IR 05000369/1999010

Insp Repts 50-369/99-10 & 50-370/99-10 on 990322-26.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspect of Licensee Health Physics Activities During Unit 2 Refueling Outage

ML20196H184
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	06/16/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19002A261	List: IR 05000369/1999010
References
50-369-99-10, 50-370-99-10, EA-99-010, EA-99-10, NUDOCS 9907060121
Download: ML20196H184 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 i

Docket Nos: 50-369,50-370 License Nos: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No: 50-369/99-10,50-370/99-10 l Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: March 22- 26,1999 Inspector: E. Testa, P.E., Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety l

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9907060121 990616 Enclosure

, PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR L

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-369/99-10,50-370/99-10 This specialinspection included aspects of licensee health physics activities during the Unit 2 refueling outag Plant Suocort

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A non-cited violation was identified for failure to adequately post and properly control access to a Very High Radiation Area. (Section R1.1)

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A non-cited violation was identified for failure to implement adequate controls, including having adequate process controls, for the sump room when the area was a Very High Radiation Area. (Section R1.1)

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Material was labeled appropriately. (Section R1.1)

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Personnel dosimetry devices were appropriately worn. (Section R1.1)

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The licensee was maintaining exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable. (Section R1.1)

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ReDort Details Plant SUDDort C

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R Tour of Radioloaical Protected Areas Inspection Scope (83750)

The inspectors reviewed personnel monitoring, radiological postings, high radiation area controls, posted radiation dose rates, contamination controls and container labeling. In addition, As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) work planning, prejob worker briefings, and job execution observations were performed. The inspectors reviewed licensee records of personnel radiation exposure and discussed ALARA program details, implementation and goals. Health physics facilities, the auxiliary building, outside radioactive waste storage areas, and the steam generator replacement building were toured. Requirements for these areas were specified in 10 CFR 20 and Technical Specification Observations and Findinas Radiologically controlled areas including radioactive material storage areas (RMSAs),

High Radiation Areas, ana Locked High Radiation Areas were appropriately posted and radioactive material was appropriately stored and labele Reviewed records showed that the licensee was tracking and trending personnel contamination events (PCEs). The licensee had tracked approximately 35 PCEs for the 1999 calender year to date which included skin and clothing contamination From review of two Unit 2 steam generator Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) and observations of prejob briefings and work activities in progress via closed circuit television, the inspectors verified appropriate dose control and acceptable work practice The inspectors reviewed selected Problem investigation Process Reports (PIPS). PIP 0-M99-1310 stated that " Radiation Protection was not aware that the incore thimbles were being retracted to the incore sump room." This issue was reviewsd by the inspector because of the very high radiation levels that can result from incore thimble retraction On March 15,1999, prior to the incore thimble retractions, Maintenance personnel opened the 738' access door to the Unit 2 incore sump room and Radiological Control personnel performed a radiation survey of the sump room. Normally, the entrance door way to the sump room is posted as a Very High Radiation Area and the door is locked shut with a special lock controlled by the Radiological Control organization. Following the radiation survey that showed the radiation levels in the sump room were well below

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the regulatory limits for posting the area as a Very High Radiation Area, the Very High Radiation Area posting and the speciallock were remove On March 17,1999, the 738' access door was closed by Maintenance personnel. At that time,ihe door was bolted shut with two 3/4" bolts in anticipation of the incore thimble retraction. On March 19,1999, technicians performed work at the seal table which involved retraction of the incore thimbles. During the time the thimbles were retracted, the radiation levels in the sump room were estimated by the licensee to range between g 790 and 6800 Rads / hour depending on the amount of Cobalt 60 assumed to be in the thimbles. These levels exceeded the regulatory requirements for the establishment of Very High Radiation Area controls for the sump room. However, at the time of the thimble retraction, the sump room was not being controlled in accordance with regulatory requirements for a Very High Radiation Area. The radiological posting of the area was not upgraded to a Very High Radiation Area and the door was not secured with the special lock controlled by the Radiological Control organization, in addition, the inspectors identified that procedure IP/0/A3007/009B Revision 018 titled Movable incore Detector Thimble Retraction and Insertion did not contain adequate process instructions to assure establishment of adequate radiological controls of the Very High Radiation Areas prior to subsequent movement of the incore thimble The inspectors determined that the sump area was inadequately controlled, with work in progress, for approximately three and one half hours. Dose records of the employees assigned to work in the seal table area during thimble retraction were reviewed by the inspectors. Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2811 was used for the seal table work. The highest radiation dose for workers on the RWP was 24 millirem. This low dose confirms that none of the workers entered the sump while the thimbles were retracte Following discussions with the inspectors, the licensee reclassified the PIP from action Category 3 to Category 2 which required an investigation and completion of a root caus The licensee was informed that the failure to adequately post and control the access to the sump room on March 19,1999, during the thimble retraction when the area was a Very High Radiation Area constituted a violation of 10 CFR 20.1601. This failure to properly control access to the Very High Radiation area is a Severity IV violation that is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Polic This NCV is identified as NCV 50-370/99-010-01. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP 0-M99-131 In addition, the licensee was also informed that failure to impi: - additional controls, including having adequate process controls, for the sump ror :tm o the thimble retraction on March 19,1999, when the area was a Very Higc n. A aon Area, was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1602. This failure is a Severity IV violation that is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is identified as NCV 50-370/99-010-02. This issue is in the iicensee's corrective action program as PIP 0-M99-131 . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The outage exposure goal was set at 135.435 person-rem. At the time of the inspection (March 26,1999), the outage person-rem was about 64.103 person-rem. This was close to the predicted outage dose at that tim The inspectors reviewed operational and administrative controls for entering the RCA and performing work. These controls included the use of radiation work permits (RWPs)

