IR 05000369/1989018

Insp Repts 50-369/89-18 & 50-370/89-18 on 890629-0728.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities,Followup of LER & Followup on Previous Findings

ML20246D089
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	08/09/1989
From:	Cooper T, Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246D068	List: IR 05000369/1989018 ML20246D065
References
50-369-89-18, 50-370-89-18, IEB-88-010, IEB-88-10, NUDOCS 8908250248
Download: ML20246D089 (9)

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UNITO STATES i.. ,

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Report Nos.: 50-369/89-18,50-370/89-18 -4

' Licensee: Duke Power Company j 422 South Church Street :l

, Charlotte p C 2824 *

Facility Name: McGuireill.uolear Station 1 and 2 .  !

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' Docket Nos.:~: 50-369, 50,H 3 4,.

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i License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Inspection Conducted: -June 29, 1983 - July 28, 1989

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Inspectors: / m., 2, 7-f- M l K. Na'dDoorn, Senior ResidentfInspector ~ Date' Signed  !

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T.oCooper, Resident Inspect 6r Date Sign 6a l

' Approved by:

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Date Signed M.,B. ShymT9tk. Section Chief d Division of Resctor Projects

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L SUMMARY l j

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. Scope: i This routine ; unannounced inspection involved. the. areas of operations safety verification, ' surveillance testing, . maintenance' activities.- followup -of licensee event reports, and follow-up on previous inspection finding l

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Results: ,.

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. a In the areas inspected, no violations were identified.- The licensee identified

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i an inoperable Power Operated Relief Valve which should have been discovered by post maintenance testing. A previous ' violation ' had been issued for similar .

. problems ' occurring in the same time frame. Previous corrective actions appear j

appropriate for, this problem, therefore, a violation was not cite (See '

j paragraph 5.b)

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. ,Adtiir, Superintendent of Station Services D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager J. Boyle Superintendent af Integrated Scheduling D, Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager

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J.1 Foster, Station Health Physicist l H. Funderburke, Station Chemist G, Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager

• T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

• D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager W. Reeside, Operations Engineer

.R< Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

• M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance R Sharp, Compliance Manager J. Snyder, Performance Engineer "

J. Silver, Unit 2, Operations Manager

'A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations R. White, Instrument & Electrical Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction - crafteen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• K. VanDoorn

• T. Cooper

• Attended exit interview Unresolved Items An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more inform 6 tion is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. There were no unresolvcd items identified in this repor . Plant Operations (71707, 71710)

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control rooni logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment j

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i removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were j conducted with plar,t operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,  !

and performance personne Activities within the control room were monitored during shif ts and at shift - changes. Actions ar.d/or activities observed were ::onducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required ,

by Technical Specifications (TS). j Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxilthry building, Units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 anc 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected are During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, f equipment status and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 Operations

Unit 1 began the period at 100% power. On June 30, 1989 the Digital Electro Hydraulic (DEH) turbine control system malfunctioned. A capacitor in the circuit for a status monitoring panel apparently failed which affected two 15 volt DC control power supplies. The effect was to reduce the voltage to approximately 5 volts leading to l

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erratic behavior of the turbine governor valve Despite sudden megawatt decreates of approximately 200, 300 and 400 megawatts the licensee successfully shutdown the plant without a trip. Operrtors handled the transient in a well coordinated fashion as observed by i the inspecto The affected circuit card was replaced and the unit

was restarted on July 1, 1989. A preventive fix is being evaluated with the vendor. The unit remained on-line the rest of the period, however, on July 5,1989 the licensee discovered that the un;t was ,

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actually running at 101-102% power for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> while the nuclear instrumentation (NI) was indicating 95-96% The NI channels had apparently been miscalibrated on July 2,1989. A detailed inspection of this event was conducted by the inspector and a regional inspector and is described in NRC Report 369,370/89-2 Unit 2 Opn3tions l Unit 2 tegan the period at 98% in a fuel conservation coast down leading to a refueling shutdown which occurred on July 5, 1989. The unit ended the period in no morle, refuelin The inspector reviewed licensee practices for removing licensed operators from the active shift based on requalification test results. The licensee requires a retest if an operator scores 70-80%

on any section of the test, hcwever, the operator would not be removed from the shift. A score of less than 70% on any section would be considered a failure and the person wotid be removed from the shift.

