IR 05000369/1988027
| ML20205Q705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1988 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205Q690 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-88-27, 50-370-88-27, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8811090324 | |
| Download: ML20205Q705 (22) | |
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'4 UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETT A ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 NOV 0 i W t
Report 90s.: 50-369/88-27 and 50-370/88-27
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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242
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Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1-and 2 Inspection Cond e:/Sdptember 13-16, 1988 l
Inspector:.
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/#dd N4'
i A.L.Cunninpm 7 ate Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
B. R. Bonser
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M. Lesser
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y.j. Stein E
i Approved by:
3I h
/B-78'8S p' T. R. Decker, Section' Chief Date Signed
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l Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evalu don r
of the Annual Radiological Emergency Response Exercise.
The small scale
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j exercise commenced at 8:30 a.m. on September 15, 1988.
Federal, State and
County participation was linited to receipt and acknowledgement of emergency
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i notifications and periodic followups of same.
The exercise was teminated at
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12:00 p.m. on the above referenced date.
Medical emergency and fire orills l
were perfomed on September 14, 1988, at 9:00 a.m. and.6:00 p.m. respectively.
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Offsite support assistance and resources were promptly requested and l
effectively used by the licensee in each of the referenced drills. Critiques
of each drill,were conducted imediately following their termination.
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Results: No violatons or deviations were identified; however, an exercise I
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weakness was identified involving failure of the Control Room Shift Supervisor
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(Emergency Director) to identify an Emergency Action level (EAL) and promptly j
i declare the respective Alert emergency classification.
Following contingency
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prompting by a facility controller, the cited declaration was made.
The
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licensee comitted to review and correci. ion of this finding, and implementation
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of required training to preclude recurrence of the event. Notwithstanding the
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identified weakness, the exercise was considered fully successful based upon development L.id proficient implementation of a realistic, and challenging
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i scenario.
Similarly, the scenarios developed for the medical emergency and
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fire drills were effectively implemented.
Licensee and offsite support I
interaction during the drills demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in
performance of assigned tasks and responsibilities.
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I 8811090324 881101 PDR ADOCK 05000369 l
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The Crisis Management Center (CMC) was activated, fully staffed, and operated as part of the subject exercise in partial fulfillment of corrective actions
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comitted to in response to exercise weaknesses identified during the Catawba
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Nuclear Station Annual Exercise performed February 17-21, 1988 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/88-03,50-414/88-03).
The facility was effectively managed in response to required assessment, control, and mitigation of the casualty j
(Pargraphs 9 and 17).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. Addis, Superintendent of Safety
- N. Atherton, Production Specialist - Compliance
- R. Bowman, Director, Plant Connunications/ Corporate Communicatins
- S. Deskevich Associate Engineer
- G. Gilbert, Assistant to Plant Manager
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner, Nuclear Production Department
- J. Jenkins, Assistant Operating Engineer
- E. Kuhl, Nuclear Production Engineer / Emergency Planning R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner
- T. McConnel, Station Manager
- M. McIntosh, General Manager Nuclear Support, Nuclear Production Department
- W. McRee, Emergency Planner Nuclear Production Department
- J. Reeside, Coordinator, Industrial Safety and Health
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
- R. Sharpe, Compliance Engineer
- A. Sipe Chairman, McGuire Safety Review Group l
- B. Trasis, Superintendent of Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
+echnicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident inspector
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- R. Croteau
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-06S4, Rev. 1.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no maior scenarie problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies were minor. however, and failed
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to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise presented a series of realistic and challenging events which fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient infonnation to the State, counties, local government and Federal agencies consistent with the scope
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of their participation in the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated a
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significant comitment to training and personnel through use of
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controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.
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The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players l
was observed.
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The scenarios developed for the medical emergency and fire drills
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adequately exercised the participating groups of the licensee's
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l organization and the respective offsite support agencies. The plant Fire
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Brigade, Medical Emergency Response Team (MER'J and assigned security
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demonstrated effective training in their integated approach to management i
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and control of the simulated fire and med. cal emergency.