to be reviewed and understood by workers prior to entering the RCA. The inspectors reviewed selected RWPs for adequacy of the radiation protection requirements based on work scope, location, and conditions. For the RWPs reviewed, the inspectors noted that appropriate protective clothing, and dosimetry were required. During tours of the plant, the inspectors observed the adherence of plant workers to the RWP requirement Personal dosimetry was being worn in the appropriate location and workers were observed using friskers properly at RCA exit locations and exiting the protected area through exit portal monitor Conclusions Two NCVs were identified for: (1) Failure to properly post and control access to a Very High Radiation Area and, (2) Failure to implement adequate controls, including having adequate process controls, for the sump room during the thimble retraction on March 19, 1999, when the area was a Very High Radiation Area. Radiological facility controls in radioactive material storage areas, health physics facilities, and waste storage buildings were found appropriate. Personnel dosimetry devices were appropriately worn. The licensee was maintaining exposures ALAR R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-369.370/98-07-09: Failure to establish procedural guidance for the abnormal vent path used for degassing the Unit i volume control tank to the environment. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Reply to Notice of Violation dated September 4,1998. The inspectors selectively reviewed the corrective actions including the procedure revisions and effluent release data. For the items reviewed, the inspectors found them as scated. This item is close V. Manaaement Meetina Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management on March 25,199 A telephone exit was conducted with the licensee on April 15,1999 for the purpose of informing the licensee that the input would be included in a separate repor A telephone exit was conducted with the licensee on May 13,1999 for the purpose of informing the licensee of the enforcement decision to issue the two NCV c

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

• Barron, B., Vice President, McGuire Nuc! ear Station

• Bhatnagar, A., Superintendent, Plant Operations

• Boyle, J., Manager, Civil / Electrical / Nuclear Systems Engineering

• %Byrum, W., Manager, Radiation Protection

• 1. Cash, M., Manager, Regulatory Compliance

• Dolan, B., Manager, Safety Assurance

• Evans, W., Security Manager

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• Geddie, E., Manager, McGuire Nuclear Station

• Peele, J., Manager, Engineering

• Loucks, L., Chemistry Manager

• Thomas, K., Superintendent, Work Control

• Travis, B., Manager, Mechanical Systems Engineering

. Attended March 25,1999 exit

1. Attended April 15,1999 telephone exit

% Attended May 13,1999 telephone exit NRC

• Resident attended the March 25,1999 exit meetin # Maintenance Branch Chief participated in the telephone exit on May 13,1999 INSPECTIONS PROCEDURES USED I l

lP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-370/99-10-01 NCV Failure to properly post and control access to a Very High Radiation Area (Section R1.1)

50-370/99-10-02 NCV Failure to implement adequate controls, including having adequate process controls, for the sump room when the area was a Very High Radiation Area (Section R1.1)

Closed 50-369,370/97-04-05 VIO Failure to establish procedural guidance for the abnormal vent path used for degassing the Unit i volume control tank to the environment (Section R8.1)

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50-370/99-10-01 NCV Failure to properly post and control access to a Very High Radiation Area (Section R1.1)

50-370/99-10-02 NCV Failure to implement adequate controls, including having adequate process controls, for the sump room when the area was a Very High Radiation Area (Section R1.1)

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