IR 05000369/1997012

Insp Repts 50-369/97-12 & 50-370/97-12 on 970804-08.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20211E315
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	09/22/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211E303	List: IR 05000369/1997012 ML20211E298
References
50-369-97-12, 50-370-97-12, NUDOCS 9709300094
Download: ML20211E315 (20)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll Docket Nos: 50 369, 50 370 License Nos: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No: 50 369/97 12, 50 370/97 12 l Licensee: Duke Power Company I

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry R Huntersville NC 23117 Dates: August 4 8,1997 Inspectors: W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader K. Clark, Public Affairs Officer -

D. Forbes, Radiation Specialist G. Satyero. Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by: K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety

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9709300094 970922--- Enclosure PDR ADOCK 05000369 0 PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 369 and 370/9712 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise. This plume exposure exercise consisted of partial participation by the state of North Carolina and full participation by the Risk Counties. The exercise was an off-hours exercise conducted from 3:00 a.m. to 11:22 a.m. on August 5, 1997. This report summarized the observations of the four person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to the simulated accident scenario for the plume exposure exercise. The NRC evaluators concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Radiological Emergency Plan in response to a simulated accident. One exercise weakness was identified because the follow up notifications were not sufficient to keep offsite agencies aware of changing conditions.

Summarized observations from the key emergency response facilities follow:

Control Room Simulator (CRS)

The Operations Shift Manager declared the Alert and became the Emergency Coordinator (EC). He effectively implemented his emergency procedure until relieved by the EC in the Technical Support Center.

Technical Support Center (TSC)

Good command and control by the EC in the TSC assisted the implementation of effective accident mitigation by the TSC staff.

Operational Support Center (OSC)

The OSC was activated timely and provided in-plant teams as directed by the TS Emeroency Operations Facility The EOF Director was effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the emergency and providing information to the Federsl. State, and local authorities responding to the simulated radiological emergenc Media Center The Media Center operated effectively in managing the coordination of information to the news media personne .

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l Report Detajlt Summary of Exercise Events This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included partial participation by the State of

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North Carolina and full participation by the Risk Counties. This plume exposure exercise was evaluated by an NRC Inspection team and was conducted from 3:00 a.m. to 11:22 a.m. on August 5,1997. Player critiques were conducted by the licensee's emergency response participants in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following termination of the exercise. The NRC exit meeting was conducted on August 7,1997, following the licensee's presentation to management of exercise result VI. Plant Sucoort P Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)

P Exttci te Scenario Inspection Scope (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's plan, Q_b.attystions and Findinas The licensee submitted its Exercise Objectives and scenario to the NRC in a timely manner. A review of the package indicated that the scenario was challenging and progressed from an Alert, to a Site Area Emergency (SAE), and then to a General Emergency (GE). The scenario fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient Informauon to the State and local govemmental agencies for their participation in the exercis Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capabilit P4.2 Onsite Emeraency Oraanization Inspection Scope (82301)

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The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergenc ;

4 4 2 Observations and Findinag The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined. The Operations Shift Manager assumed the responsibilities of the EC, and other personnel assumed their respective pre-established responsibilities as they responded to this off hours exercis Conclusion The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilitie P4.3 Emergency Classification Systen Inspection Scope (82301)

l l The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee, Observation and Findinas The licensee properly used their implementing procedures to correctly identify the conditions with the emergency classifications. The Alert was declared at 3:12 based on an Anticipated Transient Without a Scram (ATWS). A Site Area Emergency was declared at 7:57 a.m. based on the steam generator heat sink not being available. The General Emergency was declared at 9:24 a.m. when the feed and bleed mode of cooling could no longer be maintaine Conclusion The licensee had a standard system for emergency classifications and used it effectively to classify the off-normal events promptly and correctl P Notification Methods and Procedures inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local govemmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with procedures, Observations and Findinas The initial emergency notification to the offsite governmental agencies were made in a timely manner. However, the inspector noted that notification messages 3 thru 6, which were follow-up notifications to the Alert classification, all indicated that the plant condition was stable, in actuality, the plant conditions continued to degrade during

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i this period of time as reflected in the emergency description portion of the notification message. By 7:57 a.m. they had degraded such that a SAE was declared. This failure to provide a correct prognosis of the plant conditions to the offsite govemmental agencies was identified as an exercise weakness. This was particularly significant during this off hours exercise as it would probably impact the response of the offsite govemmental agencies during the Alert condition, inspector Follow-up ltem 50 369,50 370/9712-01-Exercise Weakness for failure of the follow-up notifications after the Alert to keep offsite agencies aware of changing plant prognosis that could affec' the offsite respons Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial notifications following an emergency declaration in a timely manner. However, the follow up notifications following the Alert declaration did not properly identify the degrading plant condition This was identified as an exercise weakness.

