IR 05000369/1987028

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Insp Repts 50-369/87-28 & 50-370/87-28 on 870909-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML20235V812
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1987
From: Cunningham A, Decker T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235V744 List:
References
50-369-87-28, 50-370-87-28, NUDOCS 8710150326
Download: ML20235V812 (12)


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, ; UNI?ED STATES

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- o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 18 j,

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101 MARIETTA STREET;N.W.

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ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323

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OCT 0i 1987

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' Report Nos.:..50-369/87-28, 50-370/87-28-

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Licensee:. Duke Power Company

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_ -422: South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242

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Facility Name
'McGuire.

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Docket.Nos.:' 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.:

NPF-9 and NPF-17.-

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Inspection Conducted:. September 9-13, 1987 Inspector:~

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/0 '- [~ S 7 A. L Cunningham Date-Signed

Accompanying Personnel

B. B. Desai D.'Perrotti K. Vandoorn'

.i M.LLesser

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G. Bryant Approved by:

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T. R. Decker, Section Chief

.Date Signed

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Division'of Radiation Safety and Safeguards j

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SUMMARY

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Scope:. Routine, announced evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.

NRC Region II responded to the exercise with a partial site team.

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Resultsi No ' violations or deviations were identified.

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I l-8710150326 871007 gDR ADOCK 05000369 PDR I

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REPORT DETAILS.

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Persons Contacted.

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n, Licensee EmployeesJ

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  • M. McIntoshi General Manager Nuclear Support j
  • R. -Harris, System Emergency Planner
  • B.LMcRee,. Staff; Emergency.P1anner

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  • R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner

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  • G. Dalbreath, Office Assistant
  • R. Gill, Licensing Engineer

Other licensee ' employees contacted included. engineers, ' technicians, operators : mechanics, security office members and office personnel.

  • Attended exit interview 2.

ExitInterview(30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 16, 1987, via'a telephone conference call with those members of your staff indicated j

in Paragraph 1 above and Messrs. W. M. Sartor and A. L. Cunningham of this j

office.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee regarding

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the' exercise findings.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any f

of the materials' provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the

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inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement matters -(92700)

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.

Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major

portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and j

local emergency and organizations as required. by I

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) plans

,10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.F and specific

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criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and i

was discusse:1 with licensee representatives.

As would be expected in an I

exercise of this scope, several minor scenario inconsistencies became l

apparent during the exercise.

However, these inconsistencies did not

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detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency I

organization.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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5.

Drill Scenarios (82301)

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..The scenarios' for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed 'to

assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)'14), Paragraph IV.F of. Appendix E to -10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in e

Section II.N-of NUREG-0654.

j The licensee conducted' limited ' drills on September 10, 1987, to include a

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medical emergency, fire emergency, and operation of the Post-accident Liquid Sampling System, and the Post-accident Containment Air Sampling System.

a.

The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was adequate to exercise the participating. licensee organization and offsite local emergency agencies.

The licensee noted in their critique that the North Mecklenburg Rescue Squad did not respond although requested to

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do so.

It was also ncted by both licensee and NRC observers that

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I poor contamination contre' and poor HP frisking practices would have resulted in the Stokes

.,ket being unnecessarily contaminated as well as the HP-210 probe being contaminated.

This failure to i

maintain good contamination control and HP frisking practices during i

the medical emergency' drill was identified as an inspector followup item (50-369/87-28-01,50-370/87-28-01).

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b.

The scenario for the fire emergency was developed to evaluate the capability of both the McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Brigade and the Gilead and Cornelius Volunteer Fire Departments.

The licensee noted in their critique that the artificiality of the simulated fire

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resulted in a delayed request for offsite fire support, however, the

response was very timely when requested.

c.

The licensee's ability to obtain samples using the Post-accident Liquid Sampling System and the Post-accident Containment Atmosphere Sampling System was observed pursuant to specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

An inspector observed that the i

collection of post-accident air and liquid samples was adequate and

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consistent with licensee procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and

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that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required I

by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A, and specific (

criteria in NUREG-0654, Sections II. A and II.B.

