ML20247M580
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| ML20247M580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247M576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-10, 50-370-89-10, NUDOCS 8906050075 | |
| Download: ML20247M580 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1989010
Text
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UNITED STATES :I
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
* 3 p. 1 REGION 11 '
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j. 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
-2' . ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 -
. A***b / MAY 151989 - 3
Report Nos'.: 50-369/89-10 and 50-370/89-10
-. Licensee: Duke Power Company.
422 South ~ Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket'Nos.:- 50-369 and.50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17
Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted pril 4- 1989
Inspector: f?/YCA-
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2 / P / F A?P
A. L. Cunningham
.
Date Signed
Approved by:
W. H. Rankin, Chief
w 5- /5 - 21
Date Signed
' Emergency Preparedness Section
l Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection
Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope
This special, unannounced inspection was conducted to review and assess
emergency preparedness requirements and practices implemented' during - the
licensee ls response to facility Unit 1 Steam Generator-B-tube rupture incident
of March 7, 1989. The following areas were' reviewed: accident' detection and
assessment; emergency classification and declaration; notification of offsite
support groups; shift staff augmentation; Control Room and applicable emergency
-response facility (ERF) event logs; training status of participating emergency
response organization (ER0) personnel; and news releases disseminated during
the casualty.. Inspection also included review of outstanding emergency
preparedness open items unrelated to the casualty.
'
Results
No ' violations or deviations were identified. Inspection disclosed that
emergency requirements and practices implemented during the casualty were
consistent wfth W McGuire Station Radiological Emergency Plan and respective
procedures.
,
evaluated for Inspection corrective also action disclosed the following)
by the licensee: items that were
(1 emergency being
action level
'
(EAL) addressing identification and quantification of reactor coolant system
(RCS) leakage regarding classification and declaration of Site Area Emergency
(Paragraph 2); (2) documentation of offsite radiological release data on
offsite notification forms, including recommended protective action responses
0
89060500{5[500 69
PDR ADO K PNV ^
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thereto (Paragraph 3); (3)-availability of additional trained ERF communicators
.
(Paragraph 3); and (4) NRC review of press releases during plant emergencies
~(Paragraph 6).
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W
F ~ REPORT DETAILS
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' 1 '. PersonsLContacted
Licensee Employees
M. - Cartwright, General Manager, Media and Community Relations -
. *D. Franks, Quality Assurance Verification Manager
.
.
*G. Gilbert, Technical Services Superintendent
'*B. Hasty, Production Specialist II', Emergency Preparedness
,
*C. Leonard,' Station Emergency Planner
e *T. McConnell, Station Manager
*R.fSharpe, Compliance. Manager
*A. Sipe, McGuire1 Safety Review Board Chairman
'
*B. Travis,' Operations Superintendent
0ther Organizations
LJ. Baker, M.D., Chairman, Department of Emergency Medicine (Charlotte
- Memorial Hospital)
' W. Root, Radiation Safety Officer (Charlotte Memorial Hospital)
NRC. Resident Inspector
*K. VanDoorn
* Attended exit interview
2. EmergencyDetectionandClassification(92701)
Consistent with the facility Emergency Plan and respective Emergency Plan
Implementating Procedures (EPIPs), the licensee declared an Alert
following prompt detection and classification of primary coolant leakage
. greater than 50 gallons per minute (gpm). Accordingly, the . initial
primary-to-secondary leak rate was determined to be 150 gpm. It was later
determined, however, that transient monitor data indicated that the leak
rate was 540 gpm. Consistent with the inspector's review of the Shift
, and the casualty logs maintained in the Technical
Supervisor's
Support Centerlog (TSC) and Crisis Management Center (CMC), the licensee
considered upgrading the emergency classification to Site Area Emergency
based on the EAL defined in Enclosure 4.1 to procedure RP/0/A/5700/00
addressing "RCS leakage greater than make-up pump capacity." It was
further noted that the licensee considered the subject EAL procedure
unclear, since the actual unit make-up capacity is based upon the
cumulative volume of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The
licensee discussed this item with the NRC during the course of the
casualty. It was determined that the Alert classification would be
maintained as declared.
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The licensee. included the 'above EAL concern as a casualty action. item
requiring detailed review and' resolution. _ This item will be tracked as an
. Inspector' Follow-up Item (IFI). The inspector discussed this. item with
cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during_the exit interview'.
The licensee committed to review the EAL in conjunction with their current'
EAL procedures review, and implement the appropriate revisions.
IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-01: Clarify and quantify Site Area _ Emergency EAL'
addressing reactor coolant system leakage makeup.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Notification and Communication (92701)
Inspection included a detailed review and evaluation of the initial
offsite notification, periodic follow-up notifications, and respective
hard copies of same issued during the casualty. Inspection confirmed that
the initial notification of the State, counties, and local offsite support
agencies regarding declaration of the Alert was implemented within the
15-minute time ' regime. The NRC was notified within one hour of the
declaration. Inspection also disclosed that the notification form
documented the radiological release accompanying the steam generator tube
rupture although the radiation level was determined to be well within
Technical Specification release limits. The inspector was informed by
licensee representatives that releases were discussed with offiste support
agencies during offsite periodic telephonic follow-up notifications.
