ML20056A586
| ML20056A586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1990 |
| From: | Cooper T, Son Ninh, Shymlock M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056A582 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-90-11, 50-370-90-11, NUDOCS 9008080276 | |
| Download: ML20056A586 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1990011
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
REGION 11
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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- Report Nos. 50-369/90-11 and 50-370/90-11
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. Licensee: Duke Power Company
P.O. Box 1007
,
Charlotte, NC 28201-1007
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Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
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Docket'Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted: May 22, 1990 - June 25, 1990
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Inspectors:
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%K3 /#
7/03l70
P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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7/ n MD
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T. Cooper, Resident Inspector'
Date Signed
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?/ 21 l'70
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S. Nip
R si ent Inspector l
Date 51gned
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Approved by0./
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p M. B.: Shymlock, Section Chief
Dhte Signed
. Division of Reactor Projects-
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This' routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in
the areas of plant operations _ safety verification, surveillance
testing, maintenance activities, facility modifications, followup-on
. previous inspection : findings, followup of event reports, and
quality assurance requirements for Diesel Generator fuel oil.
Results:
In the areas inspected, three cited violations, two non-cited
violations (NCVs), one unresolved item and a weakness were
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toe 6Liiiea.
One violation involved failure to follow Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 regarding inoperability of Control Room
Ventilation System (VC) (paragraph 2.g.).
The second violation
involved failure to report the inoperability of VC to NRC within four
hours (paragraph 2.g).
The third violation involved failure to
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follow a . maintenance procedure for signing; off on work requests .
(paragraph 4.e.). -One NCV involved a failure to follow TS regarding
preapproval of overtime hours (paragraph 2.f.).
The second NCV
involved failure to follow a maintenance procedure for notifying
Quality Assurance personnel of pending work (paragraph 4.d.)
The
weakness identified involves a lack of guidance for installation of
scaffolding and ladders relative to seismic considerations
(paragraph 4.b.).
One unresolved item was identified regarding
-ordering of safety-related consumable materials such as diesel fuel
(paragraph 7),
90080
276 900724
QCK 050003S9
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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. G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager
- A. Beaver, Operations Coordinator
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- J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Schedulir.-
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D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager
- G. Copp, Planning Section Manager
J. Foster, Station Health Physicist -
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D. Franks, QA Verification Manager
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- G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services
C. Hendrix,' Maintenance Engineering Services Manager
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- T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
T.'McConnell, Plant Manager
R. Michael, Station Chemist
D. Murdock McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager
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- R._ Pierce, IAE Engineer Section Manager
W. Reeside Operations Engineer
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R. kider, Mechenical Maintenance Engineer
M.' Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
- R. Sharpe, Compliarice Manager
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J. Snyder, Performance-Engineer
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J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager
A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
- B. Travis,' Superintendent of Operations-
- L. Weaver, Training Manager
Other licensee employees. contacted -included craf tsmen, technicians,
operators, mechanics,' security force members, and. office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview on June 25, 1990 (paragraph 8)
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2.
PlantOperations(71707,71710)
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a.
The inspection -staff reviewed plant operations during the report
period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records
and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely
reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations,
maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and
at shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were conducted
as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives.
The
complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the
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minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS).
The inspectors
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also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports to determine if the
ligensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing
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corrective actions.
The inspectors observed and participated in an emergency drill on
June 12, 1990, and attended the licensee critique of the drill. The
licensee generally performed well and appeared to identify
appropriate areas for improvement.
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b.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxil'ary building, electrical
equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, ana the station yard zone
inside the protected area.
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During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire
protection, security, equipment status and radiation control practices
were observed,
c.
Unit 1 Operations
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The unit began the inspection period at 55 percent power and
increasing.
On May 24, 1990, the unit reached 78 percent power and
stopped power incrwes due to steam leaks on the high pressure
turbine.- Power wae ecreased to 38 percent to allow attempts at
stopping the steam leaks with a sealant.
On May 27, 1990, a po.er
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spike due to feedwater swings caused a lif t of Steam Generater B
power operated relief valve for approximately 3 minutes.
Power was increased on May 31, 1990 following the installation of the
sealant to the high pressure turbine.
On June 5, 1990, a spurious
actuation of a sprinkler system on the main turbine caused a ground
in the runback circuitry and the turbine experienced a rapid runback
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from 80 percent power to zero power. The operators manually removed
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the generator from the line, in order to stabilize End repair the
probl em.
