IR 05000369/1987039

Insp Repts 50-369/87-39 & 50-370/87-39 on 870921-1020.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Followup of Previous Enforcement Actions

ML20236M494
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	11/03/1987
From:	Guenther S, William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236M473	List: IR 05000369/1987039 ML20236M470
References
50-369-87-39, 50-370-87-39, NUDOCS 8711130146
Download: ML20236M494 (10)

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UNITED STATES

/gn RIGg D- o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET. * r= ' ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 '

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Report Nos.: 50-369/87-39, 50-370/87-39 Licensee: Duke Power Company

.422 South Church Street .)

Charlotte, NC- 28242 ]

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2- )

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 l

License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

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Inspection Conducted: September 21 - October 20, 1987 {

Inspectcrs: I /]I W. Orders,'SEnid'r' Resident spector

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n h llO * Il Date Signed S.Guenther,ResldentInspectf~

Accompanying Personnel: D. Nelson i l

Approved by: / // J- U T. A. Peebl6s,' Sectio"n Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the' areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, ~. follow-up o previous enforcement actions, and refueling activitie <

Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie o

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1 REPORT DETAILS )

1 Persons Contacted )

d Licensee Employees j l

T. McConnell, Plant Manager

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations '

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• D. Rains,. Superintendent of Maintenance  !

• B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services .!

N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling f i

• R. Banner, Compliance i

• J. Snyder, Performance Engineer i *R. Gill, General Office - Licensing +

jl Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, .j technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office j personne l l

• Attended exit interview i Exit Interview l

l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 23, 1987,

, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licenseo did not

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identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspector during the course of their inspectio j

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, Unresolved Items l

An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is l

required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a. violation

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or deviatio ne Unresolved Item concerning prevention of foreign objects from entering the reactor coolant system was identified and is discussed in paragraph . Plant Operations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personne j i

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at

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shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as l prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The. complement l of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications.'

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' Plant tours taken during the reporting ' period included,' but ~ were L not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and:2: .]

electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms,' Unit 11 '

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reacto'r building and the station yard zone inside 'the protected are ,

i During the pl ant ? tours , ongoing activities, housekeeping', . security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed, j O Unit 1 Operations

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Unit 1 began the reporting period in mode 6, in its fourth refueling'

outage, with fuel .off-loading 'in progress: (commenced on: >

September 20). Off-loading was completed ~and. the unit entered "no q mode" at 9:00 a.m. on. September 2 .

'On September 23, following the inspection 'of ' the ' high ' pressure turbine, HP turbine work became the critical: path for the remainder - H of the outage due to blade ^and blade ring damage. requiring repai J An ' approximate three week extension of the outage : schedule . was , 3 '

estimated, with a revised on-line date of November 15. .The tur,bine-work contin 0ed on schedule for the. remainder of the reportingLperio Mode 6 was reentered when fuel loading began at 2:07 on October Loading was completed.at 10:00 p.m. . on October 6 and the unit entered mode 5 (cold shutdown) at 8:45 a.m. on.0ctober 1 ;

On October 1 both units entered Technical Sp~ edification paragraph 3.0.3 due to both trains of control room ventilation (VC/YC) becoming  : f i

inoperable. The details of this event are discussed ' in; Unit'2  ;

Operations, belo On October 2 a leak in the Nuclear Service Water:(RN) ' system'was-  :

discovered at a flanged joint of valve RN-190.. The. leak was coming

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from what appeared to be a crack in the pipe at the' toe; of .the weld g attaching the slip-on flange to the piping. Upon removal of the -

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valve the cause of the leak was determined to be erosion /of the pipe wall due to flow impingement resulting from operation with RN-190, a butterfly valve, in a throttled position. The licensee; replaced the'

section of pipe and flange and performed l ultra-sonic' wall thickness j measurements at the corresponding location on the. opposite train. as well as on both trains of Unit 2. The Unit 2 locations were found to have acceptable wall thickness, . but .the . opposite train ! location in : '

Unit 1 (RN-89) was found to have wall thinning and an external; patch

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was welded in plac The operability of the' pressurizer PORVs came into question when it was found that the valves would'not shut without air. operator ~ assist, after being opened during testing. Normallys the valves shut with at combination of. spring force with air -' operator ' assist .and! an undetermined amount of " flow assist". It was' postulated that.the-valves should shut under spring force ~alone as wouldL be the . case '

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assuming the non safety grade air system became unavailabl The valves do satisfactorily perform their safety function which is to- J open within a minimum specified time during low temperature / low l pressure conditions. Evaluation'of this condition, which is believed i to exist in Unit 2 as well, is continuing and will. be tracked as a 1 regional inspector follow-up item identified in inspection report .j 50-369, -370/87-4 No violations or deviations were identifie I I Unit 2 Operations l

Unit 2 operated at 100% power for the entire period except for a  ;

l brief load decrease initiated as a result of- entering Technical  !

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Specification paragraph 3.0.3 due' to both trains of control room 1 ventilation (VC/YC) becoming inoperabl "A" train of VC/YC tripped I ( at 5:30 p.m. on October 1 due to a blown fuse in the control power I circuit. The "B" train chiller was started, but shortly thereafter it was found that the "B" VC/YC control room air handling unit was not running due to the inlet damper motor being burned out. . TS 3. ,

was entered at 5:45 p.m. and load decrease was commenced at 6:43 i The blown' fuse was replaced several times to no avail but no causs for the biown fuses could be' detected, other than an increased load being on the circuit due to this circuit also supplying control power i to Unit l's containment purge (VP) system. A temporary modification was installed replacing the original 5 amp fuse with a 6 amp fuse and 1

"A" train VC/YC was restored to operation with no further problem j TS 3.0.3 was exited at 8:35 p.m. and the unit was returned to 100% i power. A permanent modification which installed an additional 5 amp j fuse dedicated to VP was made late '

No violations or deviations were identifie l l Unit'2 Fuel Element Defect The fuel element defect, first evident on August 26,. appears to have not progressed based on primary coolant sam'ples. The dose equivalent ;

Iodine 131 concentration has been stable at approximately 0.07 ]

microcuries/ gram since September 21 following a peak level of 0.93 microcuries/ gram after the unit trip on September 1 Personnel at McGuire and the Duke Power General Office have been

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tracking the data closely and have evaluated the consequences of operating for an extended period of time with a significant fuel element defect. The licensee has compared the limited data-available for Unit 2 at this time with the data from- fuel element defects at other Duke facilities and other_ licensees. Historically, fuel element defects have been induced by two mechanisms, either grid fretting or debris. The data available appears to fit the coolant activity trend found in debris induced fuel failures. The inspectors will continue to monitor licensee activities in this are P j

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing a i

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance l with applicable Technical, Specification l

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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available al.d in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was l'

completed and test results were adequat Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

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PT 2 A 4208 01A NS Pump 2A Performance Test 1 l PT 2 A 4208 04B Train 2B NS Heat Exchanger Test PT 2 A 4206 01A NI Pump 2A Performance Test PT 2 A 4401 01A KC Pump 2A Performance Test PT 2 A 4208 01B NS Pump 2A Performance Test PT 2 A 4209 018 NV Pump 2A Performance Test PT 0 A 4350 28A 125 V DC Quarterly Test '

PT 2 A 4204 11 .ND Pump 1B AHU Test PT 2 A 4252 018 CA Motor Driven Pump 2B Performance Test No violations er deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequat No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up of Previous Enforcement Actions (CLOSED) Violations 50-369/85-03-03 and 50-370/85-03-02 Background: Failure to implement the requirements of TS 3.0.3 with both trains of VC/YC inoperabl Resolution: The licensee issued a TS interpretation on March 23, ,

1985 to clarify what components must be operable for the VC system to be operable. On March 23, 1987, the licensee issued Station

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Oirective 2.8.2, Operability, Determination, to ' establish Nuclear -

Production . . Department ' p'olicy for ' determir.ing .the" operability ' of ,

, systems, sub-systems, t' rains, ~ components- or devices. :That directive

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states-that 1f a running piece of equipment' trips, the time * frame for)

TS consideration 'begins at the time; of the -initial trip.~ s Thisfis .

! deemed to provide sufficient guidance _'to the operations. staf f to l minimize the possibility -of future misinterpretations of LC0-action statement timin This item is: considered closed, os,

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l (CLOSED) UNR 50-369/85-03-05 Background: Failure to seismicall'y mount 1 equipment on trie s ' ma'in; control panel ~

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i f' Resolution: This issue involved a nuclear station modification (NSM .

MG-1-1204 and MG"2-158) on 'both; units which replaced the existing obsol'ete operator aid . computer video monitors .with. updated models'.

The modification ' packages were reviewed and it was' determined that-

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design engineering had analyzed the - temporary modifications which

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originally secured the monitors and - found them to be adequate. The temporary modifications ( #4043 and' 4044 =) were closed out when the

'NSM packages were completed on May 30, 1985 and cApril 16, .1985, respectively. This issue ~1s considered close , (CLOSED) Deviation 50-370/84-33-01 Buckground: Failure to meet commitment concerning standby sh'utdown -

facility (SSF)'inoperabilit Resolution: A memorandum to' al'1 licensed personnenwas. issued o November 21, 1984, requiring that the SSF be declared inoperableLand Security be notified whenever- SA-48, ..the' steam supply valve to _the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, c failed its valve stroke

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l timing tes Design . Engineering subsequently determined .'that SA-48 , .,;

need not meet IWV- requirements in order to satisfy SSF operability'

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requirements and that all timing' tests; to date., had,been acceptabl .

(: ' NSMs MG-1-1759.and MG-2-0591, which replaced valves'1 sand 2 SA-48'and 4 !

4, their actuators with a better' design, have.been implemented since the-date of this Deviation and appear 7 to' have resolved the earlier problem with slow valve openings, t .

^' (CLOSED) Violations L 50-369/85-l'0-0"1, 85-10-02, In'd '85-10-03' j Violations 50-370/85-11-01, 85-11-02, and 85-11-03 k Background: These violations l involve 3 ; vital : battery . surveillance-testing, 50.591 evaluations and. failure to follow procedures relevant to_ battery testin .c l ll .

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. Resolution: In order to assure'a. detailed te'chnical analysis'of the corrective actions and ' current configuration, these items - will" be - fl carried as an inspector follow-up' item to_ be closed by 'the RII ,1 electrical group. (IFI-50-369,370/87-39-01)

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a l- (CLOSED) Deviations 50-369/85-10-04 and 50-370/85-11-04- ] !

L Background: ' This deviation dealt with a non-conformance with vend _or- ' J

! manual and/or'IEEE 450-1972 commitments in FSAR section 8. q

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Resolution: This item is herewith. closed based upon the review of'the=

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response to _the-. Deviation- dated September 13, 1985, and Lth :)

corrective actions' taken as described therei 'j H (CLOSED) UNR 50-369/85-40-01 -l L ,

I B6ckground: Non-Conservative analysis error in peak _. containmen _j pressure transien .l

, . 1 Resolution: Containment pressure does not exceed; design values ~in the peak . containment - pressure. transient using an updated computer model, WCAP 10329;'and the timing of-key events in.the current Final l Safety Analysis report. Therefore, further ; evaluation. o_f emergency procedures to consider ccntinuous containment spray pump ope _rationi l during suction switch-over i s . no longer necessary. . This' ii tem i s l closed, i

, (CLOSED) Violation 50-370/85-41-02 l '!

I, Background: Failure to perform required surveillance -on refueling I

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canal drains and PORV block valve .l

Resolution: This item is' herewith closed based upon review of an 1 Operations Management Procedure which _ was issued defining :i responsibilities and requirements for scheduling periodic . tests; j 1, (CLOSED) Violation 50-369,370/86-08-O'1 Background: Failure to perform required surveillance for off-site: '

l dose from liquid and gaseous effluent '

Resolution: . A program has .been implemented to ensure that periodic

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Ej tests (pts) are accomplished in accordance with anSl internally j generated schedule ~ instead of relying ~ on recelpt' of a report f rom '

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off-site to implementothe PT- f

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' (CLOSED) Violations.50-369/85-30iO4and50-370/85-32-03 ,

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Background; Failure, to maintain designated,0perations staff 1n 1 the . j control roo y ' -

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f Resolution: Station Directive 3.1.9, Relief ' at Duties of Plant l Operations, which was the ~ subject of this violation, has been

, superseded by Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 2-2, Shift i Turnover. . That OMP, in. conjunction with OMP 1-7, Shift Manning and Gvertime Requirements, ensures that the minimum shift manning requirements of- TS 6.2.2(b) are . satisfied while incorporating flexi' oil-ity for temporary control 1 room SRO reliefs;

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i j (CLOSED) UNR 50-370/85-15-01 i

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Background: Determine safety significance and reason for missing j shorting bars on valve.2NI- Resolution: This item was subsequently resolved as a violation (50-370/85-17-02) and is, therefore, considered close The j associated viclation is addressed separately in the next paragrap (CLOSED) Violatior.s 50-369/85-16-01 and 50-370/85-17-02 l l

Background: Failure to install shorting bars on 20 safety related 1 valves as required by design specification !

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Resolution: The licensee installed shorting bars on the applicable !

valves under either work requests or NSMs, as appropriat Other l motor control centers on both Units 1 and 2 were inspected for. proper configuration. The procedure which governs replacement of components j in Nel son Electric Motor Control and Distribution Centers 1 (IP/0/A/3062/08) was also revised to include a verification that shorting bars and jumpers were properly installed, when require . (CLOSED) UNR 50-369/85-06-05 Background: Resolve TS inaccuracies regarding .the containment pressure control syste '

Resolution: On September 6,1985, the 'iicensee submitted a request to the NRC to correct the inaccuracies in TS tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4-relating to the containment p re ss!Jre control system (CPCS).

Amendment No. 56 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 (Unit 1) and Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License NPF-17 (Unit 2) were issued by the NRC on April 28, 1986, (CLOSED) Violation 50-369/85-23-01 Background: Failure to perform surveillance on source range instrumentation and violation of TS 4. Resolution: The licensee promptly tested the source range monitors under Work Request Nos. 042338 and 042339. Enclosure 4.3, the Shutdown to Mode 6 Checklist of 0F/1 and 2/A/6100/02, the: Controlling

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i Procedure for Unit Shutdown, was revised to ensure that the source range monitor TS (3.9.2) is verified prior to entering Mode MP/1/A/7150/41 and MP/2/A/7150/73, the Unit 1 and 2 Control Rod Drive j Shaft Latching procedures, were revised to ensure that the applicable j TS requirements were satisfie The basic refueling outage .j scheduiing computer program has also been revised to include source !

range cnannel checks as required by the T l

\ (CLOSED) Vio'lation s 50-369/85-23-02 and 50-370/85-24-03 j l

Background: Failure to folicw procedures / inadequate procedures I resulti1ig in inadvertent engineered safety feature actuatio l

Resolution: The issue was reviewed with shift personnel to emphasize 1 the standard operating practice when opening reactor trip breaker ')

PT/0/A/4601/08A(and B), the Solid State Protection System Train A (B) l Periodic Test Above NC (reactor coolant) System Pressure of 1955 3 (psig) has been revised to ensure that feedwater isolation reset ,

pushbuttons are depressed while closing the reactor trip breaker ) (CLOSED) Violation 50-370/85-17-01 Background: Fail ure to follow procedures during equipment )

restoration, valve manipulation and containment cleanliness closecu ,

I Resolution: The licensee has revised the applicable plant operating j and maintenance procedures in a manner which should preclude the i repetition of the first two examples of this violation. The plant's Operations and Maintenance staffs were also provided with additional I instructions regarding valve gagging policy, and the Nuclear Equipment Operator training program now requires qualification on recognizing and operating valve gagging devices. In September 1985, the licensee developed a Containment Cleanliness Inspection procedure (PT/1 and 2/4600/03F) to provide guidance on checking containment cleanliness prior to entering Mode NRC Inspection Report No. 50-369, 370/87-21 documented a violation in which Unit 2 again entered Mode 4 without ensuring adequate containment cleanliness as required by the plant's TS and the PT. . Any future corrective actions regarding containment cleanliness will be trccked under Violation 50-370/87-21-02, 8. Refueling Activities Unit I continued its refueling outage commenced on September Refueling activities were observed and monitored to ascertain whether Technical Specification requirements were satisfied and activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, u___._____

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Several foreign objects including a pipe and flange and a pipe wrench were

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found in or fell into.the refueling cavity and/or in the vessel during refueling operation Although no adverse situations resulted, the licensee's ability to prever.t foreign objects from entering. the reactor coolant system is questionable. This concern is particularly appropriate in light of the fuel element defect occurring in Unit 2 which shows the ,

characteristics of being caused by foreign debris. Pending completion of '

> inspector review of administrative controls in place at the time and *

i analysis of licensee evaluation, this will be carried as an Unresolved .!

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Item (UNR 50-369/87-39-02).  ;

No violations or deviations were identified.

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