IR 05000369/1997005
| ML20138J427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138J426 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-97-05, 50-369-97-5, NUDOCS 9705080207 | |
| Download: ML20138J427 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No:
50-369 License No:
NPF-9 Report No:
50-369/97-05 Licensee:
Duke Power Company Facility:
McGuire Generating Station. Unit 1 Location:
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville NC 28078 Dates:
March 9 - April 5.1997
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Inspectors:
M. Sykes. Resident Inspector N. Economos. Regional Inspector (paragraph M.1.2)
R. Chou, Regional Inspector (paragraph E1.1. El.2)
D. Forbes. Regional Inspector (paragraph R1. R6. R7)
Approved by:
C. Casto. Chief. Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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l 9705080207 970428 PDR ADOCK 05000369 Enclosure
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Generating Station Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-369/97-05 This integrated inspection was conducted of Steam Generator Replacement Project activitics in the areas of maintenance, engineering, and plant support.
The report covers a four week period of announced inspections performed by resident and regional inspectors.
Maintenance Reactor coolant loop pipe cutting and machining were beira performed in
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accordance with procedures and controlling documents.
Craft and supervisors were knowledgeable, and carried out their assigned tasks in a conscientious and professional manner.
(Section M1.2)
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedure
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guidelines for air-arc cutting lateral support shim stock material.
Licensee response to an adverse condition resulting from air-arc cutting of lateral restraints of reactor coolant pumps was good.
(Section M1.2)
Enaineerina The inspectors concluded that the temporary restraints installed for the
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pipes and the SGs were acce) table per the design drawings and were adequate to provide the sta3ilization of the SGs for removal.
(Section El.1)
The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed adequate
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preparation and operations for the lifting and transporting of the old Westinghouse SG from the containment building to the retired storage facility.
(Section El.2)
Plant Support Housekeeping was considered good in areas where reactor coolant loop
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pipe cutting and machining were being performed.
(Section M1.2)
The licensee had established good planning for implementing radiological l
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controls during the Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP)
outage.
The licensee had developed procedures and work practices to control radioactive contamination, and to maintain internal and external exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
(Section RI.1)
l The steam generator reolacement project training focused on good
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radiological control work practices.
(Section R5)
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The radiation protection staffing appeared adequate to support the Steam
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Generator Replacement Project activities.
Licensee personnel experienced in as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning and radiation protection activities were actively involved in all phases of
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the steam generator replacement project.
(Section R6)
The licensee, upon identification of the high radiation area problem,
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exercised adequate radiological controls.
(Section R7)
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Report Details
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Haintenance The Unit 1 steam generator ins)ection replacement outage began February 14, 1997.
The replacement is aeing performed due to significant degradation which has diminished the original steam generator service life. The original Westinghouse supplied steam generators will be replaced by Babcock and Wilcox International Inc. supplied steam
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generators with minor changes in design characteristics.
Duke Power is
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acting as the prime contractor for the project.
The replacement is to be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
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M1.2 Steam Generator Reolacement (50001)
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Insoection Scoce This inspection was performed for the purpose of observing cutting and machining of the reactor coolant aiping in preparation for welding the re)lacement steam generators to t1e existing reactor coolant piping.
Otler activities included review of welding procedures for welding main steam piping.
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Observations and Findinas The controlling document for cutting the reactor coolant loop from the existing SGs was Final Loop Document NSM MG-19310. "RCS Cutting.
Welding and Temporary Restraint." Rev. 3.
The existing reactor coolant
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pipe system was templated using state-of-the-art optical measurement techniques. These measurements were subsequently used to specify parameters for cutting the primary nozzle safe ends, bevel location, orientation on the primary nozzles and associated reactor coolant piping, and for other locations which were critical to attaining a good fitup.
The primary pipe was cut with a modified pipe lathe, under the requirements of procedure TN/1/A/9310/00/05M "SG Primary Pipe Severing Procedure," Rev. O.
At the time of this inspection all SGs had been severed from the primary coolant piping. Accordingly, the inspector discussed the activity with the licensee's cognizant engineer and reviewed related work packages. Through this work effort, the inspector verified that the procedure had been reviewed ar.d a) proved by DPC's OA:
craft had received the necessary training: a pre-jo) briefing had been held prior to the start of the cutting activity: the proper sever profile had been attained, and the location of the cut was well within specified limits.