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The unit reached 100 percent operation on June-7, 1990,
Small steam
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leaks necessitated the injection of more sealant, at this level. On
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June 14, 1990, power was reduced and the unit was taken off line tc
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allow repair of a main turbine hydraulic control oil leak on a
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turbine intercept valve.
Following completion of the repairs, the
unit was returned to full power operation on June 15 and continued
operation at this level through the end of this inspection period.
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Unit 2 Operations
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The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent power and, except
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for periodic decreases for routine maintenance and surveillance and
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one decrease to 10% for adding reactor coolant pump bearing oil, has
continued operation at this level. As of June 22, 1990, the unit had
continuously operated on-line for 275 dayr.,
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The inspector attended General Employee Training requalification
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(bypass) class during the inspection period.
The class consisted of
the viewing of four tapes, on various topics, and in the successful
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completion of a written examination.
Both the viewing of the tapes
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and the passing of the examination is required to complete the
course.
The inspector noted that the practice of the training proctor was to
start one of the tapes and then to leave the room. The proctor would
return when the tape had completed ard place a new tape in the
machine for the class.
During the class, the inspector observed an ir 'vidual who, whenever
the proctor lef t the room, would go to sleep.
When the proctor
opened the door to return to the classroom, this individual would
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wake up.
The inspector informed the proctor that there wa a person
in the class who was sleeping through the tapes. The proctsr replied
that they would be more alert for this, placed the tape in the
machine, and left the room.
At the end of the course, the inspector
informed the proctor of which Individual had been sleeping through
the course, since the proctor had not observed the sleeping.
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The proctor discussed the lack of attentiveness with the individual
and required him to watch all of the tapes again. After discussions
with Training management, the method by which the proctors function
was altered.
Spot checks of the class have been increased
significantly. At the beginning of the class, personnel are informed
that anyone caught sleeping will be required to retake the class.
Observations by training management of the classes has increased and
no further-incidents have occurred,
f.
The operatic
.taff's overtime records for the unit 1 outage period
of January 6nrough May 1990 were examined to determine the
effectiveness of the licensee's program to control the working hours
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of staff who perform safety-related functions. The overtime records
of one. shift supervisor, three assistant shift supervisors, two staff
SR0s, one engineer, four R0s, and ten non-licensed operators in the
9perttions department were randomly selected for review and found to
be in compliance with the Operations Management Procedure (OMP) No.
1.7, Shif t Manning and Overtime Requirements, and TS No. 6.2.2.f
eacept in two instances,
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On March 21 and 22, 1990 an engineer worked 30.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />
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period without obtaining an assessment and approval from management.
This individual was directly responsible to coordinate and provide
guidance on diesel generator tests during the unit 1 outage period.
On May 23 and 24,1990 an assistant shift supervisor worked 30.0
hours in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period without obtaining an assessment and
approval from management.
This individual was attending a
supervisory effectiveness training meeting at the end of the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />
and did not return te work on the next dLy.
Section 6.2 of OMP No.
1.7 states, in part, that an individual who works taore than 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br />
in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period shall obtain an assessment and approval from
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appropriate management.
Failure to obtain an assesssment and approval
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was identified as a non-cited violation, NCV 369 370/90-11-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure for Control of Overtime.
This NRC
identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in
Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
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The inspector noted that OMP No.1.7 did not clearly cover the
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overtime requirements for a staff. SRO or engineer who may sometimes
provide direction to other operations staff performing safety-related
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work.
Operation management was informed of the weakness in the
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procedure and immediate corrective action was taken to revise OMP No.
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1.7 to incorporate the requirements for all operating personnel at
the time of inspection.
Therefore, this NCV is considered to be
closed.
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g.
TS 3.7.6 requires two independent Control Room Ventilation (VC)
systems to be operable at all times.
If both trains are inoperable
the licensee is required to comply with TS 3.0.3 which requires that
within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> sction shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE
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in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as
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applicable, in:
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At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
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At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and
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At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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TS 4.7.6.e.3 requires that.VC be able to maintain a positive pressure
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of greater than or equal to 1/8-inch water gauge relative to outside
atmosphere,
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On August 19, 1989, the licensee issued an Operability Evaluation for
the VC System.
Due to a design deficiency this evaluation re
all outside air intakes (eight valves, two valves per intake) quired
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to be
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maintained open to meet Technical Specification pressurization
requirements for both trains of VC.
