,e the clear intent is to deal with those ;
- v. lopment o~f capabilities for attack preparedness,That diver: ion of fur.ds detracts, m e resou~as f or 31 $ nc u t t b t e_c u-n % q t - ,1 h neds are n-
$ orocran, they should ba <auc5* " ' - - - t ';
-++a em any her scurces, ev the State of Massachusetts frem _
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..... Juns 19, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Joe De1 Medico, Congressional Affairs Officer Office of Congressional Affairs FROM:
T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations Office of Executive Director for Operations SUSJECT:
HISTORY OF REGULATORY PERFORMANCE AT PILGRIM-NUCLEAR POWER STATION In res;cnse te Richard Ucell's recues: of June 5,1986, thi: .nemerandum forwards Pcwer Statien, a his :ry of regula:Ory prcolems relative to the Pilgrim Nuclear j
milestones ed enforcement acticns, suchshutdcwn as:This orders, historymajor includes a tabulation technical milestones, civil penalties / orders, significant management meetings, enforcement conferences, and Imediate/ Confirmatory Acticn letters.
! als:
ackrc-ledge his su::lemental recuest for five specific-items; hcwever, si tz hiatien a,:
.:e it wi" reccire .cre time :: develep, we have cecided n:: :: celay this we will provide the cther items in aucut a week.
t .__ 3
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' T. ,A.Relm, Assis:an: f:r 0: era icr.s Office of Exe:v:ive Dir.ec:Or Encicsure: for Operatiens As Stated e
G i
PILGRIM STATION Decke- No. 50-309
_ REGULATORY piRFopyANCE HISTORY A tabulation of significant milestones and enforce.e.en actiens 9 s i -
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r w----._----_--._ - . _ _ _ - _ . _ - . - - _ - _ _ - . _ - . - _ _ _ - _ __ ._ _- -)
3 June 1972 l Issued ocerating license.
December 1973 Shutdown Order issued to ihspect for and re-pair fuel channel box damage.
December 1974 Fuel failure: Hydriding and pellet-clad interaction failures resulted in high gaseous ac'tivity. Operation with the fuel-cladding perforations resulted in high dese rates in locations requiring access for operation and maintenance. During 1975, 75 and 77, power was limited between 60-80% to maintain offgas activity within regulat:ry requi rements. .
The last of the defective l fuel buncles was replacec curing the 1977 !
refueling outage.
May 1975 1 A civil penalty ($12,000) was assessed for 1
violations concerning Inservice Inspectien activities identified during an , inspection conducted Cecember 197a - February 1975.
~
July 1975 .
Managemen; meeting to discuss c:ncerns '
related t: the management and implementation i of the Health Physics Pr: gram. !
. October 1976
! Management meeting to discuss c:ncerns related t: management and im the Health Physics Pr: gram. plementation ef-Ncvem:er 1977 Management meeting :: revie4 licer.see e#f:r:s to strengthen Radia:icn Protection Pr: gram.
March 1978 A civil penalty ($16,000) was assessed for violations identified in'inspecticn re cr; 50-293/77-31. The viola:1:ns were: cver-exposure of cne individual; failure to in-struct personnel in accordance with 10 CFR 19; failure to perform required air sampling; and failure to follow precedures.
September 1973 Managemen: meeting t: discuss c:ncerns en H r9 cent inspecticn findings (all areas).
j Sectember 1979 Management meeting to discuss viciatien cf primary c:ntainmen; integri:y.
Oc:cber 1979 .
A civil per.alty ($5,0CO) was assessed for a 5 violatien identified in inspecti n recer:
E0-293/79-15 involving a failure' to fellcw
( the Securi y Plan. i l
February 1980 A civil penalty (55,C00) was assessed fer shipping radioactive materials with externai r:diatien levels in excess of regulatory limits.-
March 1981 (SALP)
Hanagement' meeting to discuss' the results of the SALP for the period January 1,1980 to December 31, 1980.
April 1981 A civil penalty ($13,000) was assessed for events surrounding movement of irradiated fuel without secondary containment as identified in inspection report i 50-293/80-09.
July 1981 A management =eeting was hele in July 19E.*' t:
ciscuss c:ncerns for TMI Ac:fcn Plan Items involving pos .ac:ident sampling _ precedures and equipment and an Imediate Action Letter was issued regarding implementation of these items. Meeting was.prempted by a' June'1981 -
radiation prctecticn inspection .
, (EC-293/21-14) fcunc.:he licensee failed t:
c:nf:r;; with NRC cri:eria in c:nnectien with 4 cf the 5 NUREG-0572 Catescry A items inspected.
- June - September 1981
( ~ Inspections 50-293/81-18 and 81-22 identified six pr:blems; ineperable cemeustible gas c:ntrol system;- failure to perf:r en acecuate 50.59 review; failure to pr: vide a::r ::riate precedures- and. drawings ;. failun to make a- repor recuirec by Tecnnical Specifications; failure to previde accurate information to NRC;'and failure to satisf an Limiting Ccndition fcr Opera:icn (LCO)y regarding primary containment isolatien valves. These inspections were subsequently the subject of enforcement actiens taken in January 1982.
July - August 1981 A Per'ormance Aporaisal Inspecticn (50-292/.
El-EC) average.found 6 of 3 areas examined beicw These were: c:mmittee activities; quality assurance audits; maintenance;
- r ective acticn systems; licensed and ncn-licensed training; 2nd pr:curement. Fian cperations and design changes and medifica-tiens were fcund to be average; hcwever. *
( significant weaknesses were identified in bcth areas.
(
Cctober 19E1 Enfer:ement conference to discuss management' '
controis of safety related activities in-cluding the violations identified during inspections 50-293/81-18'and 81-22, the Performance Appraisal Inspection results, !
1 and an interim SALP review (pericd !
September 1,1980 - August 31,1981).
January 1982 Civil penalty ($550,000) assessed for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50.44; submittal of false information to NRC and subsequent delay of notification to l
NRC of known inaccurate information; and {
failure to comply with LCO for RCIC '
c:ntainmen: 1 solation valves.
(P!P) ,
Order modifying license required licensee :o '
submit a comprehensive plan of action that would yield an independent appraisal of.sita -
and corporate management, rec:mm.endatiens-for improvements in management c:ntroisiand eversight, and a review cf previces :m- .
pliance with NRC requirements. -
Management meeting to discuss implementing requirements of the NOV/preposed civil '
penalty and order modifying license I. regarding the independent appraisal of . ;
Besten Edisen C:mpany (SECo) management practices.