Review and audit of the respective follow-up- noti tication forms
disseminated to these agencies disclosed that no release data was
documented subsequent to the initial Alert notification. The' inspector
was informed that the subject data was not included on the edification
form (Enclosure 4.3 to procedure RP/0/5700/01 " Emergency Notification")
since the releases were considerably lower than the Technical
Specification limit, and involved no danger to the public or plant
employees. Licensee representatives added, however, that the term
" radiological release," as it relates to emergency conditions, required
definition. The licensee included this item as an action item based upon
their detailed critique of the casualt,, and committed to determine if low
level radiological releases which require no protective action
recommendation (PAR) should be entered on offsite emergency notification
forms. This item will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-02: Determine the level of offsite radiological
releases reportable on initial and follow-up notifications during plant
emergency events.
During review and discussion of offsite notifications, the availability of
dedicated State / county communicators required to irplement notifications
during prolonged plant emergency events was also included. The licensee
noted that there was an insufficient number of trained State / county
communicators in the TSC. It was also noted, however, that cognizant
personnel were available to supplement required State / county
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communicators. This item was listed by the licensee. as a casualty action
i tem.' This item will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-03: Provide and train additional ERF communicators
to ensure availability of same during-prolonged plant emergencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Shift Staffing and Augmentation (92701)
The inspector conducted a detailed review of records of shift staffing in
. response to the casualty to determine if the required staffing .was
adequate in number and functional capability. Additionally, inspection
included a review to determine that administrative and physical means were
in place and maintained to ensure. augmentation of the ERO in a timely
manner,- and/or as needed throughout the duration of the casualty.
Inspection confirmed that shift staffing and augmentation requirements
were routinely implemented throughout the casualty consistent with the
Emergency Plan, respective procedures, and Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
Inspection also included detailed discussions with cognizant licensee
representatives, and review of casualty records and logs documenting
augmentation times for the TSC following declaration of the Alert.
Notwiths.tanding existing weather and accompanying hazardous (icy) road
conditions, required shift staffing augmentation was. readily implemented
within or near the assigned time regime.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Tr'aining (92701)
Inspection included a detailed review of the training status of emergency
organization personnel who participated in the response to the casualty.
A listing of the subject personnel was obtained and their respective
, training histories were audited. Inspection disclosed that emergency
training for each participant was complete, annually updated, and
consistent with the plant Emergency Plan and respective procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Public Information (92701)
Inspection was conducted to determine that information was made available
to the public which described the emergency planning and protective
actions developed in response to the casualty. News releases were issued,
periodically updated, and coordinated with cognizant offsite officials.
Inspection disclosed that the media was promptly informed following
declaration of the Alert, and periodically updated regarding plant status !
throughout the duration of the casualty. j
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' Inspection disclosed concern regarding the NRC's access to and review ofi
news _ releases: prior to their dissemination to the media. .This' concern
addressed the'need for NRC and the. licensee to be continuously and fully. q
cognizant of ' the casualty status . to: preclude promulgating . conflicting {
information when independently communicating with the. public. . During the 1
Alert emergency classification, the: NRC does not dispatch a' site team;
therefore, designated NRC site representatives are not available to' review ;
press releases prior to issuance. The licensee . included this item -as
casualty action items requiring definition and clarification of the NRC's
role in reviewing news releases prior to NRC's . site team deployment and i
This item will be tracked as an IFI.
'
staffing of the TSC and CMC.
IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-04: Define the process of coordinating news -
releases with the NRC prior to deployment of the NRC site team to the TSC
and CMC.. j
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.. Status of Previous Emergency Preparedness Findings (92701)
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a. (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-369,370/88-27-01: Failure to identify j
an EAL and escalate the casualty to an Alert Classification 1
'
Inspection of training records and review of ' applicable lesson plans
confirmedJ that adequate corrective actions were ' implemented as
required. .;
b. (Closed) Violation 50-369, 370/88-34-02: Failure to take. prompt
corrective action to repair' Alert and notification system sirens.
Guidelines were established and in effect to ensure required testing,
preventive maintenance, and prompt repair of sirens within seven
working days. ,
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c. (Closed)-IFI 50-369, 370/88-34-03: Conduct an augmentation drill to i
verify and document Figure B-1 (Emergency Plan) staffing requirements !
and arrival times. Detailed review and inspection of shift staffing '
augmentation attending the steam generator tube rupture casualty
confirmed the licensee's capability to promptly implement shift staff
augmentation' in response to an actual plant emergency (Paragraph 4,
above). !
8. Exit Interview )
The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 7,1989, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results contained in this i
report. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any materials provided to or
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reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Item Number Description / Reference
50-369, 370/89-10-01 IFI: Clarify and quantify the Site
Area Emergency EAL defining
reactor coolant system leakage
make-up (Paragraph 2),
50-369, 370/89-10-02 IFI: Determine the level of
offsite radiological releases
reportable on initial and
follow-up notification forms
during plant emergencies
(Paragraph 3).
50-369, 370/89-10-03 IFI: Provide and train additional
ERF communicators to ensure
availability of same during
prclonged plant emergencies
(Paragraph 3).
50-369, 370/89-10-04 IFI: Define the process of
coordinating news releases with
the NRC prior to deployment of
NRC site team to the TSC and CMC
(Paragraph 6).
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INSPECTOR'S REPORT
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