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f d' . On July 14, 1989' the licensee informed the inspector of a wiring .

problem associated with the filter preheaters power supply for the Annulus Ventilation (VE) System. The' wires were found. to be Teflon jacketed which can break down in a radiation environment reducing their ability to function as a moisture barrier. The licensee judged

.that moisture from an accident situation could cause electrical shorts.and prevent operation if VE was stopped after initiation of

, the accident. The operations procedure was changed to restrict stopping of the system and. instructions were given to operations personnel. The licensee expects'to be able to corrcet the wiring in

.approximately three months. J An additional problem was identified to 1 the inspector on July 19, 1989. The licensee had discovered that the cross-connect valves between the two VE trains if left open (normal

. position)' could result-in an increase in offsite dose greater than originally assumed although below 10 CFR 100 limit The original offsite dos cross-flow calculation from a possibla dididle not trai take into account Technical higher humidity)

Specification (TS - 4.6.1.8.d.3 for VE. requires verification that the valves can be opened. A' Phase B Isolation signal starts VE and opens the valve . The cross flow design was developed to provide cooHng flow through the charcoal filter of the idle train for fire prevention.- The possibility for a fire is considered remote and a deluge system is available. Therefore, although the system appears to meet design basis as designed, it appears that a modified design which results in lower dose- may be an improvement over the existing design. The lice'nsee indicated that-a modified design and appropriate TS change would be coniidered. This is - Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/89-10-01: Review of Design and Technical Specification changes for Annulus Ventilatio On July 18, 1989 the. licensee discussed the. fuel clip replacement process which was planned during the Unit 2 outage. The licensee was planning to conduct the removal and replacement in' Region 2 of the Spent Fuel Pool. The licensee is committed to store unqualified fuel in a checker board pattern in this area with physical barriers in the empty locations. The licensee indicated that the fuel clip removal

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device would be placed in Region 2 and no assemblies would be present in Region 'One assembly at a time would be placod within the device for clip changeout and in addition the device physicall restricts the adjacent spaces from receiving fuel. The inspector reviewed procedure PT/0/A/4550/33: Controlling Procedure for fuel Clip Removal and drawings of the device. The licensees methodology appears to meet the licensing commitment No violations or deviations were identifie Surveillance Testing (61726) Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the i inspetor to ascertain procedural and performance acequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification I

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l Selected tests were witnessed or reviewed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were adequates Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST TT/2/A/9100/329 Reactor Vessel Thermal Mixing Data Acquisition IP/0/A/3001/001C Main Steam Flow Calibration Loop C Channel I (See Note)

'IP/0/A/3007/17 NIS Power Range Calibration to Best Estimate Thermal Power (See Note)

PT/0/A/4450/08C Control Rcom Area Ventilation Performance Test (Train A)

Note: These completed procedures were reviewed during followup of an

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overpower event pf July 5, 1989. Results arc documented in NRC l Report 369,370/89-2 The inspector reviewed the licensee's practices regarding the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS). The TS for RVLIS does tot require the upper range to be operable. The NRC and the licensee are presently reviewing whether this is acceptable. While the lower range indication would assure adequate inventory for core cooling the upper range serves to indicate decreasing level from the upper head area and is utilized in Emergency Procedures. The licensee includer l RVLIS upper range in the monthly surveillance procedure, PT/1 and l 2/A/4600/03D, Monthly Surveillance Items. Step 1.5 of Enclosure 13-1 .

requires verification that upper range indication show " Invalid" if one or more Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPS) are running. The inspector questioned whether this surveillance was adequate in that it may be possible for the system to be valved out and still show " Invalid".