Jar.uary '352 Ins:ec;ien re:cr: 50-292/51'25 icen-ified a severity level III violation for transporta-tien of radioactive materials with liquid in the containers. This violatien was based on an inspecti:n in Aucus 1981 by the Sta:e of Scuth a civil Carolina which resulted in issuance of penalty (51,000).
March 1982 Boston Edison Company (SEco) submitted the Per# 0rmance Improvement Pr: gram (?IP) recuired by the January 1922 Order.
NRC Managemen: meetings :: review status cf the Performance Improvement Pr: gram were held accrex ma:aly every six weeks un-il i
Septem:er 1954 4
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June 1982 '
A special inspection (50-293/82-20) c:nduc:cd of licensee actions after radioactive spent.
- resin was found on roof tops and pavement within the protected area. No violations identified. Confirmatory Action Letter I
- issued concerning actions to be taken regarding the spent resin.
July 1982 Enforcement Conference to discuss exceeding an LCO associated with the Reactor Protection System water level i
instrumentation. j August 1982 j Enforcement Conference to dis:uss exceeding )
an LCD associated with the Vacuum Breaker l Alarm System.
September 1982 (SALP) 1 Management meeting to discuss the results of the SALP for the period September 1,,1981 to June 30, 1982. '
August 1983 .
A shu:dcun crder was issued recuirinc the licensee inspec to shu:d:wn in Cecem:er 1953 and the recirculation sys:em piping f:r In:ergranular Stress Ccrrosicn Cracking. 1:
recuired them to remain in cold shutdown until authorized to restart by the Director I. of HRR. The licensee replaced the recirculation system piping and was .
autheri:ed :: restar in Cectm:er ;?E4 Se::sm:er ;?5- (2AL.:)
Managemen: mee:ing :: discus's the resul:s'ef the SALP for the peried July 1,1922 to June 30, 19E3.
November 1983 Management mee:ing to discuss refueling / pipe replacement preparations. .
January 1984 Ccnfirma: cry Acticn Letter issued regarding licensee actions relative to health physics practices following the discovery of small, ;
highly radioactive sources in the c:n:r:1 r:c drive repai.r recm.
February 1984 i Enfer:ement conference regarding the unc:n- i trolled handling of small, hignly j radioactive repair recm. scur:es in the c:n:rol r:c drive i
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April 1554 A civil penalty ($40,0C0) was assessed fer.
problems in c:nnection with the unc:ntrolled d 1
handling of small, highly radioactive 1 i sources in the contni rod drive repair r:cm between January ~ 14 and 18, .1984 The violation involved identified problems with 4
the labeling of containers, the use of extremity dosimetry, and the adequacy of instructions given to individuals working in the repair room.
September 1984 -
Management meeting to discuss a sec:nd instance of the uncontrolled presence of small, highly radioactive scurces in the c:ntrol red drive re: air r:cm.
Oc: cer 1554 Enfer:ement c:nfertnca en the unplanned ex-tremity expcsure (within regulatory limits) connected with the small, highly r'adioactive scurces recm.
in the control red drive repair -
(Follow-up to September 1924 -
management meeting en same subject) .
C:nfirmat:ry Acticn Letter issued in c nnecticn witn recurring radiatien .
protection program weaknesses. Tne letter outlined licensee plans for evaluating and correcting these weaknesses. .
November 195a
. An crder mcdifying the license was issued in c:nnecticn with recurring weaknesses in :he raciatien pr: tecti:n quired the licensee ::pr:gra.d. The ceder re-c:mplete an independent centrac :r assessment cf the radiological c:ntrols pr: gram and to submit to NRC review and aper: val a Radiclegical Improvement Plan (rip) for upgrading the radiological controls program. Follewup inspections conducted in May, August, and November 1985 and April 1986.
A Severity Level I~I violatien (nc civil penalty) was issued for failure to perfcrm radiation surve workers in ac::ys; failure to instruct "
rdance with 10 CFR 19;- and -
failure to pr :erly imolemen: a pr:cedure in connecticn wi:n the unplanned expcsure no:ad above.
~
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Enforcemen: c:nference to discuss weaknesses )
s in the c:n r:1 and menit: ring of neutr:n in- 1 strumentatien during refueling :; era:icns. l
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - " - - - ' - ' " ' - - - ' - - - '
Janua ry ' 1955- (SAL?)
Management meeting to discuss the results of the SAL? for the perf ed July 1,1982 to September 30, 1984.
1 Enforcement conference to discuss an unpinnned occupational radiation exposure within regulatory limits associated with sludge-lancing operations on a waste tank as identified in inspection 50-293/54-44 i August 1985 Enforcement. conference to discuss licensee's !
action on abnormal and a degraded vitalsurveillance area barrier.test results October 1985 A civil penalty (!!0,0C0) was assessed f:r one degradation of a vital area barrier. ~
Novemcer 1925 !
A safety' system functional team inspection I (50-293/85-30) was conducted by the Offi.ca of Inspection and Enforcement tc. assess the operational readiness and function of _ ^
selected safety systems. The-ins;ec-icn .
~ i:entified tha: :ne licensee hac ne: -
effectively mitigated a water ha==er pr:blem a:seciated with the hPCI turbine exhaust line which had been eccurring since the f.scinning_of plant _neraticn. keaxnesses were also icentified with the licensee's -
design ~ chang' e process; c:ntrol of plant:
instrumentation; handling of vender infer =a -
ti:n; pr: gram f:r a:: roving and vali emergency crerating pr:cacur'es; capa:ility dating to c:ncuct a c:ntrol reem; plant shutdcwn from outside the and maintenance program for-me:Or operated valves.
1
- ' February !!!5 Inspection re;cr
- 50-293/86-Ca identified a severity 1evel III violation for failure to meet packaging requirements for iow specific activity radioactive materials. This viola-tien was based en an inspecticn in January l 1986 by the State of South Carolina which resulted in issuance of a civil penalty.
(51,0C0).
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March 1986 (SALP) Management meeting to discuss the results of-the SALP for the pericd October 1,1984 -
October 31, 1985.