A special order was issued to
operators describing the requirement for all valves to be open.
In
addition, a change was issued to the annunciator response procedure
to require the valves to be opened if the VC radiation monitor (EMF)
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alarm was received.
Two EMFs are provided.
EMF 43A, upon sensing a
high radiation, closes one set of intakes (valves IVC-1A, 2A, 3B, 4B)
and provides an alarm.
EMF 43B operates to close the other set of
intakes (valvesIVC-9A,10A,11B,12B).
On June 3,
1990 during calibration of EMF 43B, the licensee
discovered that the valves affecte<1 by EMF 43A were closed.
Further
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evaluation disclosed that the valves had been closed since May 25,
1990 when EMF 43A was calibrated.
The calibration procedure
(IP/0/B/3006/09) does not have steps to assure restoration of the
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valves to the open position, and operators failed to notice that the
valves were closed.
Procedures and other controls are expected to be
adequate to control plant configuration.
In addition, special
controls and a heightet;ed awareness are appropriate for systems which
are under a special configuration control, such as might result from
an operability evaluation.
Licensee controls were apparently
inadequate in this case.
A previous violation was issued because the licensee's design had
resulted in the plant operating in a configuration with one set of
intakes closed and unable to meet the TS pressurization requirement
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witheithertrain(seeviolation 369,370/89-24-03).
Previous review
of the problem had shown that although both trains of VC were
technically inoperable, i.e. unable to attain the 1/8-inch water
gauge positive pressure relative to outside atmosphere, positive
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pressure was maintained relative to the more critical adjacent areas.
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This, and other conservatism in the design of the system, led to a
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non-escalated violation.
This recent situation is considered a violation of TS 3.0.3 for the
VC system, since the valves remained closed for approximately nine
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days.
This is violation 369, 370/90-11-02: Failure to Follow TS
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3.0.3 for Control Room Ventilation System,
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10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(111)(d) requires that this event be reported to
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NRC within four Murs of the occurrence of the situation which, in
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this instance, was considered to be the time the valves were found
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closed.
The valves were found closed at 10:20 p.m. on June 3,1990,
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but the situation was not reported until 5:30 p.m. on June 4,1990
af ter the licensee was questioned by the inspector.
This is
violation 369,370/90-11-03:
Failure to Report Control Room
Ventilation Inoperability to NRC.
h.
The inspector participated in a management meeting at NRC offices in
Rockville, Maryland on June 18, 1990. The meeting was held due to a
relatively large number of events which had occurred primarily at the
licensee's Catawba Nuclear Station.
An overview of the events was
presented as well as a description of the licensee's assessment and
planned corrective actions affecting all licensee plants. Minutes of
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the meeting will be documented by NRC/NRR.
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Two violations were identified as described above.
3.
SurveillanceTesting(61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequa:y and
conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain- that current written
approved procedures were available and in use, that-test equipment in
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use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system
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restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were met.
Detailed below are t;1ected tests which were either reviewed or
witnessed:
Procedure
Equipment / Test
4 KV Unit Sequencer
PT/1/A/4350/004
Undervoltage Detector
Actuating Device
Operational Test
Diesel-Generator 1A
PT/1/A/4350/002A
Operability Test
VX System Train 2A
PT/2/A/4450/06A
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-Performance Test
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VX System Train 2B
PT/1/A/4450/06B
Performance Test
Control Room Area
PT/0/A/4450/08C
Ventilation Performance
Test-
A Slave Relay Test Unit 2
PT/2/A/4200/28A
Main Steam Leak
AP/1/A/5500/01
Controlling Procedure
OP/1/A/6100/03
For Unit Operation
Valve Stroke Timing Train
PT/2/A/4403/04A
Pressure Decay Test For
2RN89A
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No violations or deviations were identified,
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4.
MaintenanceObservations(62703)
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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance
adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.-
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The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that,
where applicable, current written approved procedures were available
.and in use, that prerequisities were met, that equipment restoration
was completed and maintenance results were adequate.
