IR 05000369/1987034
| ML20235M907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Harris J, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-34, 50-370-87-34, NUDOCS 8710060334 | |
| Download: ML20235M907 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES
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S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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o REGION 11 g
j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
's ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-369/87-34 and 50-370/87-34 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 (
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Docket Nos.-
50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.:
NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
August 31 - September 4, 1987 Inspectors:
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7-J'/-S7 G. R. Wiseman
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Date Signed
'W$cw i 9 - 2 f/ - & 7 J[/R. Harris Date Signed Approved by:
M [2. / d [, u m
'7 -M- $ 7 T. E. Conlon, Section Chief Date Signed
/ Plant Systems Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of Fire Protection / Prevention and Follow-up on Previously Identified Inspection Items.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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'1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
'*B.;G. Addis, Station Services. Superintendent'
- J. V. Almond,, Safety Supervisor N. G. Atherton,' Nuclear Compliance
H. D. Brandes', Analytical Engineer Fire Protection
- J. E. Brewer, Design Engineering
- J. B. Day, Licensing Associate Engineer
- M. L. Hagee, Station Services-
- T. W.' Keener, Station Services
- J. A. Oldhom,. Design Engineer Fire Protection
- D. J. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
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- D. W.'Trapp, Nuclear. Production Maintenance NRC Resident' Inspectors
- W. T. Orders
- S. Guenther
- Attended exit' interview 2.
Exit Interview The ' inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 4,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 'above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed. in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or ceviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.
(Closed)
Devia*'on Item (50-369/83-12-01,-50-370/83-16-01),
Substandard Ae'.smatic Sprinkler Systems for Reactor Buildings Annulus Areas:
Based on a NRC Reoion Il follow-up inspection conducted on July 21-24,1987, (Repm t Nc. 50-369, 470/87-24) all issues concerning this deviation were resolved except that the installation of sprinkler piping. ronitoring pressure switches for the annulus sprinkler system riping had not been accomplished. The licensee had recognized this ract during a commitment review and issued a station problem report (MGPR-0831) on August 25, 1986 but no documentation was available to indicate that design work had progressed.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed McGuire Nuclear Station
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5 Modification. Requests (NSM) Nos. MG-12049 and MG-22049 which were approved by Station Management on August 26, 1987.
The. installation of the pressure switches and associated alarm instrumentation is to be completed.following the 1987 Unit 1 Refuel.0utage, and appears adequate to complete the. licensee's corrective actions.. Final
- installation. cf the switches will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
Based on the. inspectors'
review of-these
' actions,.this item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (369/84-28-01,. 370/84-25-01), Inadequate or Failure to Provide Fixed Suppression Systems in Accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 for Rooms, Areas, or Zones-Under Consideration: This item was identified during a NRC Region II Appendix R fire protection walkthrough conducted in September 1984.
This issue involves. sprinkler system obstructions 'and plant locations where sprinkler systems. are not provided for Appendix R Section III.G.3 compliance.
The licensee has committed to correct the sprinkler. system obstructions and has initiated Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) No. MG-1-1777 for corrective action.
Other Appendix R,Section III.G.3 issues were addressed by the licensee in a letter to NRC/NRR dated September 4, 1984 which indicated that the existing sprinkler systems coverage have l>een reviewed during the plant fire hazards analysis review and a Safety-Evaluation Report (SER) issued in February 1983.
This evaluation report provided detailed listings of where fire suppression systems are provided and approved this design.
Based upon the inspectors review of the licensee's design modifications for correcting sprinkler obstructions and previously approved designs this item is considered-closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation Item (369/84-28-10, 370/84-25-10), Structural Steel Fire Barrier Supports Not Provided with Fire Resistant Rating Equivalent to the Fire Barrier:
This item was identified during a NRC Region II Appendix R fire protection walkthrough in September 1984. During the review of the fire barrier enclosures for valves CA-161C and CA-162C of each unit and associated cables it was identified that the structural steel supports for the piping and cables to the valve operators were not protected to provide a fire resistance equivalent to that of the fire barriers..
By letter, dated November 4, 1985, the licensee submitted two technical analyses to support its denial of the violation.
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memorandum dated December 12, 1985, Region II requested that the J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) review the licensee's analyses associated with the subject unprotected cabletray/ valve structural steel supports.
On August 8, 1986, NRR completed its review of the licensee's analyses.
Based on this NRC evaluation, it was concluded that protection of the subject structural steel members with fire rated material would not significantly increase the level of fire safety and, therefore, the violation was rescinded as denoted in a Region II l
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NRC letter to the licensee dated September 22, 1986.
In addition to rescinding the above violation, Region II NRC, by letter dated August 8,1985, to the licensee rescinded several other Appendix R related violations which closed out Violation Items (369/84-28-03, 370/84-25-03);
(369/84-28-04, 370/84-25-04);
and (369/84-28-07, 370/84-25-07). Based on the inspectors review of this documentation, the above items are considered closed.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (369/84-28-12, 370/84-28-12), NRR Evaluation of Appendix R Deviation Request:
By letter dated August 3, 1984, Duke Power identified and provided Technical Justification for several deviations from 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
Subsequently, the NRC staff has requested additional information in order to complete the evaluation of the deviations (reference letters from Mr. B. J. Youngblood to Mr. H. B. Tucker, March 10, 1986 and May 29, 1986).
One of the deviations involved the potential collapse of seismic steel due to a fire. As the result of discussions.between the respective staffs, Duke agreed to conduct an indepth technical analysis of the potential collapse of seismic steel due to fire.
By letter dated January 30, 1987, Duke Power provided a Technical Analyses addressing fire exposure of steel supports penetrating fire barriers.
These analyses provided the NRC with sufficient information to complete the review; therefore, this item is closed, e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (369/84-30-01), Failures of Rate of Rise Fire Detectors in the Unit 2B D/G Room: The licensee's evaluation of the fire detector problems indicated that the probable failure of the E-135-C rate-of-rise detectors was due to shrinkage of the epoxy which seals the air chamber due to long-term exposure to high ambient temperature of approximately 100 F-110 F in the D/G Rooms.
Work Request WR651691AE initiated changing out these failed detectors and replacing them with Pyrotronics DT-135 rate-compensated type heat detectors which operate on a bi-metallic principle rather than an air chamber thus eliminating an air chamber.
The replacement of the detectors was completed on June 28, 1985. These detectors have been in operation since that time; however, it was noted by.the inspectors that the new detectors apparently are subject to premature alarms
based on the licensee's Special Reports dated September 20, 1985, and August 8, 1986. The licensee indicated that these actuations would i
be investigated further and will be reviewed during a future NRC
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inspection.
Based on the review of corrective actions taken by the
licensee on the original deficiency this item is considered closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not discussed during this inspection.
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5.
Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)
a.
Fir'e Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title Station Directive 2.11.2 Fire Protection and-Revision 9, 10/28/87 Surveillance Station Directive 2.11.3 Contro'1 of Combustible-Revision 9,.5/11/87 Material s
. Station Directive.2.'11.6 Station Requirements for Revision 2, 4/7/86'
Temporary Structures Within the Protected Area 1 Station Directive 3.11.0 Housekeeping and Cleanliness Revision 10, 11/19/86 Station Directive 2.11.3,- on page 13, discusses the use of plastic material in safety related areas.
Specifically,. the use -of Gifflon plastic.is restricted to types T55FR, T75, or white lor yellow Lortex.
This is acceptable.
Based'on this review,'it appears that the above procedures meet the NRC guidelines of:
The document entitled " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative. Controls, and Quality Assurance", dated June 1977; and the licensee's fire prevention /
administrative control commitments documented in the March 1986 revision to the McGuire Fire Protection Review.
b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspectors. reviewed the following Fi re Protection System Surveillance Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title PT/1/A/4209/010 Standby Makeup Pump Flow Periodic Test PT/0/A/4400/02 Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire Hose Stations PT/0/A/4250/04 Fire Barrier Inspection
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The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the I
various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
In addition, these procecures were reviewed to determine if the inspection and test instructions followed general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire protection program guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes.
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures are satisfactory.
Based on review of Surveillance Procedure PT/0/A/4250/04, Fi re l
Barrier Inspection, the inspectors noted that this procedure does not
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include an acceptance criteria for the condition of CeraFiber boards installed as part of electrical penetration fire barrier assemblies.
This will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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c.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests
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The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test records for the dates indicated:
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PT/0/A/4600/15 Fire Detection System Monthly Tests from 5/23/86 through 5/8/87 PT/0/A/4400/02 Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire Hose Stations Tests from 7/15/86 through 8/11/87 PT/1/A/4209/01C Quarterly Standby Makeup Pump Flow Test Tests from 1/23/86 through 8/26/87 The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
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d.
Fire Protection Audit The most recent audit report of the McGuire Fire Protection Program was reviewed.
This audit was a triennial audit conducted under the cognizance of the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) to satisfy the requirements of Section 6.5.2.9(g) and (h) of the McGuire Technical Specifications.
The audit report reviewed was Quality Assurance audit report NP-86-30(MC). The audit was conducted during the period of September 8, 1986 through October 17, 1986.
This audit identified several fire protection program discrepancies and unresolved items, and recommended several program improvements.
The licensee has either implemented the corrective actions associated with these audit findings or a scheduled date for completion of the correction actions had been established. The licensee appears to be taking the appropriate corrective actions on these audit findings.
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e.
Fire Brigade -
L (1) Organization The. total. station fire brigade is composed of approximately 142 personnel from the operations, maintenance, technical and. station services. staff. The fire brigade leader is normally one of the Unit Supervisors and the remaining four ' fire brigade members are composedof.four nuclear equipment operators.
The inspectors reviewed the on duty shif ts for the period of ' August 1986 through May 1987. and verified that. sufficient qualified fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet -the provisions of -the plant's Technical Specification 6.2.2.
In addition, the inspectors verified that sufficient personnel were assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and fi_re brigade staff requirements' of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, it appears based on the review of the duty rosters associated with the above dates, that there was sufficient manpower on duty to meet both the - operational and the - fire brigade' requirements of the plant's Technical Specifications.
(2) Training
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The inspectors reviewed the training and drill records for five brigade leaders and 12 brigade members for the 1986 and 1987 calendar year.
The records reviewed indicated that each of these leaders and members had received an annual medicai review, attended the required training and participated in the required number of drills.
The inspectors also ' verified that a fire brigade drill had been conducted each quarter of 1936 for each shift. The. fire brigade training records which were inspected were found satisfactory.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial fire brigade training program to verify that the following training topics are being covered:
Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with
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specific identification of each individual's responsi-bilities.
Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and
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associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected
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products of combustion.
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Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment
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for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
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-The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the
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correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires,
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fires involving flammable and combustible liquids and hazardous process chemicals, fire resulting from construction or modifications (welding), and record files fires.
The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and
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emergency breathing equipment.
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The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.
The direction and coordination of the fi re fighting
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activities (fire brigade leaders only).
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Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.
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Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.
Based on this review, it appears that the licensee's initial fire brigade training program covers the above required training topics.
In addition, it appears that the license's fire brigade training program repeats the basic fire fighting skills of the initial program to qualified fire brigade members every two years.
(3)
Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors reviewed the following plant fire fighting strategies:
Reactor Building Unit 1, elevation 725, Fire Strategy RB1-1 Reactor Building Unit 1, elevation 778, Fire Strategy RB1-2 Reactor Building Unit 2, elevation 725, Fire Strategy RB2-2
Reactor Building Unit 2, elevation 778 & 10, Fire Strategy l
RB2-2 Standby Shutdown Facility, elevation 760, Fire Strategy 4.1-1 Radwaste Facility, elevation 760 & 772, Fire Strategy 4.1-3 Contaminated Materials Warehouse, elevation 760, Fire Strategy 4.1-4 Auxiliary Building, Room 926, elevation 767, Fire Strategy 1-22 Auxiliary Building, Room 928, elevation 767, Fire Strategy 1-23 Auxiliary Building, Room 925, elevation 767, Fire Strategy 1-24
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Based on this review, the inspectors determined that the above fire fighting strategies adequately addressed the fire hazards in the area, the type of fire extinguishers to be utilized, the direction of attack, systems in the room / area to be managed in order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke control and salvage.
(4) Fire Brigade Drill During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced fire brigade drill.
The drill fire scenario was a fire in the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (TDAFWP) which was apparently caused by spilled flammable liquid cleaning solvents.
The minimum five fire brigade members responded to the pending fire emergency. Initially a "first responder" operations person reported outside the Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (MDAFWP) door inside the stairwell.
This individual verified the fire emergency and reported initial information to the control room via radio.
He then advanced a single 1 inch attack fire hose line from hose cabinet 1RF887 (Battery Room) to the door of the MDAFWP Room. Approximately seven minutes after the initial fire notification, the fire brigade leader, and the fire brigade members arrived on the fire scene in full protective fire fighting turnout clothing and self contained breathing apparatus and manned the attack line.
These individuals advanced the hose line through the MDAFWP room and into the TDAFWP room and attacked the fire.
The brigade upon entry into the MDAFWP room manually initiated the Halon Fire Suppression system in the TDAFWP.
Health physics surveys were performed prior to entry into the fire affected areas. The fire was placed under control in approximately 25 minutes.
In addition, the fire brigade initiated fire victim search and rescue, smoke control, and water control operations.
f.
Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment (1)
Inspection of Fire Brigade Manual Fire Fighting Equipment The inspectors performed an inspection of the fire brigade equipment, consisting of fire hose, nozzles, tool s, and miscellaneous equipment, stored at the fire brigade equipment response locations located in the Unit 1 and 2 turbine buildings and the control room.
A total of 17 sets of turnout gear (coats, boots, helmets, etc.), nine sets of self contained breathing apparatus, and 27 spare air cylinders are stored at the fire brigade equipment responses locations.
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Based on this inspection, the designated fire brigade equipment appeared to be properly maintained and stored in a ready condition.
(2) Outside Fire Protection Walkdown The inspectors visually inspected the following fire protection systems components associated with the underground fire water distribution systems and the outside fire fighting equipment:
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Fire pumps
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Fire main sectionalizing values IRY 340, 341, 100, 79, 22, 29, 28 and 13
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Fire hydrant house houses 37 and 8 Hose carts 2 and 4
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Foam carts 1 and 2
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The inspectors found the three station fire pumps in service, the above fire main sectionalizing valves aligned in the proper position and the sampled outside fire fighting equipment to be functional and properly equipped.
The equipment houses contained the minimum equipment requirement of that specified by NFPA-24, Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, and/or the FSAR commitments.
A tour of the exterior of the plant indicated that sufficient clearance was provided between permanent safety-related buildings and structures and temporary buildings, trailers, and other transient combustible materials. The general housekeeping of the areas adjacent to the permanent plant structures was sati sf actory.
(3) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features A plant tour was made by the inspectors. During the plant tour, the following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspected:
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Safe Shutdown Facility
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Unit 1 & 2 motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms - fire areas 2, 2a, 3 and 3a Unit 1 & 2 Nuclear Service Water Pumps, common area
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649, Auxiliary Building Elevation 7/6'-0" - Fire Area 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps, common area 723, Auxiliary
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Building, elevation 733'-0" - Fire Area 14 The fire / smoke detection systems, manual fire fighting equipment (i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire area boundary walls, floors and ceiling associated for the above plant areas were inspected and verified to be in service or functional.
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The ~ automatic. sprinkler systems installed in the area of the-Nuclear Service. Water.. Pumps and the Halon-system installed.in
' the' Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms were. inspected andifound to=be in service.
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' Based on this inspection, it appears that the fire. protection features' associated with the above plant areas are
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The ' plant tour also. verified the licensee's implementation of the fire prevention administrative procedures.
The control of combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases, and the general housekeeping were-found to be satisfactory in. the areas-inspected.
A welding operation was observed in the safe shutdown facility cable -tunnel.
An approved " Hot Work" permit had been issued for the welding operations and the work practices met. the licensee's fire. prevention control procedures.
(4) Appendix R Fire Protection Features The inspectors visually inspected the fire rated raceway fire-barriers'
required for compliance with Appendix R, Seqtion III.G.2 in the following plant areas:
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Three-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 1
"B" train switchgear room One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit l'
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turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 2
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motor driven auxiliary-feedwater pump room
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One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room Based on the inspectors observations of the above raceway fire barrier enclosures, it appears that the fire barrier integrity associated with the above fire barrier assemblies was being properly maintained in a satisfactory condition.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspector Followup Items
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a.
(Closed) IFI (369,370/86-24-01), Improper Fire Fighting Equipment Deployment and Techniques Utilized by the Fire Brigade:
The inspectors, during this inspection, witnessed an unannounced fire brigade drill. The fire fighting equipment deployment and techniques
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-utilizedL by 'the ' brigade during this' drill. were _.found to be satisfactory.
In addition the inspectors reviewed the fire brigade drill critiques for drills 86-3, 86-4,: 07-1 and 87-2 and were' found
. to ' be ' satisfactory with respect to ~ the fire fighting techniques utilized by the fire brigade. Therefore, this item is closed.
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b.
(Closed)-IFI-(369,370/86-24-03), Deteriorating -Raceway Fire Barrier L Enclosures in the TDAFWP rooms: The licensee initiated Work Request WR588541 which added : 1/2-inch stainless steel straps ' to the fire-barriers to add support to the enclosure fire barrier materials. The
. modifications were completed' on November 13, 1986.
During this-inspection, the inspectors reviewed these fire. barrier enclosures which appeared continuous.and intact throughout the fire area.
Therefore this item is closed.
7.
Licensee Identified Item (Closed) LO. 369/84-22,. Design Deficiency in Control Room Filter Train Piping: Seismic design criteria were not applied to the fire protection and drain piping serving the Control Room ~ pressurization filter train in order that the' piping qualify to remain intact following a seismic event.
Corrective. actions.for. this deficiency included ~ the installation of a
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rupture disk, flange set and flexible hose on the fire protection inlet
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piping to the Filter Unitr to maintain filter housing integrity in the event upstream piping is damaged.
Nuelear Station Modification No. MG-1-1678 was initiated to implement the
' corrective, actions. The inspectors reviewed Work Request associated with the modification which indicated that all work associated with the modification was completed by February 11, 1987. The inspectors verified
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I that the installation was complete, therefore, this item is closed.
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