Neither
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prompting nor undue interaction between c ntrollers and players was t
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No violations or deviation were identified
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3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that primary rea,...1bilities for a
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emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and the (
adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to i
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
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specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.A of NUREG-0654 Rev.1.
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The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
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i was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response i
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organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; I'
however, because of the scenario scope end conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency respnnse organizatten was not
required.
Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review l
of the Site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number
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of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of t
the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
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The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the l
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations
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Support Center (OSC), and the Crisis Management Center (CMC). The CMC was t
promptly staffed and activated during this exercise.
The required l
staffing and assignment of responsibility at the facilities were
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consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and respective implementing
procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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- Pensee's ensite emergency organization was observed to assure that
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allowinn r a irements were implemented pursuant to l
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W.47Fl)D.), ?aragraph !Y.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and spe:
a R.6 p! amulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Rev.1:
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(1) :r
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. odW tien of responsibilities for emergency response;
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(2) pi
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/ hq tunctunal areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite >; '
'fe turort organizational interactions.
The ins -
r etta, that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequate.
idineC, ad that staff was available to fill key functional positions, *hin t'. organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response orga.hation was accomplished through use of onshift personnel.
An assigned Shift Supervisor promptly assumed the duties of Emergency l
Coordinator following initiatien of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until 'ormally relieved by the Station Manager.
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i Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response
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organization and State and local support agencies were consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
Interaction of the site emergency
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response organization with offsite support agencies participating in the t
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medical emergency and fire drills was outstanding and indicative of
effective training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and i
effectively using assistance resources were made, that arrangements to
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency
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I Operations Facility (EOF) were made, and that other organizations capable
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of augmenting )the10 CFR 50.47(b (3),10 CFR 50, Appendix E; Paragraph IV. A; plcnned response were identified as required by
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l guidance promulgated in Section ll.C to NUREG-0654 Rev 1.
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State, Federal and County involvement in the subject mergenc, preparedness exercise was limited solely to participation in notification
drills consistent with stated exercise objectives.
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Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and
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consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Local assistance resources
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from offsite suppert organizations were limited to fire brigades, l
ambulance services, and receiving hospital facilities.
Response of the
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subject organizations was prompt, effective, and indicative of successful i
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in r. by the nuclear facility licensee i
v pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFP 50;
specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.0 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1; and
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guidance recomended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix and respective procedures were used to identify and classify the emergency and escalate the plant status to i
more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence
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progressed.
Inspection disclosed, however, that the Shif t Superviser failed to identify an Er.L and escalate the emergency classification to an
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Alert when required.
The subject classification was declared following
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l prompting of the Shift Supervisor by a facility controller who issued a
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contingency message to that effect.
The specific EAL involved a plant
fire potentially affecting safety systems.
Consistent with the simulated i
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casualty, the fire occurred in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump i
l room; therefore satisfing the criterion for the alert.
This finding was i
j fully discussed with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and
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during the exercise critique held on September 16, 1988.
The licensee
also identified the requirement to issue the shift supervisor a contingency messege to assure escalation of the casualty to the Alert classification.
Bastd on the significance of the finding, however, the
inspector informed the licensee that the subject finding would be tracked
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as an exercise weakness.
The licensee acknowledged the finding and j
comitted to review of ssme and implementation of corrective action.
Exercise Weakness:
Failure to identify an EAL and prcmptly escalate the emergency classification to an Alert (50-369/88-27-01, 50-370/88-27-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follrwup
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messages to response organizations were established.
This area was
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further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the i
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to i
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and j
specific guidance oromulgated in Section II.E of NUREC-0654, Rev. 1.
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The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were f
j established and available for use in providing information regarding tne j
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local respense
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organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response i
organization.
Notification of the State and designated local offsite i
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organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of all emergency classifications involved.
The prompt notification system (PNS)
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for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency t
planning zone (EPZ) was not actuated during this exercise.
t Telephone notification of the State of North Carolina, and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
The copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source tenns in uCi/sec) where i
applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended
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protective actions when necessary.
t No violations or deviations were identified.
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EmergencyCommunications(82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt
conmunications among principal response organizations and emergency l
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personnel pursont to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
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10 CFR 50; and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
The inspectors observed communications within and between the licensee's emeregency facilities, the licensee and offsite agenciel,, and the
radiological field monitoring teams and the CMC.
Inspectors also observed
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information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency j
organization.
Emergency communications involving notification of the
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State, local agencies, and the NRC of emergency classifications discussed
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above, were adequate and consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan
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l and Implementing Procedures.
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i Comunications between the CMC and radiological field monitoring teams was
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evaluated and determined to be adequate.
Communications, once established e
with each team, was effective throughout the exercise.
In those instances
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where teams were unable to communicate directly with the CMC due to l
l building structures or topography, information was transmitted via relay l
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I No violations or deviations were identified.
I 9.
Emergeacy Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observcd to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipiant to support an emergency response were provided and maintained i
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i pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50;
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and specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.H of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
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1he inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
eu rgency response facilities, and use of the equipment therein.
Facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room TSC, OSC and the CMC.
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Control Room - The Control Room was used and etfectively managed throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to
the simulated emergeney.
Emergency procedures were readily
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available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the area designated as the Control Room precluded overcrowding; however, the location and size of the facility was instrumental in causing high ambient noise levels
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which could interfere with orderly conduct of operations under t
emergency conditions.
This finding was noted by the licensee and j
documented during the Controller Evaluator Critique.
Control Room personnel were cognizant of their duties
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i responsibilities, and authorities. The staff demonstrated proficient
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use of routine operating and emergency operating procedures (E0Ps) in response to plant transients and emergency conditions.
Note,
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however, the exercise weakness involving identification of the EAL Associated with classification and declaration of the Alert discussed
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in Paragraph 6, above, it was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions were readily managed by the f
Emergency Coordinator and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate actions in a timely manner, except as noted above.
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Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
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was observed that a bound log was provided and maintained for
documenting plant conditions and activities of the Emergency
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Coordinator and cogr.izant Shif t Supervisor throughout t% e.ne.':ise.
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Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly
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staffed following notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the apparent Alert classification. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their
emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The
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facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the
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assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly established and
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maintained. Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel assigned to the facility.
Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility and maintained all status boards current,
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Effective comunications were maintained with the Control Roem. OSC, and CMC.
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Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
f (1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions j
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were readily implemented and factored into problem so.ving exercises; l
(2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Coordinator was definite ar.d firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the
Control Room to the TSC was promptly implemented; (4) briefings of i-the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant
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j status and related emergency conditions; and (5) accountability,
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including identifying missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime, and was consistent with the scope I
and objectives of the scenario.
c, 0perations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed i
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following activation of the Emergency Plan by the Emergency l
Coordinator.
An inspector observed that teams were promptly
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assembled, briefed, and dispatched.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to t
be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
The OSC staff was r
i frequently updated on plant status and impact of the accident
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sequence by the OSC Supervisor.
Status boards defining the following
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were maintained and frequently updated:
(1) emergency classification l
l and specific plant status; and (2) listings of investigative / repair t
teams, their respective tasks, time of deployment / reentry, and return
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to the facility.
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Crisis Management Center (CMC) - The CMC was promptly staffed and
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activated following declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
This
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j facility was fully activated and operate' during the subject exercise
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in partial fulfillment of corrective actions comitted to in response
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I to exercise weaknesses identified during the Catawba Nuclear Station
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exercise performed on February 17-21, 1988.
(NRC Inspection Report l
Nos.50-413/88-03and50-M4/88-03).
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CMC security was promptly established and included as u routine l
requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status
i boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and
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l readily accessible for viewing by the CMC staff.
Dedicated I
comunicators were assigned to the facility, and all required j
notifications and periodic updates thereof were promptly implemented.