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The inspector reviewed the work packages for both hot and cold legs of all four SGs. The severed primary piping was subsequently faced back, removing enough material to assure that all of the initial weld metal was removed in preparation for machining the required bevel geometry for making the narrow groove welds. The controlling procedure for this
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activity was TN/1/A/9310/00/08M. Change A, " Controlling Procedure for SG Primary Pipe Beveling." Rev. O.
At the time of this inspection.
Framatone Technologies. Inc. (FTI). the primary SGRP contractor, was machining the bevel on "A" S/G hot and cold legs.
By observation and through procedure review, the inspectors ascertained that beveling was performed with a machine which was basically a numerically controlled rotating arm. This arm / beveling tool was secured on a mounting system which utilized an anchoring device and a reference ring for alignment.
This system was design to provide a quick and accurate setup of the beveling machine in all pipe. elbow and nozzle orientations. The bevel operation was used to produce the ID counterbore. bevel face, and profile required for narrow gap welding.
This same machine will be used to machine the S/G primary nozzle safe-end bevel geometry.
The ins)ectors observed machining of the bevel in the "A" loop primary piping lot and cold legs. The beveling activity proceeded smoothly..
A subsequent liquid penetrant examination showed the machined surface was free of manufacturing defects. A review of physical measurements taken after the bevel was machined showed that all critical dimensions were well within tolerance.
Through discussions with the cognizant engineer, the inspectors ascertained that wall thickness was not uniform near the weld prep on both hot and cold legs of this loop.
Preliminary measurements indicated the condition ranged from 0.034" to 0.047" above the minimum wall requirement of 2.42." A contingency had been established to deal with below minimum wall conditions. This condition will be remedied by depositing additional weld metal once the weld joint was capped and final thickness measurements were obtained.
Final material thickness will be verified by ultrasonics once metal deposition was completed.
A below minimum wall condition was observed at Catawba and was typical of RCS piping manufactured by the casting ]rocess. The subject condition was remedied in a similar manner at Cataw]a.
Following the close of this inspection.
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the inspectors ascertained that Loop "C" hot leg was the only loop where wall thickness was less than minimum wall.
Damaae to Safety-Related Components while Air-Arcina Shims from RCP Lateral Restraints Through discussions with licensee technical personnel and by observation, the inspectors ascertained that reactor coolant pump bodies and associated support components / structures had sustained some damage during removal by air-arcing of shim welds associated with the reactor coolant pump (RCP) lateral restraints. This condition was identified by the licensee in Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Reports 1-M97-1040
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and 1-M97-1041.
By observation. the inspectors verified the presence of
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i-(1) heavy gouging of-the base metal on the RCP Lateral Restraint frames with depths ranging between 3/16 to 5/16 inches. (2) arc strikes on RCP
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support pads and column trunion and (3) heavy accumulation of molten
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slag, generated by the air-arcing process. deposited and adhered.to the RCS pump bodies in the vicinity of the cut. Through discussions with
the licensee's SGRP technical personnel, the ins)ector's ascertained that Step 4.6 - Removal of RCP Lateral Support Slims, of the controlling procedure TN/1/A/9310/00/01M. provided a precautionary note to guard against the degradation of the base metal of sup) ort steel and to shield adjacent components from molten slag.
Upon furtier review the inspectors noted that paragraph 10. Temocrary Attachment of Welds.
Section IV of the McGuire Welding manual made reference to attachment welds removed by flame cutting.
This section stated that flame-cuts were to be within 1/16" of the plate or structure.
At the close of this inspection the licensee was evaluating the condition described above and conducting an evaluation to determine an appropriate repair for damages to these structure / components. This licensee identified problem was determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion V. " Procedures" anc will be identified J
as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-369.370/97-05-01: Failure to Follow Procedure:
This violation was treated as a NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
In addition to the identification, evaluation, tracking and planned corrective action, the licensee took action to incorporate specific guidance for high energy metal removal techniques into the Corporate Welding Manual.
