ML20247M580
| ML20247M580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247M576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-10, 50-370-89-10, NUDOCS 8906050075 | |
| Download: ML20247M580 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1989010
Text
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-2' . ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 - . A***b / MAY 151989 - 3 Report Nos'.: 50-369/89-10 and 50-370/89-10 -. Licensee: Duke Power Company. 422 South ~ Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket'Nos.:- 50-369 and.50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted pril 4- 1989 Inspector: f?/YCA- 2 / P / F A?P ' A. L. Cunningham Date Signed . 5- /5 - 21 Approved by: w W. H. Rankin, Chief Date Signed ' Emergency Preparedness Section l Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope This special, unannounced inspection was conducted to review and assess emergency preparedness requirements and practices implemented' during - the licensee ls response to facility Unit 1 Steam Generator-B-tube rupture incident of March 7, 1989. The following areas were' reviewed: accident' detection and assessment; emergency classification and declaration; notification of offsite support groups; shift staff augmentation; Control Room and applicable emergency -response facility (ERF) event logs; training status of participating emergency response organization (ER0) personnel; and news releases disseminated during the casualty.. Inspection also included review of outstanding emergency preparedness open items unrelated to the casualty. ' Results No ' violations or deviations were identified. Inspection disclosed that emergency requirements and practices implemented during the casualty were consistent wfth W McGuire Station Radiological Emergency Plan and respective Inspection also disclosed the following) items that were being procedures. evaluated for corrective action by the licensee: (1 emergency action level , (EAL) addressing identification and quantification of reactor coolant system ' (RCS) leakage regarding classification and declaration of Site Area Emergency (Paragraph 2); (2) documentation of offsite radiological release data on offsite notification forms, including recommended protective action responses 0 89060500{5[500 69 PDR ADO K PNV ^ G - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . -
_ _ - . - _ _ _ _ _ . . . . thereto (Paragraph 3); (3)-availability of additional trained ERF communicators . (Paragraph 3); and (4) NRC review of press releases during plant emergencies ~(Paragraph 6). - - - _ -_____ _-__________-_ .
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, ' W F ~ REPORT DETAILS ' ' 1 '. PersonsLContacted Licensee Employees M. - Cartwright, General Manager, Media and Community Relations - . D. Franks, Quality Assurance Verification Manager
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- G. Gilbert, Technical Services Superintendent
'*B. Hasty, Production Specialist II', Emergency Preparedness
- C. Leonard,' Station Emergency Planner
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- T. McConnell, Station Manager
- R.fSharpe, Compliance. Manager
- A. Sipe, McGuire1 Safety Review Board Chairman
- B. Travis,' Operations Superintendent
' 0ther Organizations LJ. Baker, M.D., Chairman, Department of Emergency Medicine (Charlotte - Memorial Hospital) ' W. Root, Radiation Safety Officer (Charlotte Memorial Hospital) NRC. Resident Inspector
- K. VanDoorn
- Attended exit interview
2. EmergencyDetectionandClassification(92701) Consistent with the facility Emergency Plan and respective Emergency Plan Implementating Procedures (EPIPs), the licensee declared an Alert following prompt detection and classification of primary coolant leakage . greater than 50 gallons per minute (gpm). Accordingly, the . initial primary-to-secondary leak rate was determined to be 150 gpm. It was later determined, however, that transient monitor data indicated that the leak rate was 540 gpm. Consistent with the inspector's review of the Shift , and the casualty logs maintained in the Technical Supervisor's log (TSC) and Crisis Management Center (CMC), the licensee Support Center considered upgrading the emergency classification to Site Area Emergency based on the EAL defined in Enclosure 4.1 to procedure RP/0/A/5700/00 addressing "RCS leakage greater than make-up pump capacity." It was further noted that the licensee considered the subject EAL procedure unclear, since the actual unit make-up capacity is based upon the cumulative volume of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The licensee discussed this item with the NRC during the course of the casualty. It was determined that the Alert classification would be maintained as declared. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
_ - _ - - -_ --- - ___ - ____ - ____ _ _ _ a. . . . 2 - The licensee. included the 'above EAL concern as a casualty action. item requiring detailed review and' resolution. _ This item will be tracked as an . Inspector' Follow-up Item (IFI). The inspector discussed this. item with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during_the exit interview'. The licensee committed to review the EAL in conjunction with their current' EAL procedures review, and implement the appropriate revisions. IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-01: Clarify and quantify Site Area _ Emergency EAL' addressing reactor coolant system leakage makeup. No violations or deviations were identified. 3. Notification and Communication (92701) Inspection included a detailed review and evaluation of the initial offsite notification, periodic follow-up notifications, and respective hard copies of same issued during the casualty. Inspection confirmed that the initial notification of the State, counties, and local offsite support agencies regarding declaration of the Alert was implemented within the 15-minute time ' regime. The NRC was notified within one hour of the declaration. Inspection also disclosed that the notification form documented the radiological release accompanying the steam generator tube rupture although the radiation level was determined to be well within Technical Specification release limits. The inspector was informed by licensee representatives that releases were discussed with offiste support agencies during offsite periodic telephonic follow-up notifications. Review and audit of the respective follow-up- noti tication forms disseminated to these agencies disclosed that no release data was documented subsequent to the initial Alert notification. The' inspector was informed that the subject data was not included on the edification form (Enclosure 4.3 to procedure RP/0/5700/01 " Emergency Notification") since the releases were considerably lower than the Technical Specification limit, and involved no danger to the public or plant employees. Licensee representatives