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i The inspector verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.

The inspector observed the activation and

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w staffing: of. the. emergency organization in the Control Room l (.CR), the

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- Technical Support Center- (TSC), the Operations Support. Center-(0SC), and'

the Crisis Management Center (CMC).

The licensee also staffed its Crisis

' News ' Group in~ the Charlotte Supply _ Building and its Crisis News Center in-the.0. J. Miller Auditorium... Inspectors observed the operation of the CR,

.TSC, OSC,.and CMC!throughout most of the exercise, along with periodic l

observations of:the Crisis News Center. - An inspector also observed the

. activities-of the offsite radiological monitoring teams.

The licensee's.

assignment ' of ' responsibilities appeared.to-be consistent with the -

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Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures as : observed.during this-exercise.

No violations or deviations were' identified.

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Emergency Response Support and Resources'(82301)

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This drea was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively.using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements'to

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ac.comodate State and ' local -staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency l

Operations Facility had been made, and that other organizations capable of-i augmenting the planned' response had been identified as required by.

j 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10'CFR 50, Appendix = E, Paragraph IV. A, and. specific criteria in NUREG-0654,'Section II.C.

State of North. Carolina personnel were accommodated at the. Crisis Management Center.

Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt q

and assistance' resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in

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the simulated emergency.

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t No violations or deviations were identified.

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Emergency. Classification System (82301)

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This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, l

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Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.

An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the Implementing Procedures.

The system am <ared to be adequate for the

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classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures

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provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the i

simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established l

for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations

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and'eme'rgency personnel, and the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been establf shed; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.

An inspector observed that ' notification methods and procedures had been

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established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency

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conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.

The licensee identified deficiencies in this-area during their critique which

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an outdated implementing procedure RP/5700/04 for General Emergency was initially being used in the TSC but was corrected prior to the declaration of a General Emergency; the Crisis Management Plan was not available in the TSC; and the TSC did not provide followup messages to the counties following the TSC's activation.

During the telephone exit meeting on September 16, 1987, it was noted to the licensee's staff that these licensee identified deficiencies were considered to be the most significant negative findings of the exercise.

The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway. was in place and operational.

The system was activated-during this exercise to simulate warning the public of

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significant events occurring at the reactor site.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Emergency Communications (82301)

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This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt

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communications among the principal response organization. and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.57(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.

Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and i

emergency organization, and between the licensee's emergency response

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organization and offsite authorities appeared to be adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11.

Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Appendix E. Paragraph IV.D, and I

specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.

Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.

The information included details on how the public would be i

notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.

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f rumor controi proranwas in place.. An Emergency News Center (ENC) was i

., established anc was.well equipped and coordinated.

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No. violations' or deviatiors were. identified.

~12.-AccidentAssessment'(82301)

This ' area was. observed to determine that adequate methods, ' systems, and.

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equipment for ' essessing and monitoring actual or potential 'offsite

[ "c consequences vof a radiological emergency conditions were in use as required 1by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), '10 CFR 50, Paragraph IV.B, and. specific.

criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.

The accident' assessment program included an engineering assessment of.

. plant status anc an. assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnei resulting from the' accident.

During the exercise, the

' engineering accident assessment team functioned effectivelycin analyzing

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t the. plant status so as ' to make recommendations to the Site Emergency Coordinator ~ concerningl mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive' materials and to terminate the emergency condition.-

No violations or ceviations were identified..

13.

Protective. Responses (82301)

This area was observed to determine that-guidelines for protective actions during the~ emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place,. anc protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonesser,tial implemented promptly as required : by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(personnel,. were 10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.

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A personnel accountability drill was held as part of the exercise.

e Initial accountability was accomplished in a timely manner.

An inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14.

Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, were established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.

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An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters.

Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of' emergency actions and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriate.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

15.

Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This area was observed to determine that general plans were made for recovery and reentry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.M.

The inspector noted that the licensee established a recovery organization.