..l The following findings were also observed namely:
[1) the Recovery
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Manager's prompt assumption and maintenance of effective comand and i
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j control of the CMC throughout the duration of the simulated casu61ty;
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(2) frequent and effective intercomunications with the Control Room i
i ano TSC; (3) effective comunications with offsite monitoring teams
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and direct use of offsite radiological survey data in calculation of i
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offsite dose assessments and projections employing the Class A dose l
i assessment model; (4) timely and effective provision of field data, l
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dose assessments / projections, and resultant protective action i
t recomendations to offsite agencies consistent with procedures and
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directives; and (5) effective and consistent use of procedures in j
assessment, management, and mitigation of the casualty.
Activation j
and operation of the CMC during this exercise, fully demonstrated the
licensee capability to effectively use the facility, it's equipment (
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and comunication systems in management, assessment and mitigation of
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the emergency event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. AccidentAssessment(82301)
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This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency conditiun were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Parag'aph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.! of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
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The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
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plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and
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offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the
engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing i
plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Director t
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concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems
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J and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and r
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prompt termination of the emergency condition.
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i Radiological assessment activities involved several groups, An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant j
l based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
Offsite r
l radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of I
radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
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Radiological effluent data were received in the CMC, where dose
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calculations were computed and factored into the exercise. All resultant data were consistent with projected scenario parameters.
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Radiological field monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by i
the NRC; however, inspectors assigned to the CMC observed dose assessment l
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activities and related coordination and management of field monitoring i
teams deployed to identify, monitor, and track offsite radiological
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releases.
The Field Team Coordinator frequently updated the teams on
current meteorological parameters and status of the casualty, t
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for
protectivt actions were developed and in placa, and that protective (
actions for emergency workers, includig evacuation of non-essential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10); and i
a specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.J of NUREG-0654 Rev. 1,
1 The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the l
inspector.
Recomendations implemented by the TSC and CNC staffs were
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timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteria and emergencv
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procedures.
Protective measures recomendations were provided by the liensee to the State as part of the exercise.
It was noted that the
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protective actions recomended by the staff were consistent with the emergency plan and respective procedures and directives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. RadiologicalExposureControl(82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented consistent with EPA recomendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) guidelines for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure i
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specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.V of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
J An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout
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the exercise by issuance of supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers
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I and by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of f
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j emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available for use as required.
Consistent witn the scope
of the exercise, use of respiratory protection equipment by emergency
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response teams was simulated, except during the fire drill.
Health i
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Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.
Dosimetry was available and was
used. High range dosimeters were also available ir, case they were needed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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i 13. Public Education and Information (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated
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emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
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specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.G of NUREG-0654.
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Public information including operation of the News Media Center was
evaluated.
Inspection disclosed that all News Releases, prior to t
dissemination to the the Media, were reviewed and thoroughly checked for
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technical accuracy and approved by Emergency News Center principals. This i
approach assured the release of accurate information and the elimination
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of technical errors.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Action of previously Identified Findings (92701)
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(Closed) Inspcctor Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-05:
Required
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improvement in management of offsite radiation monitoring teams, r
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inspection disclosed that the subject teams were briefed in detail L
regarding monitoring requirements, contamination control and health physics practices addressing exposure control prior to offsite deployment.
The CMC offsite team coordinator maintained effective comunications with each team throughout the exercise.
Teams were periodically briefed regarding plant status and prevailing j
meteorological conditions.
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b.
(Closed) IFl 50-369/85-29-01, 50-370/85-28-01:
Definition of the Extent of planned special and configuration changes to the TSC and
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projected completion of same.
Inspection disclosed that the current TSC will continue to be used as an interim emergency response facility until such tire that the
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construction of the new facility is completed.
Approved design and (
construction planning for the permanent TSC was completed and the
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projected completion date for same has been assigned.
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c.
(Closed) IFl 50-369/85-29-09, 50-370/88-28-09:
Automating the
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l present manual transfer of data from Operator Aid Computer (OAC) to j
VAX computers, and providing the VAX with continuous access to data,
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at or near real-time.
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Inspection disclosed that automation of transfer of data from the OAC i
i to the VAX computer was in progress.
Correspondence received from
l the licensee, dated September 26, 1988, informed the NRC that the OAC
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j datalink currently in operation will be used to enhh. e and automate
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the comunication process. Accordingly, a change to tne program will
convert the datalink format to the Data Transmittal System Format.
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The system would then be capable of being actuated from any terminal,
e.g.,
from the OAC in the TSC.
This system is scheduled to be in
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piace and functional by January 1, 1989.
A secondary method
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utilizing PCs is further planned to provide a backup in the event i
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that the primary method fails.
The secondary approach is scheduled l
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to be in place and operational by July 1,1989.
The subject i
modifications will be compatible with the software package resident
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in the CMC.
d.
(Closed) IFI 50-369/85-29-24, 50-370/85-28-24:
Modifying dose I
assessment Class A Model to inclade ingestion pathway dose
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calculations, and making available to the NRC documentation related
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thereto.
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Inspection disclosed that the subiect model was completed, evaluated.
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and placed in use within the TSC and CMC. The dose assessment model provides the capability for dose calculations and projections within i
the 10 and 50 mile EPZs.
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e.
(Closed) IFl 50-369/86-27-02, 50-370/86-27-02:
Assure that OSC
Coordinator appoints a cognizant alternate to act during his absence
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and to announce same to his staff and the Emergency Coordinator.
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Inspection disclosed that the above appointment was implemented by l
the OSC Coordinator during the subject exercise. Both the OSC staff
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and Emergency Director were informed of the change.
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f.
(0 pen) Bulletin 87-EP-01 50-369, 50-370: Verify Audibility of Alarms
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inPlantHighNoiseAreas(79-BU-18).
The inspector, accompanied by a cognizant licensee representative, conducted an inspection of specific areas on the turbine deck and in the vicinity of the feedwater pumps in Units 1 and 2 to verify the
audibility of emergency alarms under plant operating conditions.
Inspection disclosed that the plant public address systems were inoperative in both Units 1 and 2.
As a consequence, the licensee i
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immediately submitted a request for repair / maintenance of the subject systems. Arrangements were promptly made to reevaluate audibility of
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emergency alarms in the above designated areas of both Units by NRC
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resident inspectors accompanied by cognizant licensee
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representatives.
Results of the evaluation will be reported in the j
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applicable NRC Resident's Monthly Report.
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g.
(Closed) IFI 50-369/87-28-01, 50-370/87-28-01:
Failure to maintain l
contamination control and adequate HP practices during emergency
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medical drill.
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Inspection disclosed that effective and acceptable contamination i
control and health physics practices were implemented throughout the I
emergency medical drill performed by the licensee on September 14, 1988.
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l The CMC was activated, fully staffed, and operated during the subject
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exercise in partial fulfillment of corrective actions in response to
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exercise weaknesses identified during the Catawba Nuclear Station Annual Energency Preparedness Exercise performed February 17-21, 1988 i
(50-413/88-03,50-414/88-03). The CMC serves the Catawba and McGuire
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Nuclear Stations during emergency events.
Accordingly, observation I
and evaluation of the CMC during the subject McGuire Exercise disclosed that corrective actions implemented by the licensee were j
determined to be adequate and the findings listed below were closed.
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h.
(Closed) Exercise Weaknesses 50-413/88-03-02, 50-414/88-03-02:
i FailJre to demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedures.
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(Closed) Exercise Weaknesses 50-413/88-03-03, 50-414/88-03-03:
Dose
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I projections and field data not provided in a timely manner to offsite
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agencies and protective action recommendations (PARS) did not agree with CMIP-7 Flowchart.
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(Closed) Exercise Weaknesses 50-413/88-03-04, 50-414/88-03-04:
Overall Management of the casualty was hampered by an inadequate flow of information - sometimes between ERF's and sometimes within an ERF.
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Inspection disclosed that effective coninunications with the CMC, and
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between the CMC and other emergency facilities (CR. TSC) were i
maintained to ensure the required flow of data neces.ary to mitigate r
the casualty.
k.
(Closed) Exercise Weaknesses 50-413/88-03-05, 50-414 88-03-05:
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Failure to insure accurate news media information to the public.
Inspection disclosed that all news releases were reviewed and
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approved prior to dissemination to the Media and therefore preclude
'
the release of erroneous ir. formation.
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15. ExerciseCritique(82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency was observed to determine that
shortcomings identified as part of the exercise. were brought to the
attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
,
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654. Rev.1.
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The NRC Evaluation Team observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator
$
critique conducted immediately following the exercise on September 15, l
1988.
Inspection disclosed that the subject critique was comprehensive,
'
and addressed the following: activation, detailed operation, and required
functions of the emergency response facilities; events analysis and
mitigation; dose assessment and projections; prot % tive action reconinendations; fire and medical emergency drills, and field monitoring.
All deficiencies and indicated improvements were fully discussed and
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documented by licensee representatives, and prepared for presentation at i
the formal NRC/ Licensee critique discussed below.
These findings and
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respective corrective actions will be routinely reviewed by the NRC during i
i the subsequent inspections and radiological emergency preparedness l
j exercises.
i A fonnal licensee /NRC critique was held on September 16, 1988, with those
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persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings prior to
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and during the subject critique.
Dissenting conments were not expressed
j by the licensee, the licensee did not identify as proprietary any materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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Item Number Description and Reference
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l 369, 370/88-27-01 Exercise Weakness - Failure to promptly identify
an EAL and declare the respective Alert emergency
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classification.
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16.
Exit Interview l
The inspection scope and results were sumarized on September 16, 1988,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Although
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reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained i
in this report. Dissenting coments were not received from the licensee.
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I.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
A.
Scope
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The McGuire exercise, to be conducted on September 15, 1988, is designed to meet the exercise requirements of
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Section IV.F.
The 1988 exercise
,
will involve partial rarticipation by cabarrus, Catawba, t
Gaston, Iredell, Lincoln, and Mecklenburg Counties and the State of North Carolina, to receive communications l
only.
The Duke Power Crisis Management Center will t
participate as a remedial action to address specific
.I items identified during the February 19-20, 1988 Catawba
- j exercise.
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i Limited drills will be held on September 14, 1988<. A
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separate raedical drill will be held to involve
transportation of a contaminated, injured patient to the
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hospital.
A separate fire drill will involve support by the off-site fire department.
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A formal critique involving Duke Eower and NRC will be held on September 16, 1988 at 9T0 0 A.M.
This critique
,
will be closed to the public and will be held at McGuire
,
Nuclear Station.
B.
Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)
.
Emergency Management
f 1.
Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency
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classification in accordance with procedures.
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f 2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and the counties within
minutes after declaring an
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emergency or after changing the emergency l
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3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staf f
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the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert
or higher emergency class.
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Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than j
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classes.
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5.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 l
minutes in a
simulated emergency and provide
accountability for any not present at the assembly
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locations.
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Demonstrate notification to all on-site personnel of major changes in the emergency situation (emergency
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class, TSC or OSC activation, etc.).
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7.
Demonstrate access control measures to the plant site, CMC, the Electric Center Phase I Room 230 (News Center) and the O.J. Miller Auditorium (Media Center).
8.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, the intercoms, and the on-site radio system.
9.
Test off-site communications equipment to the county and state warning points, county and state emergency
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operations centers and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System, outside telephone lines, and the NRC Emergency Notification System.
10.
Test the adequacy and operability of emergency l.
equipment / supplies.
11.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC, and from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the Recovery Manager in 'the~ CMC.
12.
Demonstrate prope r use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to states and counties.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff
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the CMC after declaring a Site Area Emergency or higher emergency class (or af ter a decision by the
Recovery Manager during an Alert).
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Accident Assessment 14.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal System in
accordance with station procedures and to distribute this data throughout the CMC according to the Crisis Management Implementing Procedures.
15.
Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools:
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Drawings 2.
Data Display Boards 3.
Maps t
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site j
radiation levels and airborne radioiodine
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concentrations, t
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18.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between i
the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ CMC.
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Demonstrate the ability to collect air, soil, water
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and vegetation samples in accordance with procedures, j
Protective Action Recommendations I
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20.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and
appropriate protective action recommendations to l
off-site officials in accordance with station
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procedures or the Crisis Management Plan
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(communications to offsite officials may be i
simulated).
Plant Operations
21.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and
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provide mitigation strategies in accordance with
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etation procedures.
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Medical Drill
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22.
Demonstrato proper response to a simulated medical
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J emergency involving a contaminated patient in l
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accordance with station procedures.
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Fire Drill
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23.
Demonstrate proper response by the on-site fire brigade to a simulated fire in accordance with
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station procedures.
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Demonstrate the ability to request and obtain I
fire-fighting support from the off-site department.
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CONFIDENTI AL
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MCGUIRE EXERCISE EVENT SEOUENCE SEPTEMBER 15, 1988 Time Initial o Unit 1
'B' Train RN out of service for
'B'
diesel generator (D/G) heat exchanger (Hx) Tube Condition *
Cleaning and Voltage Regulator n1 clear station modification (NSM).
('B' RN essential header drained.)
o Unit 1
'B' Train CA, NV, HI pumps out of service (00S) for minor motor modifications and due to RN unavailable, o Unit 1
'B' Train RN Pump OOS for Seal Replacement.
o Unit 1
'B'
Train KC Hx OOS for Tube Cleaning.
o Unit 1 turbine driven (T/D) CA Pump Halon OOS due to Modification for Discharge Line Relocation -
Assistant Nuclear Operator Technician ( ANOT) fire watch /round being conducted-o Unit 1 is at 100% power and 274 ef fective full power days (EFPD).
o Unit 2 is at 100% power and 315 EFPD.
0835 ANOT informs U-1 Reactor Operator (RO) that T/D CA pump outboard turbine bearing oil level is 1/2 inch
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below normal and that he already has proper oil available and will make-up to normal level - U-l RO agrees and breaks communication.
Predicted Response U-l RO will inform control room Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
who may inform Unit Supervisor / Unit they may investigate Coordinator / Shift Engineer
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further.
0837 Unit blackout occurs (Reason unknown at this time).
Predicted Response Plant o
Transfer trip lockouts 86TTA/1A, 86TTB/1A, 86TTA/1B, 86TTB/1B actuate - all breakers in relaying protection zones lA & IB trip.
o Reactor trip due to 4 of 4 NC pumps UP or UV relays, o
Turbine trip due to reactor trip.
o
'A'
train blackout sequencer starts
'A'
D/G, load sheds 1 ETA bus, closes D/G breaker to bus, and loads blackout loads (including 1A CA pump),
o T/D CA pump start,
.
o Steam generator's (S/G) PORV's and safeties lift (Condenser pumps unavailable.)
o NC system (NCS) pre'ssure drops initially and recovery to 2080 psig within 30 sec.
o Unit 600V motor control center's (MCC) aligned to U-l transfer to U-2 - loads power uninterrupted.
o Shared 600V MCC's aligned to U-l transfer to U-2 -
loads power interrupted.
o Partial loss of instrument air occurs.
Players o
Implement AP/1/A/5500/01 (Reactor Trip).
o Implement AP/1/A/5500/07 - Case II (Loss of Electrical Power - Unit Blackout).
o Implement RP/0/A/5700/00 for Notification of Unusual Event.
Dispatch personnel to VI compressors to stabilize o
VI pressure.
0850 Receive EFA zone alarms f rom T/D CA pump room - ANOT calls control room from T/D CA pump room and reports l
smoke and flames from T/D CA pump turbine.
Also l
reports oil was spilled on-the turbine during oil addition and was being cleaned up when pump started and is probable source of fire.
T/D CA pump trips as this is being reported.
Predicted Response
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Fire brigade is dispatched to U-l T/D CA pump room.
o U-l RO takes action as necessary to maintain S/G i
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levels lA & IB 6 no-load narrow range level - RO l
may ask SRO for guidance to prevent 1C & 1D S/G/s dryout (close main steam isolation valves (MSIV) or
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l cross-tie to 1A CA pump).
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o Emergency Coordinator implements RP/0/A/5700/00, l
initiating condition 4.1.7 (Alert, Item 1) - Fire
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potentially affecting safety systems.
Note:
Any attempts to determine reason for blackout from dispatcher or other means are unsuccessful up to now - All that has been determined so far is that a major fault has occurred on BLIA and l
BLlB.
0855 Centrol Room receives report from switchyard substation that a
bulldozer has backed into a
transmission tower causing a failure of the Jackson Dispatcher Ferry line crossing bus lines lA & IB
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confirms that off-site power capability won't be available for "at least a day".
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e Predicted Responso
Players Efforts will probably be made to ensure adequate
fuel oil supply for lA D/G and a suagestion may be made to power lETA from U-2 via SATA.
- blocking message may be needed at this time when step is reached to rack in standby incoming breaker on lETA (kirk-key interlock problem).
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o Action may be taken to activate S3r
- This action will be allcwed by controller.
0910 Fire is extinguished at the T/D CA pump.
Prudicted Response o Emergency coordinator will ask for damage assessment from Instrument and Electrical (I&E) and Mechanical
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Maintenance (MM) on T/D CA pump.
0920 Damage assessment of T/D CA pump is burned insulation and damaged governor
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stop valve linkage.
Time estimate for governor replacement and stop valve linkage repair is 1. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.-
Predicted Response Emergency Coordinator will ensure maximum ef forts o
to replace governor.
l 1000 Control Room receives report from 1A D/G Room of a
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gross fuel oil leak - oil is being atomized due to hi exempt personnel at scene pressure spray at leak
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report threat of explosion / fire is imminent in D/G
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room - personnel evacuating area.
Predicted Response Players
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Efforts will intensify to power lETA from U-2 via l
o SATA and to activate SSF.
- use blocking action if necessary, Decision may be made to pre-activate 1A D/G Halon -
o if this is done, it won't prevent subsequent explosion and resultant damage.
d 1005 Receive loss of all AC power due to explesion and fire in D/G Room 1A.
Predicted Response Plant i
o D/G 1A Halon activates.
o Loss of 1A CA pump, S/G's inventory.
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o Loss of NC pumps seal injection (unless being supplied by SSF) and thermal barrier cooling.
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Players Fire Brigade is dispatched to 1A D/G.
o o
Implement RP/0/A/5700/00, initiating condition 4.1.6 (Site Area Emergency, Item 1) - Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes.
o Implement EP/1/A/5000/09 (Loss of All AC Power).
May go right to RP/0/A/5700/00, initiating o
condition 4.1.5 (General Emergency, Item 2) - Since i
j emergency feedwater pumps not running and T/D CA I
pump capability won't be available for >30 more
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minutes,
- blocking action may be necessary to limit the
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emergency classification to SAE if the Crisis
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Management Center (CMC) is not yet activated.
This will allow emergency classification tind i
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protective action decision-making by the CMC l
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efter activation.
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report of
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i 1020 Fire is reported out at 1A D/G Room
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massive damage to D/G control panel.
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Predicted Response
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Ef forts still being made to power 1 ETA from U-2 via i
o
SATA - Report on Kirk-key problem is that interlock j
i is being removed -
0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> more before breaker i
i can be racked in.
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General Emergency should be declared by now.
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1055 T/D CA pump governor repairs completed and stop valve linkage repaired.
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Predicted Response T/D CA pump started and used to feed all S/G's.
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1100 1 ETA energized from SATA.
EP/1/A/5000/9.1 (Loss of J
All AC Recovery Without SI Required)
or i
EP/1/A/5000/9.2 (Loss of All AC Recovery with SI Required) implemented.
l 1200 Exercise ends.
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Rev. 2 / 06-14-88
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