P Emeraency Communications inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency response organization and from and between the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency informatio Observation and Findinos The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were effective for the prompt transmission of emergency information. Responsible personnel were kept informed of ongoing events and communicated effectively in performing accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite and offsite personnel, Conclusion Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency response.

P4.6 Public Education and Information Inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed how information conceming the simulated emergency was made available to the publi Observations and Findings Duke Power Company established it's Media Center ut the Duke Power Electric Center located at 522 Church Street, Charlotte, N.C. The Media Center was activated in a timely manner and effectively coordinated the release of public information, Conclusions The Media Center and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that provided for the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the public via the news media.

P Emeroency Facilities and Eauloment Inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency response, Observations and Findinas Control Room Simulator - An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the emergency response. The facility and equipment supported the crew as they responded to the simulated emergenc Technical Support Center - The TSC was promptly activated with assigned emergency response personnel. The facility layout provided for the necessary communication between the EC and his staff. The inspector noted electronic displays and computers were effectively used in the TS Operational Support Center - The OSC was activated in accordance with procedures -

and in a timely manner. Congestion and noise were minimized and habitability of the facility was verified on a periodic basis. The facility and equipment supported OSC mission accomplishment. Team formation and briefings were reasonably timel Emergency Operations Facility. The EOF was activated in a timely manner and provided the necessary focus for communicating with offsite agencies. The inspector noted the video-ceaference between the EOF and TSC provided for the effective transfer of information between the respective facility leader Conclusion The ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that provided for the emergency respons . .

P4.8 Protective Responses Inspection Scope (Q23.Q1)

The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and the protective action recommendations (PARS) provided by the licensee to the offsite agencie Observations and Findinas The EC implemented appropriate protective actions for onsite personnel as the emergency classification escalated to a SAE. The EOF Director reade the PARS to the State within 15 minutes of the GE declaration. The inspector observed good communication between the EOF Director and the representative in the EOF from the State of North Carolin Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required PARS for the protection of the public.

P4.9 Exercise Critious, Inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise ano portions of the controller / evaluator organization critique process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee managemen Observations and Findinas The licensee conducted effective player critiques following exercise termination. From the player comments and the controller / evaluator observations, the controller / evaluator staff determined the performance of the emergency organization responding to the simulated accident to be generally satisfactory. A summary of this performance and supporting observations were provided to licensee management on August 7,1997, just prior to the NRC Exit Meetin Conclusion The controller / evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing exercise performance. Substantive comments were provided by the evaluators to their managemen I

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LDanantment Meetinat X1 Exit Meeting Summary l

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The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 7,1997. The summary indicated satisfactory performance. No proprietary information is contained in this repor !

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED

.Ucensee B. Barron, Site Vice President A. Beaver, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness R. Beckham, Radiation Protection Scientist M. Cash, Manager, Compliance M. Geddie, Station Manager  ;

R. Hasty, Manager, Emergency Preparedness ,

C. Jennings, Public Affairs '

B. Kinney, Public Affairs T. Kuhr, Nuclear Emergency Planning Consultant B. Sherrill, Radiological Protection General Supervisor INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED .

IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED OPENED 50-369, 50-370/97 12-01: IFl Exercise Weakness Follow up Notifications following the Alert declaration did not keep offsite agencies aware of changing plant condition Attachment (11 pages):

Exercise Objectives, and Narrative Summary P w-s-we T- - y , g m-_m,v

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McGUIRE NUCL AR SITE 0 19,7 xx Ro cr ex RcI EXERCISE OBJECTIVES SINULATOR CONTROL ROOM Demonstrate ability of the Operations Shift Manager to recognize conditions, classify emergencies, and assume the initial responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator in a timely manne . Demonstrate ability of the Control Room staff to make timely determination of the cause of the incident, perform mitigating actions, keep onsite personnel informed of the emergency situation through periodic announcements prior to TSC and OSC activation, and a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Cente . Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after

,/^ declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio . Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or higher emergency classificatio . Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to notify the NRC no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classification . Demonstrate the assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the assembly locatio . Test primary off-site communications equipment to the State EDC and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste O

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. . Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and staff the (~T EOF after declaring an Alert or higher emergency

\l classification or after a decision by the Emergency Coordinator during an Unusual Even . Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the State and Countie . Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and supplie TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room Omergency Coordinator to the TSC Emergency Coordinato . Demonstrate the ability of the Site Emergency Coordinator to provide effective direction, command and

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control, to manage activities of classification, accident analysis, or mitigation and to perform periodic briefings for the TSC/OSC staff and personnel.

() Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classification.

' Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the State and Countie . Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, intercoms, and on-site radio system, Test primary off-site communications equipment to the State EOC and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste . Teet the adequacy and operabxlity of emergency equipment and supplie I'T 2 V

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, Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear O transfer of responsibilities from the TSC Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Directo . Demonstrate the ability to transmit data in accordance with station procedures, and to distribute this data according to 2mergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP).

1 Demonstrate the ability to provide data to the TSC and OSC in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to notify the NRC no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declarin, one of the emergency classification . Demonstrate adequate communications between the off-site monitoring teamn and the TSC/ EO . Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections-in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur . Demont rate the ability to determine on-site radiation ( levels and airborne radioiodine concentration . Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategie OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur . Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airborne radiciodine concentration . Test _the adequacy and_ operability of emergency equipment and supplie . Demonstrate the ability to assess the~ incident and provide mitigation strategie (:)1

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' EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

O Demonstrate the ability of the EOF Director to provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activities of classification, accident analysis, or mitigation and to perform periodic briefings for the EOF staff and personne . Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency operations Facility staff to notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio . Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the State and Countie . Test prime'.y off-site communications equipment to the State ECv and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste . Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and supplie O Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Directo __ Demonstrate adequate communications between the off-site monitoring-teams and the TSC/ EO . Denonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability to collect soil, water and vegetation samples in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability to asaess the incident and provide mitigation strategie (:) 4

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!, i Demonstrate the ability to control the scenario and provide accurate data for player us j P PUBLIC INFORMATION (NEWS GROUP)

Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate information  !

to the news media,in a timely manner and to provide- -

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ef fective rumor control accornny to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure r Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with state and county public information officers prior to

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ucouire wuclear site siennial muercise scenario August 5, 1997 Partial Participation amorcise Narrative sumanary This exercise will be a full station drill with the simulator control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support -

Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staffed with players, controllers and evaluators. The Media center and the Joint Information Center (JIC) will be staffed because the State of North Caroline and Counties of Gaston, Mecklenburg, Lincoln, cabarrus, Catawba and Iredell are playing in this exercis Time Event 0300 The plant is operating at full powe The operating train is *lA", and the 'lA* Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is out of servic All three Hotwell Pumps fail due to mechanical / electrical faults, causing the turbine generator to trip and the reactor fails to trip as expected. Control Rods are manually inserted from the control Room and a local manual reactor trip from outside the Control Room is effecte This event should result in the declaration of an bLERT Emergency Action Level (EAL).

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Off-site authorities are notifie Alert and notification-of responders is implemented. - Minimum s'taffing of state and county emergency operations centers (EOCs) begin The 'lB* Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is lost due to an

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electrical fault / blackout on *lETB". Tho #1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump remains as the only available source of feedwater to the Steam Generator The #1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump trips and depletion of secondary side inventory on all Steam Generators commence _ ._ $

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( 0745 Severely depleted secondary side inventory on all Steam N-- Generators necessitates feed and bleed cooling of the reactor core. This event should result in the declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY Cmcrgency Action Level (EAL).

Notification of off-site authorities. State and county EOCs are fully staffed. Coordination of public notification should take place, with notification occurring via sirens, public address systems and the Emergency Action System (EAS). Activity at this time should also include the establishment of relocation centers, traffic control and personnel / vehicle monitoring /docontamination station UQIE: There will be an actual activation of the cirens and the EAS at Site Area Emergenc An off-site release of noble gases begins due to a previously unidentified open containment penetration to the Reactor Building Annulus. The *lA* Annulus Ventilation Fan provides an atmospheric release by way of the Unit Vent Stac As a result of the earlier blackout on *1ETB",

radiation monitors (EMPs) 35, 36 and 37 (Unit Vent Stack Rad Monitors) may be out of service due to loss of power to their process sample blowe This would constitute an unmonitored releas (D j

! The release of noble gases to the atmosphere is from the

\d reactor coolant system to the Unit Vent Stack, via feed and bleed cooling of the reactor core through the open containment penetration to the Annulus ventilation Syste The "lA* Charging Pump (high head injection) trips and reactor core feed and bleed cooling cannot be maintained, resulting in loss of decay heat removal capacit *

Malfunctioning Pressurizer PORVs (power-operated relief valves) limit reactor coolant system depressurization capability. This event should result in the declaration of a GENERAL EMERGEt[QX Emergency Action Level (EAL).

Rectmmendations concerning protective actions should be made to off-site authorities. They, in turn, will coordinate public notification among themselves, with actual notifications occurring via sirens and the Emergency Action System (EAS).