The licensee was requested to evaluate this question on July 10, 1989. The licensee indicated that additional checks and controls for RVLIS are in place but not formalized. RVLIS data is being verified during Reactor Coolant System fill and vent prior to placing the L system in operation. The system also contains three alarms; ICC

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Monitor Trouble, RVLIS Capillary Tubing Trouble, and Diagnostic Information. The licensee's practice has been to implement a high priority work request whenever these alarms are present. The licensee practice for the Magnex isolation valves is to remove the operators from the valves once the system is aligned to prevent inadvertent isolation. The licensee indicated that verification of the absence of alarms would be added to the surveillance procedure I and the other practices would be formalize _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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L On July 16, 1989 the inspector was informed that a portion of a control room door seal was found missing possibly rendering the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System inoperable. VC was declared inoperable and TS 3.0.3 was entered for a short period until the door could be taped. The taping process had been previously evaluated as acceptable for sealin The licensee later discovered through interviews that the seal had been missing during the previous performance test and, therefore, even with the seal missing VC was operable. This was confirmed with an A train VC test on July 26, 198 A concurrent problem also existed in that the locking mechanism en the door had not been working properly. The licensee is investigating whether this rendered VC inoperable, i.e. the door could be pushed open by control room pressurization from VC rendering VC inoperable (unable to maintain control room overpressure). The licensee is continuing their investigation on VC operability, the need to improve surveillance and/or maintenance practices, root cause for the missing seal, and the need for improved practices to assure that operations personnel are promptly informed of defective lock problems. Further followup :nspection will be conducted relative to the licensee's investigatio This is Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-18-02: Review of Licensee Evaluation of Control Room Door Problem No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703) Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that,

where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequat Activity Torone Switch Bypass Modifications for Valves 1 and 2 CF-126B, 127B, 128B and 1298. (Variation Notices MEVN-1854 and 1769).

l Portions of IP/0/B/3250/08, Calibration Procedure For Hays Republic V5A Indicaturs, for the B Emergency Diesel Generato On July 5,1989 the licensee discovered two wires rolled in the reactor protection cabinet which would have prevented operation of Pcwer Operated Relief Valve (PORV) 2NC-32B from operating in the low temperature overpressure (LTOP) protection mode. Concurrently the licensee discovered a blown fuse which would have prevented PORV 2NC-32A from operating in the LTOP mode. These two valves are one of

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two LTOP systems required to be operable by TS 3.4.9.3. The other required system is a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent of greater than or equal to 4.5 square inches with the RCS depressurized. The situation was immediately corrected, however, this appears to be a past operability question and the licensee is investigating and developing a Licenste Event Report. Initial review of the event indicated that the improper wiring occurred during maintenance activities in July,1988 and post maintenance testing failed to identify the proble A previous NRC violation was issued for similar post maintenance testing problems which had occurred in the saue time frame (See Report 369,370/08-29). Therefore, this appears to be another example of post maintenance test.ing weaknesses previously cited. The previous violation involved incomplete testing after Nuclear Station Modifications (NSMs) to valve motor operators, The licensee reviewed other valve operator NSM packages to determine if similar problems existed but had not reviewed other NSM package However, the program enhancena -ts implemented as a result of the previous violation also appear to be appropriate for this problem. Therefore, this problem is not being cited as an NPC violation at this tim Additional corrective actions were being evaluated by the licensee at the end of the inspection perio Further NRC review will be conducted upon completion of the LE No vitiations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712, 92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of coupliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional -

inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are close *LER 369/89-10: Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were Potentially Inoperable Because Of A Manufacturing Deficiency. The inspector reviewed documentation of torque switch bypass modifications completed as a short term corrective action. The licensee is planning to supplement this report defining long term corrective action *LER 369/89-11: A Technical Specification Surveillance Was Missed Because The Wrong Component Was Declared Operable Due To A Lack Of Attention To Detai The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken and interviewed various licensee staff personnel to determine their familiarity with the corrective action requirement ;