\ February - March 1986 A special diagnostic team inspection (50-293/
86-06) was conducted to-determine the under-lying reasons for the licensee's poor performance described in the most recent SALP and to ascertain whether they could have an adverse impact on the safety of-plant operations.-
April 1986 An Augmented Inspection Team.(AIT) conducted 1 an inspection of recen: eceratienal' events wnich included 1) the s:urious grcuo one primary containment isola:1cns (and associated reactor scrams) that occurred on April 4 and 12, 1986, 2) the failure of the !
main steam isolation valves to prcmptly. j reopen after the containment isolatiens, and
- 3) the recurring pressuri:stiens" of the - '
resicual hea removal system. The A*T fcued ;
the licensee's evaluations fcilewing the- l second event to be carefully structured and.
thercugh. A Confirmatory Acticn Letter concerning the events was issued which
(
required the licensee to provide a written report prior to restert centaining the .
results of the evaluation and ccrrective actiens. The CAL also recuired Regicnal ;
Acministra cr autneri:stien fcr restart. j Inspecticn (50-293/86-10) reviewed implementation of the RIP. The inspection ) '
fcund the licensee adequately addressed 13 I of the 34 items reviewed.
May 1986 l Management meeting to discuss evaluations and i corrective actions ccncerning the operational !
events of April 4 and 12,1956. "
June 1986 The first in a planned series of management meetings schedulee to review BECo managemen: '
oversight of the implementa:icn cf the licensee improvemen: programs in prcgress.
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w Descriceir.n di herovemen P-ecram ' p ,,
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Per'ormance Imoreveman: PecramleIP) s i
a) Required by Order in January 1982 '
b)
[sr Areas for Improvement 1 x x 'i 2
Independent Review and Evaluation (MAC) ..T 'T Organi:ation Review /Revisien
- 3) Management Control System Review /Revliun
- 4) Training'on Changes
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c) 125 milestones established >
- examcies - Precedure Upda:e Program i (tic 0 precedures) iL 8
- Update Design Dccuments Prhram .
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(450 drawings) ,
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Licensee CA verification cf final cemit an; performe'd Oc:cher 1955
' i E II.
Radic1ccical I=crevemen: rrecram /
i a) Required by Order in November 19E' b) y Areas fer Imereve .en: ,e
- 1) Incecencen Asse:: men: e f Pr:cra., \" -
- 2) Radiclegicai Organi:atien Review'Revisien N '
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- 3) Radiological Cen:rols ReviewMcvision
- 4) Management Oversic5:
- 5) Training on Changes and Corrective AktiensV
~
g c) 209 Milestenes Established '
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As of Cecember 1925 cre item remains open' (reconfigure access centrol) r
!!!. Centinucus ! creve-or.: Frecrse -i a) Initiated by SEco in June 1955 b) A;tiens i L
- 1) Visited plants with gecd SALP evaluations ( ,
2)
Cendue:ed internal survey to identify prcblems/cause l'e .
( 3) Issued reper: of findin; in Cecameer 19E5 ,
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Prebyem Yreas fdentified- l' '\
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- 3) Weak Rco: Ccuse' Analysis '
- 4) Ccmunt.sation '
- 5) Effectivene h Assassti.tht
- e. .' i d) Sta tus '- .) .
Implementation of sixteen of eighteen recommendations (irt pregress.
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, The f ollowing material was provided by Mr. Joseph Bernero, Chief of the Boiling hater Reactor Division of the NRC.
"'se ve re acciden t s ' is the term most commonly used to describe accidents ja which the reactor core is severely damaged. As happened at ihree Mile Island, prolonged loss of core cooling can allow the heat of radioactive decay on the core to build up to the point that the fuel begins to disintegrate, the zirconium metal cladding melts or reacts with residual steam to form ecobustible hydrogen, and even the ceramic uranium oxide fuel pellets car aelt. A great deal of attention is being given to understanding the behavior of reactors and their
)
containments in severe accidents, especially since the Three Mile Island accident. The object.ives are to ensure that the lae!! heed af c e re s~}: arcidents is very low a n :' that, shnold cne cccur, in.r. as se s ',tial a s s ' a n : <. that the centa:nnent will ti:1pate ; c, c c r, s c q u e n c e s .
The severe Accident behavior of a BWR with a Mark 1 i
containment, the Peach Ectten Flant, was assessed in the reacter Sa: u, Stu '.1:1-12CC c r N'JF T E 5. C 14 ) wh i c h was
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, -!.:: : r. it; i r ' i t e. ' a r>: s t i t o l .- :
4 crerall risk for the E..i , principally Jue to its ability te prevent c o re tr e l t . The c c:i t a i nre n t was estinated to provide very little citigation of ccre melt consequences because the l buildup of pressure under accident conditions would be a direct cause of containment failure unless adequate cooling was preserved. Consistent with operating procedures in place in 1975, the Studv assumeJ little effort by the reactor operators which might effectively preserve the containment's integrity.
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.) .The situation, more than ten years later, is different and still changing for the better. It is recognized today that melten core material melting into the ground through the thick l
containment base is not the principal threat; rather, it is an atmospheric release of radioactive material which is the principal threat. The principal factors which can cause containment failure with atmospheric release are hydrogen ,
i i g'n i t i on , gas overpressure buildup to rupture, and direct '
attack of the drywell by core melt debris. The general situation for each of these is summari:ed as follows:
Hydrogen Ignition Recognizing that combustible hydrogen can be generated and ,
I releaseM in severe arci hatt, all Mark I containments now are purged and fil' led with inert nitrogen pas during creration so that even if hydrogen gas is formed it has insufficient oxygen available to support corbustion. Remaining questions in this area relate to how long the containment may be without this inert atnesphere in order to permit inspections, and how air might leak in or hydrogen leak c ut to nearby roers under a c c i .:" . * . 'ni.'.i. . .
I k i I
'.0 overpressure Failure .
Careful analysis indicates that a typical' Mark I containment can withstand pressures of more 'than twice the design pressure without rupture.
