IR 05000369/1987012

Insp Repts 50-369/87-12 & 50-370/87-12 on 870321-0424. Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure Pertaining to Auxiliary Feedwater Operational Readiness Valve Lineup

ML20214A385
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	04/30/1987
From:	Guenther S, William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214A372	List: IR 05000369/1987012 ML20214A369 ML20214A375 ML20214A385
References
50-369-87-12, 50-370-87-12, NUDOCS 8705190432
Preceding documents:	ML20215J901 (10 June 1987)
Download: ML20214A385 (8)

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UNITED STATES

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-Report Nos.: 50-369/87-12 and 50-370/87-12 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street-Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conduct : , 1987 - April 24, 1987

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Ma Inspectors: /

W. Orders,

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r' esident Inspec or

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/ 0l 5 Tiuenther, Resident Inspefor Date $igned Approved by: [] /b T. A. Peebles, Se'ction Chief Y[30/87 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, and maintenance activitie Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified: Failure to follow procedure pertaining to Auxiliary Feedwater operational readiness valve line-u {DR ADOCK 05000369 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance

• B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

• N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

• Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling

• N. Atherton, Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 24, 1987 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. One violation concerning failure to follow procedure pertaining to the operation of auxiliary feedwater was discussed. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspectio . Unresolved Items An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which rr. ore information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. No unresolved items were identified during this repor . Plant Operations

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period, to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personne Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directive The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specification _ _ _

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Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, auxiliary building, units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected are During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power from the beginning of the report period until 10:15 a.m. on April 14, 1987 when the unit experienced a reactor tri Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE) personnel had just completed IP/1/A/3008/10, the " Turbine Auto Stop Oil Pressure Calibration" procedure, and had Operations perform a functi_onal verification of the pressure switches. This involved depressing an auto-stop oil (AS0) test switch on the digital electro hydraulic (DEH) control panel in the control room for each pressure switch that had undergone calibration. This actuates a 3-way valve which isolates the pressure switch from the ASO header and vents the switch to a drain tank to simulate a loss of ASO pressur When the pushbutton was released the 3-way valve repositioned to refill and pressurize the switch and line thereby causing a momentary drop in sensed pressure sufficient to actuate a second pressure switch and satisfy the two out-of-three reactor trip logic. The licensee was able to duplicate the situation during post-trip testing and has initiated action to revise the surveillance procedure to prevent recurrenc The licensee also determined that the procedure had never been performed on a unit at power before, but there was no reason to suspect that an A50

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hydraulic transient sufficient to cause a reactor trip might occu All systems appeared to function normally during the trip. Unit restart was delayed for a period of time, however, until periodic maintenance on the "B" train of control room ventilation and chill water could be completed to clear the made change restrictions of Technical Specification 3.0.4. A reactor startup began at about 11:00 a.m. the following morning, with the unit entering mode 1 at 1:31 p.m. that afternoon. The unit completed the report period at full powe A potential concern regarding the estimated critical position (ECP)

calculation came to light during the above reactor startup. The ECP had been calculated for a reactor startup time approximately one hour earlier than the actual time of criticality. Criticality was anticipated at 82 steps on control bank D, with a " window" of plus or minus 500 PCM (percent milli-rho). Criticality was actually achieved at Step 84 on control bank C, which placed it above the rod insertion limit required by the Technical Specifications, but below the ECP window. Since the reactor had tripped i

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from a 100 percent equilibrium xenon condition approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> earlier, the rapid decay of xenon (from the post-trip peak) during the hour-long startup delay accounted for a significant portion of the error in the EC The licensee's startup procedures currently authorize an ECP to be used for up to four hours after the estimated critical time, but the possibility of shortening that time for fast recovery startups is being evaluated. The licensee's reactor group is also evaluating the other sources of error contributing to the poor estimate of April 16. These issues will be tracked as an Inspectoc Followup Item (369,370/87-12-01).