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It was here that the licensee noted that the TSC was unable to properly l

coordinate with the CMC during the recovery phase because of not having a i

copy of the Crisis Management Plan in the TSC (reference Paragraph 9).

No violations or deviations were identified.

16.

Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of 1W exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were

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formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as I

required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, j

and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

The licensee conducted a formal critique on September 13, 1987, with

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exercise controllers, key exercise participants, and licensee management l

attending.

The licensee again provided their finding on September 16, 1987, to the NRC during the exit interview.

During the exit interview the NRC representatives noted to the licensee that they had done an excellent i

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job in self-identifying many areas where improvement is needed.

The need for corrective action was specifically addressed to the licensee findings noted in Paragraph 9.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

17.

Inspection Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-369/86-27-01:

Restore to operational

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l status and assure continued operation of all sirens in Mecklenburg County.

l Approximately 95% of the sirens actuated properly during the exercise.

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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES'

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Scope The 1987.McGuire.' exercise is' designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, - Section. IV.F.

The:

1987 exercis'e will involve full participation byu Catawba,

s Gaston,: Iredell, Lincoln,~and Mecklenburg Counties.and full.

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participation ? by ' the State of North ' Carolina.

The Duke Power. Crisis. Management. Center.will participate.

Several.limitedidrills will be held on September, 10,.1987.

A separate medical. drill ;will be-held 'to ' involve transportation of a contaminated, ' injured - patient to the

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hospital.

'A separate fire-. drill will.~ involve ' support by.

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the. off-site

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Operation L of:

the Post-Accident Liquid Sampling '. System and-the Post-Accident'

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Containment' Air Sampling System will be, performed..

l 7 formal critique involving Duke Power,,NRC,'and interested

" servers.'(FEMA,. State and' Counties)

will-be' held 'on

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September 13, 1987 at 1:00 ' P.M.

This critique will be closed. to' thei public and.willJbe ' held -in the. O.J. 'Millerl Auditorium 'in the Duke Power Electric Center Building, 500 ?

South. Church'Strset'in Charlotte, N.C.

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Exercise Objectives-(Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)

Emer'ency' Management 1..

g a.

Demonstrate the ability to declare.

emergency classification in-accordance with station procedures.

b.

-Demonstrate the ability to-notify the State and the counties within

minutes after-declaring an emergency.

c.

Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC.and OSC facilities after declaring an' Alert or higher emergency class.

d.

Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC immediately after notification of the State and counties and not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classes.

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e.

Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a

simulated emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the assembly locations.

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Demonstrate notification to all on-site personnel of major changes in the emergency situation (emergency

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class, TSC or OSC activation, etc.).

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. Demonstrate access control. measures to.the' plant site, a

' CMC, the Charlotte Supply Building (Crisis News Group)

j and ~ the 0.J. Miller Auditorium (Crisis News Center).*,

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' Test ' communications. equipment among on-si.te emergency-

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facilities including plant extensions and. intercoms.

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Test off-site communications equipment to county land L state warning. points,. county and state emergency operations centers and to NRC including the. Selective-Signaling System,, two-way radios, outside-telephone -

. lines, and the NRC Emergency Notification System.

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Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment / supplies.

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Demonstrate precise and

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-responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the

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i Control' Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC

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and from' the Emergency Coordinator. in the TSC ' to' the Recovery Manager.

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Demonstrate proper use of the. message format 'and

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authentication methodology for messages transmitted to:

states and counties.

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Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate-information to the news media - in a timely manner and to provide effective' rumor control according to ' the.

Crisis Management Implementing-Plans.

n.

Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, 'and staff-the CMC after declaring a Site Area ' Emergency. or higher emergency class (or after a decision by the Recovery Manager during an Alert).

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-Demonstrate the ability to enter into recovery,

establish a recovery organization, and notify members

of emergency response organizations (i' e. CMC,. T SC,

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control room, states, counties, and NRC) in accordance

with the Crisis Management Implementing Plans.

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' Accident Assessment a.