Nevertheless, severe accidents in the extreme can generate such pressures and cause containment rupture. Overpressure damage control procedures have been developed for pressure suppression containments and are already in place for ..
operator use. With these procedures the containment remains closed for most accident conditions; but, if overpressure failure threatens, large vent valves above the suppression pool chamber are opened so that the excess pressure is released gradually by bubbling the releases through the pool, forming a filtered vent containment system. With this path assured, virtually nothing but the noble gases are released. The radioactive noble gases pose a medest exposure threat offsite only in the area very close te the plant. A number of questions are being persued in this ares. All the plants have suitably la ;e vent valves an: c ::'s cut :.e;. var,. c e te another in the ability t; cpen these valves under accident conditions. The valves are designed for highly reliable closure, not opening. Consideration is being given to modifying valve controls. In addition, the vent ductwork downstream of the valves may sarrant modification. In most plants it is fairly light gauge ductwork and might be treacted in accident venting. If sc, consideration is being given t; the ef fects cf secondsey re' esse cf radts:tive gas , hydrcgen, and pe.-hE;s steam into the reacter building.
Direct Attack The core melt debris, since it has melted through the reactor vessel into the drywell may, by direct radiation of heat, cause failure of connections in the drywell shell; or the debris, if sufficiently fluid, may flow out to the wall and melt through the steel. The Park I containments have one or more spray systems in the drywell which are able tc spray water along the walls and cnto the floor of the drywell inhibiting direct attack. Concerns in this area are in three general areas: core debris mcdeling, shell and concrete attack modeling, and spray reliability. In the first area, it is recognized that a molten reactor core, to melt throu;5 the bottom of a BWR, must dissolve a very .
4
3 1arge amount of inert metal in the lower reactor vessel, probably diluting the are melt. The key question is whether the melt would come out moving
. sluggishly like Hawaiian volcano lava or as a hot free flowing liquid. The latter is the more threatening condition.
l If core melt debris reacites the concrete floor and steel shell of the wall, it is important to understand that the path to the outside that might be opened j bypasses the beneficial scrubbing of radioactive material passing through the '
pool.
As noted earlier all these plants have drywell spray systems, but they are designed as a secondary mode of operation for a reactor safety system. Strong consideration is being given to enabling hookup of these systems to fire protection systems so that spray capability is almost always available.
Subs;antia11y different emergency cperating procedures and training were put in pla:e at all reactors after the Three Mile Island acciden_t; further improvements in these procedures are still being made. For the Mark I ontain:'ents both industry and NRC studies are being used to identify the'best ccmbined strategy for proce:cres a-d pernaps some changes in equipment su:h as alternate vent paths, or irpr .ed valve :perability. The Ma-k I studies are being given hignest priority by the hE: staff and the industry. The '
expectation is that, with modest improvements of this type, one can achieve substantial assurance of core melt consequences mitigation by a Mark I containment."
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! ,. , t NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION fa f M SHINGTON. D C. 20555
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, *...* October 7, 1986 L CEt.5EES: EWR OW:.EE!' CEOL F FACILITIES: A:.L EWF. PLA!.T5 SLU ECT: SUP. ban 0: SEFTEVED. ):, ICEf MEETItd Of, GEf,EC.:C RECUIREMEta5 F0F Ehk C0f,TAlte.Et,TS A neet r.t tetweer the C.lT C>rrrs' GrcL; iBWFCCJ ar.c the fiFC has hele is Cethesci. , i:aryler.c, cr. Septer.: er 11, ICEE. Tr.e pLrptst cf the er.eetir; was fcr tbt fTC tc presert it ite E GCG e se: cf str6wrr.er. gereric rec;uireter.ts be r.;
corsictred t; the f,FC f( r tre pLrpc$e Cf er.htr.Cing 6WE coritainrer.1 perforr8r.ct in severe accicer.: cenciticr1. The BWROG was te preser.: the results cf its ptrailel stLc2 usir g I;crtrert itates Fewr. Corpery's F.crticelle plart es refererce EJT witr f.t e. I c c i t i r r e r '. . , list cf rettir.g atter.c'ets is erclesec'(Er:1csert i ,' .
T r c f.F : ;-estt e: ;*t (;~c ::#- tr e ,v ; as so- :-1:(c' ir :tt er:::!e:
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- t * *. F . E t r r e " C 1r#t er ec :te EWFCC ;r.g: ;'t Ve rr:r : 16 ! t.t t s *. cy fCr C er :s ir.r e'; er.r.t r cert'is it. Test (rtse tc c 'ce"Ts E);rtsset lj
- T s O.trr;" cd \ e rr:r bili res;l f c \ e t a i l *. I.; L ;r( 'I' CcrsiC{rtiftt! (# sA ttl't g e " e < *: : *t:Lirerer:5.
- rt Es:CC Sese a creser:a ::* c' its gcsititt on its fi re'.ie ; ::Lcf ( E r.c ; c s . rt
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tEF. 4, srcL i C C e ir.
- i tt e # ;e: :. E r3 cerirs. rce.CVtr, trt issLt! Ct ryce;g-se**drg, 2": C:"e,Ce!s CCr* :-, cry,f. s: #E; ti':fr ::, c:! lirrer .
rart;ere-; vt e tc , rt'e re: :: :. :'.etr Li ,';'es t' ara g e ; a : r e. -
Festcr:e! Cc r'! ee (f.ll'$i', f: ge'e'ic 2;; lice *ict tc 21' Ijgr; blier rea:: ri.
It ttc cc :'.: . c' tre et- 'i, n . Eerrer: tr:ctsec' e se:cic te:r ':r' c > c r.e r.; t r. e e : i r ; M - E,.;:0 ri: f.:4er.:,er ic!E , prior tc sitif triefir; t:.
CEST scre:Liec fc f.:ver:er :F, 9Ei.
y Fc h e r. C. Thecari, Freject Fa e;cr Ger.eric Rec;Lirerer s for EWF. Coritainmer.ts i
Ercicstres:
As stated f---}\/'~] i
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Enclosure (1- !
NRC-BWROG MEETING ON
, C0hTA:hMEhT REQUIREPEhT5 SEFTEMBER 11. 1986 MME AFelLI ATION R. Bernero NRC/ DBL H. Denton NRC/NRR C. Reed Commonwealth Edison John Raulston Tennessee Valley Authority Vincent Boyer Philadelphia Electric Company Richard Diederict. Philadelphia Electric Company James C. Carter IT Corp /IDCOR Edward Howard Boston Edison R. E. Skavdehl General Electric Johr.. F. Fulten Boston Edison Compan T. H. Lande rs New York Power Authority J. A. Gray Jr. New York Power Authcrity S. D. F1cyc Carolina Power & Light Compary A. E. Cu ter Cerclina Power & Light Corpany H. V. Leise r Perrsylvar.ia Power 6 Light Crr;ary Erier PcCa'frey Le t Islard Ligrting Cceper.)
Charles Caseric Lcrg :siand Lighting Compar.)
L. T. Guc*a Ge:rgie Power Compary
- 5. h. Chestu: Georgia Power Compary J. R. Lar:gley Gulf States Utilities /HCCG Terry Pickers horthern States Power Kevir Felt:c'.aw Gereral Electric Cem;any Lear het.st;r HEC /ACFS Stef' FercLi E1taa la hER/CSR0/FIE Jir Ceocers G:.'.' States Ltilities Ccm;ar; Dernis E. hactir; Enercen Services /bCCG Wayr.e hec;ss hRC/ DBL /RSE L. G. Hvirar NRR/ DEL /PSE i Ar. gelt Marires NRR/ DBL
- 5. W. Wilczei, Jr. Niagara Mohawk Bruce A. Prester Power Supply & Ergineerir.g & Tcr.st.
Eichard P. Mv -ey Power Supply & Engineering & Lor.st.
Fichael J. May Tennessee Valley Authcrity - BFN Woody 5 troupe Enercon Services 1 Fat Pcwell Washington Public Power Supply Syster.
Lynn Conner Doc-Search Associates Larry Gifford General Electric John Stang NRR/BWRd/ Lacrosse Project Manager thor.as 5. Rete 11a NRR/ DBL /BWDa Big Rcck Fcint Pl' Faren Pichur.ari NRR/ DEL /F0E Donald R. Hoffmar Cleveland Electric 111erinatir.g I Vernon L. Rooney NRR/05L/BWD2 John tarkir.s DCM/LZ ,
Ka:imieras Carpe NRR/ DEL /PSE berald E. Gears hER/ DEL /PDr2 b
2 NAME AFFILIATION
~ J Jack Kudrick NRR/ DBL /PSB _
Jay Thayer Yankee' Atomic R. J. Lodwick Verwent Yankee ,
j Stephen P. Schult: Yankee Atomic Electric David H. Wagner NRR/ DBL /BWD3 Domenic B. Vassalle NRR/ DBL / FOB j
Daniel R. Huller NRR/ DBL /PD2 1
John A. Zwolirski NRR/ DBL /BWD1 Raj Auluck NRR/ DBL /BWD1 f Jack Donchew NRR/ DBL /BWC1 ,
i E. G. Adensen NRR/CBL/BWL3 Earl PaSe Detroit Edison l' Phillip L. Paull Vermont Public Service Dept.
G. Tarrant VT Dept. Pub. Service N. W. Edwards NUTECH C. L. Reic' Bechtel 0*er P.. Sec t: Southern Co. Services G. C. Leir.as NRR/ DEL Eve fc:cF: Lit: SERCF Licer. sir s. Eectie' The Tckyc Electric Fcwer
! Atira Cr.;c ie:st Ir TEF:C Ser.g Ec ).- hRR/CEL/PSE Mctar C. Inicari hEF/CEL/BWC2
- Kathleer F. Stet hew:.ar. & Holt:inger ,
lowt Electric Ligr.t ar.c Fower j Cevic W11scr l 5:epter Palert; Dever,rce Ccr Le, s Pississir;i Fower & Ligrt FeL' Lee:* hF;/Ent; I
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1 DISCUSSION OF A GENERIC Lt..IER ON D hr. LV.tir..b.s...:. h.. i r; nrV,Is,,,m, t. .
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ROEERT t'.. BERNER0, USNRC 1
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s GENERIC LETTER ON ]
BWR CONTAINMENT PER:0RMANCE !
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THE SUEJECTS: 37 E'rlRS k'!TH FRESSURE T'JP, :ESS10!i C0!iT A]!C'.ENTS i
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THE METHOD: A GENERIC Lti ER 0.: REDL'IREMENTS TO IMPLEMENT CHAfi3ES EASD CN GENERIC EVALUATION 4
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--_._.._______________Q
NRC SEVERE ACCIDP,'T PDLICY STATEMEN.
t e THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE OFTIONS FOR REDUCING THIS VULNERABILITY SHALL EE IDENTIFIED AND A DECISION SHALL BE-REACHED CONSISTENT WITH THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS CRITERI A 0F THE COMt;1SSION'S LACKFIT POLICY AS TO WHICH OPTION OR SET OF OPTIONS (IF ANY) ARE JUSTIFIABLE AND REQUIRED TO EE 1fp::v.:hi:
e IN THOSE INSTAN:E5 WHERE THE TECH:,1 CAL ISSUE GDES EEYC.-
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DISPOSED :0. THROUGh THE CONVENTIONAL FRACTICE D.: 1SSU1h:-
BULLETINS A!D ORDERS OR GENERIC LETTE S WHERE E3 DEIFICATIONS I
ARE JUSTIFIED THR^L'GH EA:KFIT PDLICY, OR THROUGH PLANT-SPECIFIC DECISION MAKING ALONG THE LINES OF THE INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (ISAP) CONCEP 40N. 1 I
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CRITERI0fi 16 - C0fiTAINMENT DES]GN. --AN ESSENTIALLY {
LEAK-TIGHT 3ARR}ER AGA]NST THE UNC0fiTROLLED RELEASE OF f RAD 10ACTIV1TY TO THE ENVIRONMiliT AfiD TO ASSURE THAT THE C0fiTA]NMEfiT LESIGN C0fiDIT10NS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY ARE NOT EY:EEDED F3.. : AS L0f:: AS POSTULATED ACC] DENT COICITIONS RED:JJEE,"
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. e JUNE 36, 1985: MEETING WITH BWROG/IDCOR PROPOSED A GENERIC LETTER, PRESCRIPTIVE SOLUT10fi, BY BACKFIT i JUNE 30, 1985: VERMDNT YANKEE COMMITS TO GOV. KUNIN TO DO A l e
SPECIAL 60-DAY CONTAINMENT STUDY e JULY 25, 1986: BOSTON EDISON COMPANY BOARD DECIDES TO FIX j PILGRIM CONTAINMENT AUGUST 39, 3985: BWROG EXECUTIVES VOTE TO FUND AND CONTIN'JE f
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1:::- ACES SU3:0M:TTEE ON CONTAINMENT e SEFTEM:::
PER:0RX;h:E TO E:SCL'SS FAR ERS FERRY WORKSHOP RESULTS ANC- EWF COl,TAINMEt,T GENERIC AFFECA:r. e SEPTEMEER 2L, 1925: ACES SL'ECOMMITTEE ON CL ASS 9 ACCIDENTS TO DISCUSS BWE/ MARK 1 ANALYSES A!O SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM e N:'.'EMIE; H , Hi : C GR RE'c:E.' 0F DE :T GENE:.!C LEFER Oh EW:. CC hT A i h'~.E' RE: lRE.Ei,TS (TC EE FJELISHEL FOR COMMENT) e DECEMEER 17, 39E5: ISSUE DRA:T GENERIC LETTER ON EWR CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PUEllC COMMENT e A:R]L 19E7: 1SSUE FINAL GENERIC LETTER ON EWR CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS i l ( . l J
CORE DEERIS PROPDSED REQUIREME': ; e ASSURE RETENTION OF WATER l' LEAST 3 FEET DEEP IN TORUS RODM IF TORUS LEAKS Ei; TIRE CONI _.TS i DESIRAE'.E e CONCRETE CURES CR C'HER EARRIERS WHICH WOU'r _ RETARD DEER:S A . .i m. L C,:
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The Implications of the Chernobyl Accident for the 0.5. Nuclear Power Program Remarks by J Commissioner James K. Asselstine ; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission' ! Before the 1 i New England Conference of Public Utilities Co:miissioners ! 1986 Annual Symposium ; Chatham, Massachusetts June 9, 1986 1 ! Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure to be here this. evening to c'iscuss the implications of the April 26, 1985 accident at the' ! Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union for the U.S. nuclear power program.
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1 want to begin with a brief sumary of what we do and do not know at this ) I l point about the Chernobyl accider.t. I should say at the outset that I do j not have any surprises as to cur understanding of the events during and following the accident. IbelievethattheavailableinforEationhasbeen j quite well publicized. i We believe that the accident resulted in a large early release of radiation ! l i from the plant that continued for several deys. Based upon back l calculations from actual contamination levels experienced in western Europe, principally in Sweden, we estimate that between 30 and 60 percent !
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of the radioactive iodine and cesium contained in the reactor' core was
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- released offsite. For comparison purposes, this relates to offsite
( releases that are somewhat less than the worst releases predicted in the t Commission's Reactor Safety Study. In the parlance of the Reactor .%fety
- _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - -_ _ a
.I c Study, SST '1 and SST-2 accidents, the worst considered, would result in the '
release of 70 per:ent of the iodine and 40 percent of the cesium. The next most serious sequence, SST-3, would result in the release of only 20 4 1 percent of the iodine and cesium. Thus, the Chernobyl release would equate
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to something between the SST-2 and SST-3 levels. We also believe that.the graphite fire provided a strong driving force which, by creating a. chimney l effect, aided in the offsite release of the radiation, particularly, over j the longer distances. ( The' effects of the release have been fairly well publicized, with sokething approaching 30 fatalities thus far, with the contamination- of substantial j areas around the plant, with the need to evacuate large numbers of pecple f l from the vicinity of the plant, unfortunately many h'ours after the release-began, and with the need to monitor the future health of perhapsgmany as _100,000 people. It is also worth noting that during the course of the accident, EPA's. preventive.pretective action guides were exdeeded by the contamination in several western European countries including Sweden, Finland, Norway, West Gemany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. While these. preventive protective action guides are admittedly fairly conservative l levels -- 1.5 rem to the thyroid and 0.5 rem whole-body exposure, this ' provides some indication of the world-wide impact of this accident. I should emphasize that our knowledge of the accident is still very . limited. Our estimates of the radiation releases from the plant are still' ! based upon back calculations over long distances.rather than upon actual-
- a j measurements in the Soviet Union, and we still do not have a clear L___________._.__________________------_-------
, , . d
) understanding of the sequence of events that caused the accident. Nor do we have detailed design information for the Chernobyl plant as yet. The Soviet Union has agreed to provide a full accounting of the accident to the ,
International Atomic Energy Agency by September, and perhaps as earlyIs , July. I suspect that our many questions about how this accident began and progressed to a catastrophic early release of radiation, and how effectively the Soviet Union is dealing with its aftermath, will not be fully answered until then. Clearly, this detailed accounting is important. to us, as it is to many other countries. But I do not believe that we need
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to wait until then to begin learning the lessons of this accident for our nuclear power pre; ar. Unfortunately, it is not clear that these lessons are being heeded, either-by the industry or by the fluclear Regulatory Comission. In fact, the initial reacticr. from mar.y in the U.S. nuclear industry and in governr.ent aswellhasbeeneneofdfgl. We are told that such an a'ccident could not happen here because of the many differences in design between this Soviet reactor and U.S. reacters, because of our stronger comitment to safety, and because of the existence of an independent regulatory process in the United States. Interestingly, in support of this thesis, the nuclear industry points to the willingness on the part of the government regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, to insist upon continuing safety improvements in the-U.S. plants and to the use of an open regulatory , process that welcomes public involvement. For these reasons, many in N s ~ industry and governent argue that there are few, if any, lessons for us in the Chernobyl accident.
', I disagree. To be sure, there are some rather significant design differences between the Chernobyl plant and the U.S. light water reactors that comprise the bulk of the 100 operating nuclear power plants and the 20 plants now under construction in this country. Perhaps chief among these differences is the combination of large amounts of uranium fuel, zirconium, w'ater and graphite in the reactor core of the Soviet plant which creates l the potential for generating substantial quantities of explosive hydrogen under accident conditions. And there may be differences as well in .the containment capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet designs, although we do not yet have sufficient information on the design of the Chernobyl plant "to reach an informed conclusion on the degree of similarity or difference between the Soviet and U.S. containment capability. I would also agree that our safety philosophy and system of regulation are different than the Soviet system. But we would be remiss if we ignored some of the broader I
lessons cf the Cherncbyl accident that transcend these design differences. .) In my judgment, there are several lessons that apply to the U.S. nuclear progran. Some of these lessons reinforce previous safety decisions made here. In this vein, the Chernobyl accident seems to demonstrate the wisdom _of some of the ny safety requirements adopted in the United States in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. One example is improved emergency planning around comercial nuclear power plants, which provides an added measure of public protection, independent of plant safety systems, to mitigate the consequences of an accident resulting in the offsite ; release of radioactivity. Ancther example is 'the addition of hydrogen control features on certain types of plants which are intended to prevent
.v -
large-scale hydrogen explosions that could breach the reactor containment. And still another example is the environmental qualification of. electrical equipment, which is intended to ensure that necessary safety equipment will continue to function under s.:-ious accident conditions such as heat, moisture and radiation. f All of these measures reflected a recognition after the Three Mile Island accident that severe reactor accidents involving the melting of the reactor core and the potential release of substantial amounts of radioactivity can.
, in fact occur. Obviously, the Chernobyl accident reinforces the validity of that judg ent. A more detailed understanding of the'Cherncbyl accident may tell us that we need to revisit some of these issues, such as emergency
,(. ", , % planning and hydrogen control. I The Cherncbyl accident also ce onstrates quite vividly that nuclear safety J . is truly a global issue. It is new clear that the effects of a severe reactor accident are not necessarily limited to the irmediate vicinity of the plant, and that such accidents can affect many other countries. In a very real sense, we are all hostage to each other's performance. But perhaps the most important lesson of the Chernobyl accident has to do with the acceptability of a severe accident in the United States and the ; adequacy of the measures now being taken by the industry and the NRC to prevent such an accident. For this accident brings home the fact that severe reactor accidents which involve snelting of the reactor core, the ( potential for dangerous exposures to radiation, the potential for extensive ( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U
. 4 land contamination, and public stress and trauma, can occur. The I fundamental lesson from Chernobyl must be that such an accident is simply ,
{ unacceptable, and we must make every effort to reduce or eliminate the { chance of such an accident in this country. The central question I want to focus on this evening is whether our present regulatory approach and the level of performance of the U.S. plants are fully consistent with ,this most fundamental lesson of Chernobyl. I must conclude, based upon the experience of the past few years, that they are not, and that we should be pursuing additional measures both to reduce the possibility of a core
~
meltdown accident in this country and to mitigate the adverse effects of such an accicent shculd one occur. To support my conclusion, I want to turn first to an examination of several actions by the NRC over the past several years which evidence an N increasingly complacent attitude on safety and a reluctance to insist upon further safety improvements in the plants that would substantially reduce the risk of core meltdown accidents. I want to begin my analysis with a historical look at the period immediately following the Three Mile Island accident. In the af termath of TMI, the president's Connission on the Tnree Mile Island Accident charted a new safety philosophy for the country, particularly with respect to the prevention and mitigation of core meltdown accidents. In the words of the President's Cornission: Whether in this particular case we came close to a catastrophic accident or not, this accident was too serious. Accidents as serious as TMI should not be allowed to occur in the future. The accident got ' sufficiently out of hand so that those attempting to control it were operating somewhat in the dark... Once an accident reaches this stage, one that goes beycnd well-understood principles, and puts those
controlling the accident into an experimental mode ... the uncertainty of whether an accident could result in major releases of . radioactivity is too high. Adding to this the enormous damage to the plant, the expensive and potentially dangerous cleanup process that remains, and the great cost of the accident, we must conclude that -- whatever worse could have happened -- the accident had already gone too far to make it tolerable. While ... we emphasize that fundamental changes are necessary to prevent accidents as serious as TMI, we must i not assume that an accident of this or greater seriousness cannot happen again, even if the changes we recomend are made. Therefore, in addition to doing everything to prevent such accidents, we must be fully prepared to minimize the potential impact of such an accident on public health and safety, should one occur in the future. (Report of the President's Comission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, p.15.) : The Comission adopted this safety philosophy in favor of new safety
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improvements both to prevent serious accidents and to mitigate their l ccnseque,ces. Accordingly, in the years imediately following the TMI accident, the NRC develcped and imposed on the industry a substantial rumber of new requirements to address many of the specific weaknesses that had been identified at TMI. These new requirements have resulted in r g d_better.. trained personnel at the plar.ts, im; ogprocedures for dealing with accider.: situations, better plant instrur.e.tation and i _p-w plant diagnosticlogis, and upgraded emergency planning and response capabilities. Satisfying these new requirements took a considerable effort
,p by the utilities, state and local governments, and the NRC, and cost the
[ utilities and their ratepayers on the order of $50 mfilion per plant. In addition to imposing these near-term safety improvements, the NRC comitted itself to a number of longer-term efforts aimed at reassessing the risk of core meltdow.. accidents and developing more fundamental safety' improvem2nts . The longer-tem comitm;tnts took the fom of an imediate - reappraisal of the risk of core reeltdown accidents at the most heavily I
,' populated reactor sites in the country, focusing on the Indian Point plant's
, near New York City, and a broader examination of measures that could reduce the risk due to core meltdown accidents at all existing and future plants.
But as time passed and the memory of the Three Mile Island accident faded, the Comission's enthusiasm for both of these efforts began to wane. And in three decisions last year, the Comission out an__end to further efforts both to reduce the possibility of a core meltdown accident in the United States in the future, and to minimize the consequences of such _an a..ccident should one occur. In those decisions, the Comission effectively rejected the vigilant and forward-looking approach to safety that had been advocated by the Pres.ider.t's Corr ission on the Three Mile Island Accident. The first of these decisions involved the severe accident risk at the Indian Point plants. Despite projections of severe consequences frem a core reltdcwn accident at Indian Point involving the offsite release of radiation, and despite the long-standing difficulties in providing adequate I energency planning for the heavily populate,d Indian Point site, the Comission declared the two Indian Point reactors, acceptably.,.saf_e,an,d rejected all of the proposed safety improvements for th.e_p.lants, including ! the relatively straightforward safety improvements urged by our own technical staff and our hearing board. These improve rats would have cut the severe accident risk at Indian Point in half. In reaching its decision, the Comission improperly placed heavy reliance on the bottom-line results of probabilistic risk assessments and ignored the - uncertainties in the risks associated with the operation of the Indian - Point reactors. r
This decision prompted a critical letter from five members of the Comis-
- sion's Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards, a group of senior scientists and engineers who advise the Commission on significant technical and policy matters. As they pointed out, the Comission's Indian Point decision was at' odds with the consistent advice of the Advisory Comittee on the need for improvements in the risk of severe reactor accidents. In its Severe Accident Poliev Statement, the Comission then declared all plants acceptably safe for the foreseeable future, and ended all further efforts to develop new safety features for the plants that would
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substantially reduce the risk of a core meltdown. The Cemission's third cetisien was the adoption of a backfit rule, which
$ . . _ V
, restricts the NF.C's ability to impose new safety requirements on the existinc plants in operation and under construction.