added, however, that the term " radiological release," as it relates to emergency conditions, required definition. The licensee included this item as an action item based upon their detailed critique of the casualt,, and committed to determine if low level radiological releases which require no protective action recommendation (PAR) should be entered on offsite emergency notification forms. This item will be tracked as an IFI. IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-02: Determine the level of offsite radiological releases reportable on initial and follow-up notifications during plant emergency events. During review and discussion of offsite notifications, the availability of dedicated State / county communicators required to irplement notifications during prolonged plant emergency events was also included. The licensee noted that there was an insufficient number of trained State / county communicators in the TSC. It was also noted, however, that cognizant personnel were available to supplement required State / county - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-__-__ __-_. . .+ . , ' 3 communicators. This item was listed by the licensee. as a casualty action i tem.' This item will be tracked as an IFI. IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-03: Provide and train additional ERF communicators to ensure availability of same during-prolonged plant emergencies. No violations or deviations were identified. 4. Shift Staffing and Augmentation (92701) The inspector conducted a detailed review of records of shift staffing in . response to the casualty to determine if the required staffing .was adequate in number and functional capability. Additionally, inspection included a review to determine that administrative and physical means were in place and maintained to ensure. augmentation of the ERO in a timely manner,- and/or as needed throughout the duration of the casualty. Inspection confirmed that shift staffing and augmentation requirements were routinely implemented throughout the casualty consistent with the Emergency Plan, respective procedures, and Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737. Inspection also included detailed discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, and review of casualty records and logs documenting augmentation times for the TSC following declaration of the Alert. Notwiths.tanding existing weather and accompanying hazardous (icy) road conditions, required shift staffing augmentation was. readily implemented within or near the assigned time regime. No violations or deviations were identified. 5. Tr'aining (92701) Inspection included a detailed review of the training status of emergency organization personnel who participated in the response to the casualty. A listing of the subject personnel was obtained and their respective training histories were audited. Inspection disclosed that emergency , training for each participant was complete, annually updated, and consistent with the plant Emergency Plan and respective procedures. No violations or deviations were identified. 6. Public Information (92701) Inspection was conducted to determine that information was made available to the public which described the emergency planning and protective actions developed in response to the casualty. News releases were issued, periodically updated, and coordinated with cognizant offsite officials. Inspection disclosed that the media was promptly informed following declaration of the Alert, and periodically updated regarding plant status ! throughout the duration of the casualty. j i ! 4
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A - , .. l - 4: , , I ' Inspection disclosed concern regarding the NRC's access to and review ofi news _ releases: prior to their dissemination to the media. .This' concern addressed the'need for NRC and the. licensee to be continuously and fully. q cognizant of ' the casualty status . to: preclude promulgating . conflicting { information when independently communicating with the. public. . During the 1 Alert emergency classification, the: NRC does not dispatch a' site team; therefore, designated NRC site representatives are not available to' review
press releases prior to issuance. The licensee . included this item -as casualty action items requiring definition and clarification of the NRC's role in reviewing news releases prior to NRC's . site team deployment and i ' staffing of the TSC and CMC. This item will be tracked as an IFI. IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-04: Define the process of coordinating news - releases with the NRC prior to deployment of the NRC site team to the TSC and CMC.. j No violations or deviations were identified. 7.. Status of Previous Emergency Preparedness Findings (92701) - a. (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-369,370/88-27-01: Failure to identify j an EAL and escalate the casualty to an Alert Classification 1 ' Inspection of training records and review of ' applicable lesson plans confirmedJ that adequate corrective actions were ' implemented as required. .; b. (Closed) Violation 50-369, 370/88-34-02: Failure to take. prompt corrective action to repair' Alert and notification system sirens. Guidelines were established and in effect to ensure required testing, preventive maintenance, and prompt repair of sirens within seven working days. , i c. (Closed)-IFI 50-369, 370/88-34-03: Conduct an augmentation drill to i verify and document Figure B-1 (Emergency Plan) staffing requirements ! and arrival times. Detailed review and inspection of shift staffing ' augmentation attending the steam generator tube rupture casualty confirmed the licensee's capability to promptly implement shift staff augmentation' in response to an actual plant emergency (Paragraph 4, above). ! 8. Exit Interview ) The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 7,1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results contained in this i report. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any materials provided to or ! l ) _ _-_- -_ _-- - --_- _
- -____-_ - . , , ... ~ 5 reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Item Number Description / Reference 50-369, 370/89-10-01 IFI: Clarify and quantify the Site Area Emergency EAL defining reactor coolant system leakage make-up (Paragraph 2), 50-369, 370/89-10-02 IFI: Determine the level of offsite radiological releases reportable on initial and follow-up notification forms during plant emergencies (Paragraph 3). 50-369, 370/89-10-03 IFI: Provide and train additional ERF communicators to ensure availability of same during prclonged plant emergencies (Paragraph 3). 50-369, 370/89-10-04 IFI: Define the process of coordinating news releases with the NRC prior to deployment of NRC site team to the TSC and CMC (Paragraph 6). - - _____-____ ___ _____ ._
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