Demonstrate-the ability to transmit data using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal System in accordance.3 tith station procedures and to distribute this data throughout the CMC according to the Crisis i

Management Implementing Plans.

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. Evaluate the > adequacy of: the following; assessment

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. Data ' Display? Boards-f U-

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Maps;

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Test the: ability to provide.' adequate Lon-site and-

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. of f-site-radiological monitoring and personnel ~ dose.

record control par station procedures.

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Demonstrate: adequate ~ radio; communications with the off-site monitoring, teams; e.

Demonstrate.the ability'totdevelop off-site dose

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projections in accordance with station procedures.

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. Demonstrate the" abilityf to1 collect soil, water, and f

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vegetation, samples in accordance-with station

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Demonstrate the. ability:to locate a simulated, radioactive. plume and to measure the off-site

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radiation levels.

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Denkmatrate the ability _ to obtain samples using the fPost-Accident'

Liquid.

Sampling.

System..

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the Dost-Accident' Containment Atmosphere Sampling-System.

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ProtectiveiAction Recommendations a.

-Demonstrate-the ability :to prov'ide - ' timely and appropriate protective _

action'

recommendations-to off-site officials. in accordance.

with station.

proceduras or the Crisis Management Plan.

4.

Plant Operations a;'

Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and

provido mitigation strategies-in accordance with station procedures.

5.

Medical Drill Ja.

Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical

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emergency involving a contaminated patient in accordance'with station procedures.

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Fire Drill'

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Demonstrate response in accordance with station procedures by t;he on-site fire brigade to a simulated

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Demonstrate the ability to request and obtain

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fire-fighting support from the off-site department.

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CONFIDENTIAL j

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McGuire Exercise Event Sequence

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1-September 11-12, 1987 Actual Scenario

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Time Time Event TF7ri)

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1155 1155 Both units at 100%' power.

Safety

injection. (NI) pump 2B is out of service for repairs.

VQ is in operation on Unit

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2.

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v 1200 1200 Earthquake data from seismic monitoring equipment indicates e seismic event i

greater than OBE but lebe than SSE.

Operators, by procedures RP/0/A/5700/07 and OP/1/A/6100/10N, should trip the reactor.

System transient knocks seal out on main feedwater (CF) causing seal failure on CF pump 2A.

ALERT SHOULD BE DECLARED.

1330 1330 RN leak from 2 RN B train expansion joint begins in auxilliary feedwater (CA) pump room'from damage due to an'

aftershock.

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1345 1345 Groundwater sump level alarm.

p/I400 1400 Flooding of CA pump room to 54 inches

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causes loss of PORV's, and CA, NV, KC and ND pumps.. SITE AREA EMERGENCY SHOULD BE DECLARED.

Operators should use CF for secondcry side cooling.

NC pump seals cooled by SSF.

1415 1415 RN leak isolated with valve 2 RN ISB, O RN 10A or 0 RN 11B.

Flood level in CA pump room at 60 inches.

1700 1700 Stop exercise.

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(9/12)

(9/11)

0730 1700 Resumo exercise.

- 0745 1715 Crack propagation in hotwell pump-i suction piping due to aftershock

resulting in hotwell Jow level and loss of CF.

GENERAL EMERGENCY SHOULD BE

DECLARED.

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0930 1900 Steam generators boil dry and primary system pressure begins to increase.

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McGuire Exercise? Event'Sequende

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. September-11-12,'1987

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L1000:

1930-

. Quench tank ruoture disk blows..VQ

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fails to isolate on containment isolation signal. -Containment'sp/ay'is.

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initiated.

1030 2000-

. Core uncovers.

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"1130 2100 Core degradation begins.

1215-2145 Regain operability of PORV's, KC pumps and ND' pumps 2A,and 2B.

Feed and bleed

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cooling begins and. stops core degradation..Off-site release begins through VQ.

1245 2215 i

VO isolation valve is closed '(method to -

be determined).

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1330 2300 Recovery phase begins.

~1430 2400 Exercise ends.

Rev. 4 / - 0 5-21-8 7 i

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