This backfit rule erects a thicket of pr::edura' cbstacles to backfitting existing plants that effectively prever.ts our technical staff from imposing new safety requirements on the industry. By requiring that the agency prepare numerical c_ost benefit analyses for each proposed _new requirement and demonstrate that each requirement will result in a substantial safety improvement, the new backfit rule shifts th urden of proof to the proponent of the safety improvement. This directly contradicts the policy infavorIfihedevelopdn'tTfnFsafetyimprovementsadvocatedbythe President's Comission on the TMI accident. Taken to'gether, these three. decisions bring an end to regulatory efforts in this country both to seek
- additional safety features for the plants and to bring about improved -
k
l i safety performance that would reduce the possibility of a severe accident l
. or minimize the consequences of such an accident.
A review of recent safety studies of U.S. nuclear power plants and actual operating experience with the plants demonstrates that the Comission's new-found philosophy of safety complacency is inconsistent not only with the advice of the President's Commission on the Three Mile Island Accident but also with the lessons of the Chernobyl accident as well. Safety . 1 analyses of a number of U.S. plants indicate that even with the improve- )
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ments made after the TMI accident, there is about a 45 percent chance of a i core meltdown at one of the 100 plants now in operation in this country l over the next 20 years. i In addition, plant operating experience demonstrates that losses of reactor
' safety systems, multiple and simultaneous equipment. failures, human errors, peor maintenance practices, poor management and rapid unplahned reactor 1
K shutdowns are still frequent occurrences at nuclear power plants in this country. These weaknesses in plant performance can serve both as the initiating events for accidents and as complicating factors that can turn less serious operating events into severe accident situations. Last year, these weaknesses in plant operations caused several significant operating N # events which created the potential for a much more serious accident in this country. These operating events included the togloss of feedwater event at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, the water hammer event at the San Onofre* Unit 1 plant in California, the severe overcooling event at the Rancho Seco ~ plant in California, and the many operating events at the Tennessee Valley i - i
' ' I
1
)
.)
i Authority plants leading to the collapse of the TVA nuclear management
. structure and the indefinite shutdown of all five of TVA's operating plants.
The number of serious safety events at our nuclear power plants together with the existing safety analyses which show a high likelihoo'd of a core meltdown in the United States over the next 20 years provide clear evidence that we are not yet at the point where we can relax our search for practical safety improvements. Many other countries appear to have learned this lesson, and are achieving substantial improvements in reactor s'afety at ressor.able cost that go beycnd what this country is now requiring. ( Japan, West Germany and Sweden have achieved outstanding quality in the construction of their plants and in the material condition of plant components and equipment. This high quality in plant equipment is main-tained thrcu;hout the cperating life of the plant through extensive i preventive reintenance programs. In addition, each of these countries
]
consistently achieves outstanding levels ef human performance. As a result, plant reliability is very high, with few unplanned shutdowns, ! equipment failures and personnel errors. Serious operating events involving widespread equipment failures, losses of safety systems, and the potential for a more serious accident are virtually nonexistent. i In additien, the United Kingdom is considering the addition of extensive new safety features beyond those found in U.S. plants for their proposed new light water rea: tor at Sizewell. The purpose of these new fectures is. ' to further reduce the risk of a core meltdown accident. West Germany,
12 - Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands have also added or are adding new safety features to their plants, which go considerably beyond the designs of U.S. plants. The purpose of these new design features is either to reduce the likelihood of a core meltdown or to mitigate the consequences of a meltdown to the public. These advances in achieving true excellence in
' plant performance and improvements in accident risk for existing as well as future plants means that many of these r ennn+H ee are already well ahead of X
the United States in reducing the risk of a core meltdown accident. - m
. ~~
This foreign experience demonstrates that there are practical and reasonable options available to reduce the severe accident risk in this country as well. I would propose a three-part program to achieve this objective. First, each of the 100 operating plants in the U.S. should be r Y' reexamined to identify design deficiencies and vulnerabilities, of the type z-.-. . ._. :.. seen in our recent sericus o'erating events and plant safety analyses, that p could cause..or contribute to I severe accident. Second, imp'rovement
. . . . . . . . .. -n.s --
programs should be required in areas of demonstrated weak performance at the U.S. plants such as management, mai_ntenance, personnel performance and w
^
equipment reliability. Mjective should be to bring all U.S. plants up to the hichest standards of operating performa' nce being achieved in other countries. We should insist upon rapid improvement in the case of those U.S. plants with a history of poor perfonnance. v'
.Ibi.rd .new.design features should be considered for existing and future
- U.S. plants which have the potential to reduce both the likelihood and the . . - - -
_ consequences of a core meltdo.<n accident. The design features being added" ( .
in foreign plants, such as an added independent decay heat removal system, improvements in the reliability of reactor control systems and emergency _power supply systems, systems to protect against the loss of power to ograte cooling and safety systems, and systems to allow the controlled venting from some reactor containments, provide a good starting point for
'this review.
Taken together, these measures should lead to a substantial reduction in the risk of a core meltdown accident in this country. They would also l represent a return to the vigilant and forward-looking safety philosophy advocated by the Presider.t's Comissien on the Three Mile Island Accident. If we are to heed the lessons of the Chernobyl accident, we must return to ' a safety approach that stresses the need to improve plant perforr.ance, to learn the lessons of operating experience, and to pursue practical safety 1 i improvements in existing as well as any future plants in order to reduce j the risk of a core meltdown to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable. Protection of the public, protection of the sizeable investment made by the utilities in the 100 operating plants, and public l confidence in our nuclear program demand nothing less. Thank you.
. 1
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Chiltonville Training Center PO Bcx 1065
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, Plymouth. Massachusetts 02360
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July 25, 1986 A. L. Oxsen VNPO #86-83 vice President Nuclear Operations Mr. Peter Agnes, Jr. Asst. Secretary of Public Safety Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety 1 Ashburton Place - Room 2133 Boston, MA 02108
Dear Mr. Agnes:
As requested, please find enclosed the status, effective June 25, 1986, of Boston Edison's plant-s;e:ific commitments in response to ItiPO's 1985 evaluation of Pilgrim f.uclear Power Station. If I can te of ary f;r: .sr assista.:e, please do net hesitate to centact es. Very truly y:.;rs, ' f
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