IR 05000369/1987006

Insp Repts 50-369/87-06 & 50-370/87-06 on 870218-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Insp:Tmi Action Items

ML20207T752
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	02/26/1987
From:	Hosey C, Revsin B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T729	List: IR 05000369/1987006 ML20207T728
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-369-87-06, 50-369-87-6, 50-370-87-06, 50-370-87-6, NUDOCS 8703240304
Download: ML20207T752 (4)

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p?. Kfiug UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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j REGION ll 101 MARIETTA STREET *I ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 J

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MAR 0 21987 ,

Report Nos.: 50-369/87-06,50-370/87-06 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242

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Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: February 18-20, 1987 Inspector;ht &Yb 6-S. K.~Revsin i Date Signed roved g ,

g jC.-M.Hosey,SectionChief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This special announced inspection involved onsite inspection at the licensee's General Office (GO) and at McGuire Nuclear Station in the area of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie gDR ADOCK 05000369 PDR

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REPORT $ETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• T. L. McConnell, Station Manager

• B. Hamilton, Superintendent, Technical Services

• J. Foster, Station Health Physicist

• M. Funderburke, Station Chemist

• J. A. Norris, Senior Engineer, Design Engineering, G0

• N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

• Byrum, Health Physics Coordinator

• D. Cline, Radioactive Waste Coordinator

• N. Atherton, Compliance

• J. R. Hilley, Jr. , Design Engineer, G0 E. Roberts, Operations J

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. TMIActionItems(25401B) (Closed) 50-369, 370/87-FRP-01, Plant Shielding for Vital Area Access NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2.2 directed that all licensees perform a radiation and shielding-design review and provide adequate access to vital areas and protection of safety equipment by design changes, increased permanent or temporary shielding or post accident procedural controls. Duke Power Company performed the required review and described their activities in a letter to the NRC dated May 23, 1980, and updated by letters dated July 18, 1980, August 6, 1980, September 8, 1980, October 10, 1980, October 29, 1980, February 6, 1981 and June 18, 198 During the inspection, the inspector verified through review of records that the assumptions, methodology and source terms utilized in the shielding-design review were consistent with requirements specified in NUREG-0737. Plant systems or portions of systems which might contain significant levels of radioactivity as a result of a

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Design Basis Accident were reviewed by the licensee for accessibilit Two types of area access were designated, continual occupancy and infrequent occupancy. The licensee identified the Control Room, the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (0SC), and the Personnel Access Portal (PAP) as areas requiring continual access. The licensee identified that areas requiring infrequent access (i.e., motor control centers, instrumentation panels, etc.,) were generally located in Auxiliary Building (AB) corridor The shielding review concluded that modifications to the Floor Drain Tank Room were necessary. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) sump pumps discharge to the Floor Drain Tank, and manual valves associated with isolating the tank and directing its contents elsewhere for storage or processing were located in the room. Dose rate projections for the room post-accident indicated that personnel exposures could potentially exceed NUREG-0737 guidelines. The inspector verified that reach rods had been added to the valves and that they are accessible in an AB Corridor (Valve Nos. 189 lwn and 282 lwn). Areas requiring continuous occupancy, the Control Room, TSC, OSC and PAP, were projected to have dose rates post-accident sufficiently low to permit continual occupancy without adding additional shieldin The inspector reviewed Emergency Procedure EP/1/A/5000/01, Safety Injection, August 19, 1986, to determine if procedural requirements could be performed in the Main Control Room or if procedural steps required an operator to leave the Control Room to operate a valve or breaker. The inspector accompanied by a control operator and a design engineer walked down the procedural step Based on area dose rate maps, the inspector verified that an operator could leave the Control Room and safely enter the vital areas required by the procedure to perform their task and receive less exposure than the limit specified in NUREG-073 Based on the review of licensee actions, the inspector concluded that the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2.2 had been met.

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b. (Closed) 50-369, 370/87-FRP-02, Inplant Radiation Monitoring t

l NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.3 directed that each licensee provide

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equipment, training and procedures for accurately determining the airborne iodine concentrations in areas within the f acility where plant personnel may be present during an acciden The licensee committed in a letter to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated June 18, 1982, to inplant radiciodine sampling through the use of silver zeolite cartridges and portable air sampler The inspector observed the equipment and the ( distribution of the silver zeolite cartridges throughout the plant.

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Sample counting was to be performed in the health physics (HP)

laboratory on the 767 foot elevatio The maximum dose rate I

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pro,jected for the area was approximately 5 millirem per hour. The licensee anticipated that background radiation levels would not be too high to prohibit sample counting taking into consideration the shielding of the detectors and the extra concrete shielding of the counting room floo Nonetheless, a backup rounting facility is available at the Technical Training Center ap; r hnately one eighth of a mile away, shculd it be necessar The inspector reviewed Procedures HP/0/B/1003/06, Procedure for Quantifying High Level Radioactivity Releases During Accident Conditions, September 9, 1986, and HP/0/8/1009/12, Inplant

Particulate and Iodine Monitoring Under Accident Conditions, July 11,

. 1986, which specified the methodology for sample collection, transfer to low background, purging and counting the samples. Also reviewed was Training Guide: Performance Standards, Task: HP-122, Emergency Sampling, which contained the performance standards for e.sargency samplin The inspector detennined that adequate traini.ig was provided in that all HP technicians were required to qualify on the air sampling task and that retraining was performed annuall Based on the review of licensee actions, the inspector concluded that the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.3 had been me No violations or deviations were identified.

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