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Activit.y
Work Request
Perform PM/PT on DSF-1B
07324B PT
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Damper Control Instruments
Perform PM/PT on DSF-10
07650B PT
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Damper Control-Instruments
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Repair Oil Leak on SR
053409 MNT
Rocker Box and Replace 0
Rings on Valve Lever Shaft
Sample and Change Oil in the
08221B PM
D/G "1B" Pedestal Bearing
Capacity
05472B PM
Bypass Pump 1B
Perfonn PM/PT on Lube 011
07120B PT
to Engine and to Strainer
Perform PM on Diesel
-06156B PM
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Generator Starting Air
Filters 181
Perform PM on Diesel
05869B PM
Generator Starting Air
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Filter 1B2
Perform PM/PT on 1 D/G B 011
08141B FT
Tank Level Loop Instruments
Perform PM/PT on Overspeed
07121B PT
Alarm and Shutdown 1 D/G B
Instruments
Perform PM Oil Analysis
07964B PM
Vibration on Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump and turbine
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Replace the MRL Series 5311
503641 MNT
Double Row Thrusting Bearing
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on Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine
Driven Pump to the New Departure
Series 5311 Double Row Thrusting
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B" ring with Twelve Balls Per Row
Perform PM/PT Functional Test
08132B PT
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on SSPS Train B
Provide IAE Support for NC
08069B PM
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Flow Test
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Rod Out Tubes on KC Motor
056948 PM
Motor Cooler 181
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Investigate and Repair on
141362 OPS
Valve 2NC-52 as needed
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Inspect MC Power Panels
69729 IAE
for Correct Labeling of
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Breakers
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Calibration of Steam
-08098B PM
Generator Sample Monitor
2 EMF 34 (L)
Repair Mechanical Pump
142139 OPS
Seal Leak on IB1 gr. Pump
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.b.
During observation of the Unit 1A Diesel. Generator (DG) room, the
. inspector noted that numerous scaffolds were placed in the room for
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painting.
Although the scaffolds appeared sturdy and not highly
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likely to damage equipment during a seismic (earthquake) event, the
inspector questioned whether the licensee had implemented controls or
precautions for scaffolds to prevent equipment damage in case of a
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seismic event.
The inspector reviewed procedure MP/0/B/7700/85,
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Erecting and Dismantling Scaffolding, and could find no precautions
or special controls that clearly address seismic considerations.
Also, the inspector noted a ladder wired to a pipe support strut
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which was ' connected to a hydraulic snubber.
The tieoff did not
appear to prohibit normal . operation of the snubber.
Although
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prevention of damage to snubbers is stressed in the licensee training
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program, the licensee indicated that no procedural guidance is
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provided for ladder installation relative to preventing possible
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damage to equipment during a saismic event.
The licensee indicated
that the appropriate guidance would be developed for scaffolds and
ladders.
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These two issues are considered a weakness in the licensee program
for control of scaffolds and ladders.
Further followup will be
conducted relative to the licensee's corrective actions.
This is
Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/90-11-05: Weakness Regarding Control
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of Scaffolds and Ladders.
c.
The inspectors noted that Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel
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were involved in three situations during the inspection period which
could have led to events.
These involved: (1) installation of a
jumper on the wrong terminals prior to a surveillance; (2) setting up
a valve on the opposite unit that that required by a Work Request;
(3) and replacing a breaker pane) which tripped a breaker resulting
in a number of reactor protection signals and alarms in the Control
Room.
The licensee appears to have recognized the significance of these
situations and Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) were being issued
relative to these events.
Further followup will be conducted during
review of the PIR investigation results,
d.
During observations of WR# 08069B PM, Provide IAE Support for NC Flow
Test, and WR# 503641 MNT, Replace MRL Series 5311 Double Row
Thrusting Bearing on Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump to the
New Departure Series 5311 Double Row Thrusting Bearing with Twelve
Balls per Row, the inspector noted that Mechanical and IAE workers
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failed to notify a QC inspector prior to job start as required by
Section VII of the WR and Section 7.0 of Maintenance Management
Procedure 1.0, Definition of the Work Request.
The inspector
questioned the workers about the requirement and they acknowledged
the discrepancies.
As a result, the workers immediately stopped
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working and notified QC inspectors about their work in progress. The
inspector felt that these were examples of lack of attention to
detail on using the WR.
This NRC identified violation is not being
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cited because criteria specified in Section V. A.
of the NRC
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Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This is a Non-Cited Violation
369/90-11-06:
Failure to Follow Procedure Regarding a QC
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Notification.
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On June 29, 1990, the inspector reviewed WR# 142139 OPS, Repair
Mechanical Pump Seal Leak on 181 KC Pump, and associated referenced
procedures on the WR.