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Followuo on Secondary Fioe Weldina On March 21, 1997, the inspectors observed the first of several
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feedwater joints being welded inside containment.
The subject weld attached a short 90 elbow to the existing pipe at the crane wall feedwater penetration in the "A" cavity. The weld was identified as CFIFW24-1 on Dwg. No. MCFI-1CF24. Rev. 3.
The inspectors reviewed the process control record for technical content. completeness, and
accuracy: and verified that all required inspections had been performed.
In addition the inspectors verified that the required preheat was being
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maintained, that the ap3ropriate field weld data sheets were at the weld t
location, that welders lad been qualified to use the weld process, and
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that the proper filler metal was being used. On the date that this work effort was performed, welders were welding the root pass of the weld joint using the gas tungsten arc process.
By the record review and observation, the inspectors determined the weld was being fabricated in an acceptable manner.
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4-Weldino of the Main Steam Nozzle and Associated Pinina Through discussions with the licensee's cognizant welding supervisor in charge of welding inside containment, the inspectors ascertained that main steam pipe welds (i.e.. nozzle and associated piping) will be fabricated using the Flux Cored Arc Welding (FCAW) process. The process specification was DPC's L-500 Rev. 41. dated February 24, 1997.
The welding procedure was qualified in 1973, by the licensee, on plate material in the horizontal and vertical positions and in the thickness range between 0.187 and 2.50 inches.
The procedure was qualified using semi-automatic equipment and a welding gas mixture of argon (Ar), and carbon dioxide (CO ).
Welding will be performed using Field Weld Data
Sheet (FWDS) No. L-558. Rev. 5 which was reviewed and approved by QA on January 11. 1996.
A review of the subject FWDS determined that the qualification parameters and essential variables were consistent with ASME Code section IX requirements.
A preheat of 200'F. was specified for material over 3/4 inches thick, which was acceptable
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Filler metal for this application was purchased from Weldstar under P0 No. 901362.
The material was identified as type E71-T-1/SFA-5.2. lot number 49228.
The material ordered was procured to the requirements of DPCos' Specification No. DPS-1206.00-0005.
However, because of schedule and availability constraints, the vendor took exception to the requirement for testing impact specimens in the post-weld heat treated condition. To address the problem the licensee issued Variation Notice VN-19260/00AG dated March 10, 1997.
This VN prohibits use of this material on weldments requiring post-weld heat treatment; however, this condition was not in conflict with the subject application.
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Conclusion:
Activities observed (i.e.. RCS loop pipe cutting and machining) were being performed in accordance with procedures and controlling documents.
Craft and supervisors were knowledgeable and carried out their assigned tasks in a conscientious and professional manner.
Housekeeping around the work places was good.
The licensee's response to the adverse condition resulting from the air arc cutting operation was also good.
The action taken to incorporate specific guidelines into the Weld Manual to prevent a recurrence in future ap)lications of this process demonstrated a good reactive approac1 to problem resolution.
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III. ENGINEERING El Conduct of Enaineerina El.1 Review and Walkdown on Temporary Restraints for Unit 1 SGRP a.
hnspection Scone (50001)
The inspectors reviewed temporary restraints used for stabilizing the pipe and steam generator (SG) after the pipes were cut in order to t
verify that the restraints were installed in accordance with the a)plicable procedure, drawings, and work order for the replacement of t1e SGs.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors discussed with the licensee engineers the seven major temporary restraint systems installed to prevent the movement of piping and SGs during the removal of the old Westinghouse SGs and the
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installation of the new Babcock and Wilcox SGs. The restraint systems included Up)er Lateral. Main Steam Line. Lower Lateral. Main Feed Water Line, and tie Auxiliary feed Water Line.
In the Main Steam line. the licensee inserted temporary load stops on the constant and variable spring restraints to change the restraint types from variable, or t
constant supports to rigid supports to prevent aiping movement after the
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pipes were cut from the SGs. The snubbers in tie Main Steam line were also replaced temporarily with rigid struts to convert them to rigid
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restraints..
Two brackets for the new struts to be installed for stabilizing the SGs were welded onto the old SGs at the upper location to provide the upper
lateral restraints.