NOT8: There will not be an activation of the sirens, or of EAS unless there was a problem with these activities at the earlier activatio Termination of the exercis (~

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C} CONFIDENTIAL (until after Moo 0I CLEAR SITE BIENN1 L EXERCISE exercise is AUGUST 1, 1997 conducted)

0300 Simulator run start H",'P 1B flow is lost due to a sheared coupling. HWP 1C auco starts and immediately trips due to a ground fault in its motor lead connection box. HWP 1A trips due to a phase-to-phase fault in the motor winding. All CDPs trip due to low-low suction pressure, which causes the CFPTs to trip. The turbine gene,rator trips but automatic reactor trip fails. Manual reactor trip also fails but control rods can be inserted by thu operator (ATWS event) and a local manual reactor trip is effective. Following initiation of emergency boration, e blackout occurs on 1ETB due to a fault in 1B KF pump motor with subsequent failure of its breaker to tri EXPECTED RESPONSE

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-Go to EP/1/A/5000/E-0 * Reactor Trip or Safety T Injection"

-Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 " Critical Safety Function Status Trees"

-Go to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 ' Response to Nuclear Generation /ATWS"

-Refer to RP/0/A/5700/000 * Classification of Emergency" and declare ALERT, event #4.1.5(2), ATWS-Implement RP/0/A/5700/002 " Alert'

-Implement RP/0/A/5700/011 ' Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation or Containment Evacuation"

-Go to EP/1/A/5000/E-0 " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"

-Refer to AP/1/A/5500/07 " Loss of Electrical Power"

-Go to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 ' Reactor Trip Response"

-Go to OP/1/A/6100/02 * Controlling Procedure for Unit shutdown" THIS IS AN EXERCIS THESE EVENTS HAVE NOT TAKEN PtAC C EVENTS ARE BEING SIMULATED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONL THESE

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DRILL McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE BIENNIAL EXERCISE AUGUST 5, 1997 0400 #1 TDCA pump stop valve trips due to a linkage proble EXPECTED RESPONSE-When all S/G NR levels are less than 11%, go to EP/1/A/5000/FR-il.1 " Response to Loss of Secondary llent Sink" 0500 #1 TDCA pump stop valve linkage repaire EXPECTED RESPONSE-Feed S/Gs at greater than 450 gp #1 TDCA pump trips due to a broken oil lin Repairs will take at least 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> EXPECTED RESPONSE-When all S/G NR levels are less than 11%, go to

\ EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 " Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink *

0745 When three S/Gs are less than 12% WR level, initiate feed and bleed. Containment penetration M-346 which had been previously misaligned open fails to isolate upon SI initiation when IVE-5A mechanically binds ope IVE-6B fails to close due to 1ETB blackout and IVE-9 is failed ope EXPECTED RESPONSE-Refer to RP/0/A/5700/000 * Classification of Emergency *

and declare SITE AREA EMERGENCY, event #4.1. 5 (1)

1. 2-Implement RP/0/A/5700/003 * Site Area Emergency *

-Implement RP/0/A/5700/011 * Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation or Containment Evacuation * and simulate evacuation of non-essential personne Control Room team identifies that Containment penetration M-346 is failed ope THIS IS AN EXERCIS THESE EVENTS HAVE NOT TAKEN PLAC THESE

'& EVENTS ARE BEING SIMULATED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONL ____

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• i DRILL McOUIRE NUCLEAR SITE BIENNIAL EXERCISE AUGUST 5, 1997

=0800 Phase B isolation due to high-high containment pressure. lA VE train starts and commences release of noble gases to the environment via the unit ven EXPECTED RESULTS-Field monitcring teams will eventually detect release plume and report off-site reading =0910 FWST level decreases to less than 150 inche EXPECTED RESULTS-Go to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 ' Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc"

=0915 1A NV pump trips after 1ND-58A is opene EXPECTED RESULTS ( -Refer to RP/0/A/5700/000 * Classification of Emergency" ( and declare GENERAL EMERGENCY, event #4.1.5(1), or other Go to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 ' Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc*

=0930 1A CA pump restored to service, lA NV pump restored to servic EXPECTED RESULTS-Commerce feedir one S/G with C Reestablish f%ed portion of ' feed and bleed cooling *,

-Complete transfer to cold leg recirc and start to recover control of core exit temperatur =1030 Possible recovery of plant parameters to such extent that the following procedural flowpath may be utilized long ter O THIS IS AN EXERCIS THESE EVENTS HAVE NOT TAKEN PLAC THESE

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o a DRILL McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE BIEBBtIAL EXERCISE AUGUST 5, 1997 EXPECTED RESULTS-Go to EP/1/A/5000/E-1 ' Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant"

-Go to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 ' Safety Injection

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Tennination"

-Go to OP/1/A/6100/02 * Controlling Procedure for Unit shutdown *

1100 Termination of Exercise O

THIS IS AN EXERCIS THESE EVENTS HAVE NOT TAKEN PIAC THESE C EVENTS ARE BEING SIMULATED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONL _ _ _ . _