Text

Insp Repts 50-369/90-11 & 50-370/90-11 on 900522-0625. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities, Facility Mods & Follow Up of Events Repts
	ML20056A586
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	07/24/1990
From:	Cooper T, Son Ninh, Shymlock M, Van Doorn P; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20056A582	List: ML20056A581; ML20056A584; ML20056A586;
References
	50-369-90-11, 50-370-90-11, NUDOCS 9008080276
	Download: ML20056A586 (15)
	v • d • e

. q

., ;

.

-

,_

, J

A- *

UNITED STATES

, [pragS, o

.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.g k-_ REGION 11

'

N

'g' 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

Q [

. .....

Report Nos. 50-369/90-11 and 50-370/90-11

'

. Licensee: Duke Power Company

,

P.O. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007 s

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 ,

Docket'Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Inspection Conducted: May 22, 1990 - June 25, 1990

m .

Inspectors: ld JL- t' %K3 /# 7/03l70

P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

,

LddL' V DN M - 7/ n MD

T. Cooper, Resident Inspector'

, Date Signed

i M k d- x L3 ?/ 21 l'70

S. Nip R si ent Inspector l >

Date 51gned _.

Approved by0./ Avl

p M. B.: Shymlock, Section Chief

M fo-

Dhte Signed

-

. Division of Reactor Projects- !

1

SUMMARY -

Scope: This' routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in

the areas of plant operations _ safety verification, surveillance

testing, maintenance activities, facility modifications, followup-on

. previous inspection : findings, followup of event reports, and

quality assurance requirements for Diesel Generator fuel oil.

Results: In the areas inspected, three cited violations, two non-cited

violations (NCVs), one unresolved item and a weakness were !

toe 6Liiiea. One violation involved failure to follow Technical

Specification (TS) 3.0.3 regarding inoperability of Control Room

Ventilation System (VC) (paragraph 2.g.). The second violation

involved failure to report the inoperability of VC to NRC within four

hours (paragraph 2.g). The third violation involved failure to

..

follow a . maintenance procedure for signing; off on work requests .

(paragraph 4.e.). -One NCV involved a failure to follow TS regarding

preapproval of overtime hours (paragraph 2.f.). The second NCV

involved failure to follow a maintenance procedure for notifying

Quality Assurance personnel of pending work (paragraph 4.d.) The

weakness identified involves a lack of guidance for installation of

scaffolding and ladders relative to seismic considerations

(paragraph 4.b.). One unresolved item was identified regarding

-ordering of safety-related consumable materials such as diesel fuel

(paragraph 7),

90080 276 900724

PDR QCK 050003S9 1

Q PDC <

'

, '

e

,

..

.j

'

d '

i

.-

,

..

REPORT DETAILS j

1. Persons Contacted i

Licensee Employees

'

. G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services

D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager

A. Beaver, Operations Coordinator _ l

J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Schedulir.- t

D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager

G. Copp, Planning Section Manager

J. Foster, Station Health Physicist - -i

D. Franks, QA Verification Manager

'

G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services

C. Hendrix,' Maintenance Engineering Services Manager '

T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager

T.'McConnell, Plant Manager

R. Michael, Station Chemist

D. Murdock McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager

,

R._ Pierce, IAE Engineer Section Manager

.

W. Reeside Operations Engineer

R. kider, Mechenical Maintenance Engineer

M.' Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance

R. Sharpe, Compliarice Manager "

J. Snyder, Performance-Engineer

J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager !

A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman

B. Travis,' Superintendent of Operations-

L. Weaver, Training Manager

Other licensee employees. contacted -included craf tsmen, technicians,

operators, mechanics,' security force members, and. office personnel.

4

~

Attended exit interview on June 25, 1990 (paragraph 8) ,

2. PlantOperations(71707,71710) i

a. The inspection -staff reviewed plant operations during the report

period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.

Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records

and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely

reviewed. Interviews were conducted with plant operations,

maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and

at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted

as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The

complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the ;

,

!

..

c

. ,

-

. -

.

-

p ..

c. 2

1

9

L minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors

also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports to determine if the

ligensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing 3

corrective actions.

The inspectors observed and participated in an emergency drill on

June 12, 1990, and attended the licensee critique of the drill. The

licensee generally performed well and appeared to identify

appropriate areas for improvement.

i

b. Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not

limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxil'ary building, electrical

equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, ana the station yard zone

inside the protected area. ,

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire

protection, security, equipment status and radiation control practices

were observed,

c. Unit 1 Operations i

The unit began the inspection period at 55 percent power and

'

increasing. On May 24, 1990, the unit reached 78 percent power and

stopped power incrwes due to steam leaks on the high pressure

turbine.- Power wae ecreased to 38 percent to allow attempts at

stopping the steam leaks with a sealant. On May 27, 1990, a po.er !

spike due to feedwater swings caused a lif t of Steam Generater B

power operated relief valve for approximately 3 minutes.

Power was increased on May 31, 1990 following the installation of the

sealant to the high pressure turbine. On June 5, 1990, a spurious

actuation of a sprinkler system on the main turbine caused a ground ;

in the runback circuitry and the turbine experienced a rapid runback '

from 80 percent power to zero power. The operators manually removed 1

the generator from the line, in order to stabilize End repair the

probl em.

l The unit reached 100 percent operation on June-7, 1990, Small steam

l leaks necessitated the injection of more sealant, at this level. On

l. June 14, 1990, power was reduced and the unit was taken off line tc -

'

allow repair of a main turbine hydraulic control oil leak on a

l turbine intercept valve. Following completion of the repairs, the

unit was returned to full power operation on June 15 and continued

operation at this level through the end of this inspection period. ,

'

,

..

[

.

,

..

3

d.. Unit 2 Operations ,

The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent power and, except i

for periodic decreases for routine maintenance and surveillance and I

one decrease to 10% for adding reactor coolant pump bearing oil, has

continued operation at this level. As of June 22, 1990, the unit had

continuously operated on-line for 275 dayr.,

e. The inspector attended General Employee Training requalification <

(bypass) class during the inspection period. The class consisted of .

the viewing of four tapes, on various topics, and in the successful '

completion of a written examination. Both the viewing of the tapes >

and the passing of the examination is required to complete the :

course.

The inspector noted that the practice of the training proctor was to

start one of the tapes and then to leave the room. The proctor would

return when the tape had completed ard place a new tape in the

machine for the class.

During the class, the inspector observed an ir 'vidual who, whenever

the proctor lef t the room, would go to sleep. When the proctor

opened the door to return to the classroom, this individual would ,

wake up. The inspector informed the proctor that there wa a person

in the class who was sleeping through the tapes. The proctsr replied :

that they would be more alert for this, placed the tape in the

machine, and left the room. At the end of the course, the inspector

informed the proctor of which Individual had been sleeping through

the course, since the proctor had not observed the sleeping.

.

The proctor discussed the lack of attentiveness with the individual

and required him to watch all of the tapes again. After discussions

with Training management, the method by which the proctors function

was altered. Spot checks of the class have been increased

significantly. At the beginning of the class, personnel are informed

that anyone caught sleeping will be required to retake the class.

Observations by training management of the classes has increased and

no further-incidents have occurred,

f. The operatic .taff's overtime records for the unit 1 outage period

of January 6nrough May 1990 were examined to determine the

effectiveness of the licensee's program to control the working hours ,

of staff who perform safety-related functions. The overtime records

of one. shift supervisor, three assistant shift supervisors, two staff

SR0s, one engineer, four R0s, and ten non-licensed operators in the

9perttions department were randomly selected for review and found to

be in compliance with the Operations Management Procedure (OMP) No.

1.7, Shif t Manning and Overtime Requirements, and TS No. 6.2.2.f

eacept in two instances,

,

4 i j

H:

V ,

..

p. .

.

,

.

..

4

'

On March 21 and 22, 1990 an engineer worked 30.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months

period without obtaining an assessment and approval from management.

This individual was directly responsible to coordinate and provide

guidance on diesel generator tests during the unit 1 outage period.

On May 23 and 24,1990 an assistant shift supervisor worked 30.0

hours in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period without obtaining an assessment and

approval from management. This individual was attending a

supervisory effectiveness training meeting at the end of the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months

and did not return te work on the next dLy. Section 6.2 of OMP No.

1.7 states, in part, that an individual who works taore than 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months

'

in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period shall obtain an assessment and approval from

appropriate management. Failure to obtain an assesssment and approval

L was identified as a non-cited violation, NCV 369 370/90-11-01:

Failure to Follow Procedure for Control of Overtime. This NRC

identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in

Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. '

.

The inspector noted that OMP No.1.7 did not clearly cover the -

overtime requirements for a staff. SRO or engineer who may sometimes

provide direction to other operations staff performing safety-related ,

Operation management was informed of the weakness in the

'

work. ;

procedure and immediate corrective action was taken to revise OMP No. ,

1.7 to incorporate the requirements for all operating personnel at :

the time of inspection. Therefore, this NCV is considered to be

closed. ,

g. TS 3.7.6 requires two independent Control Room Ventilation (VC)

systems to be operable at all times. If both trains are inoperable

the licensee is required to comply with TS 3.0.3 which requires that

within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months sction shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE i

2

in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as .

applicable, in: '

"

,

a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

I

b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

L c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

l TS 4.7.6.e.3 requires that.VC be able to maintain a positive pressure

l- of greater than or equal to 1/8-inch water gauge relative to outside

atmosphere,

,

On August 19, 1989, the licensee issued an Operability Evaluation for

the VC System. Due to a design deficiency this evaluation re ,

' all outside air intakes (eight valves, two valves per intake) quired to be

maintained open to meet Technical Specification pressurization

requirements for both trains of VC. A special order was issued to

operators describing the requirement for all valves to be open. In

addition, a change was issued to the annunciator response procedure

to require the valves to be opened if the VC radiation monitor (EMF)

p

i

< _

'

e ,

'

.

,

..

L

5

i

alarm was received. Two EMFs are provided. EMF 43A, upon sensing a

high radiation, closes one set of intakes (valves IVC-1A, 2A, 3B, 4B)

and provides an alarm. EMF 43B operates to close the other set of

intakes (valvesIVC-9A,10A,11B,12B).

On June 3, 1990 during calibration of EMF 43B, the licensee

! discovered that the valves affecte<1 by EMF 43A were closed. Further

evaluation disclosed that the valves had been closed since May 25,

1990 when EMF 43A was calibrated. The calibration procedure

,

(IP/0/B/3006/09) does not have steps to assure restoration of the

valves to the open position, and operators failed to notice that the

valves were closed. Procedures and other controls are expected to be

adequate to control plant configuration. In addition, special

controls and a heightet;ed awareness are appropriate for systems which

are under a special configuration control, such as might result from

an operability evaluation. Licensee controls were apparently

inadequate in this case.

A previous violation was issued because the licensee's design had

resulted in the plant operating in a configuration with one set of

intakes closed and unable to meet the TS pressurization requirement ,

witheithertrain(seeviolation 369,370/89-24-03). Previous review

of the problem had shown that although both trains of VC were

technically inoperable, i.e. unable to attain the 1/8-inch water

gauge positive pressure relative to outside atmosphere, positive

! pressure was maintained relative to the more critical adjacent areas.

L This, and other conservatism in the design of the system, led to a

l non-escalated violation.

This recent situation is considered a violation of TS 3.0.3 for the

VC system, since the valves remained closed for approximately nine i

days. This is violation 369, 370/90-11-02: Failure to Follow TS i

3.0.3 for Control Room Ventilation System, i

l

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(111)(d) requires that this event be reported to

NRC within four Murs of the occurrence of the situation which, in

l

! this instance, was considered to be the time the valves were found l

l closed. The valves were found closed at 10:20 p.m. on June 3,1990, I

but the situation was not reported until 5:30 p.m. on June 4,1990

af ter the licensee was questioned by the inspector. This is

violation 369,370/90-11-03: Failure to Report Control Room

Ventilation Inoperability to NRC.

h. The inspector participated in a management meeting at NRC offices in

Rockville, Maryland on June 18, 1990. The meeting was held due to a

relatively large number of events which had occurred primarily at the

licensee's Catawba Nuclear Station. An overview of the events was

presented as well as a description of the licensee's assessment and

planned corrective actions affecting all licensee plants. Minutes of !

the meeting will be documented by NRC/NRR.

I

.

'

i

j

o

L.

V .

.

-:

7

..

6

Two violations were identified as described above.

3. SurveillanceTesting(61726)

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the

inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequa:y and

conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.

Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain- that current written

,

approved procedures were available and in use, that-test equipment in

use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system h

restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were met.

Detailed below are t;1ected tests which were either reviewed or

witnessed:

Procedure Equipment / Test

4 KV Unit Sequencer PT/1/A/4350/004

Undervoltage Detector

Actuating Device

Operational Test

Diesel-Generator 1A PT/1/A/4350/002A

Operability Test

VX System Train 2A PT/2/A/4450/06A .

-Performance Test I

VX System Train 2B PT/1/A/4450/06B

Performance Test

Control Room Area PT/0/A/4450/08C

Ventilation Performance

Test-

A Slave Relay Test Unit 2 PT/2/A/4200/28A

Main Steam Leak AP/1/A/5500/01

Controlling Procedure OP/1/A/6100/03

For Unit Operation

Valve Stroke Timing Train PT/2/A/4403/04A

Pressure Decay Test For

'

2RN89A

No violations or deviations were identified,

i

_

-

m

~

.

g.

-

,

c .

'

.

[ , , - h

7 !

4. MaintenanceObservations(62703)

!

3

a. Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the ;

resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance ;

adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.- ,

The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that,

where applicable, current written approved procedures were available

.and in use, that prerequisities were met, that equipment restoration

was completed and maintenance results were adequate.

'

Activit.y Work Request

Perform PM/PT on DSF-1B 07324B PT '

Damper Control Instruments

Perform PM/PT on DSF-10 07650B PT .

'

Damper Control-Instruments

Repair Oil Leak on SR 053409 MNT

Rocker Box and Replace 0

Rings on Valve Lever Shaft

Sample and Change Oil in the 08221B PM

D/G "1B" Pedestal Bearing

Capacity

Perform PM on Lube Oil Filter 05472B PM

Bypass Pump 1B

Perfonn PM/PT on Lube 011 07120B PT

to Engine and to Strainer

Perform PM on Diesel -06156B PM ,

i Generator Starting Air

Filters 181

Perform PM on Diesel 05869B PM

, Generator Starting Air

Filter 1B2

'

Perform PM/PT on 1 D/G B 011 08141B FT

Tank Level Loop Instruments

Perform PM/PT on Overspeed 07121B PT

Alarm and Shutdown 1 D/G B

Instruments

Perform PM Oil Analysis 07964B PM

Vibration on Auxiliary

Feedwater Pump and turbine

,

_

.

t g .

? . * >

, ,

'

..

8

1

a

L' Replace the MRL Series 5311 503641 MNT

Double Row Thrusting Bearing ,

on Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine ;

Driven Pump to the New Departure

Series 5311 Double Row Thrusting ,

B" ring with Twelve Balls Per Row

Perform PM/PT Functional Test 08132B PT l

on SSPS Train B :

Provide IAE Support for NC 08069B PM ,

Flow Test

,

'

Rod Out Tubes on KC Motor 056948 PM

Motor Cooler 181 >

Investigate and Repair on 141362 OPS

Valve 2NC-52 as needed

i

Inspect MC Power Panels 69729 IAE

for Correct Labeling of t

Breakers

I

Calibration of Steam -08098B PM

Generator Sample Monitor

2 EMF 34 (L)

Repair Mechanical Pump 142139 OPS

Seal Leak on IB1 gr. Pump

'

.b. During observation of the Unit 1A Diesel. Generator (DG) room, the

. inspector noted that numerous scaffolds were placed in the room for i

painting. Although the scaffolds appeared sturdy and not highly 1

likely to damage equipment during a seismic (earthquake) event, the ;

inspector questioned whether the licensee had implemented controls or

precautions for scaffolds to prevent equipment damage in case of a

L seismic event. The inspector reviewed procedure MP/0/B/7700/85,

1 Erecting and Dismantling Scaffolding, and could find no precautions

or special controls that clearly address seismic considerations.

Also, the inspector noted a ladder wired to a pipe support strut

l

which was ' connected to a hydraulic snubber. The tieoff did not

f

appear to prohibit normal . operation of the snubber. Although

i- prevention of damage to snubbers is stressed in the licensee training

I

program, the licensee indicated that no procedural guidance is

--

provided for ladder installation relative to preventing possible

l damage to equipment during a saismic event. The licensee indicated

that the appropriate guidance would be developed for scaffolds and

ladders.

I

..

,

'.-

l

.

..

9 >

i

'l

These two issues are considered a weakness in the licensee program

for control of scaffolds and ladders. Further followup will be !

conducted relative to the licensee's corrective actions. This is

Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/90-11-05: Weakness Regarding Control >

of Scaffolds and Ladders.

l

c. The inspectors noted that Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel '

were involved in three situations during the inspection period which ;

could have led to events. These involved: (1) installation of a

jumper on the wrong terminals prior to a surveillance; (2) setting up

a valve on the opposite unit that that required by a Work Request;

(3) and replacing a breaker pane) which tripped a breaker resulting

in a number of reactor protection signals and alarms in the Control

Room.

The licensee appears to have recognized the significance of these

situations and Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) were being issued

relative to these events. Further followup will be conducted during

review of the PIR investigation results,

d. During observations of WR# 08069B PM, Provide IAE Support for NC Flow

Test, and WR# 503641 MNT, Replace MRL Series 5311 Double Row

Thrusting Bearing on Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump to the

New Departure Series 5311 Double Row Thrusting Bearing with Twelve

Balls per Row, the inspector noted that Mechanical and IAE workers '

failed to notify a QC inspector prior to job start as required by

Section VII of the WR and Section 7.0 of Maintenance Management

Procedure 1.0, Definition of the Work Request. The inspector

questioned the workers about the requirement and they acknowledged

the discrepancies. As a result, the workers immediately stopped ,

working and notified QC inspectors about their work in progress. The

inspector felt that these were examples of lack of attention to

,

detail on using the WR. This NRC identified violation is not being .

! cited because criteria specified in Section V. A. of the NRC

L Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This is a Non-Cited Violation

369/90-11-06: Failure to Follow Procedure Regarding a QC

! Notification.

1

'e . On June 29, 1990, the inspector reviewed WR# 142139 OPS, Repair

Mechanical Pump Seal Leak on 181 KC Pump, and associated referenced

procedures on the WR. The inspector determined that Section IX of

the WP. was signed off by an acting supervisor prior to completion of

i acceptance and all required procedures referenced on the WR, it was

!- noted that mechanical workers failed to implement procedure No.

MP.0/A/7700/45, The Controlling Procedure for System Leakage Testing

of ASME Mechanical Connections and/or ASME Section XI Suitability

Evaluation, aftar the completion of corrective maintenance. This

procedure required a QC inspection hold point to evaluate system

leakage as part of overall functional verification.

.

>

.c

,

, .

,

..

10

It is noted that maintenance personnel do appropriately have lead

responsibility for quality and assuring procedures are properly

implemented. However, it was also noted that a QC inspector hid an

opportunity-to correct this discrepancy, but he failed to do :o and

signed off the WR. Section 7.0 of Maintenance Management Procedure

No.1.5 states, in part, that Section IX of the WR is used to

document the completion, acceptance, and approval of the maintenance

activity and associated documentation. The pump was operated for a

functional check with maintenance personnel present prior to signing

off the WR, in effect accomplishing the leak check since the only ;

work performed was on the pump itself. Therefore, the missed

~

procedure was not significant to operability of the pump. This is

considered a violation of TS 6.8.1.a. Violation 369/90-11-07:

Failure to Follow Maintenance Proceds.re.

The inspector was informed by the Itcenset that a supervisor can mark

initials on the Section IX of the Wh prior to completion of all work,

as long as all critical work is completed and signoff will be

completed later; however, this initials practice was informal. The

maintenance program does not appear to address this practice, which

would otherwise assure consistent implementation and appropriate

training. This program weakness may have. contributed to this

violation.

One. violation was identified.

5. LicenseeEventReport(LER) Followup (90712,92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine

if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination

included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with

Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action

taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements

satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.

Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as

appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The

following LERs were closed:

369/89.22 Rev. 1: Reactor Trip Occurred Because of a Failed

Universal Board in the Solid State Protection System.

369/90-06: Corrosion Occurred on Steel Containment Vessel Because of

Unanticipated Environmental Interaction Design Deficiency.

369/90-07: Improper Screws Installed in the Bottom of Ice Condenser

Baskets.

'

,

!

A

. .

,

-.

11

369/90-08: Required Flow Rate Verification and Contaminated Parts

Warehouse Ventilation Samples Were Not Performed Properly Because of .

Inappropriate Actions. This it the third recent event involving '

inadequate surveillances by Radiation Protection personnel. A

non-citedviolation(NCV 369,370/90-06-02) was previously issued for

the first two events. . The lice 3see appears to have initiated

appropriate corrective actions, hovever, these had not been completed

at the time of this event. Therefore, this event is not being cited

and is considered another example of the previous problem. Further

followup will be accomplished against the NCV which remains open.

369/90-09: Feedwater Isolation Occurred Because of Lack of Attention

'

to Detail.

370/88-10. Rev. 2: Unit 2 Containment Sump Isolation Valve Switchgear ;

Logic Wire Was Incorrectly Wired due to Personnel Error.

370/89-09: Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Automa-

tically Started Because of an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features

'

Actuation Caused by inappropriate Actions. The inspector verified

that ap)ropriate procedure revisions were issued and that all

requirec training was completed.

370/89-11: Technical Specification 3.0.3 was Entered to Perform .

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate-Test of Two

Emergency Core Cooling System Check Valves. ;

370/89-12: Diesel Generator Surveillance was Missed Because of Start

Classification Problems Caused by inadequate Directives. The

inspector verified that the licensee procedure had been revised and

issued, and that a Technical Specification interpretation had been

developed and approved.

370/89-14: Diesel Generator 2A and 2B Sump Pump Discharge. Valve Was

Closed Because of an Inappropriate Action and a Management i

Deficiency. The licensee revied tne controlling procedure for the

discharge valves, moving responsibility for these valves from the

Chemistry group to the Operations group.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

The'following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that

the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in

compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been

completed. Selective verification included record review, observations,

and discussions with licensee personnel. The following items are closed:

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-31-07: Follow-up of Licensee

Improvements in Control Room Deficiencies. The inspector verified i

.

_ _ _ .

'

.

'

(,- -

.

"t

t

12

the establishment of a control and resolution program. This program l

has been monitored since its inception and a marked decrease in the

- number of outstanding deficiencies has been noted.

'

,

Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/88-31-24: Verify Licensee

Improvements in Identifying Generic Corrective Actions Relative to r

'

Events. The licensee has implemented additional training for root

cause analysis. Although some additional cases of incomplete ,

corrective actions were identified since this item was opened, the

licensee has generally improved and more recent LERs appear to be

more thorough. A problem with evalua' ion of recurring events was

identified as Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/89-32-02 but has been

corrected (seebelow). Observations at Abnormal Plant Event r::atings

have shown that the licensee's management is aggressively pursuing 1

root cause and generic corrective actions. Continuing inspections ,

will be conducted in this area as part of the routine eview of all

LERs.

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-12-02: Evaluate Original Design

Basis for the Range of the Main Steam.Line Radiation Monitors and

Subsequent Monitor Modification. Variation Notices were developed,

for both units, to complete the evaluation and implement set point ;

changes on the Radiation Monitors. These changes were verified to De

completed.

Deviation 369, 370/89-16-01: Fdilure to Meet Commitment to Provide

Bypass Indication for Control Room Ventilation System. The licensee

responded to this item in a letter dated September 12, 1989. The

licensee indicated that plant modifications would be initiated to

correct the problem. The inspector verified that this had been done.

'

Violation- 369, 370/89-16-02: Failure to Implement Adequate Design

Control Measures for Air Operated Valve Components. The licensee

responded to this item in a letter dated September 12, 1989. The

specific valve problem was corrected. In addition, the licensee

conducted additional reviews and implemented a 100% inspection of

safety-related solenoid operated valves and dampers. The licensee is

also developing upgraded component lists and loop and logic diagrams

as a long term effort. These actions are considered satisfactory to

address this problem.

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-32-02: Failure of Licensee

Programs to Consistently Identify Repetitive Problen Areas. The

guidance procedure for evaluating repetitive problems has been

revised. The revisions provide more compnhensive evaluation

guidance, more realistic examples, and an inciease in reliance on

juigement on the part of the evaluator.

1

.

,

4f

.

-

.

13

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-37-01: Development of Diesel

Generator Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Guidance. The licensee has

revised the p *ocedure for diesel generator start classifications and

has issued a Technical Specification interpretation for the diesel

generator.

inspector Fr.110wup Item 369, 370/89-37-04i Followup of Improvements

to Modificetion Program for Relabeling. The licensee has initiated

formal programs to require labeling to be properly completed for all

modifi ct',on and maintenance work. In addition, a training session

on the _ labeling program has been initiated for all maintenance

personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Inspection For Verification Of Quality Assurane.e Request Regarding

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (TI 2515/93)

The inspector verified that the Diesel Generator (DG) fuel oil was

included in the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program. DG fuel oil is

listed in the licensee Quality Standards Manual as QA-1 material. i

However, DG fuel oil is not available as nuclear QA grade material. The ;

licensee orders commercial grade #2 fuel oil and conducts their own

testing as requirts by TS. Licensee testing of DG fuel oil was previously

reviewed (see Report 369,370/89-14). The inspector noted, however, that a

recent purchase order was checked "no" for Quality Assurance Required, l

10CFR Part 21 Applicability and Commercial Grade. The inspector requested ;

the licensee to evaluate whether QA consumable materials othar than DG !

fuel oil are being properly ordered and whether DG fuel oil should be j

formally ordered and listed as a comercial grade material. The licensee

indicated that this avaluation would be accomplished. This is Unresolved ,

Item 369,370/90-11-b/: Evaluation of QA Consumable Materials Ordering j

Practices. I

No violations or deviations were identified. 9

I

8. . Exit Interview (30703) <!

The inspection scope and findings identified below were sumarized on June

25, .1990, with those persons indicated in paragraoh 1 above. The 1

following items were discussed in detail

'

i

- Non-Cited Violation 369,370/90-11-01: Failure to Follow Procedure for !

Control of Overtime (paragraph 2.f.)

Violation 369,370/90-11-02: Failure to Follow TS 3.0.3 for Control Room

Ventilation System (paragraph 2.g.)

Violation 369,370/90-11-03: Failure to R(port Control Room Ventilation !

Inoperability to NRC (paragraph 2.g.) l

l

o .

-

a; 1

.

', i

e

14

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/90-11-04: Weakness Regarding Control of

ScaffoldsandLadders(paragraph 4.b)

Non-Cited Violation 369/90-11-05: Failure to Follow Procedure Regarding a

QCNotification(paragraph 4.d.)

Violation' 369/90-11-06: Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure

(paragraph 4.e.)

Unresolved Item 369,370/90-11-07: Evaluation of QA Consumable Materials

Ordering Practices (paragraph 7)

The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor

did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the

inspectors during the course of their inspection.

-

,

i

h

I

!

._

ML20056A586

Text

Navigation menu

Search