One end of the two rigid struts was connected to
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the same bracket and the other end of two struts was connected to two locations at the concrete wall to stabilize the old SGs before the main
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steam line was cut.
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The existing lower lateral supports were shimmed to fill in gaps between
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the SGs and supports to prevent the movement of the SGs when hot and crossover legs were cut.
However. the licensee workers observed that a movemerit had occurred.
They felt vibrations on the SGs and observed a noticeable misalignment between pipe and nozzles of the SGs when a crossover leg was cut.
Problem Investigation Process (PIP) No. 1-M97-0950 was issued for root cause analysis and investigation.
The licensee found that a set of the shims was different from original design sha)es These mismatching shims shifted resulting in the movement of t1e SG when a crossover leg was cut.
The licensee replaced the mismatching shims with the original design shape which solved the problem.
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The licensee also provided horizontal and vertical struts to restrain
the SG column movement.
The hot and crossover legs were tightened to the anchor bolts located on the concrete floor by slings to restrain the
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pipe movement.
The inspectors inspected the temporary restraints including new struts.
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temporary load sto)s in variable or constant spring supports, brackets.
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shims, slings, anclor bolts, and base plates around the SGs.
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Conclusions
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i The inspectors concluded that the temporary restraints installed for the pipes and the SGs were acce) table per the design drawings and were
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adequate to provide the staailization of the SGs for removal.
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El.2 abyervation of SG Liftina and-Transcortino for Unit 1 a.
Insoection Scone (500011
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The inspectors observed SG lifting from the containment and transporting of the equipment to the retired storage facility to verify that those activities were performed in accordanco with the established procedures.
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Observations and Findinas The procedures used for the lifting and transporting of the old Westinghouse SGs were:
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Procedure TN/1/B/9205/00/01C. Removal of "A" Cavity Westinghouse Steam Generator. Rev. 0
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Procedure TN/1/B/9205/00/17C. Transporting the "A" Cavity Westinghouse Steam Generator. Rev. O.
The inspectors observed the licensee performing the following steps of the lifting and transporting of an original Westinghouse SG to the retired SG storage facility:
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Checking that all the temporary restraints were in position and all the obstacles were cleared
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Hooking the SG and lifting with 90 percent of the weight and
removing all the connections from tie SG
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Lifting the SG 1/2" from the support pad, and holding the SG for
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10 minutes to verify the Temporary Lifting Device (TLD) was capable of holding the load
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Slowly lifting the SG higher than the concrete enclosure which was above the refueling floor Enclosure
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Moving the SG to approximately the center of the Reactor Building and lowering the SG to 3' above the refueling floor
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Installation of cover plates for hot and crossover nozzles to seal
and reduce the radiation levels
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Moving and connecting the SG to a J-Frame (also called downender)
near the containment door
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Slowly inclining the SG with the J-Frame into the powered railcar
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Moving the pcwered railcar with the SG to outside of the
containment
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Lifting the SG to a transporter by using Outside lifting System
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(OLS). securing the SG to the transporter. and removing the
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J-Frame
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Transporting the SG carefully and slowly to the retired storage area j
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Inserting two supporting beams under the SG
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Inspecting and measuring the placement of rest plates which were
located inside of the retired storage facility to support the SG
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Driving the transporter to inside of the SG storage facility and unloading of the SG by lowering the SG onto the top of rest plates i
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Driving the transporter out of the storage facility The licensee engineers. craft personnel, and Bigge representatives (the provider of the TLC and OLS) coordinated the project efficiently and-performed the lifting and transporting of the old Westinghouse SG without incident.
The licensee followed the written procedures. The engineers were knowledgeable and the crafts were skillful in handling-the task. The inspectors observed all the major steps of the operation.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licen.see performed adequate preparation and operations for the lifting and transporting of the old Westinghouse SG from the containment building te the retired storage facility.
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IV. Plan _t_ Support R1 Radiological Pr.otection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Steam Generator Reolacement Outaae (Unit lj.
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Insoection Scoce (50001)
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The inspectors observed and reviewed licensee activities for Unit 1
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steam generator replacement project (SGRP) to determine the adequacy of the licensee's radiological controls as required by 10 Code of Federal
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Regulations (CFR) Parts 20.1201. 20.1501. 20.1601, 20.1801. 20.1902.