A Notification of Unusual Event (N0UE) affecting both units was declared at 7:20 a.m. on April 16, when it was discovered that the plant's meteorological instrumentation was inoperable. Selected instrumentation had been declared inoperable for maintenance on April 14. The 7-day technical specification limiting condition for operation action statement did not expire until April 2 Since this equipment was already inoperable the operators did not immediately recognize the fact that the operating instruments had also ceased to function during a severe electrical storm at about 3:00 p.m. on April 15. The licensee replaced the damaged meteorological instruments and terminated the NOUE at 7:04 p.m. on April 1 Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at essentially full power for the entire reporting perio It was unaffected by the Unit 1 trip of April 15, but was subject to the NOUE of April 16 as discussed abov . Surveillance Testing Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were adequat Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed and/or witnessed:

PT/1/A/4601/04 RPS Channel 4 PT/0/A/4600/14C Source Range N-31,N-32 ,

PT/1/A/4601/01 RPS Channel 2 '

PT/1/A/4208/03A NS HX Test .

PT/1/A/4403/01B RN Train B l PT/1/A/4206/01A NI Train A l

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PT/1/A/4451/018 YC Train B TT/0/A/9100/187 DG Halon PT/1/A/4450/06A VX Train A PT/1/A/4250/04G Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip PT/1/A/4403/07 RN Train A PT/2/A/4252/01B CA Train B

. PT/2/A/4252/01A CA Train A

' PT/2/A/4208/01A NS Train A PT/2/A/4208/01B NS Train B PT/2/A/4209/01A NV Train A PT/2/A/4206/01B NI Train B PT/2/A/4252/01 CA Turbine Driven Maintenance Observations Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequat I Halon System Maintenance i

Each McGuire unit is equipped with two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to supply standby power for safe unit shutdown in the event of a loss of offsite power. These EDGs are protected by a halon fire suppression system consisting of two eight-cylinder banks (main and reserve) for each unit. Either bank can be selected for standby operation by means of a local selector switch. The selected bank is actuated by either an automatic signal from the fire protection system or by a manual pull lever on that bank's pilot cylinder. The automatic actuation signal opens a solenoid pilot valve which admits nitrogen from a small pilot control cylinder to the pilot cylinder's manual pneumatic actuato This actuates the pilot cylinder which then supplies the additional gas pressure needed to actuate the remaining seven slave cylinders in the ban While performing a performance test on February 18, 1987, Operations personnel discovered that the manual pneumatic actuator on the Unit 2 main bank pilot cylinder did not operate properly. The reserve bank functioned properly and was placed in service, and a work request was initiated to repair the defective actuato On March 11, 1987, Maintenance personnel performed the " Diesel Generator Halon Cylinder Pressure and Weight Test", MP/0/A/7400/49 on the Unit 2 main and reserve banks. This involved removing the manual pneumatic actuator and its flexible connection tubing from the pilot cylinder so that the cylinder could be weighe _ _ . . .. . _ _ ._-

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l On March 17, 1987, Instrument and Electrical personnel began work on the Unit 2 main bank actuator and discovered that the reason for its

" failure" on February 18 was that the actuator had been incorrectly installed. The flexible tubing which connects the "A" and "B" ports of the manual pneumatic actuator assembly to the actuation and slave pilot manifolds were found reversed. The same condition was found to exist on the Unit 2 reserve bank pilot cylinder suggesting that those connections had probably been reversed during the performance of MP/0/A/7400/49 on March 1 The Unit 1 EDG halon fire suppression system was also inspected. The main bank, which happened to be in service at the time, was found to have the same problem as the Unit 2 system. The reserve bank, however, was properly connected and was placed in servic When the nature of the deficiency was understood, the licensee took prompt action to restore the degradcd halon systems to their design configuration and to correct the cause of the maintenance error to prevent recurrenc Furthermore, on April 11, 1987, the licensee conducted a special test of the EDG halon system to determine whether the incorrectly configured manual pneumatic actuator assemblies had rendered the systems inoperable. The Unit 1 reserve bank was placed in the as-found (incorrect) condition and actuated in both the automatic and manual mode Five of the eight cylinders actuated in the automatic mode and only one cylinder (the pilot) actuated in the manual mod These results indicate a definite degradation in system performance while incorrectly configured, however, the licensee's design organization is continuing to evaluate the results to determine whether minimum required fire suppression capability (operability) was maintaine The failure of MP/0/A/7400/49 to ensure the proper reassembly of EDG halon system pilot cylinder actuator assemblies on three occasions clearly illustrates an inadequacy in that MP and, as such, constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. As permitted by Appendix C to 10 CFR 2, however, no Notice of Violation is proposed and the incident is classified as a Licensee Identified Violation (LIV 369,370/87-12-02).

b. Fire Suppression System Maintenance The McGuire Nuclear Station fire suppression water system (RF)

consists of three motor-driven fire suppression pumps (A, B and C)

capable of taking suction from Lake Norman and transferring water through an associated distribution system. The A and B pumps are located in pits at the intake structure and are cooled by thermostatically controlled air handling units (AHUs) mounted in removable pit cover Two pumps (A and C or B and C) are required to be operable to satisfy Technical Specification requirement i

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On February 21, 1987, the motor on the B fire pump failed, necessitating its removal and shipment to the vendor for repai The associated AHU was removed to permit the pump motor to be removed from its pit and its electrical leads were individually taped and tied out of the wa On April 6, while reinstalling the B RF pump motor and its associated AHU, an Instrument and Electrical (IAE) technician experienced a

"near miss" when, while pulling the AHU electrical leads through their conduit, the insulating tape abraded and an electrical flash occurre The licensee's investigation of the incident is on going, however, it has been concluded that power to the AHU was never isolated by opening the associated circuit breaker as required by the licensee's Station Directive (No. 3.1.19), " Safety Tags, Lock-Outs , and Delineation Tags". The licensee is attempting to determine whether this incident represents an isolated instance of procedural noncompliance or a more serious deficiency in the tagging progra The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) also reviewed the incident during its recent evaluation of the McGuire facility and, according to licensee management, intends to include it as a finding in the Operations area. Although this incident represents a violation of the station's tagout procedure and, therefore, Technical Specification 6.8.1, no Notice of Violation is proposed at this time pursuant to the memorandum of understanding between the NRC and INP This item will, however, be carried as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI-369,370/87-12-03). Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) System Walkdown Accessible portions of the Unit 1 CA System were walked down during the inspection period to verify proper standby alignment in accordance with OP/1/A/6250/02, " Auxiliary Feedwater System". Some material deficiencies were detected (missing valve handle, loose packing gland retainer, missing vent pipe cap) and reported to the licensee for correction. Subsequent inspection revealed that the identified deficiencies had been remedie On April 8,1987, the inspector identified two valves on Enclosure 4.5, the valve checklist, of OP/1/A/6250/02 that were in other than their specified positions. Valves ICA-153 and 1CA-154 isolate CA storage tank overflow to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 condensate storage tanks, respectivel In a normal standby configuration, both the makeup to and the overflow from the CA storage tank are aligned to Unit 1 (i.e. , ICA-153 is open and 1CA-154 is closed).

Upon finding the apparent misalignment the inspector consulted the Operations Shift Supervisor to obtain verification that the valves were, indeed, out of their normal positions and to determine whether the out of normal operating condition was justifie . _ _ -- _ __ _ _ _ --- . . . _ _ - - _ _ _ .

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OP/0/A/6100/09, " Removal and Restoration (R&R) of Station Equipment", is normally used to provide the o)erators with an up to date status of all

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out of normal operating conditions by maintaining an R&R checklist in the i control room until the equipment is returned to normal service. The on-duty SS was unable to find an active R&R checklist to document the out

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of normal CA alignment and referred the problem to another Operations staff member for resolutio Further discussions with the Operations staff on April 9 confirmed that no

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R&R checklist had been completed to cover the deviation from the normal CA

alignmen They speculated that the CA storage tank makeup and overflow

had been transferred from Unit 1 to Unit 2 on February 17 when a leaking

plant heating converter caused the Unit 1 secondary system sodium

) concentration to go out of specification (as documented in NRC Inspection

Report 369,370/87-05),

i Although the actual alignment of the CA storage tank to.either Unit 1 or 2

is of minimal significance, the fact that the Operations Staff failed to

) maintain an accurate status of an out of normal operating condition as i required by the R&R procedure is evaluated as an apparent violation of l Technical Specification 6.8.1 (369/87-12-04).

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