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L LER 369/89-12: Siv Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Were Inoperable Because Of An Accu.alation Of Ice Due To Other/ Unknown Reasons. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions and determined that the incident was resolve LER 370/89-04: All Power Rar,ge Excore Detectors on Unit 2 Were Declared Inoperable Because The Transient Power Mismatch Was Exceede . Followup of NRC Bulletin (92701)

Bulletin No. 88-10: Molded Case Circuit Breakers. The licensee initiated a discussion with the inspector to update the status of this issue. The licensee recently identified that the original scope of their review of breakers in the warehouse was inadequate in that breakers ordered as more than one piece had not been included. Some breakers were discovered as having been received in two pieces and therefore~should have been removed from safety-related stock until they were evaluated. The licensee indicated that .the Bulletin response would be updated. The licensee's original response committed to retain any breakers taken out of stock for one year. The licensee has since experienced a parts shortage and desires to use some breakers in non-safety-related applications. The inspector indicated that this appeared acceptable as long as safety-related equipment was not affected and the amended response describes that affected breakers would be used in non-safety-related applications as necessar The licensee also indicated that breaker spare parts inspections had revealed apparent refurbished components subject to the same operability questions as identified % the Bulletin for complete breakers. The inspector suggested that thi: be documented to NRC in the additional response or other report as appropriate. This information was verbally forwarded by the inspector to NRC/NR No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-31-22: Followup of QA Department Personnel Training and Subsequent Improvements in QA Surveillance and Audit The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel and reviewed documentation of various QA surveillance and audit Audits reviewed included NP-88-14 (Performance, Refueling and Inservice Inspection), NP-88-03 (Quality Assurance Department), NP-88-15 (Fire Protection), NP-88-18 (Operations Activities) and NP-68-30 (Corrective Action).

Surveillance documentation review included Surveillance No MC-88-40, 41, 42., 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52 and 53 and Summaries for Surveillance Nos. MC-89-01, 02, and 07. Also reviewed was a letter to the station manager dated June 2,1989 summarizing surveillance findings for the March 1 through May 31,1989 time fram .

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.- ;, . g It was noted that the corporate audits remain heavily weighted toward documentation review although they are not devoid of field observation. A consultant was used for a fire protection audit and the inspector witnessed a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) from another Duke plant conducting an audit.- The corporate auditors are completing extensive operations traiaing (46 weeks). On-site surveillance personnel have completed this trainin The corporate program is complemented by a diverse on-site surveillance program often weighted toward field observatio Findings were supported and a number of findings were mor significant than minor paperwork problems and indicated a good technical knowledge of activities associated with an operating plan It is noted that the Quality Assurance (QA) Department is in a lead role for the Self Initiated Technical Audits (SITA) and previous NRC review has shown these audits to be thorough and valuable. The site QA Manager is presently in SR0 school which will further bolster QA Technical expertise. Also an experienced Maintenance Superintendent

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has been added to the SlTA staff. In addition an NRC maintenance inspection team recently reviewed audits and surveillance for irtintenance and found no problem (See Report 369,370/89-15) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 379,370/88-31-23: Verify Improvements in Licensee Followup of QA Audit and Surveillance Findings. The inspector reviewed followup of selected findings from the above listed audits and surveillance and held discussions with

'QA personnel. Items appeared to be closed out in a timely manner with appropriate corrective action The NRC maintenance team also reviewed this area for maintenance audits with no problems identifie .No violations or deviations were ident4fie . ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings identified below were stanarized on July 28, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following items were discussed in detail:

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-18-01: Review of Design and Tech Spec Changes for Annulus Ventilation (paragraph 3.d.).

Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-18-02: Review of Licensee Evaluation of Control Room Do'or Problems (paragraph 4.c.)

The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the I

inspectors during the course of their inspectio .

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