20.1904
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Observations and Findinas
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The SGRP radiation protection (RP) outage organization had initiated dose estimates for all work activities associated with the replacement
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of all four Unit 1 steam generators.
The licensee had previously established an ALARA goal of 160 person-rem for SGRP work performed
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during the outage and approximately 98 person-rem for refueling outage work tracked seaarately from the SGRP. At the time of the inspection.
)reviously esta)lished challenging goals for maintaining exposures ALARA lad been achieved through source term reduction during a planned reactor plant shutdown crudburst and by implementation of lessons learneu from the recent Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 SGRP.
The inspectors also observed and reviewed Nuclear Coolant (NC) pipe end decontamination work which included the use of remotely operated decontamination equipment to maintain exposures ALARA. The pipe end decontamination process utilized an abrasive sponge medium to clean piping ends prior to installing shielding inside the pipe o>enings.
Survey results following decontamination and shielding of t1e "A" SG hotleg and crossover leg piping resulted in total dose rate reduction factors of approximately 87 percent on the hot leg and 93 percent on the crossover leg.
At the time of the inspection the licensee had not experienced eny internal exposures during NC pipe end work or steam generator removal.
The inspector observed airborne isotopic analysis results for the Unit 1 containment building which included low level background results for naturally occurring radon daughter products. Also, at the time cf the inspection, approximately 24 personnel contamination events (PCEs) had been associated with the ongoing SGRP.
Radiological controls to limit the spread of contamination at the Reactor Containment Building exits were observed to be adequate.
The inspectors toured Unit 1 Reactor Building. Auxiliary Building and Radioactive Waste Building observing work in progress and interviewed workers.
At the time of the inspection, radiological housekeeping was Enclosure
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observed to be good.
Radiologicaliy controlled areas observed were appropriately posted and radioactive material was appropriateb labeled based en surveys reviewed and independent randoa contamination and radiation surveys performed by the inspectors.
The inspectors determined RP survey ecuipment observed in use was currently calibrated
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and source checked, anc personnel were performing surveys as required by station procedures.
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The inspectors also observed the use of numerous cameras positioned in containment and outside of containment to support the SGRP. Wireless
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communications and teledosimetry was also used in conjunctico with the cameras to remotely assist in controlling work and radiation exoosure.
Video films from the SGRP evoiutions performed at Catawba wera being used for pre-planning and training for the two 1997 SGRP outagns at the McGuire Nuclear Plant.
The licensee was also filming the Unit 1 SGRP for additional lessons learned to be used during the upcoming Unit 2 SGRP outage.
The licensee was continuing with an ALARA initiative to install hard wired electronic dosimetry in various areas of the facility for the purposes of remotely surveying, trending dose rates, and plannir.c 'lork in these creas during outage and non-outage periods.
The inspectors reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements.
exposure estimates and actual exposure re) orts for several of the ongoing work evolutions involving the higler exposure estimates.
These evolutions reviewed included the following:
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Pipe End Decontamination and Installation / Removal of Pipe Shield a
Plug / Dam e
Steam Generator Removal Pipe End Decontamination e
Lead Shielding Installation.
e The RWPs reviewed adequately addressed ALARA considerations, external and internal exposure controls, and contamination controi.s for the expected radiological hazards.
The inspectors also attended pre-job briefings conducted by ALARA personnel for SG removal and transport of the SGs to the Retired Steam Generator Storage Facility.
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Conclusions The licensee had established good planning for implementing radiological controls during the SGRP Unit 1 outage.
The inspectors determined the licensee had developed procedures and work practices to control radioactive contamination, and to maintain internal and external exposures ALARA.
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R5 Staff Training and Qualification in Radiation Protection and Chemistry
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Insoectj.on ScQDe (50001)
The inspectors observed licensee actions to ensure personnel involved
with the SGRP evolutions had been instructed in precautions and procedures to minimize exposure as required by 10 CFR Part 19.12.
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Obse_rEj;jons and Findinal
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Workers involved with the SGRP had received site specific training in j
radiation protection.
In addition to the routine site specific training
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the licensee had provided special classroom training consisting of i
lectures and video, as well as hands on mockup training for tasks such
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as pipe cutting beveling. decentamination of pipe ends, welding of pipe i
ends, and shielding installation / removal.
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The inspectors concluded the specific SGRP training focused on 90%
radiological control work practices and met the requirements of 10 CFR Part'19.12 for instructing workers in precautions and procedures to minimize radiation exposures.
R6 Radiation Protection Organization and Administration
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Insnection Stone (500011
The inspectors reviewed the current SGRP organization and administration
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staffing procedures and work practices to support ongoing SGRP RP activities, as required by 10 CFR 20.1101 for maintaining exposures ALARA.
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Ohservations and Findinqs The licensee's SGRP RP organization was primarily staffed with personnel who had been involved with the Catawba SGRP. These personnel were i
sunalemented as needed with McGuire site radiation protection i
teclnicians and supervisors. The assigned SGRP staffing as outlined.en the organizational chart included: SGRP mant'gers, supervisors, lead RP technicians. senior and junior RP technicians, decontamination technicians, ALARA specialist, radioactive materials technicians, audio / video technicians, and administrative staff.
The inspectors also attended two daily ALARA staff meetings and two daily SGRP staff planning meetings.
These meetings reviewed the ongoing work schedule, daily ALARA information which included current radiation exposure reports, and any issues that had occurred involving personnel safety during the outage.
The ins)ecturs observed RP management staff was adequately represented at t1ese meetings to address ALARA issues and to address any other radiological issues discussed.
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determined the licensee had developed procedures and work practices to control radioactive contamination and to maintain internal and external exposures ALARA.
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Conclusions
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l Based on a review of the organization chart. observations of work in progress, and discussions with licensee representatives the RP staffing appeared adequate to support the SGRP activities.
The inspectors determined licensee personnel experienced in ALARA plaraing and RP
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activities were actively involved in all phases of the SGRP.
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i V. Management Meetinas i
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
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management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 15. March 18, and
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March 21, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED j
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Licenseg I
Barron. H., Vice President. McGuire Nuclear Station Byrum. W., Manager. Radiation Protection
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Cash. M., Manager. Regulatory Compliance Cross R., Regulatory Compliance
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Dolan, 8.. Manager. Safety Assurance Geddie. E.. Manager. McGuire Nuclear Station
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Hanes.
L., Steam Generator Replacement ALARA Manager Jhamil. D.. Superintendent. Maintenance (Acting)
l Jones R., Superintendent. Operations Michael. R., Chemistr.) Manager
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Morgan, R.. Manager. SGRP Engineering
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Nazar. M.
Superintendent. Maintenance
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Robinson.M., McGuire SGRP Project Manager i
Schlise.
L., Steam Generator Replacement Radiation Protection Manager Sharpe, R., SGRP Licensing
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Teague. M., SGRP Engineering i
Thomas K., Superintendent. Work Control i
i Hallman. W.,
SGRP Manager
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l NRC i
d S. Shaeffer. Senior Resident Inspector. McGuire
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M. Sykes. Resident Inspector. McGuire j
R. Chou Regional Inspector N. Economos. Regional Inspector
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O. Forbes, P.egional Inspector l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED j
Steam Generator Replacement Project Inspection IP 50001:
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED t
[LQSED TITLE
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NCV 50-369.370/97-05-01 Fcilure to follow procedure guidelines for
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air-arc cutting lateral support shim stock i
material (paragraph M1.2)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Law As Reasonably Achievable
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ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers'
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CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations 4-FCAW Flux Cere Arc Welding
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FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report J
t FTI Framatome Technologies Inc.
FWDS Field Weld Data Sheet NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSM Nuclear Station Modification OLS Outside Lifting System PCE Personnel Contamination Event i
PWHT Postweld Heat Treatment I
QA/0C Ouality Assurance /Ouality Control Rem Radiation Equivalent Man
.RCA Radiological Controlled Area RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System
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RP Radiation Protection l
RSGSF Retired Steam Generator Storage Facility RWP Radiation Work Permit SG Steam Generator SGRP Steam Generator Replacement Project TIG Gas Tungsten Arc TLD Temporary Lifting Device VN Variation Notice
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Enclosure
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