The inspector determined that Section IX of
the WP. was signed off by an acting supervisor prior to completion of
acceptance and all required procedures referenced on the WR,
it was
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noted that mechanical workers failed to implement procedure No.
MP.0/A/7700/45, The Controlling Procedure for System Leakage Testing
of ASME Mechanical Connections and/or ASME Section XI Suitability
Evaluation, aftar the completion of corrective maintenance.
This
procedure required a QC inspection hold point to evaluate system
leakage as part of overall functional verification.
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It is noted that maintenance personnel do appropriately have lead
responsibility for quality and assuring procedures are properly
implemented.
However, it was also noted that a QC inspector hid an
opportunity-to correct this discrepancy, but he failed to do :o and
signed off the WR. Section 7.0 of Maintenance Management Procedure
No.1.5 states, in part, that Section IX of the WR is used to
document the completion, acceptance, and approval of the maintenance
activity and associated documentation.
The pump was operated for a
functional check with maintenance personnel present prior to signing
off the WR, in effect accomplishing the leak check since the only
work performed was on the pump itself.
Therefore, the missed
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procedure was not significant to operability of the pump.
This is
considered a violation of TS 6.8.1.a. Violation 369/90-11-07:
Failure to Follow Maintenance Proceds.re.
The inspector was informed by the Itcenset that a supervisor can mark
initials on the Section IX of the Wh prior to completion of all work,
as long as all critical work is completed and signoff will be
completed later; however, this initials practice was informal.
The
maintenance program does not appear to address this practice, which
would otherwise assure consistent implementation and appropriate
training.
This program weakness may have. contributed to this
violation.
One. violation was identified.
5.
LicenseeEventReport(LER) Followup (90712,92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine
if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination
included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with
Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action
taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements
satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as
appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The
following LERs were closed:
369/89.22
Rev. 1: Reactor Trip Occurred Because of a Failed
Universal Board in the Solid State Protection System.
369/90-06: Corrosion Occurred on Steel Containment Vessel Because of
Unanticipated Environmental
Interaction Design Deficiency.
369/90-07: Improper Screws Installed in the Bottom of Ice Condenser
Baskets.
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- 369/90-08: Required Flow Rate Verification and Contaminated Parts
Warehouse Ventilation Samples Were Not Performed Properly Because of
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Inappropriate Actions.
This it the third recent event involving
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inadequate surveillances by Radiation Protection personnel.
A
non-citedviolation(NCV 369,370/90-06-02) was previously issued for
the first two events. . The lice 3see appears to have initiated
appropriate corrective actions, hovever, these had not been completed
at the time of this event.
Therefore, this event is not being cited
and is considered another example of the previous problem.
Further
followup will be accomplished against the NCV which remains open.
369/90-09: Feedwater Isolation Occurred Because of Lack of Attention
to Detail.
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370/88-10. Rev. 2: Unit 2 Containment Sump Isolation Valve Switchgear
Logic Wire Was Incorrectly Wired due to Personnel Error.
- 370/89-09:
Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Automa-
tically Started Because of an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features
Actuation Caused by inappropriate Actions.
The inspector verified
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that ap)ropriate procedure revisions were issued and that all
requirec training was completed.
- 370/89-11:
Technical Specification 3.0.3 was Entered to Perform
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Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate-Test of Two
Emergency Core Cooling System Check Valves.
- 370/89-12:
Diesel Generator Surveillance was Missed Because of Start
Classification Problems Caused by inadequate Directives.
The
inspector verified that the licensee procedure had been revised and
issued, and that a Technical Specification interpretation had been
developed and approved.
- 370/89-14:
Diesel Generator 2A and 2B Sump Pump Discharge. Valve Was
Closed Because of an Inappropriate Action and a Management
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Deficiency.
The licensee revied tne controlling procedure for the
discharge valves, moving responsibility for these valves from the
Chemistry group to the Operations group.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
The'following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that
the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been
completed.
Selective verification included record review, observations,
and discussions with licensee personnel.
The following items are closed:
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-31-07:
Follow-up of Licensee
Improvements in Control Room Deficiencies.
The inspector verified
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the establishment of a control and resolution program.
This program
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has been monitored since its inception and a marked decrease in the
- number of outstanding deficiencies has been noted.
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Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/88-31-24: Verify Licensee
Improvements in Identifying Generic Corrective Actions Relative to
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Events.
The licensee has implemented additional training for root
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cause analysis.
Although some additional cases of incomplete
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corrective actions were identified since this item was opened, the
licensee has generally improved and more recent LERs appear to be
more thorough.
A problem with evalua' ion of recurring events was
identified as Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/89-32-02 but has been
corrected (seebelow). Observations at Abnormal Plant Event r::atings
have shown that the licensee's management is aggressively pursuing
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root cause and generic corrective actions.
Continuing inspections
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will be conducted in this area as part of the routine eview of all
LERs.
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-12-02:
Evaluate Original Design
Basis for the Range of the Main Steam.Line Radiation Monitors and
Subsequent Monitor Modification.
Variation Notices were developed,
for both units, to complete the evaluation and implement set point
changes on the Radiation Monitors. These changes were verified to De
completed.
Deviation 369, 370/89-16-01: Fdilure to Meet Commitment to Provide
Bypass Indication for Control Room Ventilation System. The licensee
responded to this item in a letter dated September 12, 1989.
The
licensee indicated that plant modifications would be initiated to
correct the problem. The inspector verified that this had been done.
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Violation- 369, 370/89-16-02: Failure to Implement Adequate Design
Control Measures for Air Operated Valve Components.
The licensee
responded to this item in a letter dated September 12, 1989.
The
specific valve problem was corrected.
In addition, the licensee
conducted additional reviews and implemented a 100% inspection of
safety-related solenoid operated valves and dampers. The licensee is
also developing upgraded component lists and loop and logic diagrams
as a long term effort.
These actions are considered satisfactory to
address this problem.
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-32-02:
Failure of Licensee
Programs to Consistently Identify Repetitive Problen Areas.
The
guidance procedure for evaluating repetitive problems has been
revised.
The revisions provide more compnhensive evaluation
guidance, more realistic examples, and an inciease in reliance on
juigement on the part of the evaluator.
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Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-37-01:
Development of Diesel
Generator Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Guidance. The licensee has
revised the p *ocedure for diesel generator start classifications and
has issued a Technical Specification interpretation for the diesel
generator.
inspector Fr.110wup Item 369, 370/89-37-04i Followup of Improvements
to Modificetion Program for Relabeling.
The licensee has initiated
formal programs to require labeling to be properly completed for all
modifi ct',on and maintenance work.
In addition, a training session
on the _ labeling program has been initiated for all maintenance
personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inspection For Verification Of Quality Assurane.e Request Regarding
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (TI 2515/93)
The inspector verified that the Diesel Generator (DG) fuel oil was
included in the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program. DG fuel oil is
listed in the licensee Quality Standards Manual as QA-1 material.
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However, DG fuel oil is not available as nuclear QA grade material. The
licensee orders commercial grade #2 fuel oil and conducts their own
testing as requirts by TS.
Licensee testing of DG fuel oil was previously
reviewed (see Report 369,370/89-14).
The inspector noted, however, that a
recent purchase order was checked "no" for Quality Assurance Required,
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10CFR Part 21 Applicability and Commercial Grade. The inspector requested
the licensee to evaluate whether QA consumable materials othar than DG
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fuel oil are being properly ordered and whether DG fuel oil should be
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formally ordered and listed as a comercial grade material.
The licensee
indicated that this avaluation would be accomplished. This is Unresolved
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Item 369,370/90-11-b/:
Evaluation of QA Consumable Materials Ordering
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Practices.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
. Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings identified below were sumarized on June
25, .1990, with those persons indicated in paragraoh 1 above.
The
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following items were discussed in detail
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- Non-Cited Violation 369,370/90-11-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure for
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Control of Overtime (paragraph 2.f.)
Violation 369,370/90-11-02:
Failure to Follow TS 3.0.3 for Control Room
Ventilation System (paragraph 2.g.)
Violation 369,370/90-11-03:
Failure to R(port Control Room Ventilation
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Inoperability to NRC (paragraph 2.g.)
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Inspector Followup Item 369,370/90-11-04:
Weakness Regarding Control of
ScaffoldsandLadders(paragraph 4.b)
Non-Cited Violation 369/90-11-05:
Failure to Follow Procedure Regarding a
QCNotification(paragraph 4.d.)
Violation' 369/90-11-06:
Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure
(paragraph 4.e.)
Unresolved Item 369,370/90-11-07:
Evaluation of QA Consumable Materials
Ordering Practices